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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to explore the prospects for small and medium enterprise (SME) development 
using inter-finn linkages between large and small finns in Kenya A wide range of strategies has 
been adopted already for the development of small enterprises globally, but limited use appears to 
have been made, outside Japan, of inter-finn linkages as a specific strategy. Despite the recent 
global movement towards inter-finn relationships as a strategy for achieving efficiency through the 
down-sizing of large finns, externalisation of activities, and adoption of lean production 
techniques, no attempt appears to have been made to use the strategy for SME development, 
possibly because little is known about how inter-finn linkages between large and small .finns are 
fonned . This thesis aims to con1ribute to the development of this understanding by using an 
inductive, qualitative research approach to explore the fuctors influencing the sourcing strategies of 
large finns in Kenya, to detennine whether these have some potential for SME development both 
in the country and more generally. The study focuses on the Kenyan vehicle assembly industry 
and examines, through in-depth case studies, the sourcing activities of three vehicle assembly 
plants and four franchise holders. 
Overnll, the research lends support to the argument that for various reasons largely related to 
m.arlcet failure, and a non-conducive business environment, large firms in Kenya's motor vehicle 
industIy are reluctant to outsource voluntarily from local small finns, and that when they do, 
relations appear to be arms-length and adversarial. The research also reveals that in the Kenyan 
environment, contrary to the arguments of transaction cost theory, outsourcing decisions are 
predicated on the need to comply with compulsory regulations in order to gain access to resources 
and m.arlcets, rather -than primarily on cost minimisation. Consequently, strategies which assure 
access to resources such as foreign exchange and impo.rt licenses were found to override purely 
efficiency considerations. 
The findings imply that although there are some prospects for SME development using this 
approach, the selection of small enterprises as suppliers by managers of large firms is limited by 
large firms' perceptions of the suitability of such suppliers, and that if SME development is to take 
place through such linkages, strategies whiCh either change the image of small suppliers, or 
improve the attitudes oflarge buyers have to be adopted. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
This study a.ixru; to explore the prospects for SME development through linkages between large 
and small firms in a developing country, Kenya Since the ILO Mission (1972) to Kenya on 
employment, the infonnal and small enterprise (SSE) sectors have received considerable attention 
as potential job generators, and vehicles for economic regeneration (GOK, 1986). Yet, the 
strategies adopted for the promotion of these sectors to date have focused on the development of 
institutions and programmes which promote them separately rather than as part of an industrial 
system which recognises the complementarity of various sizes of firms in an industry. 
Consequently, their contribution to employment or to national output in Kenya has remained small 
(World Bank, 1987). 
The genesis of this study is the desire to develop an approach for linking various sizes of firms in 
industry, ostensibly, to achieve the advantages of a size distribution of industry reported elsewhere 
(Watanabe, 1983). Stimulated by the flexible specialisation paradigm, and its implications for 
work organisation, and pressured by prevailing economic conditions, current international thinking 
about work organisation supports such a strategy. Further, the dominance of large firms, which 
have continued to condition the social and institutional structure in developing countries, could be 
addressed by encouraging collaborative or competitive linkages between large and small firms. 
Yet, little research exists which eJl..'plicitly explains how large firms can be encouraged and used to 
develop such linkages. This study aims to address this broad question. 
1.2 OVERVIEW 
Considerable research highlights the importance of SMEs in industrial development (Watanabe, 
1971. 1972; Sengenberger et al ., 1987), particularly in manufacturing (Watanabe, 1971, 1972; 
Sengenberger and Loveman, 1987; Rothwell, 1989), their implications for regional development 
(Storey and Johnson, 1987; Keeble and Wever, 1986; Shutt and Whittington, 1986), and their role 
in the export performance of industries (Minato, 1992). Further, various researchers have 
suggested their importance to large firms, exploring their role in technology generation and 
transfer in collaboration with, and providing services to large finns (Rothwell, 1989; Rothwell and 
Zegveld, 1982), providing supply and distribution networks (Becattini, 1990; Watanabe, 1972; 
Sato, 1989; Brusco, 1986; Bade, 1986), or services (Beccatini, 1990). Apparent in these arguments 
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is the premise that small finns can, and do provide synergy within an industrial system, and that 
the viability of that system depends, to a large extent, on a size distribution of production between 
large and small finns . Arguably, in developing countries, SMEs also play the role of redistributing 
resources by penetrating resource control netwOIXs formerly concentrated in the hands of a few 
people (De Soto, 1989), in addition to increased competition introduced into hitherto highly 
concentrated industries. The wider implication of this is a possible redistribution of wealth as 
fonnerly exclusive ownership is gradually opened up to more people in the society. This study 
views SMEs as having this more socio-political role of dispersing excessive centralisation of 
resources control, possibly leading to their redistribution. 
Despite this importance of the complementarity of SMEs to other finns in the industrial structure, 
and also as demonstrated in the Japanese economy (Watanabe, 1971 ; 1972; Friedmann, 1988), 
western and developing countries' approaches to their promotion have hitherto been limited to 
developing assistance institutions and programmes aimed at assisting SMEs; development of the 
policy environment in which SMEs operate; and encouragement of the growth of the SMEs 
themselves (Gibb, 1993). Limited use has been made of inter-finn linkages as a specific strategy 
for SME development, despite widespread acknowledgement of the success of Japanese 
manufacturing being largely attributed to a deliberate strategy to encourage complementarity 
between the various sizes of finns in industries and the Italian experience where SMEs have had 
significant contributions in industrial development alongside, and inspite ot: large finns (Weiss, 
1988). A linkage strategy is based on inter-finn relationships which emanate from contractual and 
collaborative relationships, yet this phenomenon is neither developed nor understood in many 
economles. 
It is important to define, at this juncture, the concept of inter-finn linkages as used in this study. In 
th~ context and scope of this study, this means any fonn of relationship between different finns, in 
particular, between large and small firms . This study does not limit the discussion to sub-
contracting relationships although these are recognised as the most frequently used and 
documented fonns of inter-finn linkages, since the potential for other relationships such as joint 
ventures, licensing and franchising exist. 
Why Q linkage strQtegy? - The main rationale for a linkage strategy for small enterprise 
development as adopted by this study, lies in the broader logic of shifting production from large to 
small industries, requiring large firms to externalise production activities to small finns as 
suggested by the 'flexible specialisation' paradigm. Inspite of the controversies surrounding its 
practical applications, this paradigm emphasises some concepts which provide a broad framework. 
within which to analyse size related production distribution in industry: flexible work organisation, 
extemalinput and process sOUICing, clustering and networking of suppliers, market segmentation 
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and vertical disintegration of enterprises (Best, 1990; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 1982). Since 
the seminal wolk by Piore and Sabel in 1984, world thinking has shifted from mass production to 
'flexible' founs of production where economies of scope are argued to be more important than 
economies of scale as the importance of fixed costs declines. At the same time, current 
management theory in the west argues that more flexible systems are required for the increased 
volatility in demand, and increased customisation of goods and services, and hence a movement 
away from Fordist modes of production. In some cases such as in developing country contexts, 
however, it is the small and fragmented internal marl<.ets which make the paradigm appealing by 
questioning the relevance of the principles and philosophy of mass production in environments 
where domestic marl<.ets are small and fragmented and prospects for export are limited. While the 
debate about the appropriateness of large versus small founs of production continues (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984; Weiss, 1988), European and American management specialists have gone on to 
counsel large finn disaggregation and adoption of flexible production and labour organisation 
(Kanter, 1989; Peters, 1987; Drucker, 1985) as strategies of competitive advantage. Although the 
effects of these measures and their wider implications have not been tested, it appears that finns 
are fragmenting more (pettigrew, 1985). 
At this juncture, it is important to emphasise that although the themes of1ean production', 'flexible 
production', and 'post-fordism' have separate identities and emphasise differring underlying 
concepts, they cover the common phenomenon of finn de-integration and the use of inter-finn 
linkages as a mechanism for supplier chain management. Hence, it is the 'externalisation' logic 
which interests this study. Consequently, in ensuing discussions in subsequent chapters about 
these themes, it is the linkage variant of flexible production, involving vertical links between large 
and small finns, which is considered, rather than the small finn collaboration variant described b y 
authors such as Brusco (1986). 
These fragmentation decisions and the concomitant outsourcing activities stimulate some 
fundamental questions. (i) what factors influence the finn's decision to externalise its activities to 
others outside the firm; (ii) what factors influence the firm's decisions about who to externalise 
these activities to; and (iii) the nature of the relationship with such outside suppliers should the 
finn decide to externalise, which, in turn, defines the kind of marl<.ets to be used subsequent to 
fragmentation. 
One possible explanation for the limited use of linkage strategies for SME development is, 
perhaps, the current paucity of knowledge about the requisite conditions for inter~rganisationa1 
relationships (lORs), particularly those between large and small.finns. The current knowledge is 
either too specific to particular founs of inter-finn relationships, many of them studied in the 
context oflarge public organisations, or is itself theoretically fragmentary (Oliver, 1990). Besides, 
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some of the underlying assumptions made about the reasons for some of the inter-finn 
relationships restrict the wider use of emergent theories, and hence the need for an integrated 
theory which brings together these requisite conditions. 
Why the focus on large firms? Whereas other issues are material to understanding these conditions, 
for example factors relating specifically to SMEs as suppliers or to the environment within which 
both suppliers and buyers operate, this study recognises that as an initial step towards filling this 
gap, it is expedient to explore the intrinsic behaviour of the buying finns, in this case large finns, 
since (i) given the current production organisation paradigm supporting mass production, what 
goes on in an industry is an aggregate of what goes on in key finns, usually large finns, relative to 
other finns; (ii) large firms still dominate the industrial production of most economies; and (iii) 
given existing production organisation, collaborative linkages between large and small finns are 
more likely to be initiated by large finns rather than by small finns. 
In short, the focus on large finns is based on the premise that aggregate industrial behaviour is the 
result of intrinsic coIpOrate decisions at individual finn level, particularly those decisions taken by 
large finns. Hence, such decisions are likely to detennine, to a large extent, the division of labour 
among finns, resource distribution, and interorganisational relationships in that industry. In 
addition, the development of SMEs through linkages with large finns will depend on such 
decisions taken inside large finns . Besides, Kelley and Harrison (1990) argue in their study of 
subcontracting behaviour among single plant and multi-plantfirms in the USA, that there is a size 
related hierarchy among finns, and that larger finns are more likely to instigate inter-finn 
relationships for the simple reason that they are likely to be leaders in their own industry. 
Relationships with smaller firms are likely to be instigated and 'managed', therefore, by large 
firms. 
1.3 JUSTIFICA nON OF THE STUDY 
This study is justified at two levels. The desire to contribute to the development of SMEs using an 
inter-finn linkage strategy in Kenya; and the search for an 'explanation' for inter-finn linkages 
between large and small finns . 
1.3.1 PRACTlCALJUSfIFICATION: KENYA 
The main rationale for this study lies in Kenya's search for an economic development strategy 
which can generate employment and regenerate the economy (GOK, 1984, 1986, 1989). 
Increasing attention has been focused on the infonnal and small scale sectors since the 1972 ILO 
Mission on Kenya's unemployment problem highlighted the potential of these sectors as sources of 
new jobs, technological innovation, and acquisition of management skills. In its blueprint for 
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renewed economic growth contained in Sessional Paper no. 1 of 1986, Kenya emphasised, inter 
alia, the development of its Small Enterprise Sector (SSE), as part of a broader strategy to utilise 
economic capacity, transfer ownership to indigenous Kenyans, reduce the import bil~ propel the 
development and transfer of technology, and absorb unemployed youth (GOK, 1986). However, 
this role ascribed to SMEs has not been fully realised, partly because of the inherent weakness of 
the small enterprise sector itself (World Bank, 1987; Kilby, 1987), and partly because of the 
continued dominance of lcuge finns, and its implications for the production distribution of 
industry. Currently, about 70% of Kenya's manufacturing value added is attributed to laIge finns . 
Arguably therefore, in Kenya, the development of the SME sector will depend on the strength (or 
weakness) of its links with lcuge finns which already condition the social and institutional 
structure, as well as the input and final marlrets in the economy, and to a laIge extent, play a key 
role in national politics and resource distribution. 
Given this dominance oflaIge finns, the inherent weaknesses of the SME sector in Kenya, and the 
premise that aggregate industrial behaviour is in fact: the result of internal corporate strategies, it is 
important to explore what goes on inside laIge finns, and the reasons and nature of their inter-
organisational relationships, particularly with small finns . h can be argued that the effectiveness of 
policies to develop SMEs would be, in part, a function of the extent to which these lcuge finns can, 
and will, link with small finns, and the requisite conditions for such linkages. In addition, the 
development of the sector in isolation from other actors in specific industries has contributed to the 
limited realisation of the potential of the complemantarity between laIge and small finns, even 
while various national development goals support such a complementarity. Consequently, the 
national strategy for SME development does not clearly define the role of this sector vis a vis the 
lcuge finn sector (GOK, 1986; 1992), undennining the potential for a more efficient size 
distribution oflabour in industrial production. 
Against this background, it becomes apparent that in order to succeed, SME development 
strategies must take into account and collaborate with lcuge finns as suppliers or partners, hence 
the proposal for a linkage strategy. The study is premised, therefore, on two gaps. First, in addition 
to the deficiency in the volume and quality ofSMEs in Kenya's industrial structure, links between 
laIge and small finns are weak, principally explained by the dominance of the laIge finns sector 
and the weakness of the SME sector itself. Secondly, little is known about how to motivate lcuge 
finns to form useful linkages with small firms in developing countries in general, and Kenya in 
particular. Although specific explanations for inter-finn relationships were found in the literature, 
no integrated framewOIk was found which explains how and why lcuge finns link with small firms 
as partners or suppliers. Moreover, information about such inter-finn linkages in developing 
country contexts, if any, is limited. 
6 
Why a linkage strategy in Kenya? - Apart from the argument that industrial behaviour is an 
aggregate of corporate decisions taken in response to the task environment, particularly by huge 
finns in an industry, three other arguments provide a rationale for SME development through a 
linkage strategy in Kenya - (i) the current dominance of large finns in Kenya's economy, 
particularly their relative power over resources and mrukets, and the simultaneous weakness of the 
SME sector; (ii) an apparent mismatch between the current low internal demand for goods and 
services in Kenya, and the philosophy and practice of mass production; (iii) Kenya's 
industrialisation goals which favour disaggregation of large finns, and linkages between lcuge and 
small firms . 
(1) The first argument for a linkage strategy recognises that despite the widely acknowledged role 
of SMEs in industrial development and manufacturing, and the positive experiences of developed 
as well as developing economies, for various reasons, the SME sector in Kenya is not adequately 
developed. Consequently, the supply network supporting the lcuge enterprises sector is weak. The 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) estimated, albeit conservatively, 
that in 1985, the 560 large firms employing more than 100 people, were serviced by 720 small 
firms and 1600 Informal sector workshops (UNIDO, 1988). Even while a recent estimate shows, 
for example, that there were about 350,000 small workshops and service businesses in Kenya by 
1990, they still accounted for 22% of value added in manufacturing. This paucity of modem small 
scale manufacturing establishments has been blamed by the World Bank for ''the major weakness 
of Kenya's industrial development" (World Bank, 1987:210). While acknowledging this paucity, 
and recognising that the SME sector is likely to improve economic performance, the strategies 
adopted by the government to achieve it have been delayed, weak and uncoordinated. Further, 
government macro-economic policies have continued to support large finns at the expense of 
small finns (Coughlin, 1988; Kaplinsky, 1978; Langdon, 1978; Swainson, 1980). Hence, lcuge 
firms in Kenya have continued to dominate the business environment, erecting barriers to entry 
through the control of resources and mrukets (Nyong'o, 1988; Ikiara, 1988; Coughlin, 1991), 
contributing further to the weakening of the SME sector. Hence, in an environment such as the one 
prevailing in Kenya, where large firms already dominate the economy, the development of SMEs 
largely depends on whether the large finns will 'allow' small firms to develop. This implies a 
major shift in Kenya's political economy, with major power shifts in the ownership and control of 
resources, not only between large and small, but also between foreign and indigenous Kenyan 
capital. To date, little or no linkage between large and small firms has been deliberately used or 
encouraged in planning national production organisation, and few government initiatives exist 
which encourage the use of such linkages. 
One possible explanation for the scenario described above is the lack of understanding by 
government policy makers, and large and small firms themselves, of the role and implications of a 
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size distribution of industIy where small finns play a supportive role to large finns . No empirical 
wOIk exists on linkages between large and small finns, or on their combined role as part of a 
productive system in Kenya Hence, ambiguity surrounds the advantages of the use of such 
linkages, probably accounting for the low levels of linkage between large and small finns (GOK, 
1986). Another possible explanation for low levels of linkages is the traditionally adversarial 
relationship between large and small finns, partly caused by the initial role assigned by the 
government to small firms soon after independence - as a vehicle for Kenyanisation of the 
economy (GOK, 1965), and the anticipation that such action would lead to the acquisition of 
productive resources by indigenous Kenyans. Even when current conditions in the business 
environment, and the experiences of other countries, suggest collaboration between the two 
sectors, there is little evidence of inter-finn relationships between large and small firms in Kenya 
This study intends to explore some of the underlying causes of this situation. 
Underlying this scenario is a possible perceived threat to the power position of large finns implicit 
in disaggregation and/or collaboration with small finns (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Perceived 
power and control loss through these processes could be 'threatening' to a £inn, as it could imply 
structural and size adjustments, sharing of information, reliance on parties outside the control of 
the finn, and uncertainty in the tenure of relationships arising therefrom. The implied collaboration 
and partnership with small finns is itself a further potential threat to the existing power balance in 
the political economy of particular industries. Similarly, for the small £inn, the prospects of 
dealing with the 'giants' can be daunting in the fuce of a weak knowledge and technology base 
resulting from historical developments of small finns in Kenya (GOK, 1989) where SMEs have 
remained technologically and managerially weaker than their larger counteIparts. Given the 
present precarious power balance, researchers must study what: motivates large £inns to interact 
with small £inns by eJo..'jJloring how large £inns organise their production activities, and what: 
motivates such production organisation. 
(2) The second rationale for looking to large firms for small entexprise development lies in the 
logic of 'flexible specialisation' and its implications for work distribution within industries. The 
logic for externalisation of activities which this paradigm offers, by emphasising flexible work 
organisation, external input and process sourcing, clustering and networking of suppliers, market 
segmentation and vertical disintegration of entexpri.ses (Best, 1990; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 
1982), potentially offers Kenya's industrialisation process the rationale to move away from 
predominately mass production organisation. One immediate reason which makes this paradigm 
appealing to developing countries is the "apparent mismatch between the small (mtemal) markets 
of developing countries and the philosophy and/or practice of mass production" (Schmitz, 
1990:266). Its advantage is therefore the possibility of small batch production of differentiated 
products targeted at highly fragmented markets. Most of Kenya's markets are small and 
8 
fragmented (see, for example, Masai (1991) on the vehicle assembly industry in Kenya), and are 
further constrnined by the low purchasing power of individuals (GOK, 1986). In addition, 
competition in international marlcets and the lack of competitiveness of Kenyan goods and services 
limits the prospects of exploiting export marlcets. This scenario questions the logic and suitability 
of the mass production systems in developing economies such as Kenya, particularly when 
evidence indicates that other economies are seeking industrial competitiveness by moving away 
from predominantly mass production to 'de-scaled' production systems (piore and Sabel, 1984; 
Kaplinksy, 1988). 
Additionally, disaggregation and fragmentation of large finns has become a common competitive 
strategy by large firms in the developed world, as finns seek flexibility and adaptability in the face 
of volatile business environments (pralahad and Hamel, 1990). Kenya is progressively acquiring 
demand pattems and business environments similar to those prevailing in developed countries, and 
its firms are likely to respond, therefore, to these pressures by reflecting this international standard 
of large firm disaggregation and decentralisation of w01k through various externalisation 
strategies. Kaplinksy (1993) reports in his work on the implementation of J1T in developing 
countries, thatthe adoption of this production system has been low and slow due to the 'custom' of 
mass production regimes, largely owing to the continued protection of many industries which have 
hitherto not had incentives to adopt competitive production techniques. Moreover, as developing 
countries open up their markets in response to Structural Adjustment Programmes, finns which 
have hitherto been protected 'will have to face external competition, and will necessarily have to 
adopt production systems and techniques which match those of competitors. Kaplinsky and 
Posthuma (1993), in a Zimbabwean study, report that those firms implementing J1T strategies 
were specifically motivated by the threat from this external competition. However, this is likely to 
be contingent upon the assurance that these large firms can sti.ll directly control their resources and 
markets. For example, the Transnational Corporations (INCs), which have spearheaded industrial 
development in developing countries need to be assured that new techniques and programmes 
preserve their markets. 
(3) The third rationale for the linkage strategy in Kenya postulates that its industrialisation goals 
and strategies articulated by the government, which favour a division of labour between various 
finn sizes, demand and support disaggregation of large units of production, and/or linkages 
between large and small finns . 
The Kenya Government's plan to restructure the ownership of industry motivates most of its 
development strategies, recognising that this is ''the only way through which nationals will 
graduate into the competitive system where they can participate on an equal footing with non-
Kenyans" (GOK, 1989:153). While the ownership structure of Kenyan industry continues to be 
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foreign~ital heavy (Vaitsos, 1991), and the emergence of small and medium sized African 
industrialists in Kenya slow (Kaplinksy, 1982:209-11), this goal cannot be easily achieved. The 
government sees restructuring as largely possible through joint ventures and partnerships between 
large foreign firms and small locally owned finns, among other strategies (GOK, 1989). This 
strategy is particularly appealing for technology development and transfer. Largely due to a weak 
indigenous technological base, much of the technology cunently used in Kenya has come to the 
country from the west via Multinational CotpOrations (MNCs) and other foreign firms, whose 
earlier activities concentrated on domestic processing, packaging of finished goods (Leys, 1975) 
and assembly of knocked down components. As a result, Kenyan industrialisation has not 
benefited from a growing complexity of products and/or markets. The government envisages that 
through linkages between large and smaller local finns, technology transfer can take place. 
As part of this strategy to restructure the ownership of industry, and open up markets to increased 
competition, the government envisages a programme of reduction of monopolies and industrial 
concentration through the enforcement of The Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price 
Control Act (1988). Large finns predate Kenyan independence in 1963, when MNCs and trading 
companies were used by the colonial government as quasi-political presences in the colonies. 
Later, firms which located in Kenya soon after independence perceived the need to control 
resources in the uncertain business environment inherent in developing economies at the time, and 
responded by building capacity and integrating vertically. They saw size and vertical integration as 
adequately offsetting the premium paid by holding excess capacity. This trend has continued, with 
large finns erecting entry barriers based on economies of scale and resource and distribution 
channel control. The government, therefore, saw the control of vertical integration as a means of 
preventing such excessive integration, and encouraging subsequent absorption of excess capacity 
via inter-firrn relationships such as subcontracting arrangements, joint ventures and partnerships. 
Although there is little empirical evidence indicating the impact of this strategy, casual observation 
and anecdotal evidence suggest that due to factors such as poor design and policing mechanisms, 
firms have continued to integrate. On a different level, the current privatisation drive, aimed at 
reducing the operations of state enterprise, and increasing the efficiency of public organisations as 
part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes prescribed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), has made it necessary to re-orient from large to small organisations. The government views 
this as one opportunity for indigenous Kenyans to enter into the mainstream of industrial 
development through stockholding or trade links with privatised organisations (GOK, 1989). 
1.3.2 THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION: INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIP FORMATION 
To address the research question, literature on inter-firm relationship formation has been reviewed. 
Development of SMEs through linkages with large firms is a function of the large firms' 
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motivation and propensity to fonn linkages of any kind, particularly those involving small finns. 
In turn., this is a function of the large finns' motivation and propensity to outsource some or most 
of its requirements - either externalising activities already peIfonned in-house, or entering into 
contractual and partnership relationships for new requirements. Evidently, it is the procuring firm 
that is the focus of activity. Secondly, the generic decision is the make-or-buy decision, which is 
often affected by a firm's ability to provide requirements using existing resources; and the 
availability of more 'efficient' suppliers in the marlcet. Each decision is, therefore, a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for linkage fonnation. It can be expected that when a firm makes a 
decision to outsource any requirements, it simultaneously makes decisions about its structure, size 
and relationships with suppliers. On the other hand, less rational economic motivations can be 
found. For example, political factors, necessity to comply with legislation, and others. This study 
simultaneously explores the outsourcing, organisational development and collaborative of 
competitive linkage fonnation processes. This part of the literature is ellaborated in chapter three. 
1.4 AIMS AND OBJECfIVES 
Against this background, the study aims to investigate, therefore, the motivations behind the 
existing production organisation of large finns in Kenya's motor vehicle industry, and the potential 
for small enterprise development through linkages with such large finns . The basis of this 
objective is the argwnent that externalisation of production by large finns can create an 
environment where small finns can develop, and that this is detennined by the extent to which 
large finns make decisions to internct with such small finns . This objective was guided by the 
thesis that like other developing countries where large finns constitute a significant proportion of 
the industrial structure, large finns in Kenya are reluctant to fonn collaborative linkages with small 
finns.In all probability, this reluctance is largely because, in addition to the general marlcet failure 
in most input marlcets in these countries, local small suppliers are perceived by buyers to be 'weak' 
and unable to meet the quality and delivery standards they demand. To help address this thesis, the 
study empirically e>.:plores why and how such large firms fonn inter-firm relationships, and 
whether this can lead to relationships with small finns as suppliers or partners. This latter objective 
involves the examination of the factors influencing inter-firm collaborative and competitive 
linkages in the Kenyan context. 
1.5 MEmODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Two reasons guided the methodology preference. First, the paucity of hypotheses about the 
motivations of inter-finn linkage behaviour, particularly in a developing country setting, made it 
necessary to generate infunnation inductively. Secondly, due to time and resource pressures, it was 
necessary to limit the scope of the study. 
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The case study approach (which emphasises theory generation rather than theory testing) became 
appealing in exploring the transaction behaviour patterns of large fums and their use of inter-fum 
linkages. The case studies used are intended to reveal the hypotheses underlying the transaction 
(sourcing) behaviour of large firms in the Kenyan vehicle assembly industry. By first profiling the 
activities of the three motor vehicle assemblers and four of the twelve vehicle franchise holders in 
Kenya, it was possible to reveal the prevailing production organisation and transaction behaviour 
of the finns. 'Franchise holders' are those finns who contract the assemblers to assemble vehicles 
imported in the form of CKDs. It was considered prudent to use all of the three assemblers and 
their 'contractors', and little attempt was made to sample them, given the small number of cases in 
the population of interest. A more detailed discussion of the 'selection' process can be found in 
chapter six. Having identified the cases of interest, the Purchasing and/or the Materials Handling 
Officer(s) of each finn were interviewed to determine the nature and extent of sourcing behaviour. 
The firms' archival sources were also used to examine past behaviour, and to analyse changes in 
structure and size. 
In the second phase, in-depth analyses of the motivations oflarge firms transaction behaviour were 
investigated using issues derived from the literature. The CEO or the Company Secretary was 
interviewed about the firm's strategic intentions, decisions, and motivations. Other members of the 
organisation were consulted periodically to obtain specific details of various activities and 
decisions. 
Kenya's Motor VehideAssembly Industry 
To focus the study, a case study approach has been adopted. The vehicle assembly industry in 
Kenya was selected because of the investigators familiarity with that country. Secondly, like many 
developing countries, Kenya exhibits typical characteristics suitable for flexible specialisation 
approaches (Schmitz, 1990), namely, a small and fragmented internal market for most 
manufactures; a poor supplier base for many products and services; and volatile demand structures 
in many industries. In addition, the country has recently begun the process of fonnerly developing 
subcontracting relationships between large and small businesses, giving priority to the Kenyan 
motor vehicle industry. The selection of the motor vehicle industry as a case study, therefore, 
provides an opportunity to explore the linkage strategy using some corresponding theory 
developed in other parts of the world, about relationships between large finns as buyers and small 
finns as suppliers or partners. It is hoped the at the findings of this research will inform strategies 
in other industries in Kenya, and other developing countries. 
The general empirical approach to this study is sub-sectoral. Boomgard et al . (1992) argue that a 
sub-sector approach to SME development helps focus attention on the evolution of SMEs and 
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other finns by examining the characteristics of alternative competing channels, and the nature of 
the dynamic forces at work within and between channels. Gamser (1992), while supporting this 
approach for 8ME development, posits that sub-sector analysis uses schematic maps which 
summarise the economic relationships between small enterprises and other actors in the system, 
emphasising the vertical linkages, co-ordination between small finns and other actors, and the 
competition between these various actors. Hence, the motor vehicle industry was selected as the 
case sub-sector, because of the extensive collaborative and competitive linkages documented in 
this sector enabling useful comparisons with, development in other societies. 
Three motor vehicle assemblers and four franchise holders have been used to explore the prospects 
for 8ME development through linkages with large finns . In the Kenyan motor vehicle assembly 
industry, only a few firms control the industry; there is a poor supplier base, offering only poor 
quality parts and services; there is a low and fragmented demand for vehicles; assemblers and 
importers have erected barriers to entry; because of an affiliation to principal manufacturers 
abroad, their corporate strategy demands quality and delivery standards which cannot be met by 
local small finns; and the technological requirements are constantly changing, and are expensive 
(Masai, 1991). Therefore, because of the nature of this task environment, firms in the Kenyan 
motor vehicle assembly industry are expected to: 
(i) pursue soureing strategies which primarily assure them of access to resources, rather than 
purely efficiency and effectiveness objectives. On the other hand, it is expected that they will 
pursue various and multiple goals depending on their particular task environment regarding 
particular resources and particular markets. 
(ii) try to reduce uncertainty in their environment by internalising most activities unless they can 
control their suppliers, buyers, or technological changes. Consequently, they will try to 
increase their control over their business and competitive environments through negotiation, 
compliance, manipulation, or collaboration with the various pressure constituencies, 
particularly their suppliers and the government . 
(iii) For various reasons, mainly associated with market failure, they are likely to prefer suppliers 
other than local small finns. 
Whereas these are not stated hypotheses to be tested in the study, they help to guide and focus it. 
The results of the research have been addressed using descriptive and analytical approaches 
commonly used in qualitative studies such as that used. 
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1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
'Ibis thesis is presented in nine chapters. In this first chapter, a broad overview of the study 
outlines the background of the thesis, and elaborates on the pertinent issues to be addressed. In 
chapter two, the logic for small enterprises is presented. 'Ibis chapter highlights the role of SMEs 
in development, and explores the contribution of a linkage strategy between large and small firms 
to SME development. Chapter three reviews pertinent literature which might explain laIge finn -
small finn linkages. 'Ibis literature provides a loose frame within which to explore inter-finn 
relations between large and small firms . It explores the bases of inter-finn linkage fonnation, 
factors influencing a finn's sourcing behaviour, its structure and size, and its interorganisational 
relationships. Chapter four discusses some of the pertinent literature on inter-finn linkages in the 
motor vehicle industIy. Chapter five reviews Kenya as the contextual setting of the study. This 
chapter suggests that the search for an SME development strategy in Kenya has been frustrated by 
the dominance of laIge finns and a simultaneous weakness of SMEs, and suggests that a strategy 
which links laIge and small finns is expedient. 
Chapter six provides an account of the research design used, the case studies selected for the study, 
and also describes the research process. In chapter seven the results and findings of the three case 
studies present the large firms' profiles, outlining their transaction patterns, and discussing the 
motives behind a finn's Interorganisational Relations. In chapter eight, the results are analysed and 
discussed, and finally, chapter nine presents the conclusions of the study, suggesting their 
implications for policy, inter-finn relationships, outsourcing, and collaborative "linkages. It also 
makes some recommendations for future action, and highlights the limitations of the study and 
suggests directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A RATIONALE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE 
(SME)I DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
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The overall aim of this study is to contribute to the search for a strategy which could ameliorate the 
present poor economic perfonnance in developing countries through a small enterprise 
development strategy. This research has suggested that one hitherto unexplored approach is the 
development of small enterprises through linkages with large finns . But why small enterprises? 
Since the Bolton Report (1971) in the VI<, the Birch study (1979) in the USA, and Piore and 
Sable's book (I984) in the USA, western economies have shown considerable interest in small 
finns as job generators, and in the latter case, as an alternative production organisation paradigm to 
mass production frequently blamed for poor economic perfonnance. In Japan., and the South East 
Asian countries, small enterprises are seen as important in contributing to the general efficiency of 
industry. In developing countries, since the ILO Mission to Kenya (1972) small enterprises, 
particularly those in the infonnal sector, have been viewed as employment generators as well as 
agents of indigenisation of industry. Despite this variety of emphases, it remains evident that in 
almost all economies, small enterprises are considered important in one way or another. While 
evidence from European countries disputes their role as job generators, it acknowledges the 
possibility of an alternative explanation for their continued existence in almost all economies. The 
folIo·wing discussion examines some of the 'explanations' offered in the literature for the persistent 
existence of small finns. 
The chapter argues that the importance of SMEs lies, not in their role as ameli orator of the 
symptoms of poor economic perfonnance, or as job generators, but as a logic which questions the 
Validity of the choices regarding technology and production organisation in a given business 
I . In this research, this refers to definitions offered in various contexts, including enterprises employing 11-
100 people (the case in many developing COWltries) and those employing upto 300 people such. as in the 
Japanese case. In the particular case of Kenya, this includes those enterprises employing 11-100 people. 
This strategy has been adopted to avoid a protracted discussion on cut-<>ff points for various sizes as this 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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environment, and its implications for appropriate finn size and industry linkages. The internal 
logic of this study has been motivated by Schumacher's (1973) and Piore and Sabel's (1984) 
arguments regarding appropriate finn size (not small size per se), and their separate 
recommendations for nations to return to those technologies and sizes of £inns which provide 
maximum well being for a country's citizens, striking a balance between these various sizes rather 
than exclusively emphasising one category: 
Today, we suffer fiom an almost universal idolatry of giantism. It is therefore necessary 
to insist on the virtues of smallness - where this applies. (If there were a prevailing 
idolatry of smallness, irrespective of subject or purpose, one would have to try and 
exercise influence in the opposite direction.) 
The question of scale might be put another way: what is needed in all these matters is to 
discriminate, to get things sorted out. For every activity, there is a certain appropriate 
scale ...... (Schumacher, 1973:54) 
Re-thinking the philosophy and practice of mass production has both economic and political 
implications, particularly in developing countries where internal markets remain small and 
prospects for exporting are few, while the cost of large investments is likely to be high. Having 
inherited a Fordist paradigm of production fiom the west, whose main tenet is the logic of 
economies of scale, many of these countries have had little opportunity to take stock of the 
political and socio~conomic implications of the large firms which have been created by 
embracing this paradigm, and their implications for dependency on foreign capital and western 
technology and inputs. In many developing countries, the role of SMEs seems to be that of a 
socio-political vehicle for developing an indigenous business class (Soon, 1983; Harper, 1984); 
utilising local resources and technologies as a vehicle of reducing technological and economic 
dependency (Harper, 1984); and improving the purchasing power of its internal markets through 
employment generation and resource re-distribution (Eg. GOK, 1986; Soon, 1983). Arguably, by 
developing SMEs, the apparent industrial dishannony emanating fiom the use of paradigms of 
mass production would be addressed, and technology choices hannonised with uational 
development needs and objectives (Schmitz, 1990). 
As many countries face economic decline, prolonged recession, high levels of unemployment and 
poor standards of living, 5MB development has increasingly gained importance as a strategy 
which could directly or indirectly ameliorate these conditions. Recent evidence suggests that 
SMEs have taken a variety of roles in these economies, exhibiting different levels of importance at 
different stages of development (Little, 1987), or in different industries. Considerable emphasis 
has been placed on the role of SMEs as engines of general economic development through new 
firm fonnation, contribution to value added or productivity of industries (Watanabe, 1972; 
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Friedman, 1988), or as an employment generator (Birch, 1979; Sengenberger and Loveman, 
1987). In addition, while some observers have placed emphasis on the role of the SME sector in 
the generation, development and diffusion of technology to other finns and to consumers 
(Rothwell, 1989; Rothwell and Zegveld, 1982; Rothwell and Beesely, 1988), others have 
emphasised their importance in regional development and spatial reorganisation (Keeble and 
Wever, 1986; Storey, 1982; Storey and Johnson, 1987), or their social reorganisation capacity as 
income providers for large populations (GOK, 1986; Soon, 1983). 
Evidently, varying emphases have been placed on SME development depending on their perceived 
importance, and the cultmal perspective of particular countries. For Example, while Japan's 
industrialisation policies have traditionally given a central role to SMEs (Friedman, 1988), many 
developing countries have marginalised the sector, often relegating it to the peripheries of 
mainstream production systems, or designating it 'informal' (De Soto, 1989; Neck, 1977). 
Additionally, in some examples such as the US, SMEs are considered to be the cornerstone of a 
free market economy where there are few baniers to entry into business. Thus, in this case, socio-
political support for SMEs has always been normal practice (Bannock,I981). In developing 
countries, this marginalisation of the SME sector could be blamed on, inter alia, the lack of data 
which highlights the contribution of the sector to socio-economic development, and policy makers' 
lack of foresight about its importance. More recently, however, as governments learn from the 
experiences of some industrialised countries, evidence suggests there is increasing awareness of 
the value of a size distribution of industry to the general buoyancy of an economy, with small 
firms playing an increasingly more important role in socio-economic development (Eg. GOK, 
1986; 1989; Malaysia, 1988). 
The presence of SMEs in both industrialised and industrialising economies also questions the 
argument that the presence of SMEs should be seen in the context of the stage of development of a 
country - that the more industrialised a country, the lower the presence of SMEs (Little, 1987). 
Yet, many industrialised countries have moved towards the trend of smaller average establishment 
size, and have a high proportion of their production and employment in SMEs, and related SME 
activity. For example, in Japan, 20% of manufacturing is in establishments employing 9 or fewer 
people, and 38% in those employing 9-99 people (Friedman, 1988). In addition, 80% of the 49 
million people employed in Japan in 1986 were working in small businesses (Sato, 1989). Other 
variants to this argument, suggest that the importance of SMEs varies from industry to industry 
according to the maturity of such an industry (Rothwell, 1989). According to this theory, less 
mature industries will be populated predominantly by small firms, while the mature ones in the 
same economy will be populated by larger finns. The cases of the electronics industries in Japan, 
Europe and America are considered mature industries, yet these have a balance of small and large 
firms. Hence, the industry maturity argument does not provide a complete explanation for the 
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resilience of small firms, particularly in developing countries where most industries are relatively 
immature, and yet are dominated by large firms. 
The following sections discuss some of the documented rationales for SME development in 
developing and developed economies. 
2.2 THE ROLE OF SMES 
While the role of SMEs in developed economies focuses on their economic contribution, in 
industrialising economies the focus is on their socio-political role. 
2.2.1 THE ROLE OF SMEs IN INDuSTRIALISED ECONOMIES 
The focus of SME development in industrialised countries appears to have been specifically 
geared towards economic regeneration and employment creation. However, in addition to this 
intended role, various studies have shown other roles which the sector plays in economic 
development. The following are some of the major rationales which have been advanced for the 
development of SMEs in the industrialised countries of Europe, America, and Japan. Apart from 
providing the context within which entrepreneurship has been studied, SMEs have been said to 
make economic contributions to national output as generators of new growth; and employment; 
technological innovation, adoption and diffusion of innovations, and their impact in 
industrialisation; their contribution in regional development, and the re4stribution of resources in 
deprived areas. As mentioned already, SMEs mean various things to various groups, thus their net 
value to development is likely to be controversial. However, even where their contribution to 
economic development has been questioned, as in the case of their employment creation ability, 
the continued interest in the sector suggests other underlying social and economic benefits. The 
following sections briefly discuss these rationales. 
SMEs in New Growth and Contribution to Output 
Pressured by the urgency to improve economic perfOImance and to generate employment, much of 
the political and intellectual interest in the value of SMEs to economic development has been in 
terms of their contribution to new growth, value added or their contribution to industrial 
productivity. In the UK, for example, the Bolton Commission envisaged SMEs as the answer to a 
depressed economy and to cmbing unemployment (Bolton, 1971). Since this report, various 
studies have shown that whereas small firms can be traced in national industrial statistics, their 
actual contribution to employment, output or value added is small compared to that contributed by 
large finns . Much of this analysis is based on the measurement of the contribution of the sector as 
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an isolated entity, hence, its reported contribution to output, employment or value added, has not 
been encouraging. 
Conversely, in Japan, where the value of SMEs has always been measured in tenns of inter-finn 
productivity rather than by its absolute contribution to the economy as a separate sector (Minato, 
1992; Sato, 1989), SMEs are regarded more positively. More specifically, Watanabe (1972) rugues 
that the contribution of SMEs to national output cannot be sufficiently assessed purely 
quantitatively, but by their linkages with high volume large finns - through subcontracting 
activities. Thus, he concludes, the efficient use of small enteIprises in Japan has been closely 
linked to subcontracting. In 1966, 310,000 enteIprises (53.6% of all medium and small enteIprises 
in Japanese manufacturing) were subcontractors, and they employed 3.6 million workers, more 
than one quarter of the total manufacturing labour force . 
SMEs in Employment Creation 
Although policies and strategies had already been fonnulated for the development of SMEs in 
many countries before this report, Birch's (1979) seminal study of employment :in the 
manufacturing and private sector service establishments in the United States was, perhaps, the 
impetus for interest in SMEs as a vehicle for job generation. The revelation that about 82%2 of all 
new jobs created, and 66% of the net increase in employment in the USA between 1969 and 1976 
were in small finns, led to a resurgence of interest in SMEs in the United States and also in other 
economies throughout the world. These results have been controversial. Others retesting the 
America data (Eg. Evans, 1987) found different results, while the UK data (Gallager and Stewart, 
1984; Doyle and Gallagher, 1987; Storey and Johnson (1987), confinned previous results, but 
claimed that the actual rate stated by Birch was overestimated. Gallager, Daly and Thomason 
(l990) in more recent work, also concluded that almost all of the new job growth in the UK 
between 1985 and 1987 was in businesses employing fewer than 20 people. Some studies have 
disputed the argument that SMEs have a capacity to generate employment. Gould and Keeble 
(1984) note that in the East Anglia region (UK), new independent manufacturing finns set up 
between 1971 and 1981, and surviving upto 1981 employed, on average, 12 workers each, and 
accounted for 4.7% of total 1981 regional manufacturing employment. 
In the UK, this criticism of the 'over-glorification' of the SME sector suggests that rather than 
generating entirely new employment opportunities, the sector has simply abSo.rbed employment 
2 . Figures by Amington and Odle (1982) which use the same data revealed that 39% in 1979-1980 period 
and 53% in the 1975-1982 period. In addition, Fothergi11 and Gudgin (1979) repeated this study in the 
UK but reported that these figures were overestimated. 
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being shed by the large firms as they rationalise their activities (Sengenberger and Loveman, 
1987), and that there are no prospects for new employment generation in the short run (Keeble and 
Wever 1986). 
Although these negative judgements against SMEs seem harsh, their value should be seen in their 
capacity to re-orient the analysis of the SME sector. For example, it can be aIgUed that it is pemaps 
the absorptive capacity, manifest in the absorption of labour shed by large firms during 
recessioruuy periods, that has contributed to the resilience of the SME sector in some industrialised 
economies; or that the SME sector can be important in total industry efficiency, even when actual 
contribution to employment is limited. 
SMEs in Productivity and Return on Investment 
Productivity and profitability based arguments for SME development (Pratten, 1991) adopt the 
principles of trnditional economic models, suggesting that the advantage of SMEs lies in their 
lower unit cost, relative to that of the large finn. They argue that the cost saving advantage of 
SMEs results from their lower overheads and lower labour costs relative to those of the large firm, 
and that because of this, SMEs are expected to enter market niches that are too small to be 
profitable for the large firms which are sensitive to economies of scale. It further argues that 
because SMEs tend to be more labour intensive, and labour costs are currently generally lower 
than capital costs in most economies, their relative investment level is lower. Recent evidence 
indicates that this argument is no longer valid as the importance of fixed costs has decreased 
(Kleijweg and Thurik, 1991), and therefore, by adopting flexible production methods, where large 
finns can access larger and wider markets through subcontracting, they can compete in market 
niches just like the small firms. 
SMEs in Technological Innovation, Adoption and Diffusion 
Rothwell and Zegveld (1982) have argued that SMEs are important in technological innovation, as 
well as the adoption and diffusion of such technology as small finns search for cheaper ways to 
produce goods and services. Theoretically, it would be expected that because of their size, their 
limited access to resources, and their immediate objectives to survive, these finns are less likely to 
invest in R&D. However, equally likely is the possibility that in an effort to produce efficiently, 
they use technologies and processes that are innovative in their own right. Hence, SMEs have 
continued to contribute to technological innovation and diffusion. 
Basing their observation and argument on the logic of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, Castells 
(1984) and Saxenian (1985) suggest that the importance of SMEs in the technological 
advancement of newly emerging industries has become apparent, particularly in R&D activity. 
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These authors argue that owing to their owners' natwal curiosity, and the relatively small scale of 
operation of their enteIprises, SMEs are willing to try out new technologies. They argue further, 
that since the entrepreneurs personal objectives are closely associated with those of the finn, 
he/she is instrumental in finding new ways of production. This scenario explains the continuing 
interest in technology based £inns as possible regenerators of economic growth. They are not only 
capable of providing a stock. of entrepreneurs, but also a stock of new technology. 
However, Aydalot (1988) suggests that SMEs will vary in importance in different sectors, 
implying industry specific explanations for variations in the importance ofSMEs, depending on:-
(a) the technical progress in that sector. The less technologically advanced, the more 
important the SMEs and vice versa. 
(b) the technological niches available to the small enteIprises which depends on the 
homogeneity of products, the ease with which existing technologies can be adapted, and 
the flexibility of demand patterns. 
Hence, it is reasonable to expect varying emphases on the technical and technological contribution 
of SMEs in different industries. Technology-based small £inns exist in almost all industrial 
situations but will differ in the relative centrality of the role they play, many of them playing a 
complementary role to large firms through strategic partnerships and technical consultancies 
(Cooke, 1988). 
On a second level, the importance of SMEs is said to lie in their agency of adoption and diffusion 
of innovations. Rothwell and Zegveld (1982) and Rothwell (1989) propose that SMEs are used as 
agents of implementation of technologies developed by the busy R&D departments of large 
organisations which may not have the time nor the economic incentive to exploit all of their 
innovations. To extend this relationship, through activities such as technology acquisitions, the 
large finns buy back these technologies once they have been tested and 'legitimised' in the smaller 
companies (Rothwell and Beesely, 1988). These relationships are gaining importance as £inns 
collaborate to exploit technologies and marlcets. It has also been suggested that SMEs are also 
likely to be better agents of diffusion of technologies within industries. While studying finnsin the 
Paris region, Decoster and Tabaries (1986) found that personal contact rather than industrial links 
were important in the spread of innovations in industry. They went further to suggest that because 
small £inns relate more on inteIpersonallevels, innovations would be adopted and diffused at a 
faster rate, particularly in the early stages of product and process development (Rothwell and 
Zegveld, 1982). 
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Finally, it has been suggested that technologies and personnel used in the large firms are largely 
incubated in SMEs. Recent research work on technical consultancies and other fonus of 
technology-based small firms suggest that, increasingly, small firms are providing large finns with 
proven technologies, and trained personnel through technological consultancy (Jones-Evans and 
Kirby, 1992). 
SMEs in Regional Development 
The role of SMEs in regional development has been articulated mainly by geographers in tenus of 
their spatial and temporal implication for regional economic balance (Keeble and Wever, 1986; 
Storey and Johnson, 1987; Keeble, 1990). This body of literature suggests that this imbalance is 
possibly the result of historical, political, and natural factors, and the effects of the emergent 
industrial structure. Although they raise essentially socio-political questions of resource 
distribution and regional balance, these researchers use the geographical concepts of spatial 
agglomeration, and its effect on industrial location, to suggest that because inter-industry 
dependence offers markets, infrastructure and institutional support in a variety of relationships, 
finns will locate where they can find services, infrastructure and demand. Finding a deficiency in 
the services of certain regions means, according to them, that firms will not locate in such areas. 
However, this thesis has become increasingly questionable as increasing spatial separation of the 
various stages of production, conception of ideas, skilled production, and routinised production, 
give enterprises opportunities to choose production sites that are most suited to their needs. In 
addition, because of innovations in infonnation technologies (Gershuny and Miles, 1983) inter 
regional transactions are possible, particularly in industrialised countries. Therefore the 
agglomeration thesis and the concepts of 'hub' centres and 'poles'3 stand to question. 
Despite these arguments, the e:>...1ent of SME effect on regional development has vanous 
explanations. On the one hand, Aydalot (1988) has hypothesised an association between the 
structure of the local milieu with finn size in France, proposing that areas dominated by small 
finns experience fuster development and have a high finn birth rate, but those based on large 
enterprises undergo sluggish employment rates and a lower rate of new venture fonnation. Citing 
the work ofO'Farrel (1986) and llleris, (1986), he suggests further, that the establishment of small 
finns may be closely related to the number of existing finns, and that possibly associated with 
other psycho-social and economic factors, the children of business owners are more likely to 
establish businesses themselves. On the other hand, where an employee culture prevails, there is 
likely to be less competitiveness and therefore less entrepreneurial activity. Given this contextual 
role, regional SME development has been the pre-occupation of the political and intellectual 
3 . See Perroux (1970) for an account of the Growth Pole Theory. 
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promoters of the sector (Keeble and Wever, 1986). However, it is the contribution of the sector to 
general regional growth which is important. Contribution to output for regional and export 
markets; employment (Keeble, 1990); and technological progress of such regions (Rothwell and 
Beesely, 1988) have constituted the main areas of interest in this sector. 
2.2.2 THE ROLE OF SMEs IN DEVELOPING COUN1RlES 
Since the ILO mission to Kenya in 1972, SME development in developing countries has become 
an important vehicle for economic development, particularly as a vehicle for employment 
generation. Yet, despite the lessons to be learnt from the experiences of western and South East 
Asian countries, many developing countries have not developed specific SME policies. On of the 
e}>..'Planations could be the historical legacy of colonialism, and the effects of the institutions and 
structures which were used to support it. Developing countries have to examine their past 
experiences in order to formulate strategies which avoid mistakes made in the past, or those which 
attempt to ameliorate the effects of such errors. Piore and Sabel (1984) claim that as 
"The more we understand of our past and present, the more we see that it is our choices 
that shaped our history and will shape our future." (p307) 
It is precisely this realisation that has led industrialised countries to re-orient their productive 
organisation as the choice of mass production organisation has not been altogether fruitful 
(Womack et. al. , 1990). They have since begun to move towards more flexible technologies and 
fragmented productive organisation. Yet, many developing countries continue to pursue 
productive organisation paradigms currently considered to be burdensome to an economy. 
Although the role of SMEs, or Small Scale Enterprises (SSEs) as they are known in many 
developing countries, does not differ significantly from the experiences of the industrialised 
economies, they have more prominent socio-political implications in developing economies, for 
example as a vehicle for job creation. Hence, the political rather than the economic roles have been 
emphasised in such countries. The envisaged role of SMEs has been, for some countries, that of a 
political tool to achieve economic independence from the west through indigenisation of 
economies (GOK, 1965; 1986; Malaysia, 1971, 1991), while other countries see the sector as a 
tool for social re-adjustment through resource re-distribution among various regions, races and 
classes, and poverty alleviation (Malaysia, 1991). In Peru, and pet:baps many other developing 
economies, SMEs have increasingly taken the role of a vehicle for democratic change in the 
economy, primarily as a means of supplanting the elite capitalist class and transferring power to 
more people in the economy. (De Soto, 1989). 
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Yet, in many of these countries, SMEs have, until recently, been regarded as peripheral to 
mainstream production systems (the black economy). Consequently, they were not properly 
integrated into the capitalist mode of production, being regarded as residual (and labelled micro- or 
'informal') in present industrial structures, implying a kind of superiority of performance of the 
large finn, presumed to have 'efficiency' advantages. This view has been reinforced by traditional 
economic theories based on the concept of economies of scale, assuming the higher relative 
productivity of large finns. The attraction of measures such as these is their suggestion that since 
large finns tend to be more capitalised, and have a higher output per unit of capital employed, they 
are likely to have a higher productivity. However, countries which embrace this perspective fail to 
recognise (peIhaps for political rather than economic reasons) that the advantage is likely to be 
cancelled out by the higher fixed cost levels of the large finn, and the higher wages which increase 
with size either because more skilled labour is required, or higher maintenance requirements 
necessitate an increase in manpower. Therefore, the smaller firm is more likely to survive at its 
lower productivity level, mainly because of lower wage and capitalisation levels; and also because 
owners are more likely to be willing to accept lower profits. A contrary position is maintained by 
Liedholm and Mead (1987) who used a benefit-rost analysis to compare the relative efficiency of 
small and large industries in Sierra Leone and found that in all the key individual industrial groups 
examined, the social benefit-rost ratios of the small firms not only exceed one, but are also greater 
than the comparable ratios for the large-scale firms . 
The rationale for having large scale firms in the economy has also been queried in view of the 
development stages which many developing countries are at, and the demands that large scale 
production organisation makes on the socio-economic structure of the country concerned 
(Kaplinsky, 1978; Schmitz, 1990). To reinforce this criticism, Todaro (1982) cites the shortage of 
capital for large scale projects in such countries as one reason why they should not be promoted 
exclusively, adding that such projects do not lend themselves to widespread replication, rendering 
small scale projects more relevant in the generation and diffusion of appropriate technologies in 
these countries. In addition, small scale projects may be a more cost effective way of importing 
technologies into the economies of developing countries through subcontracting relationships with 
foreign and local finns which have the capacity to import technology. Further, by implementing 
technology on a small scale, and assessing its efficacy, developing countries are likely to avoid the 
expensive importation of inappropriate technologies. White (1976), Nyong'o (1988) and Coughlin 
(1988) point to the large number of failed projects in developing countries, citing the 
inappropriateness of technology as one of the prime factors contributing to this failure. Yet, large 
firms have continued to exist, and even dominate the economies of many developing countries 
(ILO, 1986). 
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The following are some docmnented roles ofSMEs (or SSEs)4 in developing countries. 
SMEs in Employment 
The greatest interest in the SME sector in developing countries has been in their envisaged ability 
to provide employment to their large populations, particularly to the poor and marginal groups, by 
providing rural and urban self-employment and, to a limited extent., wage employment (lLO, 
1986). This report indicated that in Nigeria 20%, Sierra Leone 11%, Mghanistan 16% and the 
Republic of Korea 26%, ofrural males were engaged in secondary employment in the SSE sector 
(covering very small enterprises employing 0-5 people), in order to supplement their income. In a 
different survey Liedholm and Mead (1986) report that the share of manufucturing employment of 
all finns engaging 10-49 people was 63% in Nigeria (1972); 6% in Zambia (1985); 26% in 
Thailand (1978); 25% Honduras (1979); and 12% in Kenya (1984). In Kenya, the sector employs 
between 40% and 60% of the urban labour force, and contributes between one quarter and one 
third of total urban incomes. With particular reference to Kenya, while accepting that SSEs in the 
developing countries context do not necessarily aim to maximise profit., the Kenya government 
adopts the strategy mainly to create employment for school leavers within family businesses. 
However, as can be expected, much of this employment is marginal in the sense that it is in those 
sectors with minimal value added such as retailing, and is evident in 1l11deremployment both in the 
rural and urban areas. Secondly, measurement of the true contribution of the sector to employment 
has been problematic. The accuracy of records in the sector is affected by the margjnalisation of 
small enterprises through legal restrictions which have driven them into the 'black' economy,S and 
hence, have not been registered (De Soto, 1989). Despite this initial negative attitude, many 
industrialising governments began to recognise the sector in the 1980s, and began to plan for it (Eg 
GOK, 1986).6 
4. It must be no.ted here that the tem1 Small Scale Enterprises (SSE) is used more in the developing country 
context because o.f the wide range o.f definitio.ns o.f the size o.f small and medium finns. While some 
finns are very small, o.ffering o.nly self emplo.yment prospects, o.thers are within the descriptive range o.f 
the definitio.ns adopted for fo.rmal small firms in industrialised countries - emplo.ying up to. 300 people 
(Fo.r the Japanese definitio.n see Sato., 1989). Mo.re o.ften, the upper limit fo.r support within the secto.r is 
50 emplo.yees. The support agencies use the tem1 SSEs or SMEs interchangeably, but tend to. lean 
to.wards the SSE descriptio.n. 
5. This refers to. the parnllel econo.my which has evo.lved .in many developing countries, o.ften labelled 
'illegal' by go.vernment o.fficials. In some countries such as Peru, it has been the basis o.f the info.rmal 
enterprise sector (De Soto., 1989). 
6. Kenya embarlced o.n such a programme in 1986 - The Small &aJe Enterprise Development Programme, 
as a joint venture with UNDP and ILO. The process of developing an SSE development programme 
commenced in 1987. 
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An interesting approach to employment creation is the socio-political dimension presented by 
Weiss (1988) and others, that the rationale for supporting small £inns is its socio-political role in 
maintaining social order by preventing unemployment. Small £inns act as a 'shock absorber' forthe 
modem economy - absorbing or releasing labour as the economic cycle demands (BeIger, 1980), 
which implies that the laIge scale £inns have a low absorptive capacity. Politicians have continued 
to promote the development of small finns because unemployment is 'the most serious problem 
susceptible to radicalism' and that this sector protects society from unrest and explosions (Weiss, 
1988:28). From another angle, Pizzomo (1960) is cited by Weiss as proposing that small firms are 
used to create employment as a vehicle for the management of consensus. By this is meant the 
need to cany favour with particular parts of the community, in this case, small employers and the 
wOIkers they hire. However, this thesis is not ellaborated. 
SMEs in National output and productivity 
The contribution of the SME sector to the econOmIes of developing countries is mainly 
emphasised in manufacturing. For example, ILD statistics show that in 1982, SSEs made up 95% 
of all registered enterprises in the manufacturing sector of developing countries (lLD, 1982). 
Writing about countries of South East Asia, Soon (1983) stated that in Indonesia, 99.5% of all 
manufacturing is either small or handicraft industries, while in Singapore, the population of SSEs 
is about 97% of all manufacturing £inns. The population of SSEs is not as high as this in other 
parts of the developing world. For example, in 1980, SSEs accounted for 29.6% of manufacturing 
in Brazil; while in Indonesia and Sierra Leone in 1974175 SSEs accounted for 20% and 44% of 
manufacturing respectively (lLD, 1986). 
The importance of SMEs to latge £inns in manufacturing is well documented, albeit more 
prominently about South East Asian than African countries. In his wolk, Anderson (1982) 
reported that employment expansion of latge fums attributed to the growth of small firms ranged 
between 40% and 53% for Korea, the Philippines, Twkey and Taiwan; and 67% and 70% for 
India and Columbia respectively, achieved mainly through subcontracting relationships like the 
'putting out' system, a form of su1H::ontracting. It is possible that these figures are even higher, 
since it is difficult to measure the subcontracting activity in many developing countries, owing to 
the 'informality' of the SSE sector. It is also made difficult by the lack of a clear definition of the 
full extent of the varieties and impact of sub<antracting. It is likely that varieties of 'home work' 
systems and other tiers of subcontracting in any transaction with a laIge firm exist. In other 
deVeloping countries assessment of the contribution of SMEs in real economic terms has been 
problematic due to a dearth. of.data from these countries, either because of the 'informality' of these 
businesses, or because of a deliberate matginalisation of the sector by Government agents (lLD, 
1986). 
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SMEs and Return on Investment 
It has been proposed that the value of SMEs in developing countries is their relatively lower cost 
per job created (World Bank, 1978) derived from their relative capital intensity (White, 1976); and 
use of recycled, local resources, thus less likely to have burdensome implications for foreign 
exchange reserves (Child, 1977; Haxper, 1984). For example, Aboagye (1986) has calculated that 
the capital cost per wolker employed in small finns in the developing countries of Afiica is 
US$210 and US$22,OOO in the fonnal manufacturing sector. HaIper (1984) adds that in 
developing countries SMEs provide low cost substitutes of imported goods to the rural and urban 
poor, by using local and recycled materials. He also suggests that, because they are widely 
dispersed in the rwal areas, they allow for widespread distribution of products and services thereby 
introducing relatively higher standards ofliving in the remote rural areas of some countries. All of 
these arguments have had appeal for policy makers in these countries as they were seen as capable 
of achieving the triple barrelled role of bringing development and employment to the urban and 
rwal poor, while conserving the limited foreign exchange reserves in the country (ILO, 1972; 
Neck, 1977; GOK, 1989). Although this rationale is advanced mainly in relation to micro-
enteIprises, it can be extended to more sophisticated levels, and to larger organisations as the rural 
populations progressively achieve a higher standard of living. It may also be argued that because 
SMEs can play the role of introducing technologies into an economy, they fonn a sufficient basis 
for the development of infrastructure and institutions to deal with higher levels of development at a 
later stage. 
Resource Redistribution and Restructuring of Business Ownership 
The importance of SMEs in regional development is relevant in the developing countries on two 
levels. First, that the developing countries as a region within the global economic order have been, 
for various reasons, treated as a peripheIal component of the global economy, thus remaining on 
the margins of global economic growth. Secondly, within developing countries, there are regional 
disparities which arise mainly from historical factors, and which have been peIpetuated by various 
social and economic institutions. Because regional development in these economies is closely 
linked to national unity, the political strategy is to re-&ess the racia1Jtribal question inherent in 
regional demarcation (GOK, 1986). 
Many developing countries have, therefore, continued to envisage SMEs as a political vehicle for 
reduction of resource dependency, and as an agent of regional, tribal or racial balance (Malaysia, 
1991; GOK, 1965, 1986; 1989). Because of the politics of resource ownership in capitalist 
sy~, business ownership reflects access to resources and subsequent economic power. Because 
SMEs offer alternative employment, they offer the means to acquire other factors of production, 
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thus creating a petty bourgeoisie class which has a capacity to accmnulate and invest, and 
gradually build a power base. In this sense, the SME sector can be seen as a vehicle for the re-
distribution of economic power. This income equality thesis should, however, be treated with 
caution. It can be argued that it is precisely due to the fact that a petty bourgeoisie class is fonned, 
and through a series of barriers erected by them to protect their position, that the prevailing status 
quo is maintained. For example, the gap between the poor and the rich still grows in the 
developing countries (World Bank, 1989). 
On a more global level, SMEs are seen as addressing the dependency of developing nations on the 
industrialised west, by addressing the issues of import substitution, and indigenous resource 
accumulation. The power relations between the industrialised and developing countries are, 
therefore, likely to be significantly altered by the development of strong local economies. 
Surprisingly, one of the arguments against the development of SMEs has been that this perpetuates 
the dependency of the developing countries by confining their development activities to marginal 
forms of capital accumulation like SMEs and micro- enterprises. The weakness of such an 
argument is that it does not take into consideration the impact of over-dependence on large finns, 
and on mass production technologies. 
2.2.3 SUMMARY 
Clearly, the role of SMEs varies according to the development objectives of various economies 
and from industIy to industIy. It is also clear that the net contribution of the sectorto these various 
economies has not been as impressive as was envisaged, possibly due to the way the contnoution 
of the sector has been measured - in isolation rather than as a part of a complete industrial system. 
However, the persistence of the SMEs in many of these economies suggest other benefits of the 
sector. This thesis argues that to realise the full benefit of SMEs, their contribution must be 
assessed within a composite industry funnewOlk rather than in isolation, and in relation to their 
relationship with large firms. Hence, decentralised work organisation is an alternative to mass 
production paradigms which have tended to promote vertical integration, and the continued 
isolation and/or elimination of small firms . Because the current industrial structure favours large 
finns in most countries, this strategy calls for post-Fordist production approaches. In many 
industrialised countries finns are already making strategic choices away from this paradigm as the 
importance of fixed costs diminishes (Kleijweg and Thurik, 1991), and increasingly, large firms 
are seeking complementarity with small :£inns (Olleros and McDonald, 1983). Given their demand 
and technological environments, it is even more important for developing countries to move away 
from mass production paradigms towards small batch, more flexible technologies, and a more 
balanced size distribution of industry as part of their political strategy to improve economic 
performance. 
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The next section explores the Post-Fordist (flexible specialisation) paradigm and its implications 
for productive organisation. 
2.3 THE FLEXIBLE SPECIALISA TION PARADIGM: IMPLICATIONS FOR SME 
DEVELOPMENT 
The post-Fordist paradigm, advocating flexible productive organisation, not only provides the 
paradigmatic logic for 5MB development, but also provides a framework for production 
decentralisation, and re~rganisation. Before proceeding with this discussion, it must be noted that 
although the literature makes important distinctions between 'post-fordism', flexible specialisation, 
and lean production, this thesis is interested in the underlying phenomena of de-aggregation 
present in all of these fonns of production organisation. The growing literature emanating from 
Europe, America and Japan indicates that in practice, there is no single route to flexible 
specialisation, neither does it always lead to the use of small scale £inns during the process of de-
aggregation. For example, there are large scale variants of flexible specialisation (northern 
Gennany and UK retailing), and small scale variants (Southern Gennany and the Third Italy). In 
addition, production flexibility can be achieved within a plant that adopts mass production 
techniques (Nissan automotive plant in the UK). Consequently, throughout this thesis, the use of 
these tenns will infer the underlying logic of de-aggregation, and the potential for using 'outside' 
suppliers of inputs. 
The preceding section suggested that the importance of SMEs is likely to be based on their 
cornplementarity with large £inns in a composite industrial structure, a role which can only be 
realised if and when the Fordist paradigm of productive organisation becomes less dominant. This 
implies wOIk decentralisation, fragmentation of large £inns, and a shift from intemal to e>...1:emal 
markets. In the resulting work re~rganisation as £inns attempt to accommodate the demands of 
the new productive organisation, networks and clusters of £inns emerge, based on a variety of 
relationships between large and small finns, and also among the SMEs themselves. This section 
discusses the implications of these developments for SME development. 
2.3.1 FLExIBLE SPECIALISATION AND PRODUCTIVE ORGANISATION 
The 'Flexible specialisation paradigm' is viewed as an alternative capital accumulation paradigm 
to mass production, aimed mainly at production restructuring. Its main focus is the 'flexibility' 
introduced into the production processes of organisation.This paradigm has been controversial. Its 
critics doubt its ability to restructure an economy significantly (pollert, 1988). However, three 
aspects of the logic underpinning it, are relevant for SME development: (i) while questioning the 
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paradigm of mass production, 7 this paradigm (ii) supports small-batch production OIganisatiOn, 
flexible production regimes, and (iii) a size distribution of labour in industry. Thus, the movement 
away from mass production to customised, small-batch production organisation provides a 
frameworlc within which to analyse alternative approaches to small enterprise development, 
particularly in an environment where large finns predominate, and internal marlcets are too small 
and/or fragmented to support mass production. Several proposals inherent in this paradigm are 
pertinent for this study. First, by suggesting the downsizing of large finns, industries can be de-
concentrated, allowing more finns to compete in the same markets (Howells, 1989). Secondly, 
SMEs can enter markets hitherto dominated by large finns. Thirdly, by suggesting flexible 
integration where finns form networlcs, wider markets can be reached by all parties concerned. 
Finally, through networlcs, SMEs can jointly achieve economies of scale, if these are important in 
their industries. This study bases its analytical underpinnings on the paradigm's emphases on 
flexible work organisation, extemal input and process sourcing, clustering and networlcing of 
suppliers, marlcet segmentation and vertical disintegration of enterprises (Best, 1990; Schmitz, 
1990). 
Secondly, the Japanese (Wat.anabe, 1972; Sato, 1989), Italian (Becattini, 1990, Brusco, 1986) and 
Gennan (Schmitz, 1992) experiences suggest that there is a complementarity between large and 
small finns regarding scales of production, generation and diffusion of innovations, and productive 
networking. In Japan, for example, the emphasis is not so much on downsizing large finns, as it is 
on linking small finns with large finns, as subcontractors (Friedmann, 1988). In Italy, on the other 
hand, complementarity is defined within the framework of SME networlcs which supply the large 
finns collectively, or have entered markets hitherto dominated by large finns (Becattini, 1990). In 
hypothesising how this occurs, Howells (1989) proposes that explanations are likely to be found 
within large finns, since the changes which are taking place in the size distribution of production 
in the UK and other economies is itself a function of strategic decisions and structural changes 
inside existing large firms as they adjust to a volatile and uncertain environment. At the 
operational level, large firms have responded by production decentralisation8 and structural dis-
7. Although this explanation of flexible specialisation takes the perpective of moving away from mass 
production, it must be noted that aspects of flexible specialisation, for example, flexible production 
schedules and related strategies of JIT delivery systems, can be fOlmd in firms which adopt this 
approach to production organisation. In the NISSaD. automobile plant in the UK. for example, JIT 
procurement systems co-exist withrobotised assembly, producing using mass production approaches. 
8. Decentralisation is used to mean the allocation of production capacity to units outside the ownership 
structure of the firm, rather than in its conventional sense of decentralising the activities of the firm 
within one ownership structure. 
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aggregation and de-integration (Mead, 1984) as tools for competitiveness, resulting in more 
flexible, leaner and flatter organisational structures, using external trnnsactions and inter-finn 
linkages (Harrigan, 1985). On one level, the internal efficiency of the downsizing of large finn is 
expected to produce efficiency. On another level, through integrated networks of suppliers and 
distributors, such finns can, arguably, access a wider range of inputs and markets. This theme has 
been taken up by contemporary management strategists such as Kanter (1989) as the "competitive 
tool of the 90s and beyond" . 
1birdly, this paradigm further argues that instead of seeking internal economies of scale, it is the 
external economies (of scale and scope) which are likely to lead firms to competitiveness. Hence, 
in a combination of contract and quasi-integrated arrangements (flexible production organisation), 
finns can cover wide markets, and also compete in market niches. At the same time, these flexible 
arrangements allow a finn to increase capacity, for example through capacity subcontracting, 
licensing and franchising, without necessarily altering their investment base or production 
activities in response to fluctuations in demand. It is also possible to obtain specialist capacity 
from external sources while concentrating on core activities (Lorenzoni and Omati, 1988; van 
Kooij, 1990; Harrigan and Newman, 1990). The resulting production decentralisation becomes 
important for SME development. 
Finally, an interesting perspective of the role of small firms is stimulated by Weiss (1988) who 
contends that "states, not markets per se, have generalised the impulse to scale and concentration". 
She further charges that the state has used concentration of industry to manage inter-state 
economic and military competition, thus eliminating small undertakings. This scenario is furniliar 
in developing countries where industrial policies are used for geo-political positioning, and small 
firms might be seen as a weakening of the concentration of international political power b y 
weakening the industrial base. 
2.3.2 PRODUCflON DECENTRALISATION AND SME DEVEWPMENT 
The preceding section has suggested that flexible specialisation provides a rationale for work 
decentralisation. Three concepts issuing out of work decentralisation are pertinent for SME 
9. Although WJlliamson's theory was originally fonnulated in tenns of production costs, he also argued 
that asset specificity and demand uncertainty are joint conditions for a decision to make a product in-
house. In other words, the transaction cost theory covers other costs such as those involved in searching 
for somces of supply and infonnation, as well as the costs of monitoring and enforcing contractual 
perfonnance. The 'cost' concept can be widened to include, for example, the loss of matket share which 
arises from the extended innovation cycles which may be 'thought' to have arisen through 
externalisation. 
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development: large finns are likely to externalise activities (externalisation); fragment structurnIly; 
and use external rather than internal markets, leading to external transaction, possibly with SMEs. 
Thus, while large finns move away from traditional mass production organisation, they are 
expected to use, simultaneously, disintegrated organisation structures and external marlcet 
transactions to procure inputs. Thus, prospects for SME development lie in (l) the opportunities 
opened for new entrants by externalising finns (Howells, 1989), and (2) the ensuing linkages with 
finns seeking from external marlcets, those activities which they no longer provide in-house. 
Externalisation of Activities 
When they downsize to achieve competitiveness, large finns meet their requirements by 
outsourcing. Howells' (1989) definition of the term 'externalisation' implies that activities are 
shifted from within the firm to outside it. Yet, it is all of those activities which could potentially be 
undertaken in-house, rather than only those that are being shifted, which are of interest to small 
enteIprise development. Thus, as used in this study, externalisation is the use of marlcet transaction 
to expand capacity or to procure inputs and dispose of outputs in a potentially internal market 
system, to include activities such as licensing, franchising, and capacity sub-cont:ract:ing. 
By definition, therefore, all the activities of finns can be externalised since, according to Gibb 
(1993:6), "most large finns are conglomerations of services, processes, component production and 
subassemblies, many of which could be run independently" . However, whether these activities are 
procured on the external or internal marlcets depends on the implication of external sourcing to the 
relative power position of the externalising firm within its competitive environment. This study 
proposes that firms are more concerned with their competitive position regarding markets and 
inputs, and will choose the relevant structures and size, which enables them to achieve and retain 
this position. They are, for example, concerned about access to and control of resources as a 
critical component of competitiveness (porter, 1980). 
Structural Fragmentation 
The importance of vertical integration is linked to the principles of economies of scale supporting 
the logic of mass production. Its undeIpinnings can be found in the logic of resource allocation 
first proposed by Coase (1937), arguing that finns and markets are alternative methods of co-
Ol:rlinating resource allocation - transaction, and that internal markets are used where external 
markets cannot allocate resources in a manner which alleviates uncertainty (Williamson, 1971, 
1975). Vertical integration therefore becomes necessary as a means of avoiding search, 
negotiation, and regulatory costs (Coase, 1937) especially where stable supplies of resources are 
crucial. Consequently, firms move into businesses which are different from their strategic core 
activities through lateral and horizontal integration, sometimes even when such intra-firm transfers 
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do not make economic sense (Hanigan, 1985), but have implications for their relative bargaining 
power, or are strategic moves. For example, in many developing coun1ries, the uncertainty of 
resource availability has led many finns to hold excess capacity as an insurance against production 
stoppage (ILO, 1986). 
As has been stated, by shifting transactions from internal to external markets (Sabel, 1982; Piore 
and Sabel, 1984), flexible specialisation has implications for the finn's production organisation 
(markets) and its organisational development strategies. The external markets used during 
externalisation necessarily shift the organisation from a vertically integrated structure to a 
decentralised 'quasi-integrated' one, governed by market transactions (Hanigan, 1984). Vertical de-
integration is, therefore, a finn's strategic approach, not only to achieve productive efficiency, but 
also to become adaptable by being flexible . 
Also important for SME development is the ownership change resulting from the fragmentation 
process. Shutt and Whittington (1986) and Howells and Green (1987) delineate three possible 
ownership outcomes of external transaction where: activities are decentralised to a subsidiary or 
associate company while retaining ownership; devolved to separate, autonomous enterprises via 
license or franchise agreements; or the firm uses market transactions and disintegrates into 
separate, autonomous enterprises, where no ownership links are maintained (perry, 1992). It is the 
properties of devolution and disintegrntion which have prospects for small enterprise development. 
External Markets and External Transaction Behaviour 
The third aspect of production decentralisation pertinent to this discussion is the way firms transact 
- the actual transaction behaviour resulting from their strategic positioning choices. According to 
Williamson (1975), internal markets (firms) exist because of asset specificity and the existence of 
frequent internal demand. Hence, traditional management models, underpinned by the importance 
of economies of scale, assume that managerial decisions are made to retain these internal markets, 
minimise costs and maximise profits. A firm will be expected, therefore, to seek to minimise all 
costs with minimal loss of control over transactions since, loss of control has implications for 
bargaining power positions with relevant pressure constituencies. Assuming that the £inn is a 
rational price taker motivated by cost efficiency, it will use internal markets if the costs related to 
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external rruukets, particularly transaction costs,9 are higher. However, as Harrigan (1984) has 
argued, other reasons exist for short-term transaction behaviour. Although profit assures a finn's 
survival, relative bargaining power in its environment is more important. Thus the long-term 
strategic positioning needs (the organisational vision), based on the perceived certainty or 
uncertainty surrounding markets and technologies; and the power relations in bargaining with 
clients, suppliers, markets, and other constituencies (Harrigan, 1984) will influence immediate 
transaction behaviour. The firm will then adjust its internal systems, or change the environment 
through collaboration (Hirsch, 1975) and negotiation in order to achieve more favourable positions 
with the pressure constituencies. In seeking competitiveness, therefore, finns will weigh efficiency 
(cost) against control implications. 
2.3.3 Production Re-organisation and SME Development 
Adoption of the flexible specialisation paradigm proposes that production re-organisation will 
result from externalisation and structural fragmentation, achieved through subcontracting, 
licensing, and various kinds of strategic collaborations. 
Subcontracting 
Subcontracting is the most frequently used form of outsourcing. Historically, its origins can be 
traced to the industrial revolution in Europe where the 'putting out' system was used periodically to 
smooth production (Landes, 1966). Despite initially being treated as ephemeral, marginal and 
dated (Shutt and Whittington, 1986), its role in the regeneration of the Japanese economy has 
made it one of the most prominent productivity strategies in the 1990s in Europe (Friedman, 1988; 
Tumbull et. al., 1992). 
Subcontracting pennits organisations to outsource in order to smooth production (Kamien and Li, 
1990); obtain resources which they cannot access internally for various reasons (Chaillou, 1977; 
van Kooij , 1990 Watanabe, 1971; 1972); and expand their markets through external distribution 
netwOlks (Watanabe, 1972) and product differentiation (Best, 1990). The literature highlights three 
main types of sub<ontracting based on the rationale for using the strategy: (i) economic sub-
contracting, motivated by cost minimisation where outsourcing offers a cost saving; (ii) specialised 
9. Although Williamson's theory was originally formulated in tenns of production costs, he also argued 
that asset specificity and demand uncertainty are joint conditions for a decision to make a product in-
house. In other words, the transaction cost theory covers other costs such as those involved in searching 
for sources of supply and infonnation, as well as the costs of monitoring and enforcing contractual 
performance. The 'cost' concept can be widened to include, for example, the loss of market share which 
arises from the extended innovation cycles which may be 'thought' to have arisen through 
externalisation. 
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sub~ntracting, motivated by the lack of internal capacity and technical capability to produce in-
house; (ill) capacity sub~ntracting, motivated by the need to balance demand and supply given 
limited internal capacity. Many inter-firm relationships fall in the category of specialised and 
economic sub~ntracting. Subcontracting has been criticised for being based on unequal power 
relations stemming from the hitherto adversarial model of inter-finn relationships. However, based 
on the Japanese model which supports long-term collaborative relationships, the western model of 
subcontracting has recently altered toward more reciprocal relationships (fumbull et. al., 1992). 
Licensing and Franchising 
A second variant of the strategies used in rationalisation is licensing, with franchising being a 
special case of licensing. The large firm extends the rights to use patents and other rights at a 
consideration (royalties). In this fonn of outsourcing, the externalising finn expands its markets by 
increasing capacity without making further capital investments, and without bearing the expansion 
risks. Hence, by decentralising production while retaining standardisation, the parent finn can 
achieve economies of scale using current investment levels, while providing 'tum-key' business 
opportunities for SMEs. Because the licensee uses proven, patented technology (blue prints), the 
operational risks are likely to be relatively lower than those ofan independent business. However, 
local adjustments made to adapt to local conditions are likely to be expensive for the licensee. 
Because of this and other reasons, licensing has not been widespread. 
Strategic Partnering 
Various forms of strategic alliances and collaborations are quickly gaining ground in developed 
countries as a form of productive organisation which accesses scarce inputs, and wider markets. 
Cooke (1988) makes an important distinction between two forms of alliance - the more complex 
strategic alliance, and the more common tactical alliance typical of horizontal integration through 
inter-finn co-operation, stating that the former are goal-seeking, formalised and long-term. 
Strategic alliances have also changed the fonn of subcontracting in industries where proprietary 
technology is critical for competitiveness, where more long-tenn collaborative relationships are 
forged, based on exchange rather than power relations. Joint Ventures (Kogut, 1988; Hanigan, 
1984; Harrigan and Newman, 1990) are petbaps the most frequently used form of alliances, 
although one-off collaborations are also reported, particularly in high technology industries (Emst, 
1987). 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the role of SMEs in development by first discussing the roles 
documented in the literature, then proposing a logic for SME development. The analysis in this 
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chapter reveals that by measuring the sector in isolation, its role and contribution to development 
has been under-valued. Based on the role which the sector has played in the Japanese and Gennan 
economies, the chapter proposes that the contribution of the sector lies not in its isolated 
contribution to employment generation, regional development, technology development, or to 
national output, but its contribution as part of a composite industrial structure. In addition, whereas 
industrialised countries are pressured to provide employment and regenerate the economy, hence 
their emphases on this role of SMEs, in developing countries, where large finns have hitherto 
dominated industrial activity, the SME sector has the socio-political role of restructuring 
ownership of resources from large (usually foreign) to small indigenous finns. 
lbis chapter further proposes that one strategy for addressing poor economic performance is to 
shift away from the paradigm of mass production towards a small-batch production paradigm, thus 
offering a logic for SME development. The post-Fordist paradigm, advocating flexible production 
organisation, not only provides a rationale for SME development by questioning the logic of mass 
production, but also provides a framework for production decentralisation (through externalisation) 
and re-organisation (through contracts and strategic partnerships). Thus, by downsizing and 
disagregating large fimts, and re-organising transactions in various flexible integrative models, 
SMEs can be developed, their contribution being realised within a composite industrial 
productivity framework rather than in isolation. 
This discussion has covered a variey of firm sizes falling under the rubric of 'small and medium 
enterprises' (SMEs). For example, in many developing countries, for various reasons, the infonnal 
sector (sometimes referred to as the micro-enterprise sector) is generally still excluded from 
national statistics (de Soto, 1989). On the other hand, many of these countries promote 'fonnal' 
small and medium enterprises. This study is interested in the 'fonnal' small and medium 
enterprises as these are more likely to have the technological and skill base to meet the needs of 
large finns in Kenya In Kenya, small enterprises have historically played a composite role of 
indigenising industry and commerce, while at the same time providing employment for its large 
population. The sector has recently also become the government's channel for economic 
regeneration in the face of the realisation that large finns have a limited capacity for providing 
wide-spread economic benefits to the Kenyan population (GOK, 1989). 
In this chapter, reference was also made to the Japanese experience in using a large-firm small finn 
linkage strategy for its industrialisation. While this has continued to be a model for developed and 
developing countries, care must be taken in drawing parallels with developing countries. Japan's 
category of small enterprises typically covers finns employing less than 500 people, with the 
average of about 300 people (Sato, 1989). These finns are also likely to use sophisticated 
technology and skilled manpower. On the other hand, many developing countries define small 
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enterprises as those employing less than fifty people. These are also likely to be less capitalised, 
and less sophisticated than the Japanese case. However, while direct parallels are not appropriate, 
the logic of size distribution of industry is a plausible strategy in most environments. 
The following chapter, three, discusses the some of the literature 'explaining' the existence of inter-
finn relationships. While the literature is vast, it offers highlights some key issues pertinent to the 
fonnation of relationships between organisations. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS: SOME KEY ISSUES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter two it was argued that the role of SMEs is its complementarity with large firms, and that 
this complementarity can be achieved, inter alia, through inter-finn linkage strategies. The broad 
aim of this research is to explore how large films can be encouraged to form such linkages with 
small firms . It entails establishing, therefore, whether or not large finns in Kenya use inter-firm 
linkages and what factors influence their sourcing decisions. The foonation of linkages is argued 
to be predicated on a finn's decision to dis-aggregate or to outsource their requirements. Hence, 
factors influencing vertical integration., or those discouraging dis-aggregation are important. This 
chapter reviews the received theories about (i) motivations for inter-finn relationship formation; 
and (ii) motivations for vertical integration or de-integration . It also argues that in addition to their 
various idiosyncratic weaknesses, these frameworks have limited applicability in developing 
country contexts. 
Three broad approaches to the explanation ofinter-finn relationships are advanced in the literature. 
Although these approaches are presented separately, they are not counterposed arguments. For 
example, in so far as flexible specialisation involves ill production and the need to be close to 
final consumers, then it has spatial implications. The separation of approaches is used, therefore, 
for clarity and focus . 
The spatial approach draws on theories of agglomeration to argue that inter-finn relationships 
result from finns locating themselves where they can access resources and maxkets within a 
particular geographical setting. A second approach takes a macro-economic perspective to 
hypothesise various factors triggering vertical de-integration, 'forcing' firms to use inter-firm 
relationships to access resources and maxkets. Clearly, these two approaches attribute inter-finn 
relationships to external factors, which are difficult to replicate in an economy. They also discount 
the fact that industry behaviour is an aggregate of managerial decisions taken at firm level. This 
research, therefore, adopts this intrinsic managerial perspective to 'explain' inter-finn relationships. 
The managerial "explanation", adopts a variety of approaches to the study of inter-firm 
relationships. Transaction cost theory is the most frequently used, arguing that inter-finn 
relationships are a strategy for achieving efficiency. A second body of literature argues from an 
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organisational theory standpoint, that inter-finn relationships are a strategy for achieving structural 
flexibility, through vertical de-integration, while retaining scope and scale. Yet a third body of 
literature posits that inter-firm relationships are a result of strategic behaviour by finns . Within this 
argument, various emphases exist based on the perceived objectives of the finn: competitive 
advantage and strategic positioning (porter, 1985), as a strategy for entering new markets; to gain 
access to scarce resources (Benson, 1975); to gain access to technology (Forrest, 1992; Rothwell, 
1989); in search of core competence (Pralahad and Hamel, 1990); for more effective supplier chain 
management (porter, 1985); production planning; labour process management (Atkinson, 1985); 
and strategic collaboration (lhorelli, 1986). 
The chapter discusses these approaches in five sections. This first section introduces the chapter, 
while the second section presents an overview of the various approaches to the "explanation" of 
inter-finn relationship fonnation. The third section discusses the managerial decision-making 
approaches in more detail, while the fourth section explores the peculiarities of developing 
countries and their potential impact on inter-finn linkage formation. The fifth section concludes 
the chapter. 
3.2 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTER-FIRM RELA TIONSIllPS: AN 
OVERVIEW 
Inter-firm linkages have been variously 'explained' in the literature: socio-economic pressures 
triggering vertical de-integration; spatial location and agglomeration; managerial decision-making. 
External Socio-economic pressures:- A large body of literature argues that emerging trends in 
large finn-SIIlall finn linkages are a result of fragmentation activities of large finns responding to 
wider external pressures (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 1982; Scott and Storper, 1986; Shutt and 
Whittington, 1986). Although their wOIk essentially tries to explain the persistent presence of 
small finns in the economy, it has bearing on the implications of fragmentation of large finns and 
the potential for smaller units absorbing the resulting 'fall-out'. Relationships between large and 
small finns is conceptualised, therefore, as the result of a process of fragmentation by large finns, 
and their externalisation of activities to small finns as the result of rationalisation for efficiency; 
flexibility as a coping strategy; flexible technological specialism; or investment stabilsation. Shutt 
and Whittington (1986) and also HoweIls (1989) identify several factors which they hypothesise to 
influence the formation of dependent and independent small finns through the process of 
fragmentation. These include the effects of the recession and unemployment which has forced 
large finns to restructure by means of closures and bankruptcies; the rise in the number of 'niches' 
of demand because of developments in new technologies; the effects of the end of the post-war 
boom and the pressure to restructure relations between capital and labour (Gordon, Edwards and 
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Reich 1982); and to counter the effects of increased innovation and demand risks. The main 
weakness of this approach is that it examines the factors which cause fragmentation but does not 
shed light on the internal processes leading to fragmentation of large finns. 
A related body of literature analyses emergent inter-finn relationships and netwOIks (Larson, 1992; 
Brusco, 1986; Becattini, 1989; Lorenzoni and Ornati, 1988; Thorelli, 1986). Thorelli's work, for 
example, argues that finns fonn networks as an alternative between marlcets and hierarchies in an 
environment of interdependence, although he concedes that "power is the central concept in 
network analysis" (Thorelli, 1986:38). A section of this literature introduces another dimension by 
positing that small finns use inter-finn relationships in the fonn of networks to counter the 
negative effects of small size, for example competing in marlcets where economies of scale are 
important (Brusco, 1986; Becattini, 1989). According to this thesis, networks are used as a vehicle 
for entry into resource and/or consumer marlcets. 1bis literature, therefore, views inter-finn 
relations as a strategy, by small finns, for entering into marlcets hitherto inaccessible to them. A 
second part of this literature views inter finn relationships as a network of inter-dependent finns 
which fonn linkages as a response to e)"'1ernal pressures, for instance changes in demand patterns 
requiring flexible work organisation, which have implications on productive organisation and 
related issues of division of labour (Atkinson, 1985). A large body of controversial literature has 
emerged which explores the issue of flexibility under the banners of Flexible Specialisation, Post 
Fordism, among others, explaining inter-finn relationships as part of a restructuring of 
organisations and industries. 
Spatial location:- On the other hand, Shutt and Whittington (l986) and other industrial 
geographers 'explain' inter-finn relationships, such as sub~ntracting in relation to spatial 
agglomeration, with small finns locating close to large finns . Following this argument, therefore, 
it is hypothesised that large finns act as 'hubs' around which other finns agglomerate as either 
buyers or sellers, thus creating a network of inter-related finns . The main criticism of this thesis 
argues that given the level of innovations in infonnation technologies (Gershuny and Miles, 1983), 
inter-regional transactions are possible. Neither does it provide evidence that large firms will seek 
out smaller firms as partners, or indeed that small finns will locate in the vicinity in order to 
e)"''Ploit such relationships. Proximity of buyers and suppliers is, therefore, not necessarily a valid 
'explanation' for inter-finn relationships offinns within a particular locality. 
Managerial decision-making:- Clearly, the literature outlined in the preceding paragraphs views 
organisations merely as responsive elements in a wider economic or spatial system. It does not 
take into consideration the managerial process by which such responses are fonnulated and 
executed. In addition, it ignores the fact that organisations, to some e)"'1ent, detennine their 
environment and change it by their actions. Earlier theorists such as Child (l972) correctly argued 
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that through strategic choices, organisations alter their business environment which, over time, 
changes these environments. Miles and Snow (1978) refer to this process as 'enacting the 
environment' to mean the process by which organisations take action to 'align' themselves to the 
environment as a positioning strategy. Thompson (1967) extends this argument to suggest that in 
order to do this efficiently, finns segment their environments and take separate decisions to deal 
v.rith each environment. Also important in this discussion is the concept of 'domain definition', 
which Miles and Snow (l978) and Miles, Snow and Pfeff'er (1974) describe as "the selection of 
activities which fucilitate adaptation" . By this definition, a finn makes choices about its domain -
the components and pattern of its inter-relatedness with elements in its environment (Eg. 
customers, suppliers, unions, and other 'pressure' constituencies). This apparently intrinsic 
organisational process requires an analysis of the internal 'explanations' for inter-finn relationships. 
Merely examining the external forces which are hypothesised to trigger them does not suggest 
how to stimulate such relationships on a wider level. In addition, because such external fuctors can 
be difficult to replicate, it is prudent to look inside finns for answers to the question of how to 
stimulate inter-firm relationships. 
In the overview presented in this section, it is apparent that inter-finn relationships have been 
studied largely as an outcome rather than as a process. Consequently, in documenting conditions 
or the process by which they are formed, external fuctors attributed to their formation, or the nature 
of emergent relations have been documented. W!.lliamson's (1975) work which studies inter-finn 
relations as an internal managerial process, is perhaps, the first to draw attention to the internal 
managerial processes of firms as the key to 'explaining' inter-finn relationships. The following 
section reviews the managerial approaches to inter-firm relationship formation. 
3.3 THE MANAGERIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR INTER-FIRM LINKAGE 
FORMATION 
Managerial explanations to the formation of inter-finn relations argue specifically from a 
managerial decision-making perspective. As Harrigan and Newman (1990) correctly argue, to 
understand inter-firm relationships, the motivation and propensity of finns to relate must, first, be 
understood. By this is meant the firm's 'desire' and 'inclination' to relate with another finn, perhaps, 
to access resources, markets or technology. As already mentioned, recent global experiences 
suggest that answers can be found by examining the e»..1emal pressures causing such 
developments, particularly those related to changes in demand pattems. As noted, these external 
pressures are, however, difficult to replicate in an economy. Since it is the decisions of individual 
firms which aggregate into what is considered industry behaviour, other more intrinsic managerial 
explanations are suggested, namely: (i) that finns are searching for competitiveness by focusing on 
'core competency' (pralahad and Hamel, 1990); (ii) the increasing importance of the strategic 
51 
implications of the efficiency of the supply chain to the competitiveness of the finn (porter, 1985; 
1990); (ill) the replacement of internal markets with external mrukets as one strntegy to increase 
the value of the supply chain (porter, 1980); (iv) the development of cooperative strntegies by 
finns as a strntegy for entering markets and accessing resources; and finally (v) the development 
by smaller finns, of co~perative strntegies for entering markets hitherto 'inaccessible' to them 
because of scale related barriers (Brusco, 1982). Hence, this category of explanations recognises 
that the explanation for industry behaviour can be found by examining individual finn behaviour: 
decisions about production organisation, organisational structure, sourcing activity, and the use of 
inter-finn relations. 
Harrigan and Newman (1990) have also argued that this decision is largely predicated on the 
benefits of the linkage to the finn; whether the resource or market offered by the 'partner' is critical 
to its activities; the costs of co~perationJlinkage, including transaction costs, opportunity costs, 
strntegic inflexibility resulting from co~peration, and damage to a finn's strntegic advantage when 
such linkage occurs; whether alternative strategies exist, or whether other sources of inputs or 
mrukets can be found; and the need to cooperate in order to access desired markets or resources -
the centrality, urgency and necessity of the resource or market to the other activities of the finn . 
Clearly, the central concern is the motivation of a finn to · fonn relations with another finn, and 
how it perceives the possibilities of achieving its objectives using this strntegy. This has led this 
study to focus on the factors motivating a finn to fonn linkages with other fums as part of its 
business strntegy. 
Casson (1987) makes a similar argument, but provides a useful categorisation which brings 
together the many of the issues raised in the literature. He groups the factors influencing the choice 
of contractual relationships against internal development into four broad categories: 
(a) The nature of the advantage sought from the relationship. This means the advantage that the 
finn is seeking in fonning relationships. Consequently, if a finn does not perceive an 
advantage, it is less likely to pursue inter-finn linkages. 
(b) The nature of the finn, and its ability to 'support' the relationship. 
(c) The nature of industry, and nonns, relative stability, levels of uncertainty, etc. This means 
"the industry enviromnent within which the finn operates. Consequently, if the finn seeking a 
relationship concludes that the nature of competition or industry activity are best addressed 
using inter-finn linkages, then such a strategy will be used. 
(d) The nature of the wider business enviromnent . This refers to the country or international 
setting within which managers have to make their decisions. As Porter (1990) has argued, 
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the wider environment determines, to a large extent, whether a fum uses internal or external 
markets. The most prominent of these conditions is the extent to which the supplier 
infrastructure offers adequate choices for a firm to use markets. 
3.4 EXPLANATIONS FOR INTER-FIRM RELA TIONSIllPS: SOME APPLICATIONS 
This review seeks to highlight the various approaches to the explanation of inter-firm relationships, 
and the various assumptions underlying their use in analysing motivations for such relationships. 
The literature can be discussed underthe various approaches which are relevant in explaining the 
motivations and choice of inter-firm relationships, assumptions made about their nature, and 
requisite conditions for their existence: (a) transaction cost theory (driven by efficiency and cost 
minimisation); (b) organisation theory; and (c) strategic behaviour (driven by competitive 
positioning) . 
Transaction Cost Theory Approach 
The seminal work by Williamson (1975) on the implications of transaction costs in the finn's 
decisions about internal or external markets is, perhaps, the first study to suggest that internal finn 
behaviour explains OIganisatiOnal structural patterns and trends. The Transaction-Cost logic in 
organisational studies builds its argument on the theory of the firm, which has as its starting point 
the unique capabilities of the finn. The underlying logic of this approach is efficiency and cost 
minimisation within a fiamework which assumes rationality. Consequently, it argues, 
management activities seek to fonnulate strategies which create and exploit the finn's uniqueness 
(Lenz, 1980; Kotler, 1984). 
Although the transaction cost approach has been used to analyse a wide variety of organisational 
activity, for example, bureaucracy (Williamson, 1979); franchise contracting (Williamson, 1976); 
clan-like relations within finns (Ouchi, 1980) or organisational culture (Jones, 1983), its most 
widespread use has been in the interpretation of the vertical integration of production and of 
various fonns of contractual relations (Williarnson, 1971; 1975; 1985). Williamson (1975 ; 1985) 
explored the methods of detennining transaction costs, and their effect on exchange. This theory 
argues that organisations seek to minimise their tansaction costs, thus detennining their 
organisational fonn under the assumption that the most efficient structure will displace the others -
a common, cost minimising organisation, which involves maximisation of the value of the output 
of the firm relative to production costs (Robins, 1987). Basing his work on that by Coase (1937) 
which argues that finns and markets are alternative methods of co~rdjnating resource allocation -
transaction, Williamson (1975, 1985) proposes that finns choose modes of transaction according 
to the criterion of minimising the sum of production and transaction costs. Williamson's (1979) 
argument is, in turn, based on the proposition that the most efficient mode of governing transaction 
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depends on (1) uncertainty associated with executing the transaction, and (2) the uniqueness or 
specificity of the assets associated with the goods or services transacted. In these cases, 
Williamson (1985) argues, opportunistic behaviour is expected. 
Contradictory arguments, such as those of Walker and Weber (1984), in their study ofa company 
in the automobile industry in the USA, maintain that production costs are the strongest predictor of 
make-or-buy decisions and that both volume uncertainty and supplier market competition have 
small but significant effects. Production costs may differ between firms due to the scale of 
production, learning, or proprietary knowledge, while transaction costs refer to the expenses 
incurred for writing and enforcing contracts, negotiating tenns and contingent claims, deviating 
from optimal kinds of investments in order to increase dependence on a party or to stabilise a 
relationship, and administering a transaction (Williamson, 1985). In essence, it refers to all fonns 
of search, infonnation, and negotiation costs, as well as the costs of monitoring and enforcing 
contractual peIfonnance. He argues that these costs may be reduced by the organisation of 
exchange through a variety of non-market apparatus, including bureaucratic administration -
vertically integrated organisations. However, bureaucratic administration involves both the cost of 
maintaining an administrative apparatus and the potential loss due to the (theoretically) greater 
efficiency of the market in transmitting infonnation. Hence, the bureaucratic organisation 
alternative is appealing where market organisation of economic exchange is cumbersome, and 
costly, and other forms of transaction governance are necessary. 
Williamson (1975; 1985) further argues that the principle feature of high transaction costs between 
anns length parties is small numbers bargaining in situations of bilateral governance, which 
results when switching costs are high due to asset specificity - that is, the degree to which assets 
are specialised to support tIade between only a few parties. It must be noted, however, that asset 
specificity is not a sufficient condition for high transaction costs - uncertainty and frequency of 
transactions are also necessary (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Depending on its objectives, a 
finn may still choose to produce in-house (hence vertically integrating) even though its transaction 
costs are higher than those of outside suppliers. Harrigan (1985) has suggested some of the 
conditions under which such decisions are made, namely: settings of competitive stability and low 
demand certainty; when the finn lacks the bargaining power needed to persuade outside suppliers 
to assume the risks which they hoped to avoid by outsourcing; or because vertical integration fits 
the parent coIporate strategy needs. 
Several criticisms can be levelled at the transaction-cost theory approach to organisation studies, 
particularly those relating to inter-finn relationships. First, the main limitation of Williamson's 
work in 'explaining inter-finn relations is that it assumes the primacy of cost-oriented 
organisational goals (efficiency) though it is widely acknowledged that firms have reasons other 
54 
than those of cost minimisation/profit maximisation for malcing choices about structure, size and 
production organisation (porter, 1980, 1985; Harrigan, 1984, 1985). More specifically, various 
interorganisational relationships could be motivated, for example, by other considerations such as 
those referred to in preceding paragraphs, namely necessity, asymmetry or power-dependency, 
reciprocity or exchange, stability, legitimacy, domain consensus, and access to resources. It is also 
probable that a £inn will pursue several goals simultaneously (Ihompson, 1967), and will 
therefore be variously motivated. Hence, motivations can be interactive. For example, efficiency 
motivates are not necessarily primary, nor do they exclude other goals such as power and control 
over the business environment, or indeed over some constituencies within this environment. 
Secondly, this theory is predicated, as are most economic models, on the assumption of the 
rationality of decision makers, who are also assumed to have access to infonnation. Yet, often, 
decision makers are neither rational, nor do they have access to 'all relevant' infonnation for 
decision-making - bounded rationality (Williamson, 1975). This approach also reduces all of a 
finn's activities into a cost reduction objective, which is not necessarily the case. For example, 
Porter (1980, 1985) reduces competitive advantage as well as differentiation strategies into cost 
reduction, and rivalry is reduced into brand loyalty benefits. While this is an appropriate starting 
point for conceptualising and operationalising strategy at firm level, it does not take into 
consideration the role of objectives other than cost minimisation and/or profit maximisation. 
Thorelli's (1986) argument that cooperation and collaboration are also motivations for inter-firm 
relationships contradicts this proposal. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also argue, for example, that 
joint venture activity, a particular fonn of inter-firm relationships, can be analogous to fashion 
trend setting as a fonn of band-wagon behaviour. Rumelt (1974) also stated that in some cases 
structure also follows fashion. This can be explained by arguing that industry participants rely on 
collective industry wisdom, and therefore, what is interpreted in these studies as fashion or band 
wagon behaviour is simply the expected adoption of particular strategies by £inns within the same 
business environment. Not surprisingly, however, this perspective does not receive more than a 
casual treatment in the literature. 
Finally, the Transaction Cost Economists' perspective dichotomises a firm's choices between 
maIkets and hierarchies, ignoring the possibility of other, diverse business objectives as discussed 
above (Ihorelli, 1986; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). Hence, other governance foIDlS, other than 
the pure dichotomy of maIkets vs hierarclries, exist: strategic alliances (eg James, 1985); 
partnerships (eg Perlmutter and Heenan, 1986); coalitions (eg Porter and Fuller, 1986); franchises 
(eg Friedlander and Gurney, 1981); research consortia (eg Ouchi and Kremen-Bolton, 1988); joint 
ventures (eg Kogut, 1988a; Harrigan, 1985) and various fonns of network organisations (eg 
Jarillo, 1988; Powell, 1987; 1990); and various fonns of quasi-integrated structures (Harrigan, 
1985). 
Hence, Ring and Van de Ven (1992) argue that while the transaction cost economics 
"approach provides a sound theoretical foundation for the exploration of maIket versus 
hierarchical mechanisms for solving strategic dependencies, it suffers from not 
adequately exploring such other available governance structures, repeated transactions, 
the dynamic evolution of governance and transactions, and the key roles of trust and 
equity in inter-organisational relationship" (p483) 
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Thus, while transaction costs and strategic motivation explanations provide compelling economic 
reasons for inter-finn relationships, there are other explanations outside the economic rationality, 
particularly that considering short-tenn benefits. 
Organisational Theory Approach 
The organisation theory approach to the explanation of inter-finn relations posits that inter-fum 
linkages are the outcome of structural restructuring of finns either as an organisational 'learning 
process' or, more prominently documented, as a strategic decision about organisational structure. 
In the fonner approach, it is argued that economic agents seek and discover infonnation through 
organisational learning as a social process rather than · simply a price co-ordinated outcome. 
Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) aptly state 
" ..... economic relations are in large measure the result of experience and learning over 
time. Economic explanation should therefore be a dynamic exercise. Economic activity 
is not co-ordinated simply through price mediated transactions. It is infonned by a 
range of social institutions ........ . "(p 19) 
Consequently, inter-finn relations can be argued to be an outcome of past experiences of the finn 
within a certain social milieu. Concuning with this argument, Kogut's (1988a) example of joint 
ventures serves to highlight the implications of this argument He posits that joint ventures are a 
means by which finns learn or seek to retain their capabilities by transferring their 'tacit 
knowledge' - referring to the organisationally embedded knowledge base (polanyi, 1967) to 
partners. While this perspective is frequently identified with a transaction cost argument, its 
explanatory factors are organisational and cognitive rather than derivatives of opportunism under 
uncertainty and asset specificity. For example, as Kogut (1988a) argues, because knowledge can 
be transferred without a contract, the transfer of know-how is encumbered by the hazards which 
accompany the pricing of infonnation without revealing its contents. Consequently, the maIket 
fails as sellers are unwilling to reveal their technology and buyers are unwilling to purchase in the 
absence of inspection. However, when the maIket is replaced by a joint venture, it is not because 
tacitness is a cost stemming from opportunism, but rather from the necessity of replicating 
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experiential knowledge which is not well understood (Kogut, op. cit). More genernlly, because 
tacitness is an aspect of the capital stock of knowledge within a finn, inter-finn relationships result 
when neither party owns each other's technology, procedures, or tacit knowledge - occasioning 
reciprocal dependency. Hence, in the case of joint ventures, Kogut (op. cit) concludes that a joint 
venture is encouraged under two conditions: one or both finns desire to acquire the other's 
OIganisational know-how; or one finn wishes to maintain an organisational capability while 
benefiting from another finn's current knowledge or cost advantage. Inter-finn relationships such 
as joint ventures and other quasi-integration relationships can, therefore, help a finn to access 
resources or markets. 
The second perspective of organisational theory is more prominently documented - that inter-finn 
relationships are an alternative fonn of production organisation motivated by organisational 
structure considerations, based on 'make' or 'buy' decisions. Internal growth and development are 
used when 'make' decisions are made. This means that internal structural provisions must be made 
following this strategy, usually taking the fonn of vertical integration. On the other hand, inter-
firm relationships are used in the case of 'buy' decisions. This could take the fonn of coalitions and 
strategic partnerships, or contractual relationships with independent organisations. Table 3-1 
presents a useful summary of the relationship between strategy, structure and markets. In this 
respect, inter-firm relations can be viewed as a managerial .decision to integrate as opposed to 
using markets or quasi-market arrangements to procure resources (Harrigan, 1984). Arguably, two 
basic approaches to productive organisation can be identified: that which involves using internal 
structures (vertical integration); and that which involves using external structures (inter-firm 
relations) although other fonns oftnmsaction governance fall along the continuum. For example, 
Harrigan (1984) identifies a variety of governance fonns which she labels 'quasi-integrated' 
structures. Other authors such as Kogut (l988a) pick up this theme and identify other relationships 
such as strategic partnerships and collaborative arrangements. A brief review of the implications of 
these options follows . 
Table 3-1 Strategy, Structure and Market Options 
Strategy Structure Markets & 
Governance Structures 
Internal Growth Integration Internal markets & In-
house production 
Inter-finn Relationships Dis-integration External Markets & 
Outsourcing 
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Internal Growth and Development (Vertical Integration) 
Internal development implies that a decision has been made to produce a component or service in-
house, and structural provisions must be made for it, and for the co-ordination of the resources 
deployed. This results in vertical in integration. For many organisations, internal development has 
been the primary method of strategy development, particularly in industries where products are 
highly technical, maIkets are volatile (Harrigan, 1984; 1985), there is need to acquire internal skills 
related to the product (Johnson and Scholes, 1989), or where there are no known or suitable 
suppliers of the input (Hanigan, 1985). By making the lnake' decision, therefore, finns 
simultaneously make resource allocation decisions which put in place an internal mechanism to 
co-ordinate them. 
The literature on vertical integration is vast, and to some extent context specific. However, a 
recurrent theme is the attempt to explore the conditions which influence vertical integration or de-
integration. In summary, four key fuctors suggesting reasons for vertical integration, emerge from 
the literature: (i) market failure; (ii) relative imbalances in maIket power between adjacent stages 
of industry, hence defending maIket power, (iii) the need to create maIket power by integrating 
finns; (iv) developing young or declining markets when adjaCent independent investors are pulling 
out. 
Market failure or inefficiency of markets, pemaps the most critical of these factors, is a 
combination of several fuctors which cause the buyer or seller to perceive failures in input markets, 
introducing a high level of risk and unreliability. Market failure generally involves the following 
features, none of which singly or alone signify a vertical maIket failure, but act in tandem. 
1. A small nwnber of buyers and sellers which creates power imbalances in the supply or 
distributions chains. The main rationale for vertical integration, in this case, is usually the 
possibility of Unfair' prices or market foreclosure. This is exacerbated by high 
uncertainties within the business environment. 
2. The presence of high asset specificity, durability and intensity~ factors which raise entry 
and exit barriers and switching costs. The effects of specificity are magnified when-the 
assets are also capital intensive and durable and when they give rise to high fixed cost 
structures. 
3. A high frequency of transactions between buyer and seller, accompanied by "bilateral 
oligopolies and high asset specificity" (Stuckey and White, 1993), making them 
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dependent on each other, and hence vulnerable - high frequency seems to justify in-house 
production. 
4 . Opportunism by stppliers or buyers in monopolistic or oligopolistic situations, 
exaceIbated by high uncertainty and bounded rationality. 
5. Uncertainties brought about by legal and other restrictions, including political and social 
climates. Hence finns will form relationships in response to government mandates 
restricting access to markets or resources, or those erecting entry barriers. 
6. Bounded rationality which circumscribes the extent to which managerial decisions can be 
made for all possible outcomes in the future - assuming that all finns make rational 
decisions. 
These factors threaten market efficiency, creating the need for internal development of productive 
activities (Stuckey and White, 1993). It is within this frameworlc that this study postulated that 
inter-firm linkages are predicated on a firm's propensity to vertically dis-integrate. Hence, for a 
linkage strategy to be applicable, it must first be established whether there are incentives for firms 
not to integrate, or dis-integrate where they have already integrated. In other words, where there is 
an efficient market, finns are less likely to integrate. 
Hence, imperfect competition, which explains vertical integration, is also applicable - tying 
downstream distributors or depriving competitors of raw materials or stabilising oligopolistic 
competition. Kogut (1988b) uses this to explain joint ventures while (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) 
argue that strong networlc externalities help to avoid costly duplication among finns, with 
possibilities for lower prices and improved quality in the final marlcet. In another example, 
Friedman, Berg and Duncan (1979) found that firms which use joint ventures tend to lower R&D 
expenditures, supporting this contention. Consequently, for firms to form inter-firm linkages, 
factors which cause marlcet failure have to be removed, along with other uncertainties and legal 
restriction. 
Defending market power means that if one stage of industry chain exerts more power over another, 
and thereby achieves abnormal returns, it may be attractive for participants in the dominated 
industry to enter the dominating industry. Hence, finns further down is the industry chain 'buy' 
into adjacent sectors. This is evident in the motor vehicle industry where manufacturers buy into 
components and parts industries as an assurance against loss of power. To limit vertical 
integration, therefore, those factors increasing the relative power of adjacscent stages of industries 
have to be removed. The abnonnal profits made by the marketing sub-sectors of vehicle industries, 
for example, have the potential of promoting vertical integration. 
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Creating and exploiting market power is an influencing factor for vertical integration, particularly 
when entry barriers are high. In effect, vertical integration also achieves the goal of raising entry 
barriers for the integrating firm such as accumulating proprietary knowledge, retaining highly 
skilled labour, and accessing finance and technology. Marlcet power can also be achieved through 
price discrimination. 
Vertical integration is also used to develop young or declining markets when adjacent independent 
investors are withdrawing from a marlret. This emanated fro~ and is related to the need to 
establish continuity in accessing markets even when other investors have pulled out. Clearly, finns 
which take this option are acting out of lack of choice - an element of market failure . Arguably, 
this is also affected by investment costs. If the firm perceives high investment costs relative to the 
advantage anticipated, it may abandon that market altogether. Having said that, in the case of 
young markets, prospects for future returns can be considered a 'worthwhile' rationale for 
investment. Consequently a firm is likely to integrate vertically in anticipation of market share. 
Inter-firm relationships (lORs) (External Markets and Quasi-integrated structures) 
The alternative strategy to internal development is the exploitation of external markets by using a 
variety of strategic alliances, partnerships, coalitions, and intermediate contractual relationships. 
These are used to cope with internal capacity deficiencies. hi terms of resource allocation and co-
onlination, the firm 'outsources' inputs and/or distribution channels. If competitive advantage is the 
primary goal of the finn, transaction cost theory would argue that linkages can lower total cost 
through co-ordination or joint optimisation, relative to the cost of in-house production, including 
the cost of assets relative to the frequency of transactions. While this is an important starting point 
to conceptualise such linkages, it is important to note that this cost related analysis does not always 
hold, and that other motivations for linkages are important (discussed in section 4.3.2 of this 
chapter). 
Arguing from a transaction cost perspective, therefore, while there are benefits accruing from both 
alternatives, it is critical that the firm selects that strategy which has the highest cost saving 
capacity (porter, 1985). Integration can save costs by eliminating the procurement, transportation, 
search and contract negotiation costs involved in market transactions (W"illiamson, 1985). On the 
other hand, the market has advantages of flexibility, off-loading fixed costs and utilising capacity 
more efficiently, and lowering exit barriers (porter, 1980). In effect, firms are likely to shift 
emphasis about market use depending on the costs and benefits of each option. Generally, 
however, the costs of dis-aggregation could prevent vertical de-integration, particularly if 
investments in that activity are high (high exit baniers) . On the other hand, arguing from a 
strategic perspective, firms base their decisions on their strategic positioning regarding access to 
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and control of resources and markets. Using external suppliers therefore becomes an option when 
such resources are held by others, and it is not possible to acquire them internally. 
The role of management (the dominant domain) cannot be underestimated. In their Adaptive 
Model of Organisational Behaviour, Miles and Snow (1978) argue that management's perception 
of the business environment, and their selection of strategies, shape the organisation's structure and 
process. WIlIiamson's (1975) analysis argues that the bounded rationality of managers limits the 
extent to which they can make informed decisions about alternative ways of organising 
production. In this study the attitudes and behaviour of management are considered to precede 
organisational behaviour. In addition, while cost considerations appear to be the logical motivation 
of firms aiming at competitiveness, personal and power positions of managers and other players in 
the organisational are likely to be stronger motivators for organisational behaviour. It has also been 
argued that the extent to which managers can scan the environment and process information 
determines the extent to which the organisational can adapt to its environment - the bounded 
rationality of managers (Miles and Snow, 1978; Williamson, 1985). 
Finally, inter-firm relationships are motivated by strategic behaviour to deter or block entry, or 
erode competitors' positions. This questions the dichotomy between maIkets and hierarchies, and 
introduces the use of networks and other collaborative arrangements. For example, Vickers (1985) 
describes joint ventures in research as a way to deter entry through pre-emptive patenting. He 
demonstrates that for small innovations, a joint venture is an effective mechanism to guarantee the 
entry-<ieterring investment. For large innovations, it is in the interest of each finn to pursue its own 
research, since the expected payoff justifies the cost. 10 another example, Vemon (1983) sees joint 
ventures as a form of defensive instrument by which finns hedge against strategic uncertainty, 
especially in industries of moderate concentration where collusion is difficult to achieve despite 
the benefits of co-ominating the inter-<iependence among finns. While this argument suggests that 
minimisation of transaction costs is an objective of the firm, it emphasises its competitive 
positioning considerations more, whether this is achieved through collusion or through depriving 
competitors of potentially valuable allies and resources. 
Strategic Behaviour Approach 
A thini approach to the explanation of inter-firm relationships sterns from theories of how strategic 
behaviour influences the competitive positioning of the firm (eg. Hanigan and Newrnan, 1990; 
Porter, 1985). The main difference between the motivations attributed to transaction theory and 
those attributed to strategic behaviour relate to the objectives of the firm when making 'make' or 
'buy' decisions. This means that decisions are taken not just to save cost, but for positioning 
relative to competitors. Transaction cost theory posits that firms transact by the mode which 
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minimises the smn of the production and transaction costs. Strategic behaviour explanations posit 
that finns transact by the mode which maximises profits through improving a finn's competitive 
position vis a vis that of rivals. Kogut (l988a) makes this distinction even more vivid for the 
purposes of this discussion: 
"The primary difference is that transaction costs address the costs specific to a particular 
economic exchange, independent of the product market strategy. Strategic behaviour 
addresses how competitive positioning influences the asset value of the finn" (P322). 
This study contextualised inter-finn relations as a managerial decision making process. It is 
expedient, therefore, to highlight the implications of competitive dynamics within a business 
environment, and what these imply for large-small finn linkages. Inter-finn relations occur within 
the framewOIk of a finn's desire to achieve competitive advantage. In recent years, the competitive 
environment has become more challenging for finns, with resource management becoming the 
key tool for competitive advantage (porter, 1992). Hence all OIganisatiOnal strategy and activity 
are aimed at this acquisition and superior positioning, involving managers in decisions of how best 
to allocate resources and organise the firm's activities to achieve this position. Because these 
questions are essentially managerial concerns about competitiveness, the competitive dynamics of 
the firm, and the role of inter-finn relationships are briefly considered. Proceeding from the 
argument that inter-finn linkages are a function of the strntegic choices of a:firm about its sources 
of inputs and disposal of outputs, it is pertinent to explore the concept and role of strntegy and 
strntegy formulation in organisational behaviour. 
Three ooderlying assumptions about organisations guide this discussion. First, as a pre-requisite to 
competitiveness (cost leadership or product differentiation - Porter, 1985), finns are primarily 
concemed with resource acquisition and control (Benson, 1975; Provan, et. al ., 1980). Hence, their 
activities, structures and strntegies are geared towards this goal. Secondly, this calls for a definition 
of their domain in the environment through strntegic choices, thus, 'creating their particular 
environment (Chandler, 1962; Miles and Snow, 1978; Miles, Snow and Pfeifer, 1974; Thompson, 
1967; Weick, 1969). Consequently, as Miller (1988) suggests, to ensure competitiveness, the 
finn's structure, strntegy and environment must be aligned (strategic adaptation) . Finally, 
organisations aim to increase the value of their offering by increasing the value of their value 
system (all those activities which go into giving a finn its competitive advantage). Hence, the firm 
aims its organisational development strntegies at this additionality (porter, 1985). 
Andrews (1987) like many other authors, appropriately argues that because corporate strategy 
"defines products and markets - and determines the company's course into the most indefinite 
future" (Andrews 1987: xi), the way firms make decisions is a function of how well they define 
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their products and markets, and how well they can envisage their distant future. Porter (1980), 
underlines this contention by stating that "the essence of fonnulating competitive strategy is 
relating a company to its environment." Consequently, how organisations view this task 
detennines the perceived choices available, and the process by which the finn pursues competitive 
advantage. 
Arguably, finns act upon the environment just as much as the environment affects the finn's 
decisions. As argued by Chaffee (1985:89) and others such as Biggadike (1981) and Lenz (1980), 
a basic premise of thinking about strategy concerns the inseparability of organisation and 
environment: "The organisation uses strategy to deal with environments" . In analysing inter-finn 
relationships, this chapter suggests that the dynamics of competitiveness, and the relationship 
between strategy and structure provide a working framewOIk. It proposes that finns act in self 
interest (survival) in the long tenn, and select options (as perceived by management) which 
perpetuate them in their business environment, the key issues being resourcing and disposal of 
outputs. Consequently, they make strategic and tactical organisational decisions in order to achieve 
these goals. To understand finn behaviour, therefore, it is critical to understand the drives behind 
the decisions and actions of organisations. While the fonner focuses attention on cost reduction, 
the latter focuses the finn's energies on product uniqueness. However, as argued by Pettigrew and 
Whipp (1991), even the focus on product differentiation is ultimately aimed at cost reduction via 
demand stimulation brought about by brand loyalty. Evidently, the significance of any strength or 
weakness a finn possesses is ultimately a function of its impact on relative cost or differentiation. 
Cost advantage and differentiation in turn stem from industry structure. They result from a finn's 
ability to cope with the five forces better than its rivals (porter, 1985). 
In tum, this advantage is evaluated in tenns of its value to the buyers. As Porter (1985 :3) has 
argued "competitive advantage grows fundamentally out of [the] value a finn is able to create for 
its buyers that exceeds the finn's cost of creating it" this value is translated into more superior 
returns than those of competitors. Hence, it is argued, decisions and choices about resources, 
markets, labour, etc. are geared towards this goal. Managerial approaches, which have taken 
supplier chain value maximisation, or production efficiency approaches to inter-finn relationships, 
have this basic assumption at the heart of their theorisation. 
The supplier value chain is perhaps the most critical among Porters five forces (viz. buyers, 
suppliers, substitutes, potential entrants, and industry competitors) which detennine industry 
profitability since supplier bargaining power determines the costs and availability of raw materials 
and other inputs. Evidently, power over the supplier chain is critical for the organisation's 
competitiveness. The finn is therefore, keen to reduce the supplier bargaining power which is high 
when: (a) there is a concentration rather than a fragmentation of suppliers; (b) the switching costs 
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from one supplier to another are high; (c) the suppliers brand is powerful, which is linked to 
switching costs if these are dependent on the brand; (d) there is the possibility of the supplier 
integrating forwards if it does not obtain the prices, and hence the margins, it seeks; (e) the 
suppliers customers are of little importance to the supplier, in which case long term relationships 
are not important. 
Emerson (1962) and Blau (1964) use social exchange theories to emphasise the firm's resource 
acquisition objective, contending that intefOIganisatiOnal dependencies are created by the need of 
all organisations to acquire scarce resources. This contention predicts that organisations are 
powerful relative to others, to the extent that they (1) control resources needed by others (2) can 
reduce their dependencies on others for resources. Success in the acquisition and control of 
resources has also been used as a measure of organisational effectiveness (porter, 1980). Thus, in a 
velY real sense, organisations are driven and evaluated by their relative success in the acquisition 
of such resources in their environment. 
Other authors such as Benson (l975) propose that such power can be achieved, inter alia, through 
increased cooperation among organisations, which enhances the capacity of these organisations to 
dominate their environment. Hence, Benson's argument suggests that power in interorganisational 
networks is based not only on internal network exchanges,. but also on external linkages to the 
larger environment. Provan et a/ (1980) extend this argument to suggest that an actor can lessen 
the power dependencies within a dyadic relationship by using power derived from relationships 
within larger organisational or social networks - for example, clusters of organisations such as 
those described in the Emilia Romagna model of networking among small firms in Italy are 
reported to provide a network for small firms, while giving them the necessary scale to relate with 
the wider environment (Brusco, 1986). Based on this argument, therefore, organisations are not 
concerned with their cost efficiency per se, but with their access to and control of resources and 
markets. But are these received models applicable in developing countries where the business 
environment is significantly different? 
In summary, the foregoing argument implies that firms can make decisions to position themselves 
within a market, and in the process make decisions about acquiring and retaining resources, or 
blocking the access of rivals to such resources. 
3.5 ISSUES AFFECTING INTER-FIRM RELATIONSlllP FORMATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The issues discussed in the preceding pages are based on research carried out in industrialised 
countries. The chapter has drawn on a vast organisation behaviour literature which offers a general, 
although incomplete, framework within which to investigate firm behaviour. Yet, managing in 
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developing countries can be different, with idiosyncratic features and characteristics which have 
significant managerial implications. Managerial decision-making is different and takes place in a 
severely uncertain business environment which can be heavily influenced by the state, and is 
fraught with market failure. The political economy in many of these countries that is significantly 
influenced by large MNCs, which effectively form market oligopolies. Finally, the supplier base 
can often be weak and fraught with difficulties. 
(i) Difforences in managerial decision-making: Managerial decision-making in developing 
countries is somewhat different from that in Western countries (Austin, 1990). This affects the 
options available to managers, in addition to tempering organisational behaviour in general. 
Managerial decisions are less likely to be rational as competitiveness is likely to depend, not just 
on cost or differentiation of products, but on the extent to which a finn denies its competitors 
access to resources and markets. Consequently, power becomes an important guiding philosophy 
for managerial decision-making. It is expected, for example, that because of the need to access 
resources or deny them to rivals, efficiency and cost minirni sation could become secondary. 
In addition, information is difficult to access due to its importance as a tool for competition. 
Managers find it difficult to access information owned by others, thus exacerbating the situation. 
Cooperation and partnerships are, therefore, less likely in developing country contexts where 
managers are constrained by lack of information, or because of limited trust, do not share it. 
Vertical integration is, in this case, a plausible strategy for retaining technology or proprietary 
knowledge within a finn. 
(ii) Uncertain business environments: In his opening remarks to his book, Austin (1990) supports 
this contention, stating that "the fimdamental difference [from the developed world] is the 
distinctive nature of the business environment" . Also writing about the peculiarities of managing 
in developing countries, Kiggundu (1990) and others caution that there is need to view 
organisational behaviour in such countries differently, taking into consideration the complexity of 
the interplay between organisations and the state (Kiggundu, 1990; Tandon, 1982). Jaeger and 
Kanungo (1990), also agree with this view, implicitly emphasising organisational sensitivity to a 
given environment: 
"in fact, the survival and growth of an organisation depends on its developing an 
appropriate culture that can adequately respond to external environmental forces . .... .. In 
developing appropriate coping strategies, organisations must be sensitive to 
environmental constraints and opportunities. Such sensitivity implies identifying and 
responding to three major aspects of the environment (a) economic and technological, 
(b) political and legal, and (c) socio~ulturn1" (p.3) 
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These peculiarities include government controls, production difficulties, financial restrictions, 
skilled labour deficiencies, and mazket disruptions, among others. In addition, a volatile macro-
economic environment poses special problems, with firms having to contend with high inflation 
rates . Coupled with a tumultuous political environment, these factors can have debilitating effects 
on finns. Hence, in view of these differences in the business environments of developing 
countries, which add up to produce a relatively uncertain environment in addition to a high 
concentration of industry, organisational behaviour does not necessarily follow the Western model 
which generally assumes that firms operate in a relatively free mazket and that mazket failure is the 
exception rather than the norm. 
(Hi) The Role of State Influence: This study recognises that one of the salient features of 
developing countries is the role of the state, which Austin (1990) views as the 'mega-force' 
operating at the macro level. The actions of the state substitute for and change the dynamics of 
market forces, by occasionally intervening directly (through tariffi, licensing, etc.) to influence the 
adaptation choices and processes of firms within industries, thus changing the competitive 
environment drastically. In this discussion, the state influences organisational choices by limiting 
the alternatives available in the marlcet Import licensing, for example, plays an important role in 
limiting managerial choices about inputs, while employment restriction limit access to skilled 
manpower. Other restrictions governing ownership of resources such as capital and land also 
constrain managerial choices. Doner (1993) gives an apt and succinct account of the role of the 
state in the development of some South East Asian countries, highlighting the role of government 
legislation in the industrial development of these countries. Contrary to Western models of 
industrialisation which advocate for the reduction of state intervention, some countries such as 
Japan and Italy have thrived because of variants of it (porter, 1990). 
In many developing countries the state has also been a competitor in both strategic and non-
strategic industries, often introducing a different kind of industrial concentration by operating 
monopolies or supporting them as a strategy for attracting foreign investments. In most developing 
countries, state owned enterprises account for 70/0-15% of GDP, and 150/0-30% of gross fixed 
capital fonnation (Rumamurti, 1987). Through state owned enterprises, they control the activities 
of these industries, provide employment, and use them as principal foreign exchange earners. This 
economic importance has, necessarily, motivated most governments to give significant support to 
these enterprises, mainly in the form of protection, and preferential access to productive resources. 
Austin (1990) also documents the role of the state in dictating domestic content in production 
activities, in effect controlling the sourcing possibilities in many industries. Doner (l993) also 
gives the examples of Malaysia, Thailand and Korea in positing that the motives of economic 
nationalism have led these governments to legislate the levels and nature of local content to be 
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used in some industries. The result, he argues, is a laIger indigenous supplier base, with more 
'local' technologies used. Kenya has followed a similar policy in the motor vehicle industry (GOK, 
1989) although with limited success. At the micro- level, it is concerned with the strategic 
decision of where and how to obtain resources, and the necessary governance structures for these 
activities. At the macro level, this strategy involves the political economy and the management 
and distribution of resources and markets, particularly the process of brugaining, negotiation or 
edict which balance the power structure within the system. 
Having said that, the state is not altogether a negative force in development. Current market 
orientation approaches to economic development advocate less 'interference' by the state, yet, 
recent experiences of the South East Asian countries offer a compelling, although qualified, 
rationale for state guidance in economic development. Authors such as Wade (1988) rugue that in 
fact, the state can play a positive role in the industrialisation process by prescribing conducive 
business environments and 'guiding' resource use for predetermined periods in the country's 
development process. 
(iv) The role ofMNCs in the Political Economy: Another important consideration is the influence 
of foreign direct investment (FDl) in developing countries, particularly through the operations of 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs). As buyers and suppliers, they constitute a lruge proportion of 
the industries in which they operate, in rnany cases having monopoly status. Even in industries 
where competition exists, the collective power of competitors is generally lower, particularly when 
the competitors are local firms without access to the global marketing strategies available to 
MNCs. In many cases, they are also an important force in the political economy of these countries. 
An important consideration is their ability to source their requirements from a network of local and 
foreign associated firms. By virtue of their international nature, intra-finn transfers are to be 
expected. In addition, because they generally have access to foreign capital, technology and skilled 
manpower, MNCs often operate at a higher level of profitability than local finns . They can create 
competition through global strategies, thus achieving levels of profitability that are not possible for 
local firms operating in, often, depressed local economies only . These factors, among others, often 
create animosity within the local community, based on the rugument that such firms have an 
'unfait share oftb.e economy. Writing about the role and impact ofMNCs in Kenya, for example, 
Kaplinsky (1978) maintains that they are important to the extent that they comprise ot: laIgely, 
foreign capital; and control a lruge proportion of the resources and internal markets in Kenya 
Consequently, national economic power is perceived to be vested in the hands of foreigners, 
engendering economic nationalistic sentiments among the locals. MNCs also command a laIge 
proportion of capital investment in many developing countries. For example, in 1992 in Kenya, 
about 70% of capital investment in manufacturing was accountable to foreign owned firms, a lruge 
proportion of whom are MNCs. In effect, therefore, MNCs control the industrial activity of many 
67 
developing countries. This scenario has engendered an adversarial relationship between MNCs, 
which are often large businesses, and local finns, which are often smaller businesses. 
(v) Market failure: A related factor to (iv) above is the high concentration of industry in many 
developing countries. There is maIket failure in many industries, precipitated by a policy structure 
which still rewards (or omits to sanction) large size and concentration. Consequently, the level of 
competition is low with many industries having small numbers of buyers or suppliers. In addition 
to infonnation scarcity (Austin, 1990) maIkets often fail because of such low levels of 
competition, government 'interference' in the private sector through controls and restrictions, and 
the lack of resources for potential local investors. Consequently, high levels of concentration in 
many industries have occurred. Concentration also has the effect of limiting 'incentives' for firms 
to be competitive as the high levels of protection discourage managers from seeking efficiency 
improvements. If developing countries industrialisation is to benefit from the ongoing global 
process of large finn de-integration, concentration has to be reduced. But first, the perceived risks 
of external trading must be removed through the increase of buyers and sellers as a strategy for 
reducing maIket failure . 
Austin (op. cit) cites various studies indicating the nature and extent of problems encountered by 
manufacturers who wish to procure inputs domestically in . developing countries. Studies of the 
South East Asian countries' electronic industry, for example, note that according to manufacturers 
in these countries, the largest problems of electronic component suppliers are insufficient quality 
(33%); high cost (17%); different product control standards (15%); and delivery delays (10%). A 
study in Singapore in 1978 also reported a 75% rejection rnte of local producers in contrast to a 
0% rnte of Japanese suppliers operating in the same country. In addition, the Singapore suppliers 
prices were 40% higher than those in South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong (Austin, 1990). This 
means that given prevailing conditions, buyers have a case against local sourcing. Austin (op. cit) 
also argues, for example, that manufacturers generally use imported inputs as a way of bypassing 
the deficiencies oflocal suppliers. At the macro-level, one approach currently being used in some 
developing countries is de-reguIation to allow entry into existing national monopolies and 
oligopolies. It is also expected that internationalisation of maIkets will increase the number of 
buyers and sellers in developing country environments. 
(vi) The Weakness of the local SME sector as suppliers: Vertical integration is often attributed to 
market failure caused by a small number of suppliers, or the inability of existing suppliers to meet 
the needs of buyers. The small and infonnal sector businesses, expected to serve as the major 
suppliers within many industries in developing countries are perceived to be largely inefficient. 
This can be attributed to the limited access to productive resources, and the use of highly labour 
intensive production modes which tend to be incongruent with the quality and technological 
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requirements of 'modem' large businesses (Austin, 1990). The quality of the products of this sector 
are often said to be low owing to the low levels of capitalisation and access to productive resources 
and skilled labour. 
Finally, the a discussion about managerial decision-making behaviour in developing countries 
would not be complete without a discussion about the scarcity of infonnation. The vel)' paucity of 
research infonnation about organisational behaviour in developing countries limits the extent to 
which such relations can be hypothesised, modelled and used. First, little research has been carried 
out on the behaviour of organisations in developing countries generally. Consequently, little 
inforrilation exists to guide managerial decision-making in the peculiar environment outlined in 
the preceding paragraphs. In addition, no studies are available to explain inter-finn relationships in 
a developing country context. It is even less clear why large finns in developing countries fonn 
linkages, if any, with small finns . 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that in order to understand inter-finn linkages between large and small 
finns, it is critical to understand why or not finn enter into these relationships. To this end, this 
chapter has examined the generic and specific conditions detennining inter""rganisational 
relationships. Several approaches to understanding inter-firm relationship formation have been 
discussed, including the transaction cost, organisational learning, and strategic behavioural 
approaches. Based on the proposition that inter-finn relationships are essentially managerial 
decision activities about resource allocation aimed at facilitating competitive advantage, the 
strategic behavioural approach was favoured. As a result, the competitive dynamics of the finn 
were explored, arguing that the resourcing decisions of finns are geared towards securing a 
superior competitive advantage. Table 3-2 brings together the issues raised in this chapter. 
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Table 3-2 Managerial Ration ales for JOR Formation 
Rationale for IOR Formation Explanation 
1. Competitive advantage The overriding rationale for managerial 
action. It assumes that all managerial 
decisions are aimed at competitive 
advantage either through production or 
supplier chain management (porter, 1980; 
1985) 
2. Economies of scale and rationalisation of Implies the search for lower average costs 
production (core competence) from larger volume and comparative 
advantage of 'partner where scale 
economies are important. 
3. Flexibility The search for production, labour and 
resource flexibility. (eg Atkinson, 1985) 
4. Blocking competition or entry The defensive action by fums to pre~pt 
competition, or to erect entry barriers for 
competitors (Vickers, 1985; Vemon, 1983). 
5. Meeting government mandated Compliance with government regulations 
investment or trade barriers reganling, among other things, local 
content, access to markets, or access to 
certain resources (Whetten, 1981; 
Leblebichi an Salancik, 1982). 
6. Access and defence of resources and In competitive business environments, inter- · 
markets £inn relationships are used instead of 
internal development of capacity. Secondly, 
a 'partner' may have access to markets and 
resources not available to the other (Forre~ 
1990; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
7. Risk reduction (reduction of fixed costs, Includes reduction of fixed costs to other 
lowers capital investment, etc.). sources. In other cases, this includes 
portfolio diversification without increasing 
investment costs. 
Obviously, each of these factors has a 'flip' side. Although they are presented here as important for 
inter-fum relationship fonnation, they may also apply for vertical integration depending on 
management's perception of the certainty or uncertainty of the business environment. Arguably, 
for example, when managers are faced with an uncertain business environment which affects their 
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access to resources or maIkets, they are likely to integrate vertically in order to assure their supply. 
Risk reduction could mean reducing the dependence on 'external' sources for resources and 
markets. Hence, these factors must be assessed within the frameworks of the business environment 
described by Harrigan (1985) and Casson (1987) in preceding paragraphs. 
Clearly, inter-finn relationships are perceived as a vehicle for resource acquisition. The structural 
implications of inter-finn relationships are also important. It must also be noted that it is possible 
for the finn to make the decision to outsource, but find the structural implications of sourcing too 
complicated, or that the industry cannot provide the required infrastructure to support external 
sourcing (Harrigan, 1984). Hence, in seeking to develop inter-finn relationships between large and 
small finns, it is pertinent to understand the relevant structural adjustment used to co~rdinate 
production organisation through external sources structures. 
Although the approaches discussed here provide a useful starting point in "explaining" inter-finn 
relationship fonnation, two shortcomings must be noted. These theories have been developed by 
studying relationships between large, often public sector organisations in developed countries . 
Hence, little is known about the nature of inter-finn relationship foonation between large and 
small private finns in such countries. The study sought to explore, therefore, those factors relevant 
in a developing coun1Iy context. In addition, no specific studies have been undertaken to "explain" 
inter-finn relationship foonation between finns in developing coun1Iy contexts. It is argued that 
inter-finn relationship formation in developing countries will take different patterns, for various 
reasons such as state involvement. With this in mind, it is hoped that this study begins to address 
these gaps. However, it must be emphasised that this chapter does not seek to provide a conceptual 
model, but only highlights the salient issues in analysing the reasons why firms form inter-finn 
relationships. 
The next chapter, four, examines some pertinent issues raised in this chapter in two examples of 
inter-finn relationship contexts - the Japanese and European vehicle industries. These examples 
were selected because of their prominence in the inter -finn relationship literature, and also because 
of the particular interest of this research in the motor vehicle indus1Iy of a developing coun1Iy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS IN THE MOTOR INDUSTRY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter three examined some issues raised in the literature about inter-firm relationship fonnation . 
In no other sector of industry are inter-firm relationships, particularly subcontracting and joint 
ventures, more documented than in the motor vehicle industry. Due to this and the study's specific 
interest in the motor vehicle industry, this chapter reviews the nature and status of these relations 
and the lessons which can be drnwn from it. On the whole, the literature suggests that there are 
three major reasons for the emergence of inter-firm relationships, particularly in the Japanese 
approach to auto-manufacture: JIT manufacturing techniques: the adoption of TQC procedures; 
and the adoption of simultaneous engineering. The first two have immediate relevance to Kenya, 
but because the country is at an early stage of manufacture, the third reason may not be 
immediately relevant. 
The chapter begins by first reviewing the production philosophies and techniques which have 
developed within the global motor vehicle industry in this century. Since Henry Ford and the mass 
production epoch, the industry seems to have shifted in the past decade towards a less integrated 
production paradigm which has long been used by the Japanese. The chapter highlights this 
continuing restructuring of production organisation in the global motor vehicle industry and 
suggests that inter-finn relations in this industry can be attributed, largely, to this restructuring as 
finns seek global competitiveness. The chapter also reviews the nature and implications of inter-
firm relationships in the Japanese and Western (American and European) models. The American 
and European models are largely based on a somewhat similar pattern of production organisation, 
and can therefore be regarded as adopting similar strategies in pursuit of competitiveness. On the 
other hand, the Japanese model is generally regarded as significantly different in basis and 
approach and is treated separately. Thus, although in both cases the overriding motivation for 
production restructuring in the motor vehicle industry is documented as the search for 
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competitiveness, the Japanese have adopted a different strategy from the Western manufucturers .!O 
In essence, the Japanese have adopted an obligational approach to buyer-supplier relations, 
resulting in 'partnership' sourcing, while the western model adopts a generally arms-length 
approach. Although it is clear that not all auto manufacturers adopt partnership sourcing 
approaches, it has been documented by Tumbull (1991) and others that this descrepancy accounts 
for Japan's superior productivity in the automobile industry. 
In order to incorporate other dimensions relevant in developing countries, this chapter also reviews 
some East Asian motor vehicle industry literature which suggests that state intervention through 
mandatory soureing practices account for most of the inter-finn relationships in the industry. In 
addition, the need to control scarce resources and markets makes efficiency considerations 
somewhat secondary to having control of resources and markets (market power). Hence strategic 
positioning becomes dependent on such control., or denying competitors the very resources which 
make them competitive. 
4.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MOTOR VEIDCLE INDUSTRY 
4.2.1 OVERVIEW 
In no other industry or subsector have inter-finn linkages, particularly subcontracting, been more 
extensively used and documented than in the motor vehicle industry. Particularly well documented 
are the Japanese, American, and more recently, European vehicle industries which highlight its 
importance in the economic development of these countries. 1bis is not coincidental. The 
importance and impact of the motor vehicle industry has been both ubiquitous and pervasive. l ! It 
has also experienced some important changes in production organisation, in effect generally 
changing the way goods are produced and sold. 1bis section first highlights the importance of this 
industry and then discusses these changes. 
10. The most often cited example is that of the US and Japanese automobile industries which used 
significantly differing strategies to cope with changing demand patterns which called for flexibility. 
Faced with growing competition from the Japanese, three US auto firms invested heavily ($US 70 
billion) in automation believing this to be the answer to the volatile demand patterns. This did not arrest 
the erosion of their madcet share. The difference in perfonnance was explained by the different 
organisational frameworlcs within which similar automation was used in Japanese plants (Jaikmnar, 
1986). 
11 . For a more thorough examination of its pervasive natnre, and an analysis of jts impact on production 
approaches, see Womack et aL (1990). A more general overview is adequately covered in Kenney and 
Florida (1993). Odaka (1984) also presents a good analysis of the SouthEast Asian car industry. 
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4.2.2 THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
More than forty years ago, Drucker (1946) dubbed it "the industry of industries". Since then, the 
motor vehicle industry continues to be the world's leading manufu.cturing activity, producing more 
than 50 million vehicles every year (Womack: et. al. 1990),12 with ex.1ensive backward and 
forward linkages with other industries. It has also long been considered a global paradigm industry 
where production and management techniques have been born and tested, and changes in 
industrialisation strategies initiated. Twice this century, the motor vehicle industry has 
revolutionised production paradigms, moving from craft production to mass production, and more 
recently to 'lean' or 'flexible' production, in event changing social, political, economic, and 
institutional structures. A simple but succinct summary of the importance of the motor vehicle 
industry is contained in the title of the analytical book resulting from five years of study of the 
international motor vehicle industry by Womack: and his colleagues at MIT, Boston - "the machine 
that changed the world" . 
The industry has also been critical in propelling the industrialisation strategies of many countries. 
For instance, Japanese and American industrialisation strategies are based on it (Womack et. al., 
1990). Japan has also long used it to model production techniques, and labour processes. As a 
result, based on Japan's economic performance as an indicator of the soundness of its economic 
development strategies, many countries in Europe and Asia have followed this exemplar. For 
example, countries of the Pacific Rim view the development of the motor vehicle industry as a 
logical strategy for faster growth in the manufacturing sector owing to its extensive linkages with 
other subsecton;, particularly related parts, components and electronics subsecton; (Doner, 1993). 
Although many other developing countries also follow this exemplar, their motor industries are 
perhaps less prominent in their industrialisation processes, partly because of the relatively small 
size of the activities of their vehicle industries, and partly because these industries are 
predominately assembly rather than manufacturing based. Kenya, for example, although 
recognising the importance of this subsector as a 'hub' of industrial development (GOK, 1983), has 
not been able to achieve scale economies (Coughlin, 1988) because of the small domestic market 
12. Womack and his colleagues at MIT, Massachusetts report the results of a global five year programme 
on the future of the automobile industry under the International Motor Vehicle Industry Programme 
(IMVP) at MIT. The main objective of the programme was to learn from Japanese teclmiques and 
approaches on how to improve efficiency and productivity in the global motor industry, with a view to 
drawing lessons for application in other industries. The term 'lean production' was coined by John 
Krafcik, one of the team leaden>, as a descriptor of what was seen as the anti-thesis of mass production, 
arguing that it is mass production which was to blame for the gross inefficiencies in many industries of 
many countries, and that lean production is the answer to global economic stagnation. For a more 
detailed discussion of the project background and results, see Womaek et al (1990). 
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with an annual estimated demand of20,000 for new vehicles. Arguably, these low demand levels, 
and the predominately assembly activities make inter-industry linkages less extensive than those 
evident in Japan, South East Asia, Europe and America. The proliferation of makes and models 
has exacerbated the situation further by fragmenting the small markets even further. Consequently, 
scale economies have been difficult to achieve in new vehicle production, and the parts and 
components industry has tended to remain relatively undeveloped, tending to service the 
replacement market rather than the new vehicle market. In many of the developing countries, even 
this replacement market for parts and components has been seriously affected by the prolific 
importation of vehicles from all over the world (Doner, 1993). In Kenya, for example, KM! (1990) 
reports that upto three hundred different makes and models ply the roads, fifty seven of these 
assembled in Kenya by three vehicle assemblers. Evidently, the result is a vicious cycle affecting 
local sourcing of parts and components, where the supplier base continues to be weak (Masai. 
1991), resulting in input market failure . Thus, assemblers are discouraged from local sourcing. 
In production organisation terms, the Western and Japanese motor industries are founded on the 
principles developed, tested and disseminated by Henry Ford with his Model T, and Alfred Sloan 
of General Motors after World War I. Indeed, the philosophy and principles of mass production 
moved the world from centuries of craft manufacturing to mass production. Institutional, social, 
and political structures changed to reflect the changes in work patterns, and work relations. Mass 
production became synonymous with IF ordisml, which in turn became synonymous with laxge size 
and scale economies. In turn, based on traditional economic principles, any inter-firm relationships 
were, and have continued to be, based on cost minimisation and profit maximisation achieved 
mainly through high volumes and long production runs. As the practice of mass production 
became more familiar to manufucturers large corporations were fonned, and most requirements 
were internalised in these corporations. These explanations of the development of mass production 
indicate that for various reasons, external transactions were cautiously used. In the recent past, 
however, this production organisation has altered. The increased search for higher productivity and 
efficiency are altering the way finns in the industry organise themselves for productive activities, 
and in the process altering industrial structure. These changes are not only taking place inside 
finns, but also in the relationships between finns, and in the macro~nvironment. 
4.2.3 REsTRUCTURING OF PRODUCTION ORGANISATION IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
INDUSlRY: SOME ISSUES 
It is widely documented that in search of competitive advantage, and as a strategy for survival in a 
hostile environment, finns are changing their strategies at the organisational level (Hoffinan and 
Kaplinsky, 1988; Kenney and Florida, 1993). Various studies note the increased flexibility of 
firms (Kaplinsky, 1988) and the adoption of 'flexible I production techniques such as JIT, TQM, as 
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well as simultaneous engineering (Womack et. al., 1990). Consequently, the manufucturing, 
organisational structures, and human resource management approaches have changed 10 introduce 
flexibility in order to increase productivity. This in turn has led to increasing inter-finn 
dependencies as finns use more external sources for outputs. Although changes at the macro-level 
are, less obvious (Kaplinsky, 1988), the importance of national efficiency rather than merely plant 
level efficiency are recognised. In Europe and America, there are changes in the incentive system 
to encourage finns to adopt lean production (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991). They argue, for example, 
that national policies are important in providing the right signals for finns to adopt new production 
approaches. 
Hence, by changing the production paradigm, Eiji Toyoda and Taichi Ohno of Toyota Motor 
company have triggered changes in social, political and production activities and the institutions 
which run them (Womack et. al., 1990). In simple terms, their production techniques introduced a 
system of production OJ:ganisation which differed significantly from the western mass production 
model. While the paradigmatic framewOIk has come to be known as 'flexible production', the 
production organisation has come to be known in western literatme as 'lean production' (W omack 
et. al ., 1990). It should be noted at this juncture, that these tenns have generated considernble 
controversy regarding the theoretical argument about the flexible specialisation paradigm (eg. 
Pollert, 1988). Although acknowledging this controversy, this study does not intend to analyse the 
soundness of their theoretical basis as it is beyond its scope. Rather, it proceeds from the point that 
changes have certainly taken place, and finns are more 'lean' and are more 'flexible' than they have 
been. Finns have fragmented, de-scaled, and increased their dependence on inter-firm relationships 
as part of their competitive strategy. 
As a result of the above changes, and in response to altered demand structures in many 
industries,13 production organisation and inter-finn relations in the sector have altered. It is within 
this framework that, a growing body of Japanese and European literature highlights the changes in 
the production and labour processes of the sector to more flexible fonns of organisation. Its main 
thrust is the thesis that there is potential for productivity increases derived ~m restructuring 
production activity. This literature particularly focuses on lean production as a strategy for 
increasing productivity by controlling costs, using Japanese production and management 
techniques such as just-in-time sourcing systems, flexible production, automation and robotmnion, 
total quality management techniques, continuous product and process improvement and flexible 
labour processes. 
13. HofIman and Kaplinsky (1988) offer an interesting discussion of the changing rank ordering of 
preferences in the automobile industry. 
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Arguably, therefore, the general restrncturing in the motor vehicle industry accounts for most of 
the inter-finn linkages occurring in that industry as finns scale down and use subcontractors more. 
Thus, the central elements of this new production organisation can be summarised at various 
levels: maxket fragmentation and model proliferation compel firms to use reflexive strategies; 
production organisation restructuring and changes in sourcing activity; spatial economies and 
location of suppliers; and the nature of competition. 
Market fragmentation and model proliferation 
The genesis of restructuring of production organisation in industry in general is the fragmentation 
of maxkets in the face of shifting tastes (Bessant, 1991; Hoffinan and Kaplinsky, 1988), and 
proliferation is a consequence of this variety and shifting nature of customer tastes. Although this 
development has had positive implications for the restructuring of the motor vehicle industry in 
developed countries where the industrial infrastructure is developed sufficiently to cope with the 
high levels of variability expected as a result of variability in consumer tastes, it has had a 
somewhat negative impact in developing countries. 
Writing about the South East Asian countries, Doner (1993) argues that model proliferation has 
been a challenge to the motor industries of these countries as " .. .numerous, rapidly changing 
models [have] led to maxket fragmentation in most LDCs' auto industries. The large number of 
assembly plants results in tremendous excess capacity." (p409) He also cites a similar situation in 
the case of the Latin American automobile industries as discussed by Jenkins (1977). In Kenya, 
Masai (1991) and Coughlin (1988) have associated the decline in the parts and components 
supplier base with the makes and model proliferation, arguing that with such a proliferation, it is 
difficult for assemblers to achieve scale economies and for suppliers to acquire adequate skills for 
quality improvement. Consequently, there has been a repeated argument for rationalisation of the 
vehicle industries of most developing countries, while recognising the political and social dangers 
of restricting the society's access to goods and services. This is coupled with the realisation that 
those involved in auto assembly in developing countries have sufficient political influence to resist 
exclusion of particular makes and models, even in small maxket niches. Arguably, such small 
marlcets should atrophy through natural marlcet forces . However, as Doner (1993) points out this is 
not the case. Even the Japanese manufacturers in Asian countries cling tenaciously to such low 
volume marlcet niches due to their rivalry with other finns, a belief in the long tenn Asian auto 
maxkets, extensive financial reserves, adoption of new technologies to fragmented marlcets, and 
cross financing from high-volume/high profit to low-volumellow profit models. Clearly, marlcet 
fragmentation and model proliferation in developing countries does not serve to promote supplier 
development as it limits the extent to which local suppliers can accumulate adequate experience 
and specialisation to meet the quality standards required by buyers. 
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In Asian countries, these problems have been addressed by attempting to expand the scale of 
production through assistance to supplier finns, or reduce capacity under-utilisation. Doner (1993) 
states that this has been done, largely, by imposing limits on the number of makes and models, 
and the frequency of model changes; and/or promoting the standardisation of parts among different 
models and/or brands (standardisation). The levels of success vary greatly. South Korea is reported 
to have been the most successful, followed by Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, and lastly the 
Philippines. Doner explains this as a function of state intervention in varying degrees. He 
hypothesises that, for example, in the South Korean case, "success is due less to state-imposed 
directives than to a complicated bargaining process between state and private sector" (Doner, 
1993:409). This implies that mandating alone is not an adequate strategy for dealing with 
problems facing the sector. In Malaysia, on the other hand, although success has come more 
recently, its efforts "were undermined by the state's own need to provide economic opportunities 
for Malay capital. Ethnic politics took precedence over efficiency, and this meant allowing new 
Malay entrants into the assembly sector" (Doner, 1993:409). In Thailand, the Philippines and 
Indonesia, pressure from influential assemblers makes a mockery of state imposed limits on makes 
and models, despite support for those limits by local parts finns and some assemblers. 
Consequently, officials have reverted to quasi-market strategies where the increasing costs of 
localisation drive out those makes and models with low volume sales. Three major faults of this 
approach to localisation can be identified: it assumes that localisation can take place without first 
limiting makes and models; it supposes that all foreign assemblers are sensitive to the costs of 
localisation; and neglects the domestic political costs of excluding influential entrepreneurs. 
(Doner, 1993). Clearly, therefore, decisions about sourcing are not simple, rational choices about 
the most cost efficient alternative strategy. Rather, they are about political choices by various 
actors in industrial sectors. This contradicts Wtlliarnson's (1975) contention that cost minimisation 
is the primary motivation for inter-firm linkages. 
This latter scenario is similar to that reported in Kenya The short-tennist attitude of some 
franchise holders makes it difficult to control the makes and models coming into the country 
(KMI). The demand for imported second-hand vehicles, has made it even more difficult to· 
implement a rationalisation programme. Thus, the statist thesis for the control of makes and 
models is valid - a strong state is a vital requirement for rationalisation, but it must be supported 
by large business groups which in part promote their own efficiency, initiate model limits, and 
encourage standardisation of parts and components to serve their own needs. It must also recognise 
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the importance of conducive national ruling coalitions. 14 In the Kenyan motor vehicle industry, for 
example, the decision-making power of the importer/distributor category (see chapter five) make it 
imperative that their commercial objectives be incorporated in any rationalisation strategy as their 
returns depend on 'spreading' their scope into as many market segments as possible. 
In summary, although the fragmentation of markets is often cited as a precursor to lean production 
or flexible production in developed economies, it has apparent detrimental effects on the general 
development of their motor industries. On the other hand, it can be argued that it is precisely these 
fragmented markets that would make it easier for developing countries to adopt lean production 
organisation much more easily than developed countries which have had to change their 
orientation from mass to flexible production. Developing countries can build fresh structures 
which incorporate this dis-aggregated approach to production organisation by developing 
industries exclusively based, initially, on SMEs and assisting these to expand. It must be noted, 
however, that it is this same fragmentation which is likely to restrict the extent to which external 
suppliers can be used, since, if they exist at all, they are themselves likely to be 'underdeveloped'. 
Clearly, this taises the question of the wisdom of developing the motor vehicle industry in other 
developing countries with similar characteristics. So fur, the only logical explanation is that of 
economic nationalism. Argmnents of efficiency are not necessarily relevant at this stage, hence, 
the costs oflocalisation are likely to be high. 
Production organisation 
As stated in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, an important development in the restructuring 
process is the new fonn of production organisation adopted to meet the changing demand patterns. 
The first reaction to market fragmentation by Western vehicle manufacturers was to automate to 
allow producers to deal with the high variety and high quality demanded by consumers. More 
recently, they have combined automation and new organisational fonns to achieve even higher 
flexibility (Womack et. al., 1990), an approach already used by the Japanese in their motor vehicle 
industry. Particularly interesting for this study are the quasi-integration strategies, such as joint 
ventures, strategic alliances, franchising, licensing, and asset ownership contracts, which allow 
14. For a discussion of the various coalitions pertinent in Asian countries, see Doner (1993:414). The 
Phillipino case outlined here closely resembles the Kenyan case. The importance of foreign capital in 
Marco's ruling coalition was too great to allow the exclusion of foreign assemblers when he attempted 
to create the Phillipino version of the Japanese Zaibatsu (Supplier co~peratives) . Kenney and Florida 
(1993:151) document the fonnation of a similar kind of co~erative in the USA - the Bluegrass 
Automotive Manufacturer's Association (BAMA), whim was formed by Toyota in 1990 to help create 
a state~f-the-art JIT supplier infrastructure for the company's Georgetown, Kentucky, assembly 
operation. 
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managers to access inputs and markets at lower capital costs, but offer greater productive 
flexibility. Such mechanisms allow managers to exchange certain goods, services, infonnation, or 
expertise while maintaining fonnal trade relationships with others. In addition, the finns concemed 
can retain their separate corporate identities while avoiding antitrust prosecution. 
Production re-organisation has also taken place at the level of technology, consequently affecting 
work organisation. The division between R&D and the operational functions of the organisation 
have long defined the limits of inter-function interaction. Product improvement was the function of 
the R&D department, which in turn depended on the quality control departments (Kaplinsky, 
1988). With restructured production, this distinction has become obscure as firms buy in R&D 
from other firms. In the UK for example, small technology firms provide a substantial proportion 
of technology to large firms through strategic alliances and partnerships (Forrest, 1990). In 
addition, the JIT system of inventory management and related concepts of 'zero defects' bring the 
activities of manufacturers and suppliers closer than they have been before. Quality control has, 
therefore, become ubiquitous in the whole production chain, and buyer-supplier relations have had 
to become even more 'intimate'. This theme is followed up in the the subsequent section. 
Additionally, because quasi-integrated organisational forms of production are now used, 
'employees' concemed with any particular process could be scattered over several. firms and 
geographical areas, again, reinforcing the need for closer co-operation between suppliers and 
buyers. 
The nature of buyer-supplier relations 
Changes have also occurred at the level of inter-finn relations since firms need to rely on outside 
suppliers due to the changed forms of production. Kenney and Florida (1993) for example, give an 
account of how joint ventures and subcontracting relationships have increased in the American 
motor vehicle industry as a result of JIT techniques being adopted by American and Japanese 
transplant manufacturers. They cite the results of a survey by a leading automobile trade journal 
which found that 57% of all automotive suppliers are involved in joint ventures with vehicle 
manufacturers. Consequently, mutual dependency has become important. However, this is 
predicated on the existence and the quality of the supplier infrastructure. The Japanese supplier 
infrastructure in the motor vehicle industry was developed alongside the activities of the major 
vehicle manufacturers (Smitka, 1991). Hence, the use of external suppliers has not been limited by 
a limited supplier base. In the USA, although despite a well developed supplier base in the parts 
and components industries, they have not been specifically linked to particular vehicle 
manufacturers. On the other hand, the Japanese transplants in the USA have promoted specific 
relationships with suppliers by 'building' a tier of suppliers for their specific needs (Kenney and 
Florida, 1993). As will be seen later, this is has been less the case in developing countries. 
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In the West, changes in buyer-supplier development are moving away from anns length 
contractual relations (ACR) to the obligational type of contractual relations (OCR) described by 
Sako (1992) in her schema The important elements in this schema are the level of trust, which is 
executed through a higher level of infonnation exchange and 'trusting' behaviour such as single 
sourcing~ technology transfer, and risk sharing. Kenney and Florida (1993 :141) report, for 
example, that in the US motor vehicle industry, "[Japanese] transplant suppliers share information 
and interact with assemblers", on design, production techniques and quality control. They add that 
"transplant assemblers also wolk closely with equipment suppliers to ensure that both assembly-
line machinery and processing equipment are tailored to their needs" (P142). In the VI(, Tumbull 
et. al. (1992) note a similar approach by the Japanese transplant Nissan, while the indigenous 
British £inn Rover still uses anns-Iength relations. Clearly, inventory management considerations 
have meant that buyers and suppliers have to wolk as closely as possible in order to achieve 
maximum benefit. 
Spatial economies and location of suppliers 
There have also been changes in the relative importance of the spatial location of suppliers. 
Kenney and Florida (1993) argue that the extensive dispersal of US Automotive Components 
suppliers, for example, has been a consequence of the anns-Iength character of Fordist supplier 
relations which emphasise low cost and disregard proximity. Consequently, suppliers are selected 
on the basis of price which covers all related costs. In the UK, Tumbull et. al. (1992) attribute 
these to the "ethos of short-tenn, competitive relations"(p166). On the other hand proximity and 
density of suppliers are considered important for JIT which characterises the changes in production 
re~rganisation. Casumano (1985) notes, for example, that Toyota in Japan has had more success 
than Nissan with its JIT implementation because its customers are closer, and more concentrated. 
At Nissan (UK) for example, a different pattern emerges. Out of 198 suppliers in 1992, 130 were 
from all over the UK, 29 from Gennany, 13 from France, 11 from Spain, 3 each from Belgium 
and Ireland, and one each from Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Even those located in 
the UK were widely spread in the country. Despite being located in the North East of EngJand, 46 
of its suppliers in 1992 were from the Midlands, 26 from the North East, 23 from the South East, 
19 from Wales, 9 from the North West, 6 from Yotkshire, 4 from Scotland, and 1 from Ireland. 
Oearly, the proximity thesis for JIT implementation stands to question. One likely explanation is 
the advanced communication infrastructure in Britain and Europe, allowing frequent deliveries. 
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Another angle to the argument is that although spatial proximity is important in inter-finn 
relationships such as subcontracting,15 and JIT, the proximity to final maIkets is even more 
important. Segments of the vertical integration literature argue that finns have often integrated 
because they believe that they can derive economic benefits in those stages of production where 
there is a high value added - usually in the forward stages closer to the customer. However, it is 
not the closeness to the customer, or the high value added which are important. What matters is the 
economic surplus - the return in excess of full costs of being in the business, including a fuir return 
on capital (Stuck.ey and White, 1993). Closeness to suppliers or customers may satisfy this 
condition, but can only do so if the potential for combined value derived from supplier, as well as 
consumer proximity is exploited. The Japanese approach to production organisation is based on 
economic surpluses rather than on closeness to customers per se. Consequently, for example, 
while frequency of delivery required by the JIT production approaches are important, suppliers are 
not limited to a particular spatial location although this is the current mode of organisation. The 
use of multinationals and the increasing use of transplants in other countries demonstrates that 
value lies in the combined proximity of consumers and suppliers. The most important factor 
facilitating JIT is, therefore, an efficient communication system - transport infrastructure, 
telecommunication, and an efficient internal organisational framework for infonnation exchange. 
The question of the proximity of suppliers, and its relationship to the quality and performance of a 
supplier, has particular relevance for developing countries. Given the poor nature of infrastructure 
in many of these countries, suppliers would necessarily want to locate near assemblers if the JIT 
system, or any other fonn of production organisation which requires outsourcing, is to be efficient. 
According to Ramirez (1993), in Mexico, for example, the relationships between assemblers and 
suppliers have changed the national geography through the spatial restructuring taking place 
around production plants. The Ford Hennasillo plant requires many suppliers to make two 
deliveries a day, and given Mexico's transport system, and the fact that suppliers are fined $20,000 
a minute for delays which cause stoppages, many suppliers have located near the plant. 
The nature of competition 
In industrialised countries, changes have also occurred at the level of competition. The basis for 
competition has changed from price to quality and product differentiation. Consequently, 
15. Some geographical literature argues that suppliers have tended to locate close to their buyers. However, 
the advantages of proximity due to savings in transportation and storage, are not primaty to soUTeing 
decisions. Nissan car manufactmers in Sunderland, Washington, for example, have suppliers from all 
over Europe, but still use the JIT system of procurement Bethlehem (1993), for example, argues that 
. proximity to customers might be more primary. He gives an account of the paper industry as locating 
near the customers rather than near the pulp processing regions. 
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competitiveness measured by the value delivered to the consumer, and also the extent to which a 
finn can access a large number of market segments. In addition, because of the longer-tenn 
financial outlook in the lean production paradigm, market share expansion is based on product 
diversity (niching) rnther than on extensive market coverage using lower-priced undifferentiated 
products. As already noted in preceding chapters, two common themes important to this thesis run 
through these changes. The emphasis on flexibility in response to the breaking up of mass markets 
and subsequent market segmentation. Competition is therefore on the level of scope, and ability to 
serve as many market niches as possible. Consequently, high product differentiation is demanded 
by the nature of the market. Secondly, the growing importance of the dis-aggregated organisational 
components of production imply that the organisation has to re-structure to deal with such high 
differentiation. These changes fundamentally recognise the primacy of organisational change in 
addition to the changes taking place at various levels of productive restructuring (Kaplinsky, 
1988). 
At inter-finn level, because of the need to control inventory costs and to outsource, the efficient 
use of outside suppliers has become imperative and competitiveness is defined by the access to 
good quality, reliable suppliers, or denying competitors access to such suppliers (porter, 1985). 
Hence, merely having more efficient production techniques is not enough for competitiveness. It 
has become important to have more efficient relationships with suppliers of inputs and distributors 
of outputs. The importance of the whole of the supply and distribution chains are emphasised. 
Consequently, as noted above, the buyer-supplier relationship is increasingly changing from an 
adversarial one based on price, to a co~perative one based on collective competitiveness through 
customer satisfaction (and resultant loyalty). For example, in the Japanese model where 'zero 
defects' means that the supplier has to wolk closely with the buyer in order to achieve the quality 
and delivery standards required, short-tenn cost minimisation is not important As Sako (1992) 
notes, buyers often 'invest' time and personnel in making sure that the supplier's product meets the 
quality standards required without any rejects. 
In the western model, the concept of 'zero defects' does not exist. Instead, the quality of products 
is controlled at the end of the production process, often too late to make alterntions. For the 
supplier, it is only the quality approved items which enter the buyer's production process. For 
example, Tumbull et. al (1992) note that in the OK, manufacturers have adopted 'bastardised' 
fonns of JIT where warehouses are located close to the plant (eg. Rover at Cowley), timed 
deliveries made to the buyer's plant and invoices made only when parts enter into the assembly 
plant Hence, the supplier has to bear the cost of defects ip addition to the warehousing as well as 
inventory costs (Oliver and Willcinson, 1988). The buyer is, therefore, unlikely to be interested in 
the problems causing such defects since the costs are most certainly bome by the supplier. Both 
the buyer and supplier are then left with no basis for bargaining, other than price. 
90 
However, although competition based on cost minimisation is important, it is not necessarily 
primary. Both the Japanese and European models assume that production organisation is aimed at 
increasing productivity and efficiency, hence, inter-finn relationships are seen as a function of 
these goals. Consequently, keeping the costs of the supplier chain low becomes one of the key 
elements for achieving efficiency and by extension, competitiveness. The main difference in the 
two models is that in the Japanese approach, competitiveness is seen in tenns of the long-term 
benefits while the British model takes a short-tenn view to competitiveness (Sako, 1992). In 
developing countries, however, supplier chain efficiency may not necessarily be a valid motivation 
since one of the primary concerns of industrialisation is the localjsation16 of industry and capital. 
Inter-finn relationships, particularly between transnational corporations (TNCs) and local small 
and medium finns, are more likely to be affected by the political implications of resource 
ownership and control . Hence, keeping the costs of the supplier chain low are not as important as 
gaining access to and controlling resources. As noted earlier, due to uncertain economic 
conditions in many developing countries, finns have had the incentive to integrate as an asSUIallce 
against endemic resource scarcity. In these circumstances, to encourage more inter-finD. 
relationships, the state is more likely to mandate it. 
There are obviously demerits to mandated inter-firm relationship formation, the most prominent 
being that in cases where the local supplier base is not established, as is often the case in 
developing countries, the competitiveness of the whole industry is limited. Mandating also leads to 
market failure as it affects the supply and demand of resources, and constrains markets, 
exacerbating and perpetuating the weak supplier infrastructure. Finns themselves are, therefore, 
more likely to be concerned with resource and market acquisition and control much more than 
with competitiveness achieved through cost minimisation. In other words, finns will not 
necessarily make purely economic decisions, but will make those which increase (or maintain) 
their power over markets and resources. In some developing countries, for various reasons, such 
cases are more common than they would be in developed economies such as Japan, the UK and 
America.. For example, in the Kenyan case, the prevailing lack of penalties for excess capacity, 
coupled with the need to control scarce resources and markets, has allowed finns to grow beyond 
economically rational levels. In this environment, inter-firm relationships have been the exception 
rather than the nODll. 
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In summary, this section has addressed some of the changes in the global motor vehicle industry 
impacting on inter-finn relationships. Arguably, these changes have accounted for the increase in 
inter-finn relations as finns seek competitiveness in the face of changing consumertastes. Changes 
in production organisation have taken place on the levels of competition, production activity, and 
spatial location of suppliers, increasing the extent to which finns are inter~ependent. 
Consequently, the nature of buyer -supplier relations has also changed, generally moving to more 
obligational contractual relations, which inherently encourage closer inter-finn linkage. The 
following section explore further these relations by comparing the Western and Japanese 
approaches in the motor vehicle industry. 
4.3 INTER-FIRM LINKAGES IN TIlE MOTOR VElllCLE INDUSTRY 
As noted earlier, in no other industry have inter-finn relationships been as extensively used or 
documented to the same extent, as in the motor vehicle industry. One explanation, which was 
advanced at the beginning of this chapter, is that the industry has been instrumental in the 
transition from mass to lean or flexible production organisation. This transition itself has increased 
the level of inter-finn dependency. On the other hand, it is the very nature of the process of the 
sector that could have made it possible to adopt the principles of 'flexible' or 'lean' production 
organisation. Apart from the service inputs, for example, Womack et. al . (1990: 138) report that a 
typical vehicle model uses at least 10,000 different parts and components. Inter-finn relationships, 
therefore, seem to be a logical production organisation since no single manufacturer could possibly 
provide all of these requirements intemally. It would appear, therefore, that the very nature of the 
technical process of vehicle manufacturing necessitates linkages involving several finns . This 
section examines the nature of inter-firm relationships in the Japanese and Western models. 
4.3.1 THE NATURE OF INTER-FIRM RELATIONS IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
Despite the varied nature of inter-firm relationships in general, in the motor vehicle industry they 
have been documented largely, as contractual relationships taking the fonn of subcontracting 
(fumbull, 1991; Casumano, 1985; Aoki, 1987), although collaborative relationships also exist 
(Bessant et. al. 1984; Dodwell, 1979). By definition, strategic alliances (or partnerships) are based 
on mutual need and co-opeI3tion (and mutual ownership of the activity in question), implying 
exchange relationships. Contractual relationships, on the other hand, imply that finns are more 
likely to pUISUe individual and separate efficiency advantages, emphasising cost reduction and 
profit maximisation. As discussed in chapter three, this kind of relationship is primarily founded 
on asymmetry (power-{!ependency) where one finn is dependent on the other for survival, with an 
implied superior bargaining power position of one partner. Chapter three also discussed Sako's 
(1992) useful schema which outlines the implications of these two approaches to inter-finn 
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relations. To recapitulate, Sako's schema argues that on one end of a spectrum of patterns of 
transactions, firms use anus length relationships with a pure contrnctual basis, while others use 
obligational relationships with an exchange basis. Other pattems lie along the continuum, 
exhibiting more or less of the characteristics of either extreme. Inter-firm relationships seem to 
have shifted from strictly contractual relationships to more collaborative ones as the nature of 
production organisation has changed. Earlier Japanese, and contemporary European inter-firm 
relationships are generally based on a purely 'anus-length' contractual philosophy (Minato, 1992; 
Tumbull, 1991). However, this approach changed significantly in Japan from the 1950s since 
Toyota's transition to JIT procurement systems. The Japanese approach to inter-firm relationships 
has changed to what is referred to as the 'co-operative' approach to inter-finn relations. What is 
seen today is a quasi~llaborative relationship between buyer and supplier. 
4.3.2 THE JAPANESE APPROACH TO INTER-FIRM RELATIONS IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
INDUSTRY 
It is widely suggested that the high productivity levels achieved by Japanese manufacturers can be 
accounted for by the use ot: inter alia, inter-firm relations. Hence, Japanese industry continues to 
offer, perhaps, the most prominent examples of inter-firm linkages, both of a specific and cross-
industry nature. The Japanese themselves note that their industrial development has relied heavily 
on the linkages between large and small finns (Watanabe, 1971; 1972; Sako, 1992; Sato, 1989), 
particularly subcontracting. Watanabe has argued that in fact, the efficient use of small firms 
alongside large firms through subcontracting has given Japan its industrial prominence. In general, 
about 65% of all manufacturing firms in Japan enter into subcontracting relationships (Aoki, 
1987). Similarly, the importance of the supplier netwOlk in the Japanese auto industry cannot be 
over-emphasised, where small and medium sized enterprises with fewer than 300 employees are 
particularly important in the lower achelons of the supplier pyrnmid (Dodwell, 1979; Trevor and 
Christie, 1988). The major corporations themselves account for a minimal proportion of the costs, 
but play a significant role of co-ordinating the production activities perfonned by a host of 
producers. In the Japanese motor vehicle industry, for example, Toyota and Nissan account for 
25-30% of manufacturing costs of the vehicles sold under their nameplate (Casumano, 1985). The 
rest is paid to subsidiaries, affiliates, and subcontractors, hence the need for a close relationship 
between large and small firms in the industry. Basing his conclusions on comments by Fryer 
(1982), Tumbull (1991) proposes that it is because of this close relationship between large and 
small finns in the motor vehicle industry that Nissan enjoyed 30% cost advantage over Ford UK 
and British Leyland in the outsourcing of components in the 1980s. 
Those attempting to draw lessons from the Japanese approach argue that Japanese competitiveness 
emanates largely, from supply chain management (Krafcik and MacDuffie, 1989). As noted in 
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preceding paragraphs, the Japanese automobile industry, considered the core of Japanese 
industrialisation, has exhibited some of the most innovative techniques and approaches to 
competitiveness, including just-in-time supply, long term collaborative contracts with a limited 
number of suppliers, flexible production organisation, and quality management of the production 
process. In addition, simultaneous engineering procedures, involving the concurrent production of 
designs, dies, and various parts and components, implies that several finns can WOIk on the same 
'project' at the same time thus reducing production time by upto half (Womack et. al ., 1990). One 
of the central themes in simltaneous engineering is the need to share information from ideation to 
actual production of all parts and components, leading to close collaboration between buyers and 
suppliers. In effect, therefore, the focus upon inter-finn relationships, inter alia, can be said to 
result from the ongoing search for competitiveness in Japanese and European manufucturing. It 
would be expected, therefore, that motives of efficiency (and related cost reduction objectives) 
should predominate such relationships. Yet, evidence suggests that Japanese firms fonn and 
nurture relationships based on reciprocity and exchange (Minato, 1992; Sato, 1989; Sako, 1992), 
and a high element of trust between 17 buyer and supplier. In effect, the Japanese model 'blurs' the 
dichotomous divide between contractual and strategic alliances, where efficiency is sought 
collectively rather than at the expense of the other party. 
Sako (1992) and others argue that the main thrust of relations in the Japanese 'model' is the 
interchange of information and a considerable level of 'trust' between buyer and supplier - the 
Obligational Contractual Relation (OCR). The basis of this relationship is mutuality of need, 
action, and dependency. The participants in the relationship feel mutual indebtedness or 
obligatedness at any time is a normal state of affairs which sustains a relationship (Sako, 1992). 
Womack et al. (1990) argue that this has been possible in the Japanese environment because 
"a rational framework exists for determining costs, price and profits. This framework 
makes the two parties want to work together for mutual benefit rather than look upon 
one another with mutual suspicion" (P148). 
Hence, according to Sako (1992) buyer-supplier relations do not only involve economic contracts 
covering the production and trading of goods and services, but are also embedded in more 
pluralistic social relations between trading partners who have a sense of mutual trust 
17. Casson (1987: 118) argues, on the other hand, that the form of trust prevalent in Japanese buyer -supplier 
relations is founded on the economic power of the buyer. In addition, the subcontractor may be required 
to supply the buyer exclusively, so switching cots to other buyers are high. The buyer also has several 
suppliers so that he cannot be held hostage by the withdrawal of suppliers. The short -tenn credits and a 
procmement service act as a further deterrent to client switching by a supplier. TIlls is consistent with 
the profit maximisation of the client firm over a long-tenn horizon. 
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Consequently, the exchange of infoIDlation and benefits highlights an environment of reciprocity. 
The inter-dependence which ensues, and the time span involved in this model' of buyer-supplier 
relations, are recurrent themes in the literature which seeks to contrast the Japanese and British (or 
indeed western) approaches to buyer-supplier relations. 
4.3.3 THE WESTERN APPROACH TO INTER-FIRM RELATIONS IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
INDUSTRY 
On the other hand, the Western approach to inter-firm relationships, although exhibiting some 
elements of mutual dependency between fiIDls, have been asymmetrical, and have been regarded 
by many authors as 'adversarial' in nature (fumbull, et. al ., 1992; Tumbull, 1991). As already 
mentioned, according to Sako (1992), this pattern is characterised by limited inter-dependence; 
limited infonnation exchange; limited benefit sharing; and typified by 'short-term' contracts. The 
main thrust of the literature is that in Western inter-firm relations, the element of 'trust' is limited to 
'contractual trust' (expectations that promises made are kept) or 'competence trust' (confidence in a 
trading partners competence to vehiclery out a specific task), while 'goodwill trust' is minimised in 
oroer to avoid "heavy interoependence" Sako (1992: 10). Arguably, this accounts for the 
'adversarial' relations between buyers and suppliers, with cost minimisation at the centre of 
relationship negotiation. Clearly, this limits the frequency of the use of inter-firm relations. 
European and American vehicle manufacturers have realised that in oroer to compete with Japan, 
they must adopt matching or better strategies in the industrialisation process. Comparing the 
Japanese and European automotive industry, Tumbull (1991) cites relative competitiveness of 
Japanese manufucturers . For example, Lucas Industries in the UK found that their Japanese 
competitor enjoyed 30-40% lower costs than their own typical engineering plants (pamaby, 1987). 
In addition, Tumbull cites the results of Krafcik and McDuffie's (1989) study which showed that 
the average Japanese owned vehicle plant operating in Japan can produce a vehicle of comparable 
specification and complexity using half the labour input of the average l8 European plant and only 
a third of the least efficient plant. The same study also found that Japanese motor manufucturers 
consistently recoro superior (and improving) levels of quality while that of European motor 
manufucturers is static (Krafcik and McDuffie, 1989). Consequently, motor manufucturers in the 
UK and other European countries, in trying to meet these levels of competitiveness, have to 
recognise the need to improve their performance levels and to adopt strategies which give them 
comparable advantages in supplier chain management. In reaction to the Japanese challenge, 
18. Sections of western literature comparing Japanese and western perfonnance object to the use of this as a 
basis, arguing that the Japanese industry is heavily dependent on supplier netwotks and therefore their 
output per employees is bound to be higher. 
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European motor manufacturers are emulating their production and management practices. 
Transplants' of Japanese finns dot the European map, and production techniques and resource 
management systems bear the Japanese label. In the UK automotive industry for example, the use 
of JIT procurement systems is increasing, and inter-finn relations between buyers and sellers are 
increasingly viewed as the primary vehicle for comparable levels of competitiveness already 
achieved by the Japanese. However, although finns such as Nissan (UK) are increasingly adopting 
Japanese buyer-supplier relations, for example by reducing the number of suppliers and getting 
involved in supplier development (fumbull, 1991), this is not yet a widespread phenomenon 
among British finns. 
Thus, although European manufacturers are also aware of the importance of cost management and 
efficiency, their approach is significantly different from that used by the Japanese. Western, 
particularly European manufacturers, have retained the old fonnat which supports mass 
production, and are pre-occupied with cost control. According to Tumbull (1991, this is 
inadequate when trying to change production organisation. It is clear from the Japanese experience 
that manufacturing cost minimisation is not the whole story, but rather it is the combination of cost 
minimisation; human resource management; and continuous quality improvements which matter 
in addition to the finns' commitment to each other. 
" .... .now need a step change in their manufacturing performance rather than incremental 
improvements in their manufacturing costs if they are to compete in the world or even 
domestic rruukets" (p 169) 
In addition, Western manufacturers view productivity improvements in tenns of automation rather 
than in tenns of changing their whole approach to input sourcing, production mganisation, and 
distribution re-configuration. Authors such as Tumbull (1991) suggest that one of the major ways 
to compete with the Japanese is to 
"reorganise the flow of wOIk within their own assembly plants and between their 
assembly plants and external suppliers. . ... ....... In many respects, external relationships 
with suppliers are more important given that the unit cost perfonnance of most 
manufacturing operations depends far more on the effectiveness of purchasing than on 
the close control of direct labour perfonnance" (P170) 
Yet, not all finns fully appreciate the importance of inter-finn sourcing. Auto manufacturers such 
as Austin Rover, in the UK admit that scheduling buyer-supplier relations is among the last area of 
manufacturing control to be refined in their programme of re-organisation and re-structuring 
(Bessant et al ., 1984), although those associated with other Japanese auto manufacturers such as 
Nissan (UK) have made an effort to programme supplier relations. Even these, reports (fumbull, 
96 
1991: 172), "are still preoccupied with short-tenn financial perfonnance, as illustrated by their 
focus on work practice refonns and attempts to intensify the work process in order to force up 
labour productivity." 
4.3.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR INTER-FIRM RELATIONS IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY OF 
DEVEWPING COUNTRIES 
Due to their multinational status, manufucturing finns in developing countries are largely 
modelled on Western organisational fonns, generally organising production along the principles of 
mass production. Consequently, inter-finn relationships are less likely to be used. While some 
ongoing research documents the transition from mass production to flexible specialisation in 
developing countries,19 little is yet known about the specific elements of inter-finn relations in 
these countries, and even less about their vehicle industries. However, other factors affuct the 
development of inter-finn linkages, the most prominent being the market failures brought about 
by, among other factors, the impact of state intervention on market mechanisms. Failures in input 
markets in developing countries (discussed in chapters four) have made it easier for finns to 
integrate rather than use external markets. 
In developed countries, the availability and quality of suppliers is assumed. In developing 
countries, on the other hand, the supplier base has not developed at the same I31.e . One of the 
factors affecting the localisation of input procurement is the perceived 'quality' of the supplier base. 
The vertical integration literature argues that one of the main reasons for vertical integration by 
firms is risky and unreliable markets - market failure, affected by asset specificity, frequency of 
transactions, the number of buyers and sellers in that market, and the balance of power between 
them. When market failure occurs because of few buyers or suppliers, both parties experience a 
reduction in bargaining power. In addition, both parties are vulnerable to opportunistic 
recontracting. However, this very small number of suppliers raises problems of competitiveness 
for the buyer - the market for inputs is not sufficiently developed for the quality and product 
advantages to be realised. Although the localisation strategy has been used in developing countries 
19. See for example the WOlk by Kaplinsky and Posthmna (1993) on the organisational changes taking 
place in Zimbabwean firms, particularly their use of JIT techniques. Some work has already been done 
on the relevance offlexible specialisation in Less Developed Countries (illS Bulletin, 1992; Brighton). 
Ramirez (1993) also reports the findings of similar studies on the Mexican automobile industry. 
20. Doner (1993) discusses a range of state support measures for small and medium firms. These 
include financial and tax incentives such as those used in South Korea to encourage the modernisation 
of this category of firms. He also cites the use of cartels, mandated frequency of payment of suppliers, 
reserved markets for small and medium firms, and the banning of prime contractors from buying SMEs 
through stock ownership. 
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to develop a supplier base, the conditions which encourage vertical integration continue to exist. In 
the Asian countries, for example, competition is undennined by collusion among foreign £inns or 
by the restrictions on input sourcing in contracts between local suppliers and their foreign 
customers. The state has contributed to this market failure by mandating local sourcing and 
concomitantloca1isation levels (Mardon, 1990; Enos, 1984). 
A second factor influencing localisation is 'deletion allowances'. When an assembler agrees to 
procure components from the host country, it must remove or 'delete' those components from the 
kit of knocked -down parts packed in the manufacturer's country. The deletion allowance refers to 
the price reduction of the kit after the localised parts have been removed. This, however, is rarely a 
simple deduction matter. It is often claimed by assemblers that the deletion allowances are too 
small, yet locally procured equivalents cost more. This makes vehicles assembled using local parts 
much more expensive than those without In addition, in Asia it is alleged that low deletion 
allowances are used for transfer pricing. It is also claimed that most assemblers are consciously 
trying to raise the cost of localisation and discouraging local firms from investing in parts and 
components. Deletion allowances are smaller for critical components, and assemblers are in a solid 
position to suppress the deletion allowances for popular makes and models. (Doner, 1993). Similar 
conclusions have been made about Kenya's industry (Masai, 1991). 
Assemblers can also hinder the development of local suppliers by withholding technical and 
financial support from them, either to justify their opposition to localisation, or to justify vertical 
integration. By failing to provide prototypes, technical training, sufficient lead time for new 
products or product changes, and favourable terms of payment, the uncertainty of suppliers 
increases (Doner, 1991). Evidently, this environment does not allow for co-operative relationships 
- it is still a zero-sum game. Yet, it is also evident from the Japanese inter-firm relations that a 
more co-operative relationship offers a better environment in which to promote mutually 
acceptable criteria for analysing costs, establishing prices, sharing profits and transferring 
technology (Womack et. al ., 1990). For example, in the South Korean case, the pressure from a 
strong state helped to encourage assembler-supplier co-operation by promoting the suppliers 
through financing and training, and encouraging the formation of the Korean Automobile Industry 
Co-operative Association. However, the broader coalition arrangements were also important, 
mainly to prevent economic concentration after disruptive strikes in 1987-1988.20 The strength of 
the supplier base is often evaluated in terms of product quality and supplier perfonnance. Indeed 
20. Doner (1993) discusses a range of state support measures for small and medium finns. These 
include financial and tax incentives such as those used in South Korea to encourage the modernisation 
of this category offinns. He also cites the use of cartels, mandated frequency of payment of suppliers, 
reserved markets for small and medium finns, and the banning of prime contractors from buying SMEs 
through stock ownership. 
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assemblers in developing countries have claimed that they were willing to procure locally but the 
existing suppliers could not meet their quality standards and delivery specifications (Masai, 1991; 
Doner, 1993). 
Arguably, however, the critical factors likely to influence the fonnation of inter-finn linkages in 
developing countries is the very adoption of lean or flexible production organisation as a precursor 
to inter-finn linkages. Kaplinsky and Posthuma (1993) argue that this is already in question as 
infrastructura1 inefficiencies endemic in developing countries potentially threaten the use of JIT 
techniques. In addition, state intervention in accessing markets and resources limits the extent to 
which finns can make rational decisions. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored those factors affecting inter-finn relationships in the motor vehicle 
industry, highlighting the differences in the Japanese and Western' approaches to inter-finn 
relations, and suggesting that both approaches differ somewhat from the case in developing 
countries. 
The western and Japanese approaches to inter-finn relationships presented above are both founded 
on the motive of efficiency and competitiveness (Friedman, 1988; Tumbull, 1991). However, in 
the Japanese illustIation competitiveness is viewed as a long-term goal, requiring long-term 
synergies in the production process, hence the long range view of inter-finn relations. This 
approach also moves away from the assumptions made by the mass production organisation that 
cost minimisation and profit maximisation in the short-term are the main drives of the finn . 
Rather, it sees competitiveness as a function of restructuring of production organisation to ensure 
long-term effectiveness of input procurement - control. 
However, both approaches differ from those found in developing countries. In assuming at least 
near perfect markets, both approaches also assume that the finn can make economic decisions 
about input procurement. Yet, to a large extent, some inter-finn relations are predicated on the 
external environment in which it operates. For example, government regulation and other forms of 
intervention are common reasons for market failure in developing countries. In addition, finns are 
affected by other factors such as the political/legal framewoIk within which they operate, which 
make economic decisions inappropriate. 
This chapter has highlighted the importance of several factors which are relevant for inter-finn 
relationship fonnation: finn specific factors including the economic, technical and strategic 
factors; external factors such as the supplier infiastructure, government intervention, and macro-
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economic factors; supplier related factors, focusing on the perfonnance of suppliers. In the next 
chapter, Kenya is discussed as a specific context of a developing country. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
KENYA: THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
5.1 INTRODUcnON 
In chapter one, the aim of the research was stated as the search for a strategy towards small 
enteIprise development through linkages between large and small finns. Chapter two discussed the 
rationales put forward, in a variety of contexts, for developing small enterprises and highlighted 
the potential role of small enterprises as part of a network with large finns within an industry. This 
chapter has the main objective of elaborating on the rationale of the research in Kenya, and 
contextualising the study. 
Although several of Kenya's development goals and strategies suggest that a dis-aggregation of 
production organisation is desirable, even necessary, its industrial policy favours large finns. As a 
result, large finns dominate industrial activity. In addition, although policy makers in Kenya are 
aware that the industrialisation process could benefit from current global de-integration of large 
finns, and the use of inter-finn relationships to supply reqri.irements, little is known about how to 
motivate large firms to dis-aggregate and form linkages with small finns. Historically, firms in 
Kenya have had the political and economic incentive to integrate, regarding the premium paid for 
excess capacity as a reasonable consideration for the assurance against resource scarcity, and the 
weaknesses in the supplier structure. The question is how to encourage these inter-finn linkages in 
an environment where large finns are established, and dominate and condition the social and 
institutional structures in the economy. 
lbis chapter outlines the conteA1: of the study, Kenya, in seven sections. The following section 
outlines the research problem, highlighting Kenya's development goals and strategies which 
suggest that Kenya desires to restructure its industry, particularly by promoting small enterprises, 
but also recognises that the current dominance of large firms may prevent it. The third section 
briefly discusses the effects of the dominance of the large scale enterprise sector, while the fourth 
examines the current status of small enterprise development in Kenya The fifth section discusses 
the status of large finn - small firm linkages in Kenya, while the sixth section outlines the structure 
and activities of the countIy's motor vehicle industry, the context within which the study was 
fonnulated. The seventh section summarises the chapter. 
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5.2 KENYA'S DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND STRATEGIES 
Afiicanisation of the economy and its political structures and institutions has become Kenya's 
long-term and most recurrent development theme. At independence from colonial rule in 1963, 
Afiicanisation was seen as a confirmation of political independence, and a platform for economic 
independence. Consequently, the latter has been pursued relentlessly as an asSUI3Ilce against neo-
colonialism by way of economic and technological dependence. Large foreign fums continue to be 
viewed as a potential vehicle of perpetuating economic dependence. It is within this framework 
that Kenya's Sixth National Development Plan (1989-1993) and preceding policy statements argue 
that industry and commerce must be Kenyanised in addition to the government's reduction of 
direct investments in industry and cornmerce. The plan recognises that 
in terms of turnover, the manufacturing and trading activities of non-Kenyans who 
make up less than 2% of the population now constitute more than 65% of the 
total.(p152) 
To address the broad goal ofKenyanisation, more specific goals and strategies have been adopted, 
among them: ownership restructuring of industry; technology development and transfer, capacity 
utilisation and resource use; reduction of monopolies and industrial concentration; and 
privatisation of state corporations. All of these goals and strategies have the potential of 
Kenyanising the economy through various forms of restructuring, dis-aggregating production 
organisation, and encouraging linkages between existing large and small businesses. The 
following discussion puts these in perspective. 
5.2.1 OWNERSHIP REsTRUCTURING OF INDUSTRY 
Ownership restructuring has continued to focus on addressing two issues: reduce government 
investments in industry and commerce; and increase ownership by indigenous Kenyans. Kenya's 
Sixth Development Plan (1989-1993) sees such restructuring as the "only way through which 
nationals will graduate into the competitive system where they can participate on an equal footing 
with non-Kenyans" (GOK, 1989: 153), aiming to achieve this through small enterprises. Sessional 
Paper No 1 of 1986 (OOK, 1986) outlines the various arguments for the adoption of the strntegy, 
namely: (i) for various reasons, a large proportion of indigenous Kenyan capital is employed in the 
small enterprise sector, hence the argument for restructuring industrial production to include the 
lower levels of investment; (ii) small enterprises use local materials, hence they are likely to 
reduce Kenya's import bill; (iii) Small enterprises are likely to create more jobs at a lower cost; (iv) 
large enterprises are mainly foreign owned, increasing dependency on foreign capital and 
technology. 
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At the same time, foreign firms have been viewed as contributing to the continued capital flight 
through repatriation (Kaplinsky 1978, 1988) and transfer pricing (Nyong'o, 1988; Kaplinsky, 
1978; Coughlin, 1988c; Owino, 1985). The Kenyan Government might be expected, therefore, to 
favour the creation of an indigenous capitalist class to supplant foreign capital and reduce capital 
drain while at the same time encournging indigenous Kenyans to participate in the manufacturing 
sector.21 Yet, the proportion of foreign investment has remained higher than indigenous capital 
outside government investments in manufacturing.22 While the ownership structure continues to 
be foreign-capital heavy (Vaitsos, 1991), and the emergence of large and medium scale African 
industrialists in Kenya slow (Kaplinsky, 1982:209-11),23 multinational corporations (MNCs) 
appear reluctant to invest further in Kenya (Coughlin, 1991 a). One of the reasons suggested is the 
continued fear of displacement as a result of the Kenyanisation programme. 
In an effort to prevent any perceptions of displacement by small or large finns, the Sixth National 
Development Plan (GOK, 1989), was careful to add that the government's intention to tackle these 
problems had ''to be understood in terms of efficiency in the use of resources" (P152) rather than 
merely as a strategy to eliminate foreign investors. 
In addition, because of suggestions of fears of displacement expressed by foreign investors, it was 
necessary for the government to assure large investors that 
''the thrust of the Kenyanisation strategy is, therefore, to increase the participation of 
local people in various activities of the economy. It does not imply denying non-
Kenyans effective participation in the economy. On the contraIy, it is consistent with 
the need to enhance entrepreneurial development and expanded investments in the 
country." (P153) 
Thus, restructuring is considered by policy makers to be a tool of industrialisation management 
rather than as a mere political tool to 'displace' large foreign investors or to promote indigenisation 
at the expense of industrial development. 
21. Local entrepreneurs are also likely to have contnlmted to capital flight in search of better investment 
prospects elsewhere. 
22. Kenya has over 200 Multinational Corporations from Britain (mvestment of £1500m), USA (S260m), 
Germany ($60m), and other countries (S1Om). Only about half of these have Kenyan partners or have 
government shareholding. 
23. Kaplinksy (1982) notes that in 1966, 60% of Kenya's capital was controlled by foreign investors while 
in 1976 this had gone down to 43%, being replaced, principally, by public investments. 
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A second rationale for restructuring ownership of industry is the privatisation of public 
investments and dismantling of the state's involvement in cornmerce and industry. Together with 
the large-scale finns, the state has continued to own a large proportion of industry and commerce 
through various types of parastatals. At independence in 1963, this was seen as the only way 
economic resources could be transferred into the hands of indigenous Kenyans who were 
perceived not to have the financial and managerial capacity to enter into business as private 
individuals (GOK, 1965). The recent privatisation drive (partly due to external pressures and partly 
due to internal desire to improve efficiency), aimed at reducing the operations of state enterprise 
and increasing the efficiency of government operations as part of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, has necessitated a re-orientation from state investment to private sector ownership, 
and from large to small organisations. The government views this as one opportunity for 
indigenous Kenyans to enter into the mainstream of industrial development through stock 
ownership or through trade links with privatised organisations (GOK, 1989). 
The indigenisation rationale has provided, therefore, a powerful impetus for the promotion of 
small finns in Kenya. 
5.2.2 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER 
Another pertinent goal is that of technology development and transfer. Again, since independence 
(1963), Kenya's development plans emphasised the importance of science and technology for 
social and economic development.24 Yet, largely due to a weak indigenous technological base 
brought about by the colonial legacy, Kenya has continued to rely on external sources for 
technology, largely through MNCs and foreign owned organisations. This has continued to be 
reflected in the economic structure (Juma, 1991). In the early stages of Kenya's industrialisation, 
the import substitution strategies meant that technological inputs tended to concentrate on 
imported capital goods, knock-down components for domestic assembly, intermediate goods for 
domestic processing plants and packaging of finished goods (Leys, 1975). As a result, over the 
years, the indigenous technological base has not grown. 
Government documents, such as the Sessional Paper No.1 of 1986 and the Sixth Development 
Plan (1983-1989) suggest that one strategy for fust acquisition and transfer of technology is the 
transfer of technology from foreign to local investors, and from large to small enterprises (GOK, 
24 In a programme aiming to propel Africa into economic development, Africa Priority Programme for 
Economic Recovery - APER 1986-1990- the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) recommended an 
investment of at least 1 % of GDP in technology if Africa was to catch up with the rest of the world in 
terms of economic development. Kenya adopted this 1% recommendation. 
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1992) through subcontracting relationships, partnerships and joint ventures. Yet, in practice, 
incentives for technology transfer from large to small finns have neither been adequately 
articulated nor followed up by policy makers (Coughlin, 1991c). Writing about the factors 
contributing to slow industrialisation in Kenya, Coughlin (1991c) succinctly sums up the situation: 
"The policies and institutions affecting technological development in Kenya's 
manufacturing sector have evolved disjointedly .. ... as a result, Kenya does not have a 
systematic and comprehensive policy to govern the transfer of technology and to guide 
the development oflocal technological capability" (p 3) 
Consequently, many of the partnership agreements meant to implement these policies have not 
been fully implemented, and little technology transfer has occurred (Ebangit, 1985). Moreover, 
"Kenya has no systematic mechanism for vetting technology transfer agreements ... " (Coughlin, 
1988c:286). Hence, while aspiring to encourage technology transfer from foreign owned to local 
finns, and from huge to smaller finns, Kenyan planners have failed to institute the right machinery 
and incentives to achieve this goal . 
5.2.3 CAPACITY UTILISATION AND REsOURCE USE 
Like most developing countries, Kenyan industry is charact:erised by excess capacity (World Bank, 
1987:52), much of which is caused by vertical integration of firms as a buffer against resource and 
information uncertainties. Although Kenyan planners are aware that for the country's potential to 
be fully utilised, its productive capacity must be fully used, low levels of capacity utilisation are 
reported. In the Fifth National Development Plan 1983- 1988, it was noted that: 
"The productive capacity of a nation, whether in the public or private sector, is a 
resource whose potential must be more fully realised than present if the pace of 
development is to be improved .. ... An important effect of drawing the nation's under-
utilised capital stock more fully into the mainstream of national development is that 
much additional employment will be created in the process" (GOK, 1983 :50-51) 
Yet, according to Coughlin (1985), Kenya utilises, on average, about 34% of her industrial 
capacity, although some industrial sectors show a significantly lower level of utilisation (see Table 
5-1). 
Kenya's low capacity utilisation in manufacturing has its origins in the historical development of 
its industry. First, Kenya's industry was based on Multinational Corporations, most of which were 
fully integrated. Secondly, as was noted above, because of uncertain business environments 
inherent in developing economies at the time, finns which located in Kenya soon after 
independence felt the need to control resources through vertical integration. They are likely to have 
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viewed vertical integration as adequately offsetting the premium paid by holding excess capacity. 
Finally, large size had a political advantage as it was important in bargaining with the government 
on the basis of employment contribution. However, as times and conditions have changed, this 
pattern seems to have continued, yet the need for enterprise and national competitiveness calls for 
different strategies. 
Other related explanations for capacity under-utilisation in Kenyan manufacturing industry have 
heen hypothesised in the literature. These include low demand levels (Owino, 1985); lack of 
consistent government planning for capacity installation and utilisation (Owino, 1991); supply 
bottle-necks causing shortages of materials, energy, trained manpower and infrastructure leading to 
"hoarding" of capacity (Kerre, 1991); lack of consolidation of the domestic market through 
protection (Owino, 1991); the licensing of imports thus posing excessive competition for some 
industries and encouraging them to adopt defensive strategies by 'hoarding' capacity (Owino, 
1991); inadequate co-ordination among inter-<iependent industries (Kerre, 1991); and the continual 
threat of increase in the prices of plant and equipment which leads to anticipatory installation. 
5.2.4 REDUCTION OF MONOPOLIES AND lNDuS1RIAL CONCENlRATION 
As part of its strategy to revitalise the economy, restructure the ownership of industry, open up 
markets to increased competition as well as enable indigenous Kenyans to own productive 
resources, the Kenya government has tried to restrict vertical integration offirms by adopting The 
Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act (1988). While this piece of 
legislation can achieve structuIal changes in industry, the government has not had an adequate 
implementation and policing mechanism to achieve the intended results. Loopholes continue to 
exist, and firms continue to integrate since the incentives for doing so still exist in the business 
environment. 
The development goals outlined here provide a policy justification for using large firms as a 
platform for small enterprise development They suggest that there is a political will to promote 
dis-aggregation of industry. Collaborative rather than adversarial arrangements between large and 
small firms have the potential to foster technology transfer. Further, internal restructuring of 
various finns forced to disintegrate in response to policies which control monopolies, and the 
privatisation of state corporations, have the potential to foster small firm birth and growth as dis-
aggregated firms seek suppliers in the open maIket; and also through increased competition in the 
market as finns move out of some sectors. Finally, as firms concentrnte on core activities and 
source externally those inputs and activities which they consider to be non~re, a higher capacity 
utilisation can be achieved. The question is how to motivate large firms to source primarily from 
small finns as suppliers of products and services, particularly in an environment where firms still 
Table 5-1 Capacity Utilisation Levels fOT Selected 
Manufacturing Industries 
Industry (or sub-sector) Capacity Utilisation 
0/0* 
Foundries l 230/0 
Metal Engineering W O1kshops 1 35% 
Plastics processing 1 53% 
Handtools and Cutlery! 22.9% 
Phannaceuticals 1 21% 
Textiles and Clothing:L 96% 
Food ProductionL 89% 
ElectricalL 42% 
Iron and SteefI 56% 
ChemicalsL 86% 
Paper and Wood ProductsL 93% 
Leather and FootwearL 53% 
Beverages and Tobacco ProductsL 75% 
All Manufacturing Finns* 34% 
1 .. . . These figures are adopted from Owino (1991) CIting vanous studies 
including CongbJin, 1985:172; Mwangi, 1984:159; Kerre, 1985; Owino, 
1985; ILO, 1972. All of these are culculated on a one shift basis. 
2 These figures are actual capacity utiJisation figures from a World Bank 
(1987:52) report on Kenya's industrialisation. 
*This figure is given by Congblin (1985), and is not an average 
cu1culated on the figmes in the table. A UNIDO (1986) study gives an 
average of 32%; while the World Bank (1987) study gives an average of 
about 80% over several mdustries. The studies are not explicit about the 
shift basis of these utilisation culcu1ations. All studies are based on 
installed capacity utilisation rates. 
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this dominance of large finns, and not enough small and medium enterprises. A World Bank 
report (1987) concluded 1hat: Kenya's industrial development and the manufuct:uring sector25 are 
considernbly adversely affected by the weaknesses apparent in the small enterprise sector: 
"a major weakness of Kenya's industrial development ...... [is the] paucity of modem 
small scale manufuct:uring establishments" (P210). 
The population of large finns in Kenya's industrial structure is relatively small. To illustrate this, 
Table 5-2 indicates Kenya's size distribution of finns in manufuct:uring in 1988 and 1990. It is 
important to note that this includes only those firms which enter the national statistics. This 
implies only those formal registered finns in the economy. The informal and micro~terprise 
sector tends to have limited 'visibility' due to 'informality' or non-registration. However, these 
figures provide an indication of the structure of the manufacturing sector. 
Table 5-2 Size Distribution in Manufacturing (1988 and 1990) 
Finn Size (No Share of Share of Share of 
of Employees Recorded Firms Recorded Firms Recorded 
(1988) (1990) Firms - Total 
Economy 
(1988) 
oa 16% 8% 21% 
1-4 17% 18% 25% 
5-9 11% 12% 13% 
10-19 14% 16% 15% 
20-49 17% 16% 11% 
50+ 25% 31% 14% 
Total 100% 101%0 99%0 
IVotes: 
a Zero employees means owner-managed firms with no employees recorded 
b Does not add up to 100% due to rounding etror 
Source: Statistical Abstracts (1989; 1991) - Kenya (GOK) 
25 . Kenya's industrial output has grown slowly, averaging 4.7 % p.a 1978 and 1988. Value added in 
manufacturing grew by an average of only K£l00m per year from K£39L04m in 1982 to K£906.94 in 
1989. The sector is biased towards the domestic maIket, is reliant on imported inputs, and is capital 
intensive, using mainly obsolete technology (UNIDO, 1988). 
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On the other hand, a UNIDO estimate in 1985 showed that 560 large firms in manuf3cturing 
(employing more than 100 people) were served by 720 small (formal) firms and 1600 informal 
sector workshops (UNIDO, 1988). The variance in these estimates is mainly attributable to the 
definition and measurement of the small enteIJ>Iise and infOImal sectors, in addition to difficulties 
in enumerating small non-fonnal businesses. Clearly, according to the official statistics as 
presented in the table above, Kenya's size distribution of industry is biased towards firms 
employing fewer than fifty people (75%). In other words, that category regarded as the SME sector 
in Kenya accounts for the greatest proportion of firms in the sector. h must be emphasised here 
that official estimates of firms in the category employing fewer than 4 people may be significantly 
underestimated, implying that firms empolying fewer than fifty people account for an even larger 
proportion of the population of finns in manufacturing. At aggregate economy level, the same 
results emerge. For example, in 1988, firms employing fewer than 50 people accounted for more 
than 85% of the total firm population, while large scale firms, including government investments, 
accounted for 14%. 
While not desirnble, this size distribution has not been accidental. Industrial development and 
macro- policies have historically favoured large firms providing them with a more favourable 
business environment than the smaller firms26 . Consequently, Kenya's industrial activity is 
dominated by large firms while small firms lag behind them. Large firms contribute an average of 
70% of manufacturing value added, and have a higher recorded contribution to GDP than small 
enterprises. In 1980 for example, this contribution was as high as 93% of manufacturing output. 
These figures have reduced somewhat (70% in 1990), but are still disproportionate to the size of 
the sector. Table 5-3 illustrates the size related contribution to manuf3cturing value added. 
Table 5-3 
Years) 
Share of ManUfacturing VaJueAdded (Selected 
Year Manufacturing Value Added 
049'" 5G+ 
1972 17% 83% 
1977 12% 88% 
1980 7% 93% 
1990 30% 70% 
* No. of employees 
Source: Various Statistical Abstracts - Kenya 
26. See Kilby's (1988) contradiction of this contention. He argues that small firms have had preferential 
support by the government 
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Nevertheless, both sources show a picture of a higher representation of large finns to national 
accounts. There was a shaIp increase in contribution of finns employing fewer than 50 people to 
manufacturing value added between 1980 and 1990. While this study did not test, empirically, the 
explanations for this sharp increase, it can be argued that the Kenya government's interest in small 
finns since the ao report of 1972 which has attempted to include small and micro~nterprises in 
the national accounts, largely accounts for this increase. However, the possibility of new business 
development by individuals unable to obtain jobs in the wage sector cannot be discounted. 
The higher representation of large finns has had two implications for the small enterprise sector: 
that since small finns were then concluded not to contribute significantly to national accounts, they 
were considered less important; and because large finns appeared to contribute more to national 
accounts, they were considered more important. 
In addition, large finns (over fifty employees) have recorded a higher contribution to wage 
employment. This could be explained by the fact that many of those employed in small finns are 
recorded as 'Unpaid family labour'. In addition, because the small enterprises sector is not 
compreheD.sively recorded, a significant proportion in the sector could be unaccounted for. Table 
54 indicates the size related contribution to employment in 1990. 
Table 5-4 Small Enterprises Share of Waged 
Manufacturing Employment * (1990) 
Firm Size (No. of Employees) Share of 
Employment (1990) 
(%) 
1-4 0.7% 
5-9 0.9% 
10-19 2.7% 
20-49 6.9% 
50+ 88.8% 
Total 100% 
* Although these figures are official government statistics, they 
underestimate employment in small enterprises, particularly 
those in the informal sector. A large proportion of SMEs are 
owner-managed or employ family labour, hence are likely to 
report a zero~loyee status. 
Source: Statistical Abstract - Kenya 
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Hence, from the Table 5-4 above, finns employing less than fifty people account for 12% of total 
wage employment in Kenya. 
Thirdly, large finns have often had very high rates of protection, as high as 312% in some 
industries, with finns tending towards monopolistic operations, encouraging a high industrial 
concentration. Table 5-5 illustrates selected rates of protection in Kenya's manufucturing sector. 
Table 5-5 Effective Rates of Protection for Selected Industries 
(1985-86 figures) 
Industry (or sub-sector) Effective Rate of 
Protection 
Paper and Paper Products 6% 
Beverage and Tobacco Products 38% 
Leather and Footwear 80% 
FQod Products 111% 
TeJl..1iles and Clothing 126% 
Plastics and Phannaceuticals 129% 
Chemicals 211% 
Cement and Glass 248% 
Iron and Steel 312% 
Electrical Products and Transport* 312% 
* The motor vehicle industry falls in this category. 
Note: Since the Publication of this report, a number of policy measures have 
been instituted by the Government of Kenya to reduce protection. The 
country's Sixth Development Plan elaborates these policy measures which 
include reduction of monopolies and oligopolies. The effectiveness of the 
measures have not, however, been assessed. 
Source: World Bank (1987:52). 
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As a result of such high protection, 27 most industries hold excess capacity as there are no 
efficiency pressures owing to their monopoly status. Nyong'o (1988), writing on the limits to 
industrial expansion in Kenya highlights one of the effects of high protection rates: 
"Highly protected industries producing high-cost goods for the domestic market and 
reaping unquestionably high profits under conditions of market monopoly and 
production inefficiency also tend to be content with preserving what they have and thus 
to discourage industrial expansion" (P39). 
TIlls high protection is one of the explanations of excess capacity in some industries (see earlier 
discussion). Various explanations for excess capacity in LDCs can be found in the literature, 
ranging from shortages of raw materials, energy, trained technical and supeIVisory personnel, and 
infrastructural problems; and also, where prices for plant and equipment are expected to rise faster 
than those of other assets, investors accumulate capacity (phan-Thuy et. al., 1981). The World 
Bank (1989) reported, for example, that in 1987, the Nominal Protection Rate (NPR) for passenger 
vehicles in Kenya was 69% while the Effective Protection Rate (EFR) was 173%. These 
protection rates have been achieved through import restrictions, and other licensing procedures. 
At finn level, the motivation for holding excess capacity was found in the argument that the 
premium paid for holding such capacity was a reasonable consideration for the assurance against 
resource and market volatility. TIlls has also been attributed to continued uncertainties in the 
economy, firms continue to hold excess capacity as an anticipatory strategy. For example, constant 
changes in government regulation conceming foreign exchange, and importation of machines and 
equipment contributes significantly to anticipatory buying of kits and other raw materials for 
assembly. Consequently, firms have continued to integrate vertically, and planners are aware of it. 
For example, as a preamble to presenting the strategy for industrial and commercial development, 
the Sixth National Development Plan (1989) notes: 
"With relatively high levels of effective protection in the domestic markets, the 
commercial and industrial sectors have become progressively inward oriented as many 
27. One of the main instruments of protection was the Industrial Protection Committee (IPC), one of the key 
inter-ministerial bodies set up in the sixties as the government's main agency for managing protection 
issues. In theory, it was the only body responsible for issuing No Objection Certificates (NOC), an 
import licensing procedme intended to protection domestic industries. In reality, however, the 
Multinational have been able to manipulate the political process so as to obtain NOCs for their 
subsidiaries even in cases where such grnnts would not be legally and procedurnlly authorised by IPc. 
Moreover, the method employed by IPC to enforce protection has also left loopholes to be exploited by 
the politically influential or well placed individual in finns (Nyong'o, 1988:25). This situation continues 
to prevail in Kenya 
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local £inns have been able to reap high profits in the domestic markets while operating 
at low levels of capacity utilisation."(p 141) 
In addition, because the existing, mainly large, foreign~wned subsidiaries, saw the strategy of 
developing SMEs as aimed to supplant foreign capital, the government felt the need to allay such 
fears . Consequently, the government focused its incentive schemes on the large scale sector. For 
example, through guarantees on property ovvnership,28 and the promulgation of the Foreign 
Investment Protection Act of 1964, the Government not only guaranteed the repatriation of capital 
and remittance of profits, but also moved to protect the investors from imports. This scenario has 
continued to temper industrial development in Kenya. While the Kenya Government makes efforts 
to develop SMEs, large foreign finns continue to dominate the economy. 
The dominance oflarge finns has other implications for Kenya's development. Talking about large 
finns in Kenya is synonymous with talking about foreign finns, particularly subsidiaries of 
MNCs. Because they tend to have a high level of foreign capital invested, large foreign owned 
finns have therefore caused concern about capital flight through transfer pricing and other 
activities. This raises the sensitive question of who owns industry in Kenya As a result, any 
strategies which seek to reduce foreign ownership of industry in Kenya are suspect. 
5.4 SMALL ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 
5.4.1 THE RATIONALE FOR SME DEVEWPMENT IN KENYA 
One of the strategies adopted for Africanisation was to encourage and promote small enteIprise 
ownership by indigenous African-Kenyans. As noted above, since independence from colonial 
rule, Kenya's primary objective has been to Africanise the economy (GOK: 1965), using both 
interventionist29 and non-interventionist approaches. In the early sixties, the favoured strategy was 
direct Government investment in the private sector through parastatals in addition to an 
employment policy which favoured indigenous Kenyans to expatriates, allowing Kenyans to join 
the management ranks from which they had been excluded during the colonial period. At the same 
time, a few Kenyans joined the business classes (Nyong'o, 1988). By 1972, however, there was 
still an under-representation of Kenyans in business (II.,o, 1972). 
28. This was contained in Section 75 o/the Constitution o/Kenya. 
29 . Such specific measures as the Trade Licensing Act of 1967; the Transport Licensing Regulations of 
1967; the Immigration Act of 1967; the Exchange Control Notices No. 19 and 36 of 1971 were taken to 
control the nature of ownership by foreign investors. 
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The 1972 ILO Mission to Kenya highlighted the potential of the infonnal sector as a source of 
new jobs, and vehicle for technological innovation and rapid acquisition of business management 
skills. Since then., in virtually all of Kenya's development plans and other policy documents, the 
small enteIprise sector has been viewed by planners as an important mechanism for indigenisation 
of the economy; as well as a vehicle for import substitutio~ as a mechanism for rural-urban 
balance (GOK 1965; 1974; 1979; 1986; 1989); and more recently, as an important vehicle for 
export promotion (GOK 1992). In 1989, together with United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Kenya Government launched its 
first policy paper outlining its intended strategy towards the development of the small enteIprise 
sector. In outlining its broad programme of support for SMEs, the government argued in the 
Sessional Paper No. of 1986 that 
"For Kenyans to enjoy even modest improvements in their current standard of living, it 
will be imperative that ..... the great ~ority of jobs be created, not in the cities or in 
large industry, but on fanns and in small scale industries and services, both rural and 
urban.(p2)" 
This policy paper has since been refined and given specific dimensions in the Sessional Paper No. 
2 of 1992 (GOK, 1992) specifically addressing the development of the sector. 
Hence, based on the recommendations of this ILO mission, and based on the concern about 
ownership of industry, small enteIprise development was seen as a platfonn for Africanisation. 
Vaitsos (1991) concludes that two reasons motivated the government choice of strategy: 
govemment doubts about the commi1ment of lNCs to technological development; and the 
potential of transfer pricing. To elaborate he notes, 
1. "Since large-scale manufacturing and services are so dominated by lNCs, ... .. 
underdevelopment of national technological and productive capabilities and the 
severely limited availability of specific critical resources call for, and indeed, 
promote collaboration with foreign enteIprises. Yet, the objectives and central 
planning of1NCs do not always promote national development policies used for 
Africanisation, .. . with critical implications on the country's relations with foreign 
investors." (P19) 
2. "The 1NC's internal organisation and the absence of competitive market forces in 
inter-affiliate transactions offer lNCs much freedom and flexibility to shift 
resources across national boundaries. The government needs counter measures so 
as to get an equitable share of income generated." (P 19) 
Implicitly, therefore, the indigenous small enteIprises were supposed to counter the dominance of 
large-scale enteIprises, and stem some of the negative consequences of such dominance. The 
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tensions that have ensued are to be expected, particuIarly as the 10ng-teIDl objective by indigenous 
Kenyans was ''to supplant foreign capital [in Kenya] (Kaplinsky, 1982:193). Since the Sessional 
Paper No. 1 of 1986,30 the Kenyagovemment's blueprint for the management of the economy for 
renewed growth put in motion a specific small enterprise development strategy as a panacea for 
the country's development aspirations (GOK, 1986; 1989; 1992), particuIarly to indeginise 
industry. 
5.4.2 KENYA'S APPROACH TO SME DEVELOPMENT 
Like many developing countries faced with the realities of poor economic perfonnance, and 
spurred on by the successes of fonnerly developing countries in Asia (known as Newly 
Industrialised Countries - NICs), Kenya saw small enterprises as a vehicle for developing an 
indigenous entrepreneurial capacity. Initially aIgUing that indigenous entrepreneurs were limited 
by a lack of resources, particularly finance and managerial training, the initial programmes and 
strategies aimed to remove or reduce these limitations. The policy measures and programmes 
which have been developed specifically to guide the development of the sector, range from 
developing assistance institutions which support small enterprises, those which initiate 
institutional and regulatory refonns to assist the small enterprises sector, and those seeking to 
directly offer support to small enteIprises. 
These strategies were fonnulated to promote entrepreneurship by focusing on small enterprises, 
arguing that small businesses were predominately set up by indigenous Kenyans, and could 
constitute the basis for developing and African business class in Kenya (Marris and Somerset, 
1971). Little was done to find 'real' entrepreneurs in the economy, hence all small business owners 
were considered potential candidates for the various assistance programmes such as finance, 
training and marketing, which specifically targeted small business owners. Since the sixties, for 
example, in addition to various special programmes in the commercial banks, various 
development banks have been set up to finance indigenous 'entrepreneurs': the Kenya Industrial 
Estates (KIE); Development Finance Corporation of Kenya (DFCK); Kenya Commercial Finance 
Corporation (KCFC); Small Enterprise Finance Company (SEFCO); Industrial Development 
Bank IDB); and the Joint Loan Board Scheme (JLBS) . The Exchange Control Notices 19 and 36 
of 1971 reinforced this strategy by regulating the foreign company's access to local capital, 
30. This paper remains Kenya's key statement for national development for the period 1986-2000. The key 
features of the paper include: strengthening rural-wban linkages, encouragement of small and informal 
enterprises as a source of "fast economic growth", acceleration of IDdigenisation of the economy, and 
the promotion of exports through both small and large enterprise promotion. The subsequent National 
Development Plan of 1989-1993 provides the specific policy framework for achieving the stated 
objectives of this blueprint for national development. 
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particularly short-term loans, thus freeing laIge proportions of local capital to be used by local 
'entrepreneurs'. In addition, the Kenya Industrial and Business Training Institute was set up 
specifically to train indigenous business owners and their staff To a large extent, these have 
continued to be the bases for the small and medium enterprise development programmes initiated 
and supported by the government. Various researchers note, however, that political and managerial 
problems have, however, prevented many of these programmes from producing the stock of 
indigenous entrepreneurs anticipated by the government (Coughlin, 1988c; Ikiara, 1991). 
Rigidities in the institutions meant to encourage indigenous Kenyans to enter into industry and 
commerce have been counterproductive (GOK, 1986). Instead, an informal sector has continued to 
grow as small business owners found themselves 'pushed' onto the 'black' market due to a 
prohibitive regulatory and enforcement environment. Large enterprises have also erected entry 
barriers in many industries, mainly through accumulation of proprietary technology, and scale. 
In addition to this set of promotional strategies, African businesses were given preference in 
particular areas of business through the Trade Licensing Act of 1 967. The same act also established 
the parastatal, Kenya National Trading Corporation (KNTC) which was to affect directly the 
activities of foreign owned commercial firms . The Transport Licensing Regulations of 1967 
restricted domestic transportation to Kenyan owned finns, even in the lucrative oil and oil products 
transportation business. The Immigration Act of 1 967 and the establishment of the Kenyanisation 
Bureau regulated employment of non-citizens through work permits, forcing foreign firms to 'tIain' 
Kenyans in industrial jobs. 
The conclusion arrived at by the Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 provided the political basis for a 
change of emphasis in the promotion of micro- small and medium enterprises in Kenya In 
progrnmmatic tenns, the most noticeable change of focus has been the development of a coherent 
strategy for small enterprise development, articulated in the Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1992. A 
second change in approach has been the increasing shift to private sector participation in 
implementing assistance progranunes to the sector, with the government playing what is popularly 
referred to as a Lfacilitative role'. This means that instead of direct involvement in programme 
delivery, the government is to focus on providing an enabling environment (World Bank, 1989) 
through macro-economic policies, fiscal strategies, and the provision of a skilled labour resource 
through education and training, and technological dissemination. The effects of this new approach 
have not been yet been evaluated. 
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5.4.3 THE NATURE AND CONTRIBUTION OF KENYA'S SME SECfOR 
There is considerable ambiguity in the definition of the SME sector.31 Almost all surveys carried 
out in Kenya have adopted a different definition. However, over time, the SME sector has come to 
be regarded as including all those businesses employing fewer than 50 people, and within it three 
distinct categories as shown in Table 5-6 below. 
Table 5-6 SME Classification and Distribution 
Type No. of Employees ShareofSME 
Sector* 
Micro~nterprises (fonnerly 0-10 88.9% 
known as the 'infonnal sector) 
Fonnal Small Enterprises 11-20 9.8% 
Medium Enterprises 21-50 1.3% 
Total 0-50 100% 
* These figures are provisional results of a study conducted by the GEMINI project 
funded by United States aid ageIlCY (USAID), in Kenya. The same study also 
estimates that of the estimated enterprise population of 912,161, about 76.4% are 
located in the rural areas, while 24.6% can be found in the urban areas. 
Note: A UNIDO (1986) study gives a slightly different picture, basing its analysis on 
share of employment. It stated that the category under 20 employees represented 
41.62% while the category employing 21-50 employees represented 58.38 %. 
31 . In Kenya, the official definition of large firms refers to firms employing more than 100 people. In 
practice, however, firms employing fifty people is often included in this category depending on levels 
of capitalisation.. The literature on the measurement of firm size using employee numbers is 
controversial. It is argued that this is particularly important in cases where job creation crises have 
restricted the levels of capitalisation of large finns, necessitating the use of labour intensive 
technologies. Consequently, questions about the comparability of firm behaviour based on size and 
output arise. 
The debate about firm size is far from concluded in Kenya as elsewhere. Those working in the informal 
sector with micro-enterprises include those businesses employing up to to ten people, yet the prevailing 
official definition is an employee number of up to five people. Micro-enterprises are regarded as those 
enterprises employing 0-5 people while small enterprises are those employing 6-49 people and medium 
firms are those employing 50-99 people. Additionally, controversy still SUIIOunds the use of employee 
numbers to classify businesses in Kenya due to the effects of high capitalisation in some industries, 
while other use labour intensive processes. 
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The SME sector (fums employing fewer than 50 people) is generally underrepresented in 
manufacturing. Even while noting the inadequacies of data on small and mediwn enterprises, 
Table 5-3 indicates that formal finns with fewer than fifty employees (the SME sector) contributed 
17% of manufacturing value-added in 1972, dropping to 7% in 1980, and then rising slightly to 
19% in 1990. In 1990, this category of fums contributed a meagre 12% to manufacturing 
employment (see Table 5-4). In addition, the small and mediwn enterprise sector's inherent 
weaknesses have contributed to their marginalisation. They have neither increased nor grown at 
the expected rate despite government and donor support for the sector (Coughlin, 1991a). 
Few analyses exist of the sector's performance indicating its success or shortcomings, or those of 
the strategies adopted for their development. Although there are some indications of growth these 
are minimal, and could be explained by factors other than an increase in the contribution of the 
sector to the economy. For example, since the Government's interest in the SME sector as a 
vehicle of development (GOK, 1986), fums which were fonnerly in the 'informal' sector, have 
been progressively 'fonnalised', thus being gradually included in national accounts. Several studies 
have attempted to quantify the sector and its activities.32 The GEMINI (1993) study implies that 
there are more small enterprises than previously estimated by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(1988) study (350,000), employing more than 2 million people. Official data show an increase in 
urban infonnal sector employment from 41,000 in 1973 to 202,000 in 1987, while jobs in modem 
establishments increased by two thirds in the same period (Ikiara, 1991 :314). 
However, various reports, particularly those issuing out of World Bank studies, imply that one of 
the most serious handicaps of Kenya's industrialisation is the absence of the middle level 
enterprises employing fifty to one hundred people - 'the missing middle' . This concept is important 
for this thesis because it is, pemaps, this category of finns that have the managerial and 
technological capacity to provide the needs of large finns in Kenya The GEMINI report suggests 
that mediwn sized enterprises play a small role in the economy, and none at all in the rural 
economies. It also notes that small, formal enterprises contribute 1.4% to national enterprise 
population, while the micro~nterprises make up the bulk of the enterprise this population. 
Consequently, large finns may have a point when they claim that there is a serious paucity of 
adequately developed small firms who are able to meet their needs. This position is supported by 
32. For example the Central Bureau of Statistics survey (Kenya) on micro enteq>rises (CBS, 1988) reports 
that the informal sector accounts for 20% of total recorded employment and generates 22.7% of total 
urban employment; a report, Improving the Growth Potential of the Small &ale and Infonnal Sectors, 
by J Tomecko and C. Aleke-Dondo for the World Bank's Country Economic Memorandum on Kenya 
(1993). Another example is the ongoing census of the USAID sponsored GEMINI project, whose 
results have not yet been published 
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the World Bank report (1987) although the magnitudes of enteIprise populations differ. An 
important additional point made by the World Bank report is that even those existent medium-
sized enteIprises are concentrated in sub-sectors such as food processing, saw milling, fumiture 
production, printing and sheet metal fabrication. Few enterprises operate in non-traditional sub-
sectors such as vehicle parts and components sub-sectors. 
The traditionally cited reasons for this small contribution has been the negative policy and 
institutional frameworks within which small finns work:, and an alleged unequitable support of the 
large scale sector. These contentions have been disputed. The World Bank (1987) report notes that 
"despite channening US$50 million in this sub-sector by various development banks, 
(Kenya Industrial Estates - KIE, Kenya Commercial Finance Corporation - KCFC, 
Small EnteIprise Finance Corporation - SEFCO, Industrial Development Bank - IDB), 
there has been a net addition of only 100 finns in a decade" ( p210) 
The type of enterprises included in this evaluation are the small to medium sized finns generally 
supported by the financing programmes listed. While this is only a small section of the sector 
employing less than 100 people, it is a reasonable representation of fonnal, modem finns which 
concern this study. 
Using KIE clients in a similar way to represent the fonnal small and medium scale sectors, Kilby 
(1987) also concludes that 
"For the larger, non-traditional ventures - until recently the prime target - KlE's [Kenya 
Industrial Estates] efforts have been remarkably unsuccessful" (P69). 
Kilby adds that few micro-enteIprises ever "graduate" to become medium sized £inns (Ki1by, 
1987:37). He suggests that the "still developing entrepreneurial capacities" are lithe principal 
explanation for the sector's lacklustre record" (p47), despite the assistance to this category of finns 
(discounting arguments that the sector has not had support in all of the areas he examined). This 
contention is echoed by the World Bank report (1987) which notes "clearly, Kenya's small-scale 
industry has been seriously hampered by weak entrepreneurial perfonnance rather than because of 
a lack of government support or of relatively hostile policies" (P244). 
Other weaknesses of the sector relate to the entrepreneurial capacity of indigenous Kenyans. Even 
while advocating the development of Small Scale EnteIprises (SSE) as a strategy for the 
indigenisation and revitalisation of the economy, Kenyan planners concede the inadequate 
knowledge and skills of those who are to take on this task. For example in the Sixth National 
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Development Plan - 1989-1993, it is noted that while the government is committed to the 
development of small enterprises and the indigenisation of the economy, 
"..... [it] is fully aware that serious constraints lie ahead since those endowed with 
suitable skills and management abilities often lack the opportunity of appropriate 
exposure, which hinders their success in business." (P223) 
Clearly, on its own, the SME sector in Kenya is significantly weak. Recognising this problem, the 
Government undertook, inter alia, to "encourage partnership between Kenyan and non-Kenyan 
entrepreneurs" (GOK, 1989:224) for the transfer of management and technical skills, hoping that 
this strategy would foster faster industrial development and encourage the diffusion of technology 
in the country through joint venturing and sub~ntracting relationships with foreign fums. The 
Sessional Paper no. 2 of 1992 on the Jua Kali33 sector, reiterates the need for the local indigenous 
businesses to interact: with the huger businesses as one way of achieving faster entrepreneurial and 
technological capabilities within the economy. However, in view of the role assigned to the small 
enterprise sector, and the perception of 'displacement' by lruge fums, this could prove problematic. 
It is within this context that the study was conceived - the search for a strategy which would 
promote small scale enterprises within the framework of the existing dominance of lruge fums, 
without perpetuating existing tensions between lruge and small finns. This study postulates that 
one of the reasons why small enterprises have not grown at the expected rate is this large finn 
dominance and control of the social, political and institutional structures which govern the 
management of the economy. 
5.5 LARGE AND SMALL FIRM LINKAGES IN KENYA 
Although there may be some inter-finn linkages, particularly sub~ntracting and joint ventures in 
Kenyan industry, little has been documented about their nature or those factors influencing their 
existence. In addition, little evidence exists to show that the government encourages the use of 
local products as a basis for inter-finn linkages within industrial sectors. Various researchers such 
as Murage (1983), Coughlin (1988b) and Masai (1991) anecdotally note, however, their limited 
use, highlighting the various impediments to outsourcing from local fions . The large MNCs and 
other fums have also found little impulse to use local materials and suppliers (Coughlin, 1991a; 
33 . This is the catch-all phrase used to describe the informal, micro-enterprise, and small scale enterprise 
sectors in Kenya The literal meaning of the term is hot sun, adopted as a way of describffig the 
conditions under which the infonnal sector operators wolk. It was adopted, principally, to address the 
negative image and impact of the tean "informal sector" . Initially, the tean Jua KaIi was used to 
describe those 'artisans' engaged in the industrial sector only. Currently, this tean is used to refer to all 
operators inc1udingthose in the trade and services sector. 
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Gershenberg, 1983). Gershenberg (1983) in his study on MNCs subsidiaries in Kenya reported 
that "in no case did we find finns undertaking to assist in the development of local suppliers" 
(P23), and concluded that 
''the government of Kenya does little to actively encourage the use of local resources in 
production and thus to maximise local value added in [the] manufucturing/ processing 
sector" (P23). 
Consequently, prior to 1991 when the Kenya Subcontracting and Partnership Exchange (KSPX) 
was established, there was little evidence of a political interest in encouraging large-small finn 
linkages in Kenya No strategies existed which deliberately developed linkages between large and 
small finns in industry as a strategy for exploiting the advantages of a size related division of 
labour in industry and to increase the contribution of small finns . 
The KSPX was set up by the Kenya government with the help of United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) to bring together large, medium and small enterprises in a formal exchange 
(UNDP/GOK Project Document, 1990), and to build a data bank as a facility for these activities. 
The exchange is still in its infancy with many of its problems arising from the traditional lack of 
trust between large and small firms in Kenya It is e:x .. pected that its linkage with the various 
membership organisations assisting business people, for instance the Federation of Kenyan 
Employers (FKE), will ameliorate this situation. However, there are serious doubts in the business 
circles about its survival, particularly emanating from the effect of government management of the 
programme. At a time when public sector initiatives are viewed negatively, even with some 
suspicion, the private sector is less likely to use the exchange and its facilities . 
Having said that, the exchange has already embarked on a programme to develop a data base of 
contractors and potential sub-contractors. In order to focus its initial programme, the vehicle 
assembly industry and related sub-sectors such as the auto-ancillary, metal fubrication sub-sectors, 
have been surveyed and documented. This study's interest in the vehicle assembly sector was 
reinforced by the government's recognition of its potential for external soUTeing and sub-
contracting activities, based on the successful experiences of this sector in industrial development 
elsewhere (GOK, 1986). Together with a specific rationalisation strategy aimed at streamlining the 
vehicle vehicle industry and encouraging local procurement of components, this strategy was 
expected to develop a local capacity to supply the vehicle assembly, and other industries. 
5.6 THE KENYAN MOTOR VEIDCLE INDUSTRY 
This section briefly outlines the structure of the Kenyan motor vehicle industry. Although small, 
and despite its basic role in provision of transportation, its impact on the rest of the economy 
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through linkages with the auto-ancillaIy, metal fabrication and repair sub-sectors makes it an 
important focus for Kenyan industria1isation. h directly employs an estimated 15,000 people, and 
another 15,000-20,000 people in related repair and service industries (KMI, 1990). In addition, 
policy makers believe that this sector is likely to fonn the basis of a machine tool industry (GOK, 
1989). However., its importance to small enterprise development should be viewed from the 
framework of the rationalisation and localisation programmes. 
5.6.1 STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS OF KENYA'S VEmCLE VEHICLE AssEMBLY INDUSTRY 
Since the establishment of the Kenyan Vehicle Industry (MVI) in the 1950s, with servicing as the 
main activity, the sub-sector has grown to include auto ancillary services, vehicle body building, 
and coach works. Basing its decision to license vehicle assembly in Kenya on existing auto-
ancillary activities and maintenance services, the government began to develop, deliberately, the 
assembly of vehicles by requiring assemblers to shift from semi-knocked-down (SKD) to 
completely-knocked-down (CKD) levels of assembly (GOK, 1974:292; 1979:371; 1983:204). 
Low demand for vehicles on the domestic market, and the absence of a long tenn strategy to foster 
transition from assembly to manufacture, have limited the growth of the sector and its ancillary 
sub-sectors. As noted in the discussion above, the sector is currently characterised by a 
proliferation of makes and models, and yet no officia1 policies defining the designs and models to 
be used in the countIy exist. 
The vehicle assembly industry in Kenya consists of four distinct categories of participants 
presented infig 5-1 below. This industria1 structure has been summarised acconling to current 
relationships between the various components of the sector. 
Fig.5-1 Components of the Kenyan Motor Industry (Source: Field Notes 1992/1993) 
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The first category consists of the three assemblers: Kenya Vehicle Manufucturers (KVM), 
Associated Vehicle Assemblers (AVA), and General Motors Kenya (GMK). The fonner two 
plants are contract assemblers34 while GMK is a franchise holder as well as assembler, hence, it is 
the only non-contract assembler. Until the launch of the privatisation programme aimed to reduce 
public investments in industry, the government held at least 25% equity in each of the assembly 
establishments. At the time of publishing this report, the privatisation process was not yet 
complete. Other shareholders include the major franchise holders (explained below) in Kenya as 
will be discussed in the findings in chapter seven. 
The second category consists of thirteen franchise holders (see list in Appendix A6)35 better 
known in Kenya as 'importers' of Completely Knocked Down kits (CKDs). They hold licences to 
import, assemble and market on behalf of principal vehicle manufucturers in Japan, Italy, UK, 
Germany, America, etc. About half of these have some shareholding interests in at least one of the 
assembly plants or are associated with companies which hold shares in these assembly plants. This 
category is generally thought of as the power base of the sector, owing to its central position in the 
decision-making process regarding what makes and models are to be mruketed in Kenya 
However, because of their commercial orientation, their decisions have been variously argued to 
conflict with Kenya's industrialisation goals.36 
The third category is often subsumed in the second category because of the thin dividing line, if 
any, between them. This category consists of the distributors who are usually also franchise 
holdersfnnporters. However, there are distributors who are merely serve as outlets for m<Yor 
franchise holders. The fourth category is the auto ancillary sector comprising a variety of 
independent small and medium enterprises who supply the industry with assembly and 
replacement parts. Masai's study (1991) reported that these numbered 30 small and medium-sized 
firms in the auto-ancillary sub-sector, and 15 coach wolks and body-building enterprises. 
However, because the importers purchase as complete a CKD kit as possible (Masai, 1991), or 
import most of the other inputs, this category has tended to serve the replacement mruket more 
than the original equipment (OE) mruket Yet, it is in this category that prospects for a wide range 
of small entetprises may be found. In industrialised countries, for example, about 50% of the value 
of an automobile are derived from this sub-sector. 
34. The two contract assemblers (KVM and A V A) only assemble on behalf of the franchise holders. This 
implies that they do not import their own CKDs for assembly in their plants. 
35. This includes GMK who import for their own assembly needs. 
36. Kenya Motor Industry Association provide anecdotal evidence of tensions between assemblers and 
importers, arising mainly from this power structure within the industry. 
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An important sector not included in this research is the service and repair sector of the motor 
vehicle industry, including the body fabrication and repair sub-sector, which constitutes a fifth 
category of the industry. Although vital for the industry's activities, it is not directly linked into the 
assembly or auto ancillary sectors and has not, therefore, been included in this study. Besides, 
many of the operators are micro~nterprises, or unregistered self~mployed mechanics and the 
magnitude of its contribution has not yet been documented. In addition, what is considered as the 
repair service sector in Kenya includes all types of mechanics such as watch and electrical 
appliances repairers. Consequently, the quantification of the sector or its activities is problematic. 
However, suffice is to say that in Kenya, this latter category employs perhaps the largest number 
of the small enterprise workers in the vehicle assembly industry. 
5.6.2 PRODUCTION ORGANISATION IN KENYA'S VEIDCLE ASSEMBLY INDuSTRY 
Viewed in terms of production organisation, the general 'layout' of the sector is reflected in the 
following activity flow diagram Fig 5-2. This analysis of industry-wide production organisation is 
important in infomUng the study regarding the ability of finns in the industry to de-(Xmple their 
production to allow for fragmentation and/or outsourcing from other firms . Intuitively, there is 
greater potential for de-integration where production organisation within the industry allows dis-
aggregation or de-coupling to take place. From the diagrammatic representation of the activities of 
the industry presented in fig. 5-2, it is clear that productive organisation in the vehicle assembly 
industry is generally dis-aggregated, and can be said to have the potential for de-coupling of 
production activities. For example, material inputs procurement is a 'separate' process from 
assembly, distribution and after-sales service. In addition, the service inputs are separate functions 
introduced into the production chain at different stages. Effectively, therefore, the four 'production 
chain' components (viz. materials procurement, assembly, distribution, and after-sales service) can 
be organised internally by one firm, or eJl..1emally by several finns . At the same time, in many 
manufucturing finns, services can be provided by outside suppliers. 
Consequently, based onfig 5-2, it can be argued that the motor assembly industry in Kenya, like 
other motor industries, has the potential for de-coupling. 
5.6.3 CAPACITY UTILISATION IN THE MOTOR VEIDCLE INDUSTRY 
As was shown in the first section of this chapter, it is generally argued in Kenya that large firms 
suffer from low capacity utilisation. While the motor vehicle industry is no exception, its capacity 
utilisation levels have been relatively higher on individual plant basis. In 1990, actual capacity in 
the industry was utilised in the following proportions: 
Materials 
CKDs 
local Content 
Assembly Disoibution 
Assembly 
..---+--Retailing 
ub-assembly 
Fig.5-2 Activity Flows in Kenya's Motor Industry 
Source: Field Notes and ObseIVation 1992/1993 
After Sales 
Service 
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Repair 
Servicing 
Notes: 'Others' includes insurance, infonnation (computer) and miscellaneous services 
Table 5-7 
Assemblers 
Assembler 
AVA 
GMK 
KVM 
Capacity Utilisation Levels for all 
Capacity utilisation 
80% 
63% 
74% 
.. Note: The capacrty utiltsatIon rates are estunated on a 
one shift basis 
Source: Field Notes 199211993 
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Evidently, plant capacity utilisation in the sector is significantly higher than the m.anuf.:lcturin 
average of 34% reported by Coughlin (1985). However, due to industry difficulties brought about 
by general world recession, and political and economic instability in Kenya, this reduced to less 
than 30% for all the suppliers between 1990-1993. In 1992, for example, A V A was forced to close 
down its plant for over two months, while the other two assemblers reduced production to half~y 
shifts, interspersed with prolonged closure for maintenance and holidays (Interviews). Other 
explanations for the declining capacity utilisation levels could be advanced. It is probable that it is 
also the result of excess capacity installations in the first place, and that current utilisation are 
structural adjustments within the sector in response to the 'true' demand levels. This questions, 
therefore, the efficacy of having three assembly plants, each with an installed capacity to provide 
vehicles for both prevailing and anticipated demand levels in Kenya. 
5.6.4 PROBLEMS IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
The motor vehicle industry has been fraught with problems since its inception, the most recurrent 
being. According to managers and observers in the sector: 
1. Low levels of foreign exchange available for the procurement of CKD kits. As a 
result, the assembly plants have never produced at full capacity. They have always 
operated on a one shift basis, and even then, have never achieved the potential of 
installed capacity. 
2. Lack of standards to control the quality of local components and parts. Managers 
in the sector reported that consequently, it has been difficult to achieve high 
quality standards for these components, pariculaily as it has also proved difficult 
to standardise various parts and components. On the other hand, this lack of 
standards constitutes, perhaps, the most deleterious loophole in the local sourcing 
programme. In the absence of standards, buyers have been able to claim that 
suppliers products are of low quality, and therefore request permission to somce 
abroad. 
3. Continuous influx of imported vehicles onto a smalP7 and fiagmentecP8 mruket. 
This has not only reduced the new vehicle maIket drastically, but has also 
37. In 1990, for example, the new vehicle registration was 18,000 vehicles (excluding agricultural 
equipment) and just over 16,900 vehicles in 1991. The locally assembled component of these figures 
has declined considerably in the last few years. In 1990, for example, 13,580 vehicles were locally 
assembled, while in 1991, just over 9,460 vehicles were assembled. 
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contributes to the proliferation of makes and models, which in turn prevents 
specialisation in the auto-ancillary sub-sector. 
4. Relatively higher prices of locally assembled vehicles, as compared to imported 
equivalents, brought about by high taxation, high duty, dealers' mark-ups, and the 
high cost of local components, in addition to the higher production costs 
emanating from lack of efficiency which is caused, in turn, by a proliferation of 
makes and models; 
This latter contention has been the basis of the Kenya Motor vehicle industry Association (KMl) 
lobby to reduce the number of makes and models in order to allow the assembly industry to 
develop sufficient experience to sustain efficient production activities. In 1987, the government 
agreed to begin the rationalisation process, and reiterated this in its Sixth National Development 
P fan in 1989. In practice, rationalisation has been neither seriously implemented nor effectively 
policed by the government. A position paper prepared by KMI in March of 1990 titled "Passenger 
Car Rationalisation: Facts and Forecasts" is an indicator that by this time, the industry was still 
swamped with makes and models. In newspaper editoriaJs39 in 1993, business correspondents 
reflecting prevailing opinion by observers and practitioners in the industry have continued to 
decry the proliferation of makes and models, and the increasing number of "cheap second-hand 
imports" . 
5.6.5 RATIONALISATION OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
Rationalisation of the motor vehicle industry is seen by policy makers in Kenya as one approach to 
localisation of industry, particularly in the related parts and components industries. Consequently, 
the prospects for linkages between large and small firms have been conceptualised on the basis of 
rationalisation and localisation of soureing in the motor vehicle industry. Kenyan literature such as 
Murage (1983), Coughlin (1988c) and Masai (1991) argue that because of the proliferation of 
makes and models of vehicles, it is difficult to gain eh"perience in the production of various parts 
and components destined for the motor vehicle industry. There are currently not fewer than 40 
different makes of vehicles imported into Kenya as new, used or reconditioned vehicles. Typically, 
each make offers an average of 12 m~or variants, doubled every five to 10 years. Hence of the 
3000 vehicle models available world-wide, Kenya imports up to 300 of these and assembles about 
38. It has been noted that Kenya assembles at least 30 of the 3000 makes and models manufactured world-
wide, for a market of only 10,000 new vehicles annually. 
39. For example, the Sunday Nation - Life Style, August 22, 1993. 
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30 (KM!, 1990). This is a high level relative to the new4° vehicle demand of about 10,000 
vehicles annually. This rruu:k.et has continued to decline in the face of world recession and other 
economic difficulties in Kenya brought about by, among other reasons, political instability. Table 
5-8 below indicates the decline in new vehicle sales since 1986. It is these small markets that have 
led to the lobby for rationalisation of the industry. 
It is important to note, at this juncture, that the importance of economies of scale in the motor 
industry in general (>250K pa for the auto-assembly, and > 400Kpa in engine manufacture) puts 
to question the logic of promoting a vehicle assembly industry in Kenya It also questions the 
potential for backward linkages in this industry. Noting these arguements, and in the absence of 
field data, it can only be conjectured that Kenya promotes the motor-assembly industry for 
'strategic' reasons. Consequently, for those involved in the auto-assembly industry in Kenya, scale 
economies appear to be unimportant. In turn, this questions the importance of scale economies in 
industries which have traditionally found it important to operate at certain minimum output levels, 
such as the car industry. 
Table 5-8 Changes in Vehicle Sales (Locally 
assenibled vehicles excluding agricultural equipment) 
Year Units Variation over 
previous year 
(%) 
1986 10,757 -1.36% 
1987 13,625 -26.66% 
1988 12,837 -5 .78% 
1989 14,176 +10.42% 
1990 13,582 -4.19% 
1991 9,458 -43 .6% 
1992 8,372 -11.48% 
Source: Kenya Motor vehicle industry Association 
(KM!) statistics 
The KM! argument for rationalisation is based on economies of scale, emphasising the effects of 
proliferation on transaction frequency and the difficulty in accumulating organisational experience. 
40. This is the demand for new vehicles as opposed to the general case. The ~or constraint to the demand 
for new vehicles in Kenya is cost Consequently, cheaper comparable imported vehicles dominate the 
vehicle market. When considered at an aggregate level, the average annual demand for vehicles in 
Kenya is 22,000 units. 
131 
As noted above, these are exacerbated by marlcet fragmentation. Every distinct model requires 
approximately 1,000 component spare parts to ensure full availability. Minor variants of these 
models involve about 100 components and spare parts, while ~or variants require 500. Thus for 
every additional ~or model variant, an additional stock of 500 different component parts must 
be held to ensure one piece of spare part is available. It: for example, 10 pieces of each part for 300 
different variants are required, stocks of 1.5million line items must be held to service the demand 
(KMI, 1990). Acconling to the KM! estimates, it would be beneficial to Kenyan industry if these 
components were sourced locally, but currently, less than 20% on average are locally sourced (this 
includes parts and components procured as spares). Even in such cases, this figure is reduced 
significantly by the high level of imported inputs used in the sector. In any case, in order to build 
expertise, the types would need to be reduced significantly. 
As a result of proliferation, it has been difficult for suppliers to develop the requisite experience 
needed for quality improvement. The two factors discussed in the preceding paragraph, therefore, 
provide a reasonable basis for the rationalisation of the motor vehicle industry. This aim was 
incorporated into the operational structure developed by the government to direct the activities of 
the sector from inception. 
In its Supplemental Agreement with the assemblers (pp 3-4), for example, the aims and conditions 
of instituting CKD conditions was to: 
1. rationalise the assembly industry; 
2. increase the degree of breakdown in the imported CKD kits; 
3. increase the number and types of vehicle components manufactured locally; 
4. provide training for new skills and technical expertise; 
5. provide increased employment opportunities in assembly plants and local component-
producing industries; 
6. encourage overseas manufacturers of vehicle components to establish local partnerships 
with Kenyan companies or to licence Kenyan companies to manufucture their 
components; 
7. encourage further use ofloca1 raw materials; 
8. bring down prices of vehicles in the country . 
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Although no empirical evidence exists infonning the extent to which these goals and objectives 
have been achieved, casual observation of the activities of the sector show that to date, little 
rationalisation in the motor vehicle industry has been achieved. One of the reasons for the failure 
of the rationalisation programme41 is the lack of support from various parties involved in the 
sector, particularly the reluctance of the assemblers and importers to source locally. At the 
inception of assembly activities in Kenya, the government agreed with the assemblers to achieve 
local content levels of 40%-50% by 1982. In Masai's study (1986) assemblers stated local content 
achievement of 40%, but his own assessment was that in reality, when tax and labour deductions 
are taken into account, the effective local content levels average about 25%. In the same study, the 
assemblers attributed this low perfonnance to a lack of government commitment to 
implementation of policies which restrict imports of completely built units (CBU), rationalisation 
of makes and models available on the market, and assistance in the development of local suppliers 
(Masai, 1986). The high cost oflocal components, affected by low levels of demand, also renders 
local procurement much more expensive. In Masai's study, assemblers found little incentive to 
source locally many of these components. The importer categoxy is, on the other hand, motivated 
by short-teOll profits. They therefore do not see incentives in the current industry environment -
the combined effect of deletion costs, unavailability of good quality components, and the relatively 
higher investment involved in local sourcing.42 Thus, for local small manufacturers to benefit from 
this strntegy, the government has to focus on removing the policy impediments which prevent the 
local assemblers from using local components and services. The first step is to rationalise the 
motor vehicle industry in addition to providing institutional support to auto-ancillaxy finns in the 
sub-sector in oIder to make then 'attractive' to large buyers. 
KM!, the industry's lobby group, has made efforts to press the Government to take steps to control 
the influx of makes and models onto the marl<.et, particularly those entering the country through 
'unconventional' import channels. In a position paper produced in March, 1990 to argue for 
rationalisation of passenger vehicles (and in principal, cornmercial vehicles as well), KM! (1990) 
argue that for various reasons, only 40 models are appropriate for the Kenyan markets at anyone 
time. The report argues that 
41 . See the various appendices for the contents of the Legal Notices. 
42. In arguing for rationalisation of the Kenya motor vehicle assembly industry, the Kenya Motor Industry 
Association give six investment related problems impeding local assembly and sourcing: the 
manufacture of expensive jigs for frequently changing models; dedication of an assembly line and 
training for new makes and models; kit pack logistics and low deletion allowances; development of 
local ~ecifications for the full range of models; investment in spares stocks; and special training for 
service woIkshops. 
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"This level gives adequate choice and reasonable economies of scale. It is also the 
nwnber that will naturally evolve through local assembly. More models would be 
uneconomic. Fewer models would require artificial restrictions with political, 
commercial and technical penalties." (p 1) 
Swnmarising their argument for rationalisation, KMl present the main benefits as 
1. maximwn growth of local industry, jobs and skills by multiplying vehicle volwnes 
resulting in higher production runs, higher degrees of local content breakdown, and 
improved production efficiencies; 
2. more efficient production OIganisation, with more lnanageable' spares and components' 
stocks; 
3. higher quality and/or lower prices arising out of scale efficiencies; 
4. wider range of a viable local components owing to a larger local assembly activity; 
5. higher level oflocal value added; 
6. foreign exchange saving arising from the price differential between CKDs and CBUs, and 
higher levels offoreign exchange savings from increased use of local content; 
7. improved export potential as showroom prices between locally assembled and imported 
vehicles narrows owing to various savings and price-quality benefits.(KMI, 1990) 
The same report estimates that as of 1990, Kenya's total car population (excluding agricultural 
equipment and other vehicles) was approximately 115,00()43 with 90,000 of these being imported 
in 400 different models, while 25,000 were locally assembled in 50 different models. The scale 
economies given are 225 units/model and 715 units/model respectively. This implies that local 
assembly activities are relatively rationalised already. By use of forecasting techniques, KM! 
postulated that if total local assembly rationalisation were applied, and import restrictions were 
enforced, the distribution would shift in favour of local assembly, increasing the population of 
locally assembled units to 110,000 in 60 models and a scale economy of 1830 units/mogel. This 
has important implications for local industry. While not restricting consumer choice, scale 
economies would be achieved at assembly and components production levels. 
43. These figures take into consideration progressive scrappillg of old cars, and the cumulative effects of 
model changes. They assume the same total annual market of 10,000 as at present (KMI, 1990: Section 
8). 
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The auto-ancillary sub-sector, supplying the vehicle assembly industry with parts and components, 
already produces several items. According to the Kenya External Trade Authority (KETA, 1980), 
the government export promotion body, four stages in the vehicle vehicle manufacture and 
assembly process can be identified: 
1. Stage 1: the manufacture of rubber, nylon or plastic moulded parts such as mats, bushings, 
mountings, covers, bellows, vee belts, etc.; panel mouldings; simple coiled springs and 
spring washers; exhaust and silencer systems; gaskets; shock absorbers; leaf springs; wiring 
harnesses; seats; cushions and auto trims; auto tyres and tubes; auto batteries; and miniahlIe 
bulbs. 
2. Stage 2: fiiction materials (brake linings, clutch facings); brake assembly; clutch plates and 
brake linings assembly; propeller shafts; steering gear, engine valves; spark plugs; pistons; 
rings and pins; dash board instruments; voltage regulators; distributors; head lamp assembly; 
wiper mechanisms. 
3. Stage 3: die cast components; cylinder blocks; auto wheels; automotive gears; carburettors; 
auto starters; dynamos and alternators. 
4. Stage 4: body stamping; chassis assembly; crank shaft forging and matching; fuel injection 
equipment; and metal bearing. 
Almost all items in the first stage above are produced in Kenya, although with limited variety. 
Since the government's specific legislation mandating local sourcing, some items in stage two are 
also produced. A limited variety of spark plugs, brake linings and other fiicti.on materials are also 
produced. These locally available items are destined mainly for the replacement market. None of 
the items in stages 3 and 4 are produced in Kenya Masai (1986) notes that the promotion of the 
development of these products has been restricted by, among others, the difficulty of achieving 
specialisation, efficiency and standardisation in a market that has a high proliferation of products. 
These developments present a vicious circle scenario. Because local producers predominately 
produce for the replacement market where consumers may not be discriminatory, and because of 
the lack of specialisation and standardisation, their quality is likely to improve slowly. This 
discourages, in turn, assemblers from procuring from these sources, leading to limited transfer of 
technology from the assemblers to local suppliers. 
In swnmary, proliferation has deleterious implications for local small suppliers as the high 
variability makes it difficult to accumulate adequate experience and specialisation to achieve high 
quality standards. Problems associated with proliferation have been highlighted in the motor 
industries of other developing countries such as Latin America (Jenkins, 1977) and East Asia 
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(Donner, 1990), suggesting rationalisation as a strategy of achieving both scale economies and 
increasing local supplier capability. Consequently in th.e Kenyan case, in order to encourage local 
sourcing, one of the central strategies will have to be rationalisation of industry. 
5.6.6 INTER-FIRM LINKAGES IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSlRY 
Alth.ough no studies have been conducted indicating th.e nature of inter-finn linkages in Kenya's 
motor vehicle industry, various auth.ors highlight the nature of local content sourcing, a concept 
which is adopted by th.is study as a measure of outsourcing, and by extension, inter-finn linkages. 
As has been noted in preceding paragraphs, Masai (1991) notes the absence of significant sub-
contracting activities 
"Unfortunately, poor and inconsistent quality, uncertainty regarding supply, lack of 
prnctical standards for testing components, frequent changes in component designs 
slowed down progress in increasing local content. Sub-<:ontrncting was not done 
because th.e assemblers were seeking to improve product quality and productivity in 
their own installations." (P223) 
However, his study is not supported by empirical evidence. Since th.is study, some sub-<:ontrncting 
has taken place within the industry, mainly owing to the effects of foreign exchange restrictions 
used by th.e government as a strategy to encourage local sourcing. This th.eme will be discussed 
further in the findings in chapter seven. In addition, oth.er strategies to encourage the development 
of a local supplier base are being put into place. In 1992, for example, th.e director of th.e Kenya 
Industrial and Research Development Institute (KIRDI) announced that the Kenya government, in 
collaboration with UNDP, was planning to start fonnal manufacture of vehicle spare parts. He 
further announced that th.is would be undertaken th.rough the recently established Engineering 
Development and Science Centre, which is part ofKIRDI. This project was estimated to cost $256 
million and would utilise Computer Aided Design and Computer Aided Manufacturing 
technology so as to manufacture internationally acceptable products.44 
Other fonns of linkages are to be found in the repair and service sectors of the motor vehicle 
industry, peIhaps the largest sub-sector in the industry. Again, th.ese are neither documented nor 
fonnerly encouraged in national SME development strategies. Jua Kali repair worlcshops can be 
found all over th.e country repairing and servicing all kinds of vehicles and commercial vehicles 
using very limited capital and technology. However, it is not yet clear how th.ese link with. huge 
firms. 
44. The Sunday Nation - Life Style, September 5, 1993. 
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5.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has addressed the context of the study, Kenya Its development goals and strategies 
favour vertical de-integrntion of finns, and the development of small enterprises, suggesting that 
the country's industrialisation programme can benefit from current global developments where 
large finns are dis-integrating, and turning to inter-finn relationships to supply their requirements. 
For various reasons, SME development programmes and strategies in Kenya have not deliberately 
exploited this strategy. The question is how to achieve this in an environment where large fums 
are established and historically dominate and condition the social and institutional structures in the 
economy. In contrast, small firms are weak and few in number, particularly that category of 
fonnal, modem £inns which have the managerial and technological capabilities for meeting the 
needs oflarge buyers in industry. Consequently, inter-finn linkages are likely to be limited on the 
grounds that local small finns cannot meet the requirements of large buyers. This research aims to 
explore, empirically, this and other pertinent factors limiting local soureing, particularly from 
small indigenous firms. 
In order to address the research question posed in the Kenyan context, chapter three will examine 
some of the literature explaining how and why inter-fum relationships are funned with the aim of 
exploring the factors which influence the fonnation of such linkages. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
In any research, the research strategy used depends on the nature of the research question, and the 
ability of that approach to address the pertinent questions more accurately than alternatives 
(Denzin, 1978). It is also detennined by the extent to which there exists knowledge about the 
subject, which may guide a more specific search for answers to the question (yin, 1984). The 
alternative approaches to research include surveys, experimentation, a variety of case studies and 
case histories, and the analysis of archival infoIDlation. Although these approaches are all used in 
contemporary research, the most frequently favoured approaches are the survey, relying on 
quantitative data, and the case study, generally relying on qualitative data. While surveys are 
favoured for their 'explanatory' properties (Yin, 1984) or in the study of static and stable forms of 
behaviour (Denzin, 1970), qualitative approaches using the case study are favoured in both 
'exploratory' and 'explanatory' studies (Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989), or in processual analyses 
(Denzin, 1970). 
This in itself does not indicate when to use surveys, experimentation, or case studies. The 
distinguishing factor is the question that the research seeks to answer. Ym (1984) provides a 
succinct schema which guides the choice of a particular approach to research. In summary, he 
argues that survey and archival analysis approaches are appropriate in 'who', 'where', 'when', 'how 
many' or 'how much' questions, while the experimental, historical analysis and case study 
approaches are appropriate for 'how' and 'why' questions since "such questions deal with 
operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence" (yin, 
1984:17). 
Consequently, the case study is usually used where the survey or experimental approaches are not 
appropriate and vice versa Investigators have, therefore, often pitted them against each other, yet 
these approaches are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, there are opportunities for multiple 
approaches in the same piece of research. For instance, Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) have used 
case studies within a survey. There are also possibilities for using case studies within an 
experimental approach and vice versa Hence, while one approach may predominate in a particular 
piece of research, other approaches may be used to augment that particular approach, suggesting 
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that in reality, they can be mutually dependent. Again, it is the nature of the research question 
which deterrnines to what extent a combination of the two approaches can be used. In this 
research, a strategy which combines these approaches was planned to address the research at two 
levels. The case study approach was planned for the analysis of large finns given the small number 
of cases in the population of study, while the survey approach was planned for the analysis of their 
small finn suppliers who numbered, on average, 40 for each large buyer. 
Case studies are often associated with 'qualitative' as opposed to 'quantitative' methods and data, 
which is associated with surveys and experiments. Two issues must be clarified at this juncture. 
First, while case studies more often than not use qualitative methods and gather qualitative data, 
they are by no means confined to this categorisation. Quantitative data can be collected within case 
studies However, depending on the nature of the case study, it is difficult to perfonn statistical 
analyses of such data because the cases tend to be few in number or that data may not be 
comparable across cases. Qualitative data also lends itself to statistical analysis. Recent 
developments in qualitative research methods (eg. Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Ym, 1984; Miles and 
Hubennan, 1984; and Strauss and Corbin, 1990) demonstrate that it is possible to analyse 
systematically qualitative data using a variety of regimes. Secondly, judgement is often made 
about the superiority of quantitative over qualitative data. While acknowledging the controversies 
in the literature (for example Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1981b) it is important to note that the 
polarisation of these fonns of data is somewhat artificial . Over the years social researchers 
favouring this methodology have tried to move away from the criticism that qualitative methods 
are simply exploratory, in effect neutralising their generative possibilities. Prominent in these 
debates have been Glaser and Strauss (1967) who argue in defence of case study and qualitative 
methods that 
"there is no fundamental clash between the purposes and capacities of qualitative and 
quantitative methods or data. What clash there is concems the primacy of emphasis on 
verification or generation of theory - to which heated discussions on qualitative versus 
quantitative data have been linked historically" (P17). 
The orthodox case method is argued to be more expedient in focusing on the dynamics present 
within single settings (yin, 1984, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989:534). Yet, this approach has often been 
discounted by proponents of 'rigour' in scientific research as 'weak' on three grounds: (i) the lack. of 
rigour emanating from the sloppiness of investigators; (ri) that case studies take too long to cany 
out and result in massive, imprecise reports; (iii) and more critical to scientific research, that they 
provide little basis for scientific generalisation, which arises from non-representativeness of the 
cases, and possible investigator and respondent biases. Without making excuses for some of the 
weaknesses of the case study approach, it can be noted that very .rarely do these critics highlight 
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the rich qualitative data generated by this approach. Neither do they highlight the fact that all 
research approaches are susceptible to biases of one nature or another. For example, Sudman and 
Bradbum (1982) argue that during the design of questionnaires for surveys, biases can be 
introduced into what might be perceived as an 'objective' design. Rosenthal (1966) also highlights 
the dangers of bias in experimental research approaches. 
Having said that, some researchers have still felt the need to move away from the orthodox case 
method. The traditional answer to the weaknesses attributed to the orthodox case study strategies 
enumerated above, is usually the survey method, arguing that its wider sample base, and its 
dependence on statistical sampling and analysis techniques, introduce more objectivity into a 
study. However, it can be argued that because of the generalisation levels achieved by the survey 
method, the richness of relationships and behaviour is lost. However, this chapter is not intended 
to add to the expansive literature which pits one approach against the other. Suffice is to say that 
many of the criticisms levelled at the case study approach have emanated from this misguided 
belief that the survey and experimental approaches are superior to the case study approach. 
Misguided in the sense that most criticisms are based on the analysis of particular methods of data 
collection, such as ethnography or participant-observation, which may require long periods of in-
depth study, and emphasise detailed, observational evidence (Ym, 1984, 1989). Even these 
characteristics in themselves are not negative, but may become undesirable when they do not 
explicitly present the 'reality' of a situation, or result in laborious, unfocused results. 
As noted in preceding paragraphs, despite this controversy, researchers in organisational behaviour 
have continued to use qualitative methodologies and data, particularly case studies, to explain 
various phenomena For example, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) demon.strnte in their research 
on coalitions in organisations that qualitative data is often particularly useful in explaining the 
underlying dynamics of quantitative data, explaining why or why not emergent relationships hold. 
Although this implies that the case study approach is used to augment quantitative methodologies, 
wolk by Yin (l981a), and also Pettigrew (1985; 1988) demon.strntes that this methodology can be 
used independently to generate and test theory. Pettigrew (1985) also demon.strntes in his study of 
organisational change in a British corporation, that the analysis of single settings can contribute 
fundamental insights and new theory. 
In an effort to overcome some of the criticisms of the case study approach, the case survey 
method, developed by the RAND Corporation (an American Airforce organisation) in the early 
70s (Ym and Heald, 1975) may be used. This method is basically a content analysis of cases based 
on pre-defined and pre-specified variables, rating them on a pre-detennined scale. This means that 
(i) the case studies can be conducted to include specific variables rather than offer a merely 
descriptive expose; and that (ii) issues under discussion can be repeatedly studied for different 
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cases. This approach is further 'strengthened' by the use of more than one rater, then computing the 
inter-rater agreement indices (Eisenhardt, 1989). The multi-rnter procedure uses several rnters for 
each interview as a strntegy for eliminating some of the rnter biases that may arise. Once the scores 
are thus obtained, they are amenable to various types of quantitative analysis as are survey data. 
This would involve strntegies such as content analyses of qualitative data. This approach would 
have been an appealing alternative to the single-rnter approach adopted, but because of resource 
constraints, in addition to the difficulty of pre-defining and 'standardising' the rating scales, it was 
not used. It was also considered inappropriate to use pre-determined rating scales as it was felt that 
this approach would constrain the responses given by respondents. Hence, the variables suggested 
by the literature were studied across all the cases mainly to guide the infonnation gathering 
process. 
Another criterion often used to select the case study research design and method is the paucity of 
hypotheses which can be tested, hence, the use of inductive approaches to theory generation. As 
noted in chapters three and five, little is understood about the nature and extent of inter-finn 
linkage fonnation in the Kenyan context or indeed those of other developing countries. 
Consequently, hypotheses could not be readily developed for testing. Although, arguably, 
hypotheses could have been developed from existing European and American literature, two 
factors demand caution: there is the danger of transferring framewOIks to environments that could 
be significantly different. As discussed in the literature review in chapter three, even the literature 
infonning inter-finn relationship formation does not offer a comprehensive framework for the 
measurement of phenomena (Oliver, 1990). Consequently, the lack of developed knowledge, 
theory or methodology about inter-firm linkage behaviour, suggests an inductive approach (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967; Paulin, et. al. 1982). According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), it is critical to 
formulate theory based on the context of investigation in order to genernte substantive theory, and 
that 
"substantive theory faithful to the empirical situation cannot, we believe, be fOImulated 
merely by applying a few ideas from an established fonnal theory to the substantive 
area." (P33) 
Qualitative approaches are also often used when there are small numbers of cases ill the population 
of interest, when it is considered inappropriate to use the survey approach for analysis of 
phenomena. Surveys aim to explore magnitudes, incidences, tendencies, and deviations from 
nonns about a large number of sites in a given population. On the other hand, case studies aim to 
explore the dynamics of phenomena in single settings, hence offer this research this advantage. As 
noted in chapter five, the population of interest in this research has only a small number of 
elements ., three motor assemblers and 13 franchise holders. 
145 
The research question in this study entails exploring the 'explanations' for inter-finn relations 
between large and small firms in Kenya. Essentially, therefore, the research question entails more 
than a mere quantification of phenomena (yin, 1984). It involves an exploration of underlying 
reasons for the SOUTeing activities oflarge firms, those of their inter-finn linkages, if any, and the 
requisite conditions for fonnation of such linkages. Hence, because of this exploratory nature of 
the research, the small number of cases under examination, and the lack of specific testable 
hypotheses with regard to the research context, the case study approach was preferred. 
6.2 THE CASE STUDY APPROACH 
This study has used the case study approach in an inductive research process. The case research 
design often uses qualitative strategies for data collection. This form of research approach has 
become important in management research (Eisenhardt, 1989), and is increasingly used in other 
fields involving the study of organisational processes, such as entrepreneurship development and 
small firm research (Gibb, 1993). As organisations become more complex, current theory is 
viewed as inadequate in 'explaining'the complex and multiple realities of organisations (Morgan, 
1980). Increasingly, therefore, researchers are turning to inductive approaches to theory 
formulation (Eisenhardt, 1989). Consequently, case studies have been used to accomplish various 
aims: to provide descriptions of phenomena; to test theory; or to generate new theory using 
inductive approaches (Eisenhardt, 1989). Although this research is mainly descriptive, it also 
generates some theory. 
Since what goes on inside organisations 15 complex, simply enumerating 'how many' 
organisations exhibit a certain behaviour is not enough. More important is 'why' given situations 
arise. The ability to predict future occurrence of similar situations depends on 'why' anyone case 
exhibits these tendencies, and not necessarily how many others have similar tendencies. In 
addition, each organisation presents a unique set of circumstances, reacting differently to its 
environment. As already stated, merely counting the incidence of a situation does not bring out its 
underlying explanations. Hence, it is erroneous to assume that statistical generalisations take into 
consideration the variety of peculiarities which are possible in a given population of organisations 
or indeed the reasons for such peculiarities. This question may be better answered by teasing out 
these underlying explanations by addressing the 'why' question. Glaser and Strauss (1967) also 
argue that the value of qualitative methods or case studies lies in their theoretical implications 
rather than the 'how many' question. 
Two issues become critical in infonning the design of case studies: the research question and its 
role in focusing the research; and the attempt to intemally and extemally validate the research. 
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6.2.1 THE REsEARCH QUESTION AND Focus 
Like in all other research, in case study approaches, the research question is critical in focusing the 
research and its processes. It is even more critical in case study research in focusing the actual data 
to be collected and the actual process since, what is considered to be 'bad' research is often 
criticised for lack of focus because investigators avoid the definition of the scope of their research. 
Contrary to what critics of the 'grounded theory' or indeed qualitative research argue, its 
proponents do not attempt to study phenomena without a specific focus . By use of specific 
questions, they define the scope and focus of the research study (Eisenhardt and Bowgeois, 1988). 
Even the main proponents of 'grounded theory', Glaser and Strauss (1967), emphasise the 
importance of focus while warning against having 'tight' preconceived theories to dictate the 
research boundaries. They note that 
"To be sure one goes out and studies an area with a particular sociological perspective, 
and with a focus, a general question, or a problem in mind. But he can ( and we believe 
should) also study an area without any preconceived theory that dictates, prior to the 
research, "relevancies" in concepts and hypotheses."(p33) 
This does not mean that the 'advantages' of inductive research should be sacrificed for precision in 
question definition. Arguably, although existing theory is important in defining the scope of the 
research, the inductive approach requires that these theories do not restrict the 'deeper' exploration 
of phenomena The research reported here has addressed some specific variables across several 
case studies in order to avoid laborious description devoid of analytical rigour. In emphasising the 
importance of focusing the study, it adopts Mintzberg (1979:585) contention that "no matter how 
small our sample or what our interest, we always tried to go into organisations with a well defined 
focus - to collect specific types of data systematically". 
Hence, the study was focused by seeking to address a specific research question: what are the 
underlying motivations for the sourcing strategies of large firms in Kenya's vehicle assembly 
industry, particularly with regard to their potential for inter-firm linkage formation between 
large and small firms? This question was addressed by examining the nature of, and the reasons 
behind, the sourcing strategies of large finns in Kenya'S vehicle assembly industry. While the 
'incidence' question was pertinent, the central question was to hypothesise conditions under which 
large finns are likely to link with small finns using inter-fum linkage strategies such as 
subcontracting or licensing. 
Further, although the study did not set out to test any specific hypotheses, the research process was 
focused by adopting a guiding hypothesis: that large firms in Kenya's motor vehicle industry are 
more likely to internalise activities than externalise them. If they externalise and use inter-firm 
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linkages at all, this is likely to be more because of the perceived need to do so in order to gain 
access to inputs and markets, rather than the immediate cost reduction objective suggested in 
the literature (Williamson, 1975). It can be expected that in the Kenyan context, for various 
reasons related to poor input nuukets, accessing scarce inputs is, perhaps, as critical, if not more 
so, than cost reduction per se. 
6.2.2 VALIDITY OF CASES 
A major aspect of quality control of any research study is its internal and external validity. Internal 
validity is relevant in explanatory or causal studies and not in descriptive or exploratory studies 
Yin (1989). It is the concern for the generalisability of the data results, by establishing a causal 
relationship whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to certain outcomes. On the other hand, 
external validity means establishing the domain to which a study can be generalised. h also refers 
to the extent to which inferences can be made from the data about the population of interest. Case 
study research fall within the descriptive or exploratory category, and is therefore less likely to be 
concerned with internal validity. However, external validity is to case study research what internal 
validity is to explanatory research. 
The validity of case study research could be threatened by any number of fuctors, mainly those 
related to the design of the study and the actual process of data collection. Case studies have been 
criticised on grounds of laxity on validity arising from fuctors such as the absence of precise 
research inst:ruInents and fuctors related to case selection. In this approach, validity is threatened 
right through from design to analysis as the process of case research itself can be viewed as a 
continuous design activity (Ym, 1989:41). The following discussion attempts to address the 
strategies which this study has adopted to deal with such threats to validity: the selection of cases, 
replication logic, triangulation and the use of multiple case studies, and reliability. While internal 
validity was not of concern due to the exploratory nature of the study, external validity was 
critical. Also critical was the general reliability of the data collected. 
Selection of Cases 
As noted in the overview of this chapter, the main weakness attributed to the case study approach 
is its alleged lack of representativeness (generalisability), and the difficulty in identifying the 
specific biases of each case which impacts upon the external validity of the research ~dy. Yin 
(1984) addresses this often cited limitation of the case study approach and provides a solution by 
cugui.ng that: 
"case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations and universes. In this sense the case study, like the experiment, does not 
148 
represent a 'sample' and the investigator's goal is to expand and generalise (analytic 
generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation)". (P21) 
This view is supported by others. For example, in order to disarm criticism on the basis of a lack 
of representativeness because the case study approach does not allow sampling, Eisenhardt (1989) 
asserts that it is neither expedient nor necessary to sample the population scientifically: 
"the sampling of cases from the chosen population is unusual when building theory 
from case studies. Such research relies on theoretical sampling (i.e. cases are chosen for 
theoretical, not statistical, reasons ...... " (pS37) 
Although the cases maybe chosen randomly, random selection is neither necessary, nor even 
prefernble (Eisenhardt, 1989). Having said that, because of the small number of cases in the sub-
sector of interest, the question of case selection did not arise. In fact, the co-operation of the 
participating companies was an important factor in determining which finns would eventually be 
used in the study. In the preliminary stages of the study, all the assemblers and franchise holders 
were approached with the assumption that there would be a some degree of non-ro-operation. In 
the final analysis, only those finns that could co-operate fully were followed up in subsequent 
interviews. As it turned out, those franchise holders/importers who co-operated were those 
contractors with a significantly larger stake in the assembly plants. However, in four out of twelve 
franchise holders approached, even the first interview did not yield adequate information for the 
investigation to proceed. In such cases, the firm was subsequently dropped from subsequent 
interviews. 
Eisenhardt (1989) has also argued that it is to the advantage of the research to select cases which 
replicate previous cases or eJl.1end emergent theory, the "incremental approach to case selection", 
or tend to :fulfil theoretical categories and provide examples of polar types. In this respect, 
representativeness is not a necessary condition. Because of the small number of cases in the 
population of interest, this strategy was not used. Instead, the study reported here has used case 
studies from a single sub-sector of the manufacturing industry in order to explore the theoretical 
implications of inter-firm linkages in this sector. Arguing that little is known about why finns 
fonn linkages with other finns in Kenya, particularly between large and small finns, the case study 
approach had the potential of exploring the various hypotheses about motivations for inter-finn 
linkages in the sector. 
Replication Logic and the Multiple Case Study Design 
Another approach used to deal with possible threats to validity is to adopt the multiple case study 
design as a way of establishing theoretical representativeness rather than statistical 
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representativeness. Case studies do not seek genernlisability over populations (statistical 
generalisation) but over theoretical propositions (analytic generalisation) as do experiments. He 
refers to this process as the replication logic as opposed to the sampling logic used in statistical 
generalisation. Ifu example is useful in emphasising the point that replication occurs across the 
cases. He argues that 
"if one has access to only three cases of a rare, clinical syndrome in psychology or 
medical science, the appropriate research design is the one in which the same results are 
predicted for each of the three cases, thereby producing evidence that the three cases did 
indeed involve the same syndrome. If similar results are obtained from all three cases, 
replication is said to have taken place. This replication logic is the same whether one is 
repeating certain critical experiments, is limited to a few cases due to expense or 
difficulty in performing a swgical preparation in animals, or is limited by the rarity of 
occurrence of a clinical syndrome. In each of these situations, an individual case or 
subject is considered akin to a single experiment, and the analysis must follow cross-
experiment rather than within experiment design and logic." (P53). 
Hence, each case study is used for its peculiar contribution to the research. The three main case 
studies in this research show significantly differing patterns ot: and approaches to outsourcing, 
hence provide potentially diverse theoretical outcomes. 
Triangulation and Multiple Data Sources 
Triangulation is a strategy which qualitative researchers often use to ensure both internal and 
external validity by eliminating some of the biases which arise from, and because of the research 
process. It involves the use of several data sources (respondents and/or secondary data sources) 
during field wOIk, or the use of several data collection strategies. In her example, Eisenhardt 
(1989) uses triangulation of data collection strategies, arguing that when qualitative and 
quantitative data are used together, the qualitative data is useful in understanding the rationale 
underlying relationships revealed in the quantitative data. Ym (1989) and Denzin (1978), on the 
other hand, advice the use of triangulation by various data sources rather than various methods or 
approaches. Denzin (1978:295) adds, "by triangulating data sources, analysts can efficiently 
employ the same methods to maximum theoretical advantage" . This study used such triangulation 
between various sources of infonnation as well as between methods. Several data sources 
(respondents) were used in this study, which made it possible to coIroborate information, or to 
underline some findings . On a second level, observation was used as a form of coIroborating 
information about processes provided by respondents. In addition, it was possible to use some 
archival materials regarding the history of the £inn. 
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Reliability 
Another quality control measure is the reliability of a piece of research: the extent to which the 
operations ofa study can be repeated with the same results (yin, 1989:41). One of the criticisms 
levelled at qualitative methods, particularly the case study method, is that there is a high level of 
'subjectivity' emanating from the lack of 'objective' measures, among others. One way of dealing 
with this objection is to standardise the research procedures so that the data collection can be 
replicated. Data SOUIre and method triangulation are some approaches used by researchers such as 
Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) and Denzin (1978) to address this problem. Other researchers 
have addressed it by studying specific constructs and variables across cases (Yin and Heald, 1975). 
This study 'standardised' data collection over the case studies by using an interview guide which 
addressed similar issues across the cases, although these were not treated as pre-defined but as 
potentially evolving during data collection to include variables not included (Miles and Hubennan, 
1984). 
A second way is to study specific pre-defined constructs and variables as described by the RAND 
corporation in their Case Survey approach. Although the inappropriateness of using this approach 
has already been discussed in the introduction to this chapter, this study used its general logic of 
defining specific areas of enquiry. Consequently, the study explored the research question along 
three lines of enquiry, the nature and extent of outsourcing by large fiIins, the perceived factors 
influencing this behaviour, and the nature of relations which emeIge. This way, it was possible to 
'standardise' the research process and follow only particular variables over all the cases of interest, 
although care was taken not to confine the respondents to particular responses. 
6.2.4 TBE REsEARCH DESIGN 
In the light of the above general discussion regarding the appropriateness of research design, the 
study adopts an in-depth case study approach. All three assemblers and four franchise holders in 
Kenya's motor vehicle industry (see chapter five and the section titiled "The Study Area" of this 
chapter for an analysis of the structure of Kenya's motor vehicle industry). The four franchise 
holders (whose selection is explained in the section titled "Selection of Cases" of this chapter) 
represent the major contractors of two of the plants studied. This limited scope of the study has 
been conditioned by the research objectives, and various resoUIre limitations to be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
In the.first stage of the study, expert opinion was sought from participants in Kenya's motor 
vehicle industry including government officials concerned with policy fonnulation and regulation 
of the industry; business associations concerned with representation and lobbying on behalf of 
various groups of members within the industry; and the finns which consti1ute the operational 
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sections of the industry (assemblers, suppliers, importers/distributors). This preliminary stage 
helped establish the scope of the study, and to fonnulate relevant questions for investigation. 
In the second stage, in~epth case studies of the vehicle assemblers and their contractors were 
conducted using interview guides with open-ended questions. "Contractors" refers to the category 
of franchise holders who import CKDs and contract the assemblers to assemble them. The 
subsequent section -"The Study Area" explains how this cateogory of respondent finns were 
'selected' for inclusion in the study. The main rationale for this approach was to facilitate the 
generation of infonnation without restrictions to sets of specific variables and constructs. 
However, as noted earlier in this chapter, in order to focus the study, specific issues raised in the 
literature and also by the preliminary stage of this study, were pursued. 
In an attempt to balance the opinions about the issues under discussion, and determine the precise 
nature and benefit of the relationships to the smaller finn, the research design included a survey of 
the small finn suppliers of the major companies under investigation in the third stage. A 
questionnaire was developed and the names and addresses of the relevant suppliers obtained. 
However, as will be explained in chapter nine, this part of the study had to be aborted because of 
the poor response resulting from logistical difficulties. 
The following paragraphs explain further this design by discussing the research process, 
explaining the rationale for the selection of the study area, and the various units of analysis. 
The Study Area 
Although the selection of a study area is detennined by the interests of the investigator, and the 
particular need to answer specific questions in that area, there are instances where there are no 
particular reasons other than those of convenience and accessibility of the research area This study 
has elements of both. First, Kenya has been studied because the research problem was 
conceptualised within this context, although the applicability of the findings to other developing 
countries is envisaged. Secondly, because of the authors familjarity with Kenya, coupled with the 
requirements of the sponsors of the research, it was logical to situate the study in this country. The 
study was further contextualised within the motor vehicle industry in Kenya. 
Kenya: In tenns of theory building, Kenya has been selected because it is considered to be an 
example of a developing country which has, to date, adopted a variety of small enterprise 
development strategies which have not been as successful as anticipated, and has shown interest in 
promoting linkages between laIge and small finns through subcontracting and joint-venturing 
(GOK, 1989). The paucity of pointers as to how this could be done is a particularlyappea1ing 
rationale for an investigation into the factors which could make this strategy realisable. 
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The Kenyan Motor Industry: Although chapter five has provided a more comprehensive analysis 
of Kenya's motor vehicle industry, its role in the research is discussed here. Despite its small size, 
the industry is important to Kenya's industrialjsation because of its extensive inter-industry 
linkages described in chapter five. 
The motor vehicle industry was selected for two main reasons. First, global developments in the 
motor vehicle industry offer a ready exemplar for inter-firm linkages. Hence, findings from the 
study could be compared directly with those in the vehicle industries of other economies. As 
discussed in chapter four, the changes taking place in the motor vehicle industry, globally, largely 
account for inter-firm linkages in this industry. It highlights the importance of this industry to the 
Japanese, American, British and German economies, and those of some developing countries such 
as those in South East Asia, particularly in relation to the extensive backward and forward linkages 
within the industry and with other sectors of the economy. During inception of a local motor 
assembly industry, the Government of Kenya acknowledged the potential for such linkages with 
other sectors, particularly with the services and metal working industries (GOK, 1974; 1983). This 
study, therefore, aims to contribute to the understanding of how this potential can be exploited. 
Secondly, the sub-sector was topical in Kenya's industrialisation process when the study was 
planned. As part of the country's general industrialjsation strntegy, and particularly in an effort to 
promote small and medium enterprises, the Kenyan Government selected the motor assembly sub-
sector to pilot the development of a sub-contracting exchange. The rationale provided by the 
project planners is based on the sectors potential for extensive backward and forward linkages as 
mentioned above. The Government of Kenya envisaged that the developments in the global motor 
vehicle industry, fucusing increasingly on sub-contracting between various sizes of finns, if 
replicated in Kenya, would benefit the country's industrialisation (GOK, 1989). Until the 
establishment of this exchange in 1991, Kenya did little to utilise the potential offered by linkages 
between large and small firms. Together with a specific rationalisation strategy aimed at 
streamlining the motor vehicle industry and encouraging local procurement of components, this 
was expected to develop a local capacity to supply the vehicle assembly industry. Yet, it is 
recognised that there are policy impediments which prevent local assemblers form using local 
suppliers (Masai, 1991). Hence, for local small manufacturers to benefit from this strategy, the 
government has to focus on removing such policy impediments. The motivation of this study was 
to attempt, at least in part, to inform policy makers on how to fucilitate such adjustments. 
The Kenyan Government's interest in the motor vehicle industry is based on the sectors 
relationship with the manufucturing sector whose importance to the current study hinges on 
various reasons namely:- (i) Kenya's current concern with the development of export oriented 
industrialisation anchored .in manufacturing, making all the sub-sectors in manufacturing 
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important in any plans for national development (GOK, 1989); (ii) the importance of the sector 
owing to its high contribution to GDP (only second to agriculture); (iii) the relative ease of 
physically locating manufucturing establishments because of their concentration in specific 
locations; and (iv) the amenability of manufucturing to isolation of various activities, hence 
opportunities for de~upling and externalisation of activities are more immediately apparent in 
manufucturing establishments. 
Figs 5-1 and 5-2 illustrate the relationships between four categories of actors in the industry. 
Again, it must be noted that the fifth category of motor repair services has been excluded fiom this 
analysis because of its 'tenuous' links with the assembly activities as it mainly serves the used 
vehicle market. The other four participants in the sector are linked to the assembly 'core' through 
various ownership and resource use networks. 
As shown in Fig 5-1, the four categories include the components sector, the importer/distributor 
sector, and the assembly sector (these are operationally two sub-sectors). Obviously, because the 
importer/ distributors sector are subsumed in the same firms, they are often considered as one 
category, whereas in reality, their impact on the motor vehicle industry can be delineated. For 
example, the importers fonn the core of the industry in terms of decision-making and detennine 
what makes and models are to be marlceted in the country. On the other hand, distributors impact 
on consumer demand. The assembly sector, although small in numerical tenns, is the core of the 
industry in terms of productive OIganisation and value added. Yet, the full implication of its 
activities is likely to be missed because of the large proportion of used imports competing in the 
same market. According to KM! estimates for example, in 1990, about 78% of the vehicle 
population in Kenya was imported as Completely Built Units (CBUs). In addition, for an installed 
capacity of over 15,000 units per annum on a single shift basis, about 6,542 units were assembled 
in Kenya in 1992 (a drop of over 15% on the 1991 figures), given a new vehicle registration 
figures45 for the same year were 22,000 vehicles (GOK, 1993). Nevertheless, the sector has 
continued to assemble vehicles even under such competition fiom fully assembled imports. 
In these circumstances, it is evident that the 'power to make soUIcing decisions rests with the 
importer/distributor category. They make the m~or decisions in the sector regarding what makes 
and models to produce, as well as sourcing decisions. They also impact on the production 
scheduling decisions by determining CKD procurement scheduling, and marketing programmes. 
In this regard, they constitute a critical part of the study. The distributors fonn the next level. 
45 . Note that these figures include new vehicles assembled and imported into Kenya, and any re-registration 
of Government vehicles converted to private use. 
154 
Given the intricacy of relationships between importers and distributors, it is often the case that the 
distributors are wholly or partly owned by the importing firms. Except for the case of GMK, all 
the importers/franchise holders have some ownership links with various distributors. The final 
level constitutes the component manufacturers. Due to the sourcing practices of importers and 
franchise holders, this category appears tenuously related to the rest of the motor assembly 
industry, largely serving the replacement marlcet for vehicle spare parts (Masai, 1991:226). 
Currently, a large proportion of the components sourcing is from foreign suppliers either as part of 
the CKD kits or as separate transactions. 
The three large motor assemblers in the sub-sector were studied. General Motors (K) Ltd., which 
is the only assembler and franchise holder in Kenya; Associated Vehicle Assemblers (AV A); and 
Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers (KVM) who are only contract assemblers, servicing about twelve 
franchise holders in the country. These finns are the only operators in the vehicle assembly sub-
sector, and are considered to be large finns based on employment levels, capital investment and 
output. All of the firms in the 'assembler and 'importer' categories were studied under the rubric of 
'large' by virtue of their operations, and their impact on the motor vehicle industry. While other 
measures of size could have been used to discriminate between various sizes of firms, this was not 
done owing to the limited number of cases in the sector. Even if this were not so, the inadequacy 
or unavailability of data. on investment levels or on output levels of firms would have made it 
difficult to use such measures of size. It was concluded, therefore, that the procedure adopted 
would not compromise the study. 
Levels of Analysis and Study Units 
This study used the holistic case approach described by Yin (1989) as advantageous when "no 
logical subunits can be identified and when the relevant theory underlying the case study is itself 
of a holistic nature". The study reported here meets both conditions. In addition, the research 
question suggests that the dynamics of the whole organisation were in question, making it difficult 
to isolate units of analysis. However, various levels of response were used to explore, to a large 
ex.ten!, the broad spectrum of people involved in the decision to procure; make strategic changes to 
the organisation; and relate with external firms . Hence, while following the holistic level of 
analysis, the inputs to this analysis were solicited from various respondents and archival sources. 
This had the added advantage of circumventing one of the problems of holistic approaches: that of 
allowing the "investigator to avoid examining any specific phenomenon in operational detail" 
(Yin, 1989:49). 
Because the research question sought to establish the sourcing behaviour of relevant firms, the first 
level is that of procurement of inputs, where the procurement officers were interviewed. The 
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second level of analysis was establishing from the Chief Executives their strategic intentions and 
actions. It is important to note that from an operational standpoint, it is difficult to separate the two 
levels since procurement behaviour is dependent on strategic intentions and strategic behaviour. 
However, it was necessary to separate these two levels for pmposes of analysis. 
6.3 FIELDWORK AND DATA COLLECTION 
Fieldworlc was conducted in Kenya between July, 1992 and January, 1993. Due to difficulties in 
obtaining access to some of the companies, considerable time was spent negotiating access. In 
addition, the prevailing political climate made it necessary to exercise caution during data 
collection. Nevertheless, care was taken to reduce the negative impact of these circumstances on 
the fieldworlc. 
After initial discussions with various government experts and participants in the industry about the 
nature and status of inter-firm relations between large and small firms in the industry, actual data 
collection in the firms of interest commenced (see section "Selection of Cases" above for 
'selection' procedure). However, there was a continuous 'movement' between the finns of interest 
and these experts as a triangulation process which allowed corroboration of information provided 
by respondents from both categories. By this is meant continually obtaining data from all parties 
concerned throughout the research, as this became necessary. The process involved simply 
bringing into discussion with subsequent respondents, views which had been brought up by a 
previous respondent. In this way, it was possible to verifY the infonnation given in earlier 
interviews. It was also possible to go back to some respondents over the period of data collection 
for clarification, particularly those considered to have up to date expert opinion on the sector. 
6.3.1 DATA COLLECTION INS'lRUMENTS 
Case studies typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, 
questionnaires, and observations. The evidence may be qualitative (eg. words) or quantitative (eg. 
numbers) or both (Eisenhardt, 1989). Data was collected by two main methods: (i) interview 
guides and; (ii) observation. The following is a brief discussion of these approaches. 
Interview Guides 
Qualitative methods benefit more from interview guides rather than from fonnal questionnaires 
(YID, 1984; 1989). In this way adequate flexibility is built into the research process while allowing 
the research to focus on particular variables. While based on the literature review and the 
discussion with industry experts, all the interview guides and protocols used in this study did not 
set out to measure any constructs or to test any hypotheses, but rather to bring out the variety of 
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issues pertinent to large finn-small finn inter-relationships. Consequently, all of the interview 
guides consisted of open~ded questions. 
Expert opinion was obtained from observers and participants in the industry through formal and 
informal discussions. Since this preliminary part of the research did not require precise 
measurement of constructs, the questions were necessarily 'open~ded' and organic. The 
interviews developed out of the discussion., although care was taken to keep the discussions within 
the scope of the study. It is also important to note that not all the 'experts' could provide the same 
type of information - their inclusion in the study was to provide breadth and depth of information. 
Hence, the direction and scope of the interview changed depending on what the 'eJo..1>ert' could 
contribute. This category of respondents was useful in two distinct ways: they provided 
information about general industry behaviour in addition to providing tentative views on the nature 
of inter-finn relations in the industry, particularly relating to subcontracting between large and 
small firms . 
Two interview guides (Appendices B and C) were used - one for the assemblers and one for the 
franchise holders. One reason for having sepanne interview guides for the two categories was that 
the operations of both categories, particularly the relationship between procurement and 
production., are different. It was necessary, therefore, to ask different questions. 
Observation 
The second method of obtaining information was by observation., mainly as a way of triangulating 
the data collection process (Denzin, 1978:295). First, the assembly process was observed, 
'following' inputs from the time the inputs arrived at the assembly plant, to the finished product 
ready for the distributors' outlets. While the production process itself was not particularly 
important for the study, it was necessary to establish at what points in the assembly process inputs 
were required, and what form these inputs took. For example, the imported CKD is in effect 
several groups of partially assembled parts and components requiring little, if any, additional local 
inputs (see Appendices AI-A3 for the CKD regulations and the description of various categories 
of items). Effectively, much of what may be referred to as 'local inputs' is, in fact, the labour of 
completing the assembly process, and those items included in the Legal Notices as outlined in 
Appendices AI-A3 . This is important for the conclusions that may be drawn from the sourcing 
activities of assemblers or franchise holders. 
6.3.2 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
The data collection process of any research study has significant implications for the internal and 
external validity of the study. The way access is negotiated, and interviews and observations 
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conducted, all determine the extent to which bias can be eliminated from the study. The following 
sub-sections discuss strategies used to avoid such bias. 
Negotiating Access 
Denzin (1978) and others have argued that access to a research area or organisation is important in 
determining the extent to which the research can not only be facilitated, but also claim internal 
validity. Yin (1984) also adds that the way access is negotiated influences the outcome of the 
research, but he warns that care must be taken to avoid introducing bias arising from the 
investigator being influenced by the person or people facilitating access. It is also possible for the 
investigator to be tempted by the situation he/she is studying to voice his/her own opinion rather 
than present the facts of the situation as objectively as possible. Needless to say, the dividing line 
is thin, and it is entirely up to the investigator to guard against such influences. 
Access to the organisations of interest was solicited on two levels. Initially, telephone calls were 
made to various finns in the industry requesting an interview with the Chief Executive, usually a 
Managing Director. In most cases, the investigator was referred to the firm's Public Relations 
department. In initial interviews with officials in these departments, the nature of infonnation 
required was explained, and requests made for an interview with the Managing Director. Again, 
the investigator was often referred to someone else, usually the Company SecretaIy or the 
Procurement/Purchasing Officer. It must be noted that this was not altogether negative, because 
much of the company data was available at these levels. However, it was necessary to obtain 
general infonnation relating particularly to overall corporate perceptions and behaviour. 
Consequently, further attempts were made to meet the CEO. In most cases, this bottom-up 
procedure was useful in gaining access to managing directors who would not otherwise have 
participated, particularly at a time when the industry was facing extreme uncertainty and 
depression and CEOs were reluctant to give interviews. 
On the second level, it was realised that doing research in Kenya is difficult without personal 
contacts within organisations of interest. Hence, for those firms (three of the importers) that were 
found difficult to access, persons known to the investigator were contacted. The help of the 
Secretary of the Kenya Motor Industry Association was also solicited on the grounds that 
participants in the sector 'divulged' a relatively high amount of company infonnation to him to 
facilitate compilation of industry perfonnance reports. In addition, much of the industry 
background data was obtained from this source. This point is very important because, as already 
mentioned, obtaining company data in Kenya is e:x.1remely difficult. Needless to say, it was still 
difficult to arrange interviews with 'busy' executives . In many cases, it took at least three attempts 
to see an executive. Wondering about this difficulty, the investigator was informed by one 
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respondent that "off the record, the reason why you have not been able to get easy inteIViews is 
that, at this particular time, people are generally suspicious of people asking questions about their 
activities. Some of them [prospective respondents] are not being exactly straight in their [business] 
dealings!" . Acknowledging this possibility, the investigator used methods such as engaging the 
inteIViewee in conversations about issues other than those directly related to the research, and 
gradually worked back to the study. Obviously, this meant that time investments were high. 
Having said that, what became clear from this experience was that in-depth inteIViews in Kenya 
require more than text book approaches. For example, people are reluctant to give straight answers 
to straight questions, hence most questions have to be modified during the inteIView depending on 
the preceding reactions of respondents. 
Interviewing 
As mentioned above, interview guides consisting of open-ended questions were used at three 
levels of analysis: 
(i) Both fonnal and infonnal discussions were held with various industry experts including 
officials from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; the Ministry of Planning and National 
Development; an official of Kenya Association of Manufacturers; an official of the Federation of 
Kenyan Employers; an official of the Kenya Subcontracting and Partnership Exchange; the 
Secretary of the Kenya Motor Industry Association; and official of UNIDO; several University of 
Nairobi lecturers who were involved in the National Car Project; and others directly or indirectly 
involved with the industry. These inteIViews not only provided an oveIView of the motor vehicle 
industry and the status of subcontracting and inter-finn linkages in the industry, but also helped 
focus the fieldwork. 
(ii) Based on specific variables deemed pertinent in the initial inteIViews with industry experts as 
outlined above, the Chief Executive Officers of the vehicle assembly firms and franchise holding 
firms were inteIViewed on strategic intentions, decisions, and pronouncements made by the firm . 
(iii) Also based on the variables identified in (i) above, the Purchasing and/or the materials 
handling officers were also interviewed. At this level, the extent and nature of transaction choices 
were examined, exploring the extent to which these officers followed precise economic or strategic 
rationale for procurement. The questions asked were initially direct, requiring information on 
ordering practices, etc. However, when it became clear that other factors affected the procurement 
decisions, the inteIViewing followed a probing pattern. 
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Observation 
To augment the infonnation provided by the respondents, it was important to understand the 
production process. TIme was spen~ therefore, 'following' vehicles through the production chain to 
the distribution point. These observations provided valuable insights into the various categories of 
input sourcing, subassembly, assembly and distribution. This is important in understanding the 
production organisation within the sector. 
This observation was able to identifY four basic levels of operation for the assemblers (input 
procurement- subassembly - assembly - distribution), and two levels for the importers/franchise 
holders (inputs procurement - distribution). In essence, therefore, the importers, who are the main 
decision-makers in the industry, are essentially 'traders', while the assemblers, who make fewer 
decisions about the input and distribution., were the 'real' value adding agents. 
6.3.3 FIELDWORK LIMITATIONS AND PROBLEMS 
In addition to the specific limitations noted already, it is importan~ at this juncture, to note some 
general ones affecting data. collection. 
The prevailing political situation - at the time of the study, Kenya was undergoing a significant 
political transformation-the transition from a one party state to a multi-party state. This transition 
has had a significant impact upon government policy, and also upon the stability of the business 
environment. Consequently, this impacted on the study on four levels. Fi~ due to general 
uncertainties in the business environment, managers were generally reluctant to make long-tenn 
commitments about investments and strategic intentions. It was difficult, therefore, to obtain 
responses to questions regarding future action. 
Secondly, due to uncertainties regarding the political implications of a multi-party Kenya, and its 
perceived implications for resource acquisition., it was difficult for £inns to project demand or 
make strategic plans for the future . Hence, many managerial decisions at the time of the research 
were probably more opportunistic and defensive than they would have been otherwise. 
Thirdly, the general liberalisation policy, adopted just before the commencement of the fieldwork 
in 1991, opened up a new set of opportunities and threats for many finns, particularly those 
dependent on imports of inputs. In effect, when this study was carried out, these finns were still in 
the process of assessing the effects of the policy changes on their operations. Since then, various 
changes have taken place in the industry, particularly resulting from the strong lobby by the Kenya 
Motor Industry Association. In June 1993, for example, the government repealed the legislation 
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mandating local sourcing as part of a wider programme to liberalise the economy. At the time of 
this research, however, the impact of this change was not yet clear. 
Finally, the effects of the World BankIIMF, and the Paris Club conditionalities for resumption of 
aid to Kenya, coupled with political instability in many parts of the country, have indirectly 
contributed to a generalised perception of , insecurity' by the finru; of interest. All of these factors 
have in effect made finns in Kenya generally cautious, making information gathering genernlly 
difficult. 
Uncertainties in the motor vehicle industry: The extreme uncertainties within the industry at the 
time of the study, as discussed in chapter five, are likely to have had a negative impact on the 
study in the sense that managers could not make predictions about the business environment, or 
anticipate their own responses to it. Consequently, respondents were somewhat reluctant to discuss 
their strategies or their future actions as these were not immediately clear to them, or they felt that 
it was prudent not to discuss them in detail . Because all of the participating finns had been forced 
by economic circumstances to cut production by 400/a-50% at the time of the fieldwork in the 
period 199211993, it was also probable that some of the behaviour observed was not typical. While 
the motor vehicle industIy is still weak, it was envisaged .by industIy observers such as the Kenya 
Motor Industry Association (KMI), that it would stabilise somewhat in the fuce of the increasingly 
'liberalised' business environment. 
It must be pointed out at this juncture that the high uncertainty in the industry also contributed to 
delays in data collection. This meant that there were frequent lapses of time between various stages 
of data collection. In order to ameliorate the effects of this on respondents, it became necessary to 
recapitulate on previous interviews. Obviously, this increased the time spent on interviews. In a 
research recapitulation interview with the Secretary of KM!, he reported that" at the time, CEOs 
were trying against all odds to keep their heads above the water", therefore they could spare little 
time for interviews or completion of questionnaires. These developments in the research process 
serve to emphasise the general difficulty of obtaining data in developing country contexts. 
6.4 DATA CODING AND ANALYSIS 
The case study approach calls for analysis of data as the data is collected (Miles and Hubennan, 
1984; Strauss and Coroin, 1988; Ym, 1984). Iterative analysis ofinfonnation gathered from each 
case was possible by transcribing the case material and checking it for content during the data 
collection process itself This way, it was also possible to make decisions about who else to 
interview or what other infonnation to collect from other sources. It was also possible to , 
corroborate information from respondents as the study progressed. 
161 
In addition, the conceptual analysis was conducted at the time of data collection. While some 
description of the cases is to be eA-pected, the main analysis of the study appears in the fonn of 
cross-case conclusions (Yin, 1989:56). This obviously introduces a trade-off between the richness 
of contextual insights and the potential for comparative insights (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991: 614). 
This dilemma was addressed by blending description (chapter seven) with cross-case analysis and 
conclusions (chapter eight). 
6.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has considered the various alternative research approaches which could have been 
used, describes the approach used in the research, and also justifies the research design which has 
been adopted. The study, which focuses on the vehicle assembly industry in Kenya, adopts a case 
study design based on inductive approaches. Although this design, and indeed qualitative methods, 
have received criticism regarding 'scientific rigour, evidence has shown that this can be achieved 
with this methodology. By developing designs and methods which address the traditional 
criticisms, authors such as Glaser and Strauss (1967). Strauss and Corbin (1988), Strauss (1987), 
Ym (1984, 1989) and Eisenhardt (1989) have helped to bring the case study method into the 
convention of sociological research. These are taken into consideration in the research design 
adopted here. 
A total of seven case studies (three vehicle assemblers and four franchise holders) in Kenya's 
motor vehicle industry have been used to explore the research question. It was also envisaged that 
the suppliers of these :firms would be surveyed as part of the study. However, due to logistical 
difficulties, this part of the study was aborted. For the main study, background infonnation has 
been gathered from various industry participants and observers in order to obtain a general sense of 
the nature of inter-finn linkages in Kenya, and the motor vehicle industry in particular. Interview 
guides, containing open-ended questions, have also been used to obtain responses from CEOs 
regarding company behaviour, Purchasing Officers, and Company Secretaries regarding the nature 
and motivation for sourcing activities of their companies. In addition, observation techniques have 
been used to collect infonnation about production processes, and also to corroborate infonnation 
provided by respondents. The cases have then been presented in descriptive fonn in chapter seven, 
and analysed in chapter eight to produce a set of cross-case conclusions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This chapter presents the research findings. In the three cases studied, two 'models' of production 
organisation were apparent. In the first 'model' (GMK), the sourcing and assembly functions are 
carried out by the same firm. In the second 'model' (A V A and KVM) the sourcing and assembly 
activities are carried out by separate firms with the functions of assembler and importer/distributor. 
These different scenarios present potentially different sourcing behaviour, supplier development 
activities and the use oflocal soureing strategies. 
MODEL 
ONE 
(GMK) 
MODEL 
lWO 
(A VA and KVM) 
Importer -----Assembler 
(GMK) (GMK) 
Assembler 
(AVA& KVM) 
Importer 
(Marshalls, 
Toyota, CMC 
DT Dobie) 
Adopting what G1aser and Strauss (1967:101-116) term " the constant cornparntive method of 
analysis", the presentation of the case studies takes an interpretative rather than a purely descriptive 
approach. Campbell (1975) refers to this as "pattern matching" across different sites. Explaining 
this approach Miles and Huberman (1984) state: 
The issue in the "pattern matching" approach is discovering whether a pattern found in 
one site plays in other ones as well, suggesting a common scenario. Are the same core 
variables involved? Are the ratings (high, moderate, low) the same?(p200) 
Hence, the case analysis is concerned with establishing the nature of any existing patterns. The 
first case presents the GMK. model where input sourcing and assembly activities are integrated. 
The second and third case studies present the A V A and KVM cases, each one including two 
! 
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embedded case studies of franchise holders who perfonn the input procurement function. As 
discussed in chapters three and four, this has implications for production organisation in the motor 
vehicle industry - sourcing decisions are made by the importer who mayor may not have equity in 
the assembly plant. 
Four main variables are analysed across the cases based on the proposal that developing SMEs 
through linkages with large finns is predicated on the propensity and motivation of large £inns to 
dis-aggregate, and outsource from small firms . Consequently, four themes are recurrent in the 
presentation of the case studies: 
1. Is production organisation in the investigated firms conducive .to dis-aggregation? This 
questioned was addressed by examining the way finns organise their production activities. 
2. What is the nature of their input sourcing, and what are the motivations behind such sourcing 
behaviour? What are the fuctors influencing such sourcing behaviour? 
3. What are their sources of inputs, and what is the nature or relations with suppliers? 
4 . What are their attitudes towards small £inns as suppliers or partners? 
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CASE ONE 
GENERAL MOTORS KENYA LTD. (GMK) 
ThITRODUCTIONANDBACKGROUND 
This case discusses General Motors (K) Ltd. m seven parts, highlighting its production 
organisation and its sourcing activities. Section two presents a brief. background to the case. 
Section three discusses GMK's current production status, while section four addresses its sourcing 
activities. Section five explores GMK's buyer-seller relations, while section six outlines the nature 
of supplier development activities. Section seven presents those factors believed by GMK.'s 
managers to affect their sourcing decisions. 
FORMATION AND OWNERSHIP 
GMK is one of the three assemblers in Kenya's motor vehicle industry whose shareholders include 
GM Corporation of the United States46 (44.5%); c. Itoh of Japan47 (4.5%); Industrial and 
Commercial Investment Corporation (lCDC)48 (46.4%); and ICDC Investment Company49 
(4.6%). The finn was established in 1975 and officially inaugurated in 1977, with an installed 
capacity of 4500 units per annum on one shift production basis, initially intended to serve the 
46. GMK's parent company GM Corporation, which is incorporated in the USA, is the largest automobile 
producer in the world GM Corporation was set up in 1908 by William C. Dummt, and is headquatered 
in Detroit It maintains manufacturing, assembly and distribution activities in 32 countries outside the 
USA and Canada 
47. C. Itoh and Company Ltd is an integrated (trading) corporation with 760 affiliated companies world-
wide, incorporated in Japan in 1949, which became a GMK sbareholderin 1992. The company operates 
203 offices in 87 countries, employing 10,000 people. Having started trading operations in Kenya as 
early as 1938, C. Itoh is currently involved in a wide rnnge of activities ranging from importation of 
steel, construction machinery and equipment, and export of Kenyan coffee and other commodities. 
48 . This is a state corporation set up in the 1950s to manage state industrial and commercial investments in 
Kenya, specifically aiming at indigenising Kenyan industry and commerce. Recently, because of the 
World Bank demand for the dismantling ofparastatals and state investments, ICDC has systematically 
reduced its investments in industry, only retaining investments in what the Government considers 
strategic industries. The car industry is one such industry. 
49 . This is a private investment company incorporated in Kenya in 1967. 
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commercial vehicle market. GMK started assembly in the early 1980s during the initial stages of 
the preparation to commence vehicle assembly in the country, having been one of the 16 finns to 
tender for vehicle assembly in Kenya, and was subsequently selected together with three others. 
GMK has continued to operate at levels ranging from 600/0-80% excepting for recent poor 
perfonnance owing to the general instabilities in the industry. In 1989, GMK was operating at 
63% capacity, dropping to just over 30% in the 1991-1993 during the foreign exchange crisis in 
Kenya. Like the other assemblers, and according to the agreements with the Kenya Govemment, 
GMK initially assembled only commercial vehicles, making 4 and 3 ton trucks; the Isuzu pick-up 
trucks; buses; and over-7-ton trucks. As of 1992, this range included 30 Seater mini-buses, one 
make of a Saloon car (Opel Model 1), and one make of Estate cars (Isuzu Trooper). 
When Kenya moved into saloon car assembly, GMK was also among the first to import CKDs 
and assemble saloon cars. Its first saloon cars were produced in 1986 - the Isuzu (Uhurn), followed 
later by the Isuzu Trooper car. Unlike the other two assemblers, GMK does not have significant 
assembly contracts, if any. GMK is the only assembler hitherto assembling exclusively GMK held 
franchises. 
PRODUCTS AND PERFORMANCE 
Currently, GMK assembles vehicles in three categories. However, more than 90% of the 
company's products are commercial vehicle trucks, lomes and buses, mainly used in the 
agricultural, industrial and transport sectors. Below is a breakdown of the current categories of 
GMK products. Like all the other assemblers, it has had to expand its makes and models to meet 
the demands of the market. Consequently, GMK assembles at least 9 makes of vehicles, with 
diesel and petrol variants in the light truck and saloon car categories. As expected, this diversity of 
makes and models requires frequent changes in production OIganisation. 
GMK is considered the industry leader in the trucks market, but has continued to perfonn poorly 
in the saloon car market. Table 7-1 gives an indication of GMK's perfonnance in 1991 . 
GMK leads in the over-7 -ton truck category GMK, recording a market share of 73% in 1990 and 
63% in 1991. This can be attributed to the popularity of the medium-sized bus sold only as a cowl 
for further body building and used extensively in the private transport sector. In contrast, the 
saloon car (large Saloons) category held a 5% share in 1990 for their Isuzu Uhuru model. Because 
of this poor perfonnance, this model was phased out in 1992 and the Opel Model T launched. The 
potential of this model could not be ascertained at the time of the study because of CKD 
procurement crisis in the industry. GMK does not assemble any makes in the popular Small-
Medium Saloons and Station Wagons categories. One possible reason for GMK's low market 
share is its concentration on the assembly of only one saloon make at anyone time, unlike all the 
other assemblers who compete in various.market segments with a variety of makes and models. 
Table 7-1 GMK Products and Market Share (1991) 
Type Make Marlret Share Market Share 
GMK Mkt. Leader 
Large Saloons Isuzu Uhuru na 41% 
4WD Estates Isuzu Trooper 16% 46% 
One Tonners Isuzu TFR 18% 23% 
Medium Buses Isuzu NPR 87% 87% 
Large Buses IsuzuMTIMV na 79% 
Light Trucks IsuzuNKR 44% na . 
Seven Tonners IsuzuHIR 63% na 
Ten Tonners Isuzu FIR 27% 29% 
Fifteen + Tonners IsuzuFVM 15% 52% 
Note: na - Data was not available 
Source: Field Notes (1992/1993) 
PRODUCTION ORGANISATION 
ORGANffiATIONOFPRODUCTIONA~ 
Production organisation differs significantly from the other assemblers . Its distinguishing fuctor is 
its combination of the assembly and input procurement role. As a result, its production 
organisation includes the sourcing of materials, assembly and marketing. However, GMK does not 
'own' distribution outlets. Instead, its retailing and after-sales service activities are handled by 
dealers all over the countIy. Fig 7-1 graphically illustrates this structure, highlighting the activity 
flows between materials sourcing and assembly. 
Clearly, given this production organisation, GMK 'controls' a large part of productive activities. 
Unlike the other assemblers to be discussed later, this implies that GMK can be largeted' as a 
single entity when attempting to encourage inter-firm relationships with SMEs. Buyer-supplier 
relations, and issues related to quality and quality control can be managed between fewer 
participants. 
Fig 7-2 shows how the production outline functions. As can be noted, apart from the entry point 
for CKDs and materials, all other processes are relatively 'integrated', making de-coupling difficult. 
For example, once the shell has been welded together in the frarneworlcs section, parts and 
components are simply fitted into it without any further manufacture or adjustment It becomes 
difficult to de-integrate the assembly process. 
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CKDs r- Assembly 
Local Materials I--__ ,Sub-assembly 
Fig7-1 Production Activity flows - GMK 
Fig7- 2 Asssembly Process outline - GMK 
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SOURCING ACITVlTY 
SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
In this study, local sourcing was used as a proxy measure of outsoureing. Hence, the level of local 
sourcing was used as an indicator of the extent to which a finn outsources. In all of the cases to be 
discussed subsequently, local soureing is treatment in the same way. It is important to emphasise 
here that local content is used in this study in a general sense to imply all inputs obtained from 
local sources, rather than to mean only those locally produced. The main rationale for this 
approach is that the broad aim of this reasearch is the development of S¥Es, which can be found 
in commerce (import/export) as well as manufacturing and services. However, a finer 
measurement oflocal content would exclude imported inputs and services. 
GMK utilises CKD materials sourced from lsuzu50 (Japan), Adarns 0pe151 (Germany) and some 
local inputs mandated in the import restriction legislation outlined in the Legal Notices no. 22 of 
1980. 124 of 1986 and 245 of 199152. Because of the recently opened up borders with South 
Africa, GMK has been able to source, materials from Delta Motors (SA) for the Ope! T-85 model. 
Other materials are sourced locally and also from offshore suppliers. None of the inputs are 
produced by GMK. 
At the time of the study, CKD material accounted for 63% of the total cost of direct materials 
while local content accounted for 37%, including the labour charge. In addition, a large proportion 
ofrequired services are provided in-house (80%). This is contrary to expected behaviour as psoited 
by 'core competence' proponents such as Pralahad and Hamel (1990)- that a manufucturing 
entetprise is likely to outsource more services than it provided in-house. Table 7-2 presents the 
outsourced parts and components, giving an indication of who supplies them, and an estimate of 
local content. 
50. Because Kenya is a right-hand drive cmmtry, GMK. could not obtain CKDs from GM Cmporation of 
USA Instead an agreement was negotiated with Isuzu of Japan to supply CKDs to GMK.. In addition to 
providing extensive technical training to GMK engineers, GMK. uses lsuzu dealers in Kenya to 
distnlmte its products and also to provide after sales service. 
51 . GM Corporation of the Unites States has considerable equity interest in Adam Ope} of Germany, as well 
as lsuzu. 
52. See the appendices for the specific items contained in these notices. 
Table 7-2 Outsourced1 Items - GMK (1992/1993) 
Item Supplier Estimated LC~ 
l. Oils Kenya Shell Ltd. 10010 
2. Greases Kenya Shell Ltd. 10% 
3. Fuels Kenya Shell Ltd. 10% 
4. Brake and Clutch Fluid Kenya Shell Ltd. 10% 
5. Sealers Hardware Stores 0% 
6. Adhesives Hardware Stores 0% 
7. Batteries Chloride Exide 45-50% 
8. Tyres Firestone (K) Ltd. 10% 
9. Thbes Firestone (K) Ltd 10% 
10. Paints Twiga Paints Ltd./ Sadolin Paints Ltd. 10% 
11. Toughened flat glass Impala Glass Ltd. 10% 
12. Canvas hoods, covers & Screens N/A -
13. Soft trim and upholstery Silentnig!rt (K) Ltd./ Megh Cushion Industries 45-50% 
LtdJ Trimat Ltd/ Highway Cars 
14. Sound deadening materials No supplier available in Kenya -
15. Radiators Bums and Blanel Sagoo Radiators 20-25% 
16. Exhaust pipes and silencers Mann Manufacturing Co Ltd./ Set1ak/ Auto 100% 
Ancillaries Ltd 
17. Leaf springs AutoSprings Manufacturers Ltd./ Auto 0% 
Ancillaries Ltd 
18. Spare wheel carriers Pipeline Manufacturers Ltd./ Tum-<l-Metal 100% 
Engineers! Patmose Technical Services Ltd. 
19. Seat Frames Tum-O-Metal Engineers! Silentnight (K) Ltd./ 100% 
Megh /Cushion Industries Ltd. 
20. Wiring Harnesses AutoSpring Manufacturers Ltd/ Automotive 40-45% 
Products Ltd 
21. Brake linings Supplied with CKD -
22. U-Bolts and U-Bolt Nuts AutoSpring Manufacturers Ltd/ Auto 0% 
Ancillaries Ltd. 
23 . Disk Brake Pads R B Shaw/ Varsani BrakeJinings Ltd 0% 
24. Hydraulic Dampers & Shocks Hill Products Ltd 20% 
25. Pre-mixed metal pre-treatment Henkel (K) Ltdl1\viga Paints Ltd 0% 
chemicals 
26. Windscreens, side and rear Impala Glass Industries 0% 
27. Radio and cassette players Stenorrettel Highway Radio Services 0% 
28. Hydraulic Jacks Tum-O-Metal Engineers! Car and General Ltd. 0% 
29. Spark Plugs Car and General 0% 
30. Speedometer cables Express Moparts/ Bums and Blane 0% 
31. Disk brake pad backing plates AutoSpring Manufacturers Ltd 100% 
32. Seat belts Megh Cushion Industries Ltd./ Bums and 0% 
Blane 
33. Toolkits Venus Industries 0% 
34. Airfilters Crossland-Autofilters Ltd./ Unifilters Ltd 40% 
35. Shackle pins for Leafsprings AutoSprings Manufacturers Ltd/ Auto 0% 
Ancillaries Ltd. 
I I As noted ill chapter five, this study used local sourcmg as a proxy measure of outsounng . For pwposes of this study 
locally sourced inputs include all locally procured parts, components and services, including those imported by local dealers 
and supplied to the motor industry. 
21b.ese local content estimates were provided by GMK (the buyer). There may be slight variations reported by the 
suppliers. These items include all inputs purchased from outside GMK. including those sourced from local importers. 
Source: GMK Field Notes (GMK Internal Documentation) 1992/1993 
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As can be noted, all of the items in the list in Table 7-2 are those contained in the Legal Notices 
(Appendix A). Except for the manufacture of jigs53 from time to time, GMK. has not voluntarily 
added any items to the list. Two reasons were given for this, namely: (i) it is difficult to develop 
suppliers from scratch to meet the quality standards required for GM products; (ii) it was more 
expensive to delete items from the CKD kits since Isuzu penalises any deletions while at the same 
time local products are significantly more expensive although, according to GMK. managers, these 
are of relatively poorer quality. However, through the Supplier Development Programme, GMK. is 
the only assembler actively involved in the improvement of the local suppliers of items listed in 
the Legal Notices. When asked why GMK. finds it necessary to do so without any legal obligation, 
or immediate economic reasons, one manger remarlced 
"both in the short and long run, it is GMs interest to have good loyal suppliers of inputs. 
It is GM's global policy to develop local supplier bases, and so that is our imperative 
too." 
MOTIV ATlONS FOR SOURCING ACTIVITY 
GMK.'s outsourcing behaviour is motivated by necessity - mandatory requirements by the 
government. Managers at GMK. argued that in view of the current supplier infrastructure status, it 
is 'logical' to continue sourcing as complete a CKD kit as possible. However, one manager noted 
that despite this mandatory requirement, other internal organisational considerations have 
contributed to their sourcing st:.rntegy: 
"we must think of car assembly in ten, peIhaps fifteen years to come. If we do not 
develop the supplier base now, we shall be importing almost complete vehicles from 
abroad in ten years' time. That is not industrial development!" 
Thus, GMK. has an organisational intention to use external sources, viewed from a long-term 
perspective. Contrary to economic theories of short-tenn profit maximisation, managers at GMK. 
see the future benefits of developing a local supplier base to be important. 
53. By 1992, GMK had built some expertise in the manufacture of jigs which they intended to export to 
sister companies in other African countries such as Nigeria, Tunisia, Zambia and Egypt 
Table 7-3 Local Content Percentage of Cost 
Distribution (1992) for Seleded Items (GMK) 
Item 
1. Tyres and Tubes 
2. Trims 
3. Wiring Harnesses 
4. Springs 
5. Radiators 
6. Paints 
7. Metal Parts (e.g. spare wheel carrier 
8. Shocks and Jacks 
9. Others ( Batteries, glass, exhausts) 
Total % Local Content 
Total % CKD 
Note:All figures are rounded off 
Source: Freld Notes 199211993 
FACTORS INFLUENCING SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
22% 
37% 
63% 
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As noted above, local sourcing levels were used as a proxy measure of external sourcing since 
most parts and components come as part of the CKD kit. Hence, while they do not provide the 
best fit, the factors affecting local sourcing were also used as a proxy for those affecting external 
sourcing, noting that some of the reasons for the limited use of local suppliers may be external. 
Managers argue that suppliers of the CKD kits often exert pressure, using deletion penalties, to 
coerce CKD buyers to buy complete kits. However, when asked what factors influence sourcing 
decisions GMK managers identified several general factors, and those reganling local sourcing in 
particular. These range from intrinsic weaknesses of existing and potential supplien;, to such 
external factors as Government regulation and foreign exchange restrictions. These are elaborated 
below. 
Quality of local products 
The managers interviewed at GMK argued that while they would like to buy locally because of the 
proximity to suppliers (reducing the problems of lead-time, shipping costs, and losses through 
shipping mishaps), this is limited by the low quality oflocal products. This was further explained 
by the relatively higher standards demanded by the franchisors for their vehicles. Seven reasons 
were provided by the managers: the low technological capabilities of some local supplien;; the low 
managerial capacity of local finns; unavailability of skilled manpower to local suppliers; 
inappropriateness of machinery used for production in such finns; limitations regarding raw 
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materials; the use of obsolete production methods by suppliers; and the absence of testing 
procedures in these finns. 
(a) Technological capacity: One of the issues affecting quality is the suppliers' technology. Put in 
one manager's words: 
"Most local suppliers have old machines, measuring devices and tools, which are all 
inadequate to produce some parts to equivalent quality as imported products." 
This problem is not restricted to small suppliers, but is more widespread within the sector, 
although the reasons for such inadequacies may vary. For example, when asked whether the 
technology problem was just a small enteIprises problem, one manager remarked 
"You will be sUIprised to learn that this is not peculiar to small businesses. I think it is 
one of the weaknesses of the Kenyan economy as a whole. Take for example, the case 
of laminated glass for car windsbields. Since we started assembling vehicles in this 
country, we are not able to source this type of glass from Impala Glass Industries. They 
are a relatively large company!" 
Another problem related to technology was related to the lack of technical assistance agreements 
between local suppliers and some component manufacturers in Japan or Gennany - suppliers find 
it difficult to inteIpret correctly certain specifications and manufacturing methods. Most suppliers 
use their own technology and production techniques to produce a 'best fit' for what they inteIpret to 
be the technical specifications of a given item. One manager noted his SUIprise that given the level 
of technological development of some suppliers, they produce some of the complex items required 
at all . Needless to say, this does not take into consideration the possible penalties that may have 
been borne by the supplier in tenns of inefficient production methods, and inappropriate sourcing 
of materials. However, at the time of the study, through their supplier development programme, 
GMK was making attempts to address this issue. 
(b) The management capacity of suppliers: it was noted in various interviews that most of GMK's 
suppliers are small or medium family businesses which suffer from poor management capacity, 
particularly related to quality consciousness . Consequently, the quality levels of their products are 
perceived to be low. 
(c) Unavailability to local suppliers of skilled manpower: because many local GMK. suppliers are 
small family businesses, and because the small scale of operations does not allow reasonable 
profits, the type of employees they attract are of a lower skill level than is necessary to deal with 
the technological requirements of vehicle parts and components production. 
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(d) Incompatibility of equipment: in addition to the inadequacy of the technological capacity of 
some suppliers, the available equipment, usually obtained from Europe, is rarely capable of 
producing to Japanese specifications indicating incongruency of technologies. The example of 
radiators was used to emphasise this problem. 
(e) Quality of raw materials available to suppliers: suppliers have limited control over the quality 
of the local JaW materials they use in their production. One of the reasons issuing out of the 
interviews was the lack of proper standards in the country.54 Consequently, local suppliers have 
not had adequate pressure to produce high quality products. According to GMK managers, this has 
also limited the extent to which parts and components can be standardised. 
(f) Production methods employed by suppliers: suppliers are limited in their production methods, 
using, in some cases, rudimentary production techniques geared to small scale production. 
Coupled with inappropriate equipment and poor quality JaW materials, the quality of end products 
is adversely affected. 
(g) Poor quality control and testing procedures by suppliers: because of reasons mentioned above, 
suppliers to do not have the capacity or the "consciousness" for bench testing of products to 
determine various perfonnance characteristics. Consequently, there are some defects in products 
(estimated to be about 20-25% of delivered inputs) delivered to GMK.. Although these are usually 
returned and replaced, there are significant costs in terms of time lost 
These observations have two m.yor implications for GMK's operations: (i) development costs - if 
GMK is to benefit from such suppliers, she has to incur costs in improving the technology of 
potential and existing suppliers through production standards, and engineering support; (ii) high 
warranty costs - if these low technological levels are not addressed, there are high warranty costs 
emanating from high failure rates of parts and components. It must be noted here that this study 
did not intend to pursue the correctness of the statements made about the quality of products, but 
rather to those factors considered by GMK managers to be important in making sourcing 
decisions. In this case, therefore, it is the perceptions of the managers which were sought in this 
study. 
54 . The Kenya Bureau of Standards (KBS) is the Kenyan institution charged with the duty of establishing 
standards and enforcing them. To date, the institution has had various problems in setting standards and 
enforcing them due to inadequate manpower. Appendix A2 shows those items used in the car industry, 
covered by the Kenya Bureau of Standards. 
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Lead-time 
The second factor mentioned regarding GMK's sourcing is the lead-time required between making 
an order and delivery for use in the production system. Soureing from foreign suppliers requires, 
on average, a three month lead-time, yet, the fluctuations in demand are significantly shorter than 
three months. At the same time, because of the shortages in foreign exchange, opportunities for 
holding laIge inventories of CKDs are limited. This means that it is difficult to respond quickly to 
the fluctuations in demand patterns since inputs (including CKD kits) have to be buili into the 
production system at least three months in advance. This is also affected by the lack of foreign 
exchange to pay for the order before actual despatch. This scenario implies that GMK has a critical 
internal incentive to source locally as much as possible. 
Frequency of Engineering and Model changes 
Another fuctor argued to affect sourcing is the implications of the frequency of changes in makes 
and models owing to fluctuations in consumer tastes. The main effect on GMK's sourcing is the 
frequency of re-tooling (scrapping moulds and dies) by local suppliers, which not only creates 
considerable difficulties for the suppliers, but also complicates the process of supplier development 
for GMK On the one hand, most suppliers are not flexible enough to re-tool at the rate at which 
makes and models change (at least once every year). According to one manager, some suppliers 
give up when they cannot cope with the continually changing specifications. In other instances, 
GMK has to terminate sourcing agreements when the supplier continually fails to meet GMK's 
requirements for quality, and delivery. On the other hand, even if they could re-tool as frequently 
as necessary, the costs are likely to be passed on to GMK. 
Access to Foreign Exchange 
A fourth factor cited as affecting local sourcing is the unavailability of foreign exchange. At the 
time of the study, Kenya was eAl'eriencing an acute shortage of foreign exchange brought about by 
falling commodity prices on which Kenya depends for its foreign exchange; and the action taken 
by Kenya's major donors (The Paris Club and the World Bank) to stop providing quick disbursing 
funds to Kenya as a means of encouraging it to make substantial political changes. Three effects 
were cited by managers. First, this problem restricts the eA'tent to which foreign suppliers can be 
used since the buyer may not be able to pay for CKDs in foreign exchange. However, contrary to 
eA1Jectations, this may not lead automatically to higher levels of local sourcing. Its effect is more 
generalised where the number of CKD kits which GMK can buy is reduced significantly, hence 
redueing the demand for locally sourced inputs. Thus, the lack of foreign exchange adversely 
affects the local parts and components industry by reducing demand for their output. Secondly, it 
limits the extent to which they can access inputs for their own production. Finally, currency 
fluctuations vary the cost of materials from order to order. Table 7-5 on price movements indicates 
that even when averaged over the year, some price fluctuations were very high. For example, the 
price variations in glass and exhausts went up by more than 400% between 1987 and 1988. GMK 
believe that this fluctuation is largely due to currency fluctuations. 
The recent repeal in 1993 of the legislation mandating local sourcing, and the libera1isation of 
foreign exchange, it could be argued, is likely to increase the contracts that go to local suppliers. 
This may not necessarily be the case. Instead, most buyers can be expected to buy complete CKDs 
since deletions from the kit have attracted penalties from the manufacturers. In cases where items 
are not part of the CKD kit, there are possibilities that buyers will prefer to source from foreign 
suppliers based on the argument of quality already cited above. 
Volume Levels 
The fifth factor relates to the proliferation of makes and models which is thought to limit the extent 
to which local suppliers can achieve economies of scale owing to the low volumes. Consequently, 
they [the suppliers] incur the penalties of small batch production and pass these on to GMK. In an 
interview, a manager at GMK noted that 
"it is unreasonable to expect these people [suppliers] to develop reasonable quality 
standards and to offer competitive prices given the low volumes which they have to 
deal with. Take for example our requirements. We require at least 6 types of exhaust 
systems from our suppliers at anyone time. The people [suppliers] have to supply 
perhaps less than 20 of each type in one order. Naturally costs go up because of such 
production runs ." 
Costs of local materials 
One other factor cited by managers at GMK is the high and transient cost of local. inputs (see 
Table 7-5 for a sample of price movements). Many of the raw materials used by local suppliers are 
imported and are, therefore, subject to duty and taxes. Hence, the actual products supplied to GMK 
are considered to be relatively more expensive than equivalent imported. products. For example, 
while noting that these estimates were provided by GMK, only four of the 31 items outsourced by 
GMK used 100% local materials and labour, and as many as fourteen of the 31 items used no local 
material at all, except a small local labour content (Table 7-3). The estimates also indicate that 
only three items out of 31 use 40-50% of local inputs. This is an indicator that the perception by 
assemblers and franchise holders that local inputs reduce the competitiveness of the motor vehicle 
industry, may have some basis. 
Deletion Penalties 
GMK still pays to Isuzu a penalty for deleting (omitting) any item from the CKD. The effect of 
deletion penalties has concerned the motor vehicle industry for some time (Masai, 1991), arguing 
that the deletion penalties affect the assembler (or franchise holder) twice: first because of the 
penalties imposed by the franchiser; and secondly because of the higher costs of buying more 
expensive inputs locally. Similar to Masai's (1991) finding, it was found that the deductions from 
the cost of the CKD were far less than the price paid for the locally sourced item. Speculating how 
assemblers and franchise holders dealt with this problem, an official from the Ministry of Industry 
commented that 
Assemblers find it very difficult to comply with the Legal Notice requirements because 
of the extIa costs of buying locally. In order to beat this, they use some unorthodox 
methods. Some of them simply collude with potential suppliers to issue a No Objection 
Certificate for an item they would like to buy abroad, or retain in the CKD. Our [read 
the Government's] verification and policing system is so poor that it takes a long time to 
authenticate a claim that an item cannot be obtained locally. 
However, because of the sensitive nature of this allegation, it was difficult to get direct answers 
from respondents. 
Single Sourdng 
Like other franchise holders, GMK has price-fixing problems with monopoly suppliers such as 
Firestone Ltd. (suppliers of Tyres and Tubes), and Hill Products Ltd (suppliers of Hydraulic 
dampers and shocks) - "they increase prices often, and without justification" (Interview Notes -
Manager). From the interviews it was obvious that this was not the preferred position as GMK had 
little bargaining power. In addition to price negotiation and fixing problems, it was reported that 
single source procurement introduced uncertainties in the assembly process as suppliers did not 
take delivery schedules seriously. One of the reasons cited, from GMK's perspective, is the 
contention that monopoly status makes such suppliers 'arrogant' due to their relatively superior 
bargaining position. However, one manager conceded that it could also be due to the inability to 
cope with both original-equipment (OE) and after-marlcet demand brought about by low capacity 
operation at the suppliers plants. 
Organisational Policy and strategy 
GMK's sourcing decision is also affected by global General Motors (GM) policy. GM has 
systematically followed a local supplier development policy in its global operations. Effectively, 
this global strategy accounts for GMK's use of local suppliers. The thinking behind it is the 
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argument that a local supplier base addresses the specific needs of the locality, and is, therefore, 
sensitive to consumer needs and close enough to operations to limit problems associated with 
distance. The advantage in the long-run is higher consumer benefits emanating from efficient 
analysis and solution of consumer problems. 
Table 7-4 Factors Influencing Sourcing Behaviour - GMK 
Quality Cost Availability and Reliability 
1. Low technological capacity of 1. High cost of materials which 1. Small number of suppliers, in 
suppliers suppliers use. some cases tending towards 
monopolistic or oligopolistic 
markets 
2. Low volume levels owing to 2. Low volumes leading to higher 2. For various reasons, local 
proliferation of makes and models cost of production - no economies suppliers find. it difficult to meet 
which makes it difficult for of scale. delivery targets. 
suppliers to benefit from 
experience. 
3. Poor management capacity of 3. High proportion of imported 3. Lack of access to foreign 
some suppliers, particularly related materials which suppliers use make exchange by suppliers which causes 
to quality consciousness. local components relatively more delays in delivery. 
expensive than equivalent imports. 
4. Lack of skilled manpower of 4. High duties and taxes charged on 4. Foreign sourcing requires a long 
suppliers. locally made inputs. lead-time (3-6 months), hence local 
sourcing would be preferable. 
5. IncompatIbility of supplier's 5. Monopoly suppliers charge high 5. Generaloocertainties in the 
equipment to the needs of the prices which shift constantly, thus inputs markets make it difficult for 
buyer's specifications. introducing high tIDcertainty for local suppliers to fill orders to the 
GMK.. quality, cost and delivery 
agreements. 
6. Quality of raw materials 6. Deletion penalties by 
available 10 suppliers manufacturers discourage local 
sourcing. 
7. 'Backward' production methods 
employed by some (at least 80%) 
suppliers. 
8. Poor quality control and testing 
procedures by a large number of 
suppliers. 
Source: Field Notes 1992-1993. 
Table 7-4 summarises these factors into three main dimensions: cost., quality and availability. As 
can be noted, most of these factors are related to suppliers and their perfonnance rather than GMK. 
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itself or the business environment. Even in cases where the latter are important, they are 
interpreted in relation to the supplier - how they affectthe performance of the supplier. 
BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONS 
As noted in chapter four, the nature of buyer-supplier relations has implications for inter-finn 
relationships. Buyer-supplier relations between GMK and its suppliers can be described as anns-
length. As can be seen from the Table 7-2 above, GMK retains more than one supplier for all the 
locally sourced inputs except in those cases where a supplier holds monopoly power in an 
industry. The Supplies Manager argued that this was prudent as a safeguard against delays, failures 
to deliver, and unwarranted price increases. 
In the case of single suppliers, managers at GMK were not happy with the 'lack of control' 
introduced in the buyer-supplier relations. In one case, GMK was concerned about the frequent 
and unanticipated increases in prices. As was noted earlier, relatively high cost is one of the factors 
identified by GMK managers as limiting local sourcing. Below is an indication of the 
proportionate price movements by various suppliers of inputs. 
Table 7-5 Price Movement 1987-1992 (Inputs/or all models) 
Item Description % 0/0 % % 
Difference* Difference Difference Difference 
1987-1988 1988-1989 1989-1990 1990-1991 
1. Tyres and 53 (» 1 «) 6 «) 27 «) 
Tubes 
2. Glass 469 (» 8 «) 20 (» 16 «) 
3. Batteries 62 (» 9 «) 6 «) 28 (» 
4. Soft Trims 0 «) 10 «) 11 «) 72 (» 
5 . Exhausts 409 (» 29 (» o «) 8 «) 
~ . Springs 46 (» 9 «) 10 «) 21 (» 
r. Harnesses 164 (» 21 (» 27 (» 4 «) 
~ . Radiators 77 (» 13 (» 12 «) 9 «) 
~. SI Absorbers 115 (» 104 (» 7 «) 23 (» 
!Annual Intlati(m 10.7% 11.0% 15.8% 19.6% 
IRate 
.. 
* This IS the difference m the pnces of Items from one year to the next 
«) Compared to the annual inflation rates. 
Source: Field Notes (Documents and Interviews) 199211993 
0/0 
Difference 
1991-1992 
14 «) 
10 «) 
12 «) 
12 «) 
1 «) 
18 «) 
4 «) 
21 «) 
20 «) 
27.5% 
Between 1986 and 1987, the price differential was high for all items except for soft trims, and 
continued to increase at a slower pace until 1991. Between 1991 and 1992, prices for most items 
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continued to increase but in any case lower than the official inflation rates. At the time of 
interview, GMK expected prices to increase even more due to the acute shortage of foreign 
exchange for suppliers to purchase inputs. Although the import restrictions had not been lifted at 
the time of the study (1992), speculation by the participants in the sector indicated that if this 
happened, some suppliers would take advantage of the situation to hike prices, justifying their 
action by arguing that prices in international markets were high. While it is still early to assess the 
effects of the recent repeal of regulations restricting importation, this prediction could very well be 
borne out. 
A different problem tempering buyer-supplier relations relates to the adequacy and timeliness of 
supplies. According to one manager, because the supplier serves other assemblers, and also the 
replacement market, there are delays in filling orders. Although other factors were considered 
pertinent in explaining this position, managers at GMK believe that a lot has to do with the way 
local suppliers conduct business. In an interview, one of the managers in the procurement 
department remarked: 
You have to be on the phone [to the supplier] all the time. When that fails, then you go 
to his premises just to remind him that you must have the order filled as quickly as 
possible. You would think that they have not had adequate lead-time for the order! The 
problem is that they do not take the order seriously until they have only a few days to 
the deadline. Then they cannot meet it [the deadline]. 
Another problem frequently associated with this was that of quality: because production was then 
rushed through the system, the pressure waS on delivering the parts or components, and often, 
quality slips . Commenting on this, several managers cited this as one of the reasons why it was 
imperative that the Supplier Development Programme should focus on all aspects of the suppliers 
business rather than the engineering and production process alone. This implies that one of the 
problems facing local suppliers is their inability to organise production efficiently, most 
inefficiencies emanating from lack of professionalism. When asked whether the larger more 
professional' suppliers could be placed in this category of non-professionalism, it was clear that 
most managers interviewed at GMK viewed much of their [larger supplier] laxity as the result of 
their monopoly position. 
SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT ACTMTIES 
According to Sako (1992) obligational relationships seem to increase inter-firm transactions, and 
buyers feel obligated to develop suppliers. As already mentioned, GMK has a Supplier 
Development Programme based on a supplier selection criteria developed at GM headquarters and 
adapted for the Kenyan finn. Of course, there are those suppliers who are not selected at all 
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because they are monopoly suppliers of particular products. For example, Firestone (EA) Ltd. is 
currently the only producer of vehicle Tyres and Tubes in Kenya. In such cases, all the buyers in 
the industry, including those in the replacement market, have no option. At the time of this study, 
Kenya had an operntive restriction on the importation of motor vehicle tyres and tubes like several 
other products, hence there was no legal alternative. However, there are those smaller, less 
established suppliers who operate in more competitive markets and must go through a selection 
process. Suppliers are recruited by two main methods. (i) a supplier may approach GMK 'with a 
product it believes GMK needs, in which case GMK's engineers will examine its technical 
suitability and 'approve' it, perhaps as is or with some modifications; or (ii) GMK may request a 
potential supplier to produce a 'sample' of a product it requires, based on the manufacturers' 
specifications, either independently or with the help of GMK engineers. This initial stage is 
usually fully sponsored by the suppliers although they benefit from the specifications and 
standards provided by GMK. Each potential supplier is assessed individually, based on standard 
criteria used by GM affiliates globally. Essentially, the criteria include an evaluation of the 
technological, managerial and financial ability of the potential supplier to meet the quality, 
delivery and price targets of GMK. However, other specific requirements related to particular 
suppliers' circumstances are included. For example, in some cases, suppliers also serve the 
replacement maIket, and are therefore, likely to have operntional problems in meeting GMK's 
demand. A team of engineers is involved in the supplier selection process together with the 
procurement managers in order to ensure a reasonable technical base of potential suppliers before 
they are accepted. 
The selected supplier agrees to supply GMK, while GMK agrees to facilitate the technical 
development of the supplier if the nature of the products to be supplied is specific to GMK's needs. 
Currently, this process is canied out by means of an order. No fonnal contracts are used. This 
agreement does not bind both parties to specific volumes which are agreed for particular orders. 
This relationship cannot be described as a sub~ntracting relationship because it is not governed 
by formal, binding contracts but by infonnal agreements to co-operate. Its vulnerability is 
emphasised even more by the multiple sourcing strategies adopted by GMK. Without a binding 
contract and given the ability of the buyer to shift from one supplier to another (superior 
bargaining position), suppliers are likely to be insecure. 
Currently, supplier development is based on the needs of the supplier, and is therefore non-routine. 
If a supplier meets the requirements that GMK sets, then there is usually no involvement by GMK 
in the suppliers operations since the quality of products is checked on arrival at the GMK factory 
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pattems and tooling, to improve the suppliers efficiency. GMK managers see this as an assurance 
against poor quality. One manager rerruuked 
" .... if you want the best possible quality, it is not enough to give a supplier the technical 
standards and specifications. You need to help him 'clean' up his whole operation so 
that you are not just getting a good quality product, but getting it on time as well. That 
means that you must help him look for his engineering, managerial and stock control 
problems and find realistic solutions to suit him, and of course yourself" 
This elaborate supplier development process is an indicator that GMK is making an attempt to 
build a reasonably reliable supplier base for its requirements. However, given the high costs 
involved and the continued perception that the government is not doing enough to support these 
efforts, it is possible that GMK might consider alternatives to local sourcing, particularly in view 
of the withdrawal of import restrictions. In an internal analysis of GMK's supplies status, such a 
possibility is seen· in internal manufacture of components given that some of GMK's suppliers are 
owned by competitors55, which affecting its ability and capacity to negotiate with suppliers. The 
report notes, 
"GMK can grow by getting into component manufacturing - more revenue, 
employment, profits." (Internal Report, GMK) 
While there have not yet been problems, there are real concems within GMK, so much so that in 
the report quoted above, this is given as a rationale for possible in-house production. Also pointed 
out is that other franchise holders are going into in-house production of components and parts, not 
only for their consumption but for the replacement market as well, as a means of expanding their 
company's profit base. These complications and insecurities are possible deterrents of an otherwise 
apparently 'positive' exercise. 
Interestingly, GMK is aware that other franchise holders have not invested equally in supplier 
development, yet they [the other franchise holders] continue to use those suppliers developed by 
GMK. In fact one manager noted that the other franchise holders implicitly relied on GMs 
'certification' of suppliers by sourcing from suppliers already approved by GMK. While this was 
acknowledged, there were no legal or technical restrictions on the suppliers to supply GMK 
exclusively. Neither were there discernible caveats imposed by GMK in cases where suppliers had 
multiple customers. This could be explained by the fact that GMK views the volumes they require 
55 . For example, Bums and Blane, one of their rndiator suppliers, is wholly owned by Toyota Kenya Ltd. (a 
Lohnro company). Autofilter, their airfilter supplier is owned by DT Dobie. 
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for prevailing demand levels to be too small to sustain their suppliers. That is not to say that GMK 
is primarily altruistic in their approach to sourcing. Management's expectation of future advantages 
based on the loyalty of suppliers is evident. According to one manager at GMK, in the event that 
the vehicle maxket in Kenya expands and their demand for parts and components currently sourced 
from suppliers rises, and given a scenario of limited supplies, the suppliers will be more loyal to 
GMK than to other buyers. To quote this manager, "we have developed some of these people from 
scratch. I do not think they will forget that quite so easily." 
Having said that, it is probable that owing to short term benefits accruing to suppliers, particularly 
the small suppliers, it is unlikely that when asked to choose between customers they would choose 
those who have not made significant contributions to their growth. Obviously, this would also 
depend, in part, on the price differential. 
BUYER PERCEPTIONS OF SME SUPPLIERS 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLIERS 
One of the objectives of the study was to find out the extent to which large buyers are willing to, 
and transact with small or medium firms. About 60% of GMK's suppliers can be described as 
small or medium finns. This is not accidental . According to one manager, the demand levels in the 
sector are so low that large finns have found it uneconomical to invest in the components sub-
sectors. Most of the investors in this sector are, therefore small to medium firms. Those suppliers 
described as large are also monopolies in their industry. As a result, all the buyers in the motor 
vehicle industry have had no real options. 
PREFERRED CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLIERS 
The study also sought to establish whether GMK preferred large or small suppliers, and why. A 
GMK manager reported that 
" .. . all things being equal, it is much easier to deal with large finns as long as they do 
not have monopoly power. Larger organisations in our [business] environment can cope 
with the technological and volume requirements; small finns, as we discussed earlier, 
are still trying to establish themselves." 
Hence, given prevailing circumstances, GMK would rather transact with larger finns for 
organisational and quality assurance reasons. The same manager was keen to add that large finns 
do not necessarily mean lower prices [often assumed to result from higher volumes]. He argued 
that on the contrary, owing to their monopoly position, and resulting inefficiency, large firms are 
likely to charge higher prices. 
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FORMING INTER-FIRM RELATIONSIllPS WITH SMES 
GMK is pemaps the only vehicle assembler in Kenya with a specific policy to develop local 
suppliers, and to use them for input requirements. As is discussed in preceding paragraphs, this is 
due to the global General Motors corporate policy to develop local suppliers in their respective 
countries of involvement as an assurance against the high costs of , foreign' sourcing. 
According to GMK managers, this is currently hampered by lack of institutional and 
infrastructura1 support by the government for finns that wish to 'upgrade' the productivity and 
quality standards of local suppliers. They also argue that small local suppliers are particularly 
affected because of their lack of access to technology, finance, manpower, and foreign exchange 
for the procurement of inputs. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This case described and analysed the production organisation of GMK highlighting factors 
influencing its sourcing strategies. It reveals that GMK is relatively integrated in the sense that 
many of its requirements are produced in-house, except for those items mandated in the Legal 
Notices, and some services. Reasons provided by the study range from the inadequacy of the 
supplier base to the reluctance of its CKD kit suppliers to delete more items. It also reveals that 
GMK already uses a supplier development programme as a strategy to build a local supplier base. 
It's relations with its suppliers is relatively arms-length in nature, characterised by multiple 
sourcing and relations lasting the duration of the order. This implies that there is some potential for 
future transaction but this could be limited by the arms length approach to inter-fum relationships. 
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CASE TWO 
ASSOCIA TED VEHICLE ASSEMBLERS (A V A) 
ThITRODUCTIONANDBACKGROUND 
This case describes and analyses the activities of Associated Vehicle Assemblers (AV A), one of 
the three vehicle assemblers in Kenya The presentation differs from that of GMK because A V A is 
a contract assembler, and its activities are tied to those of the franchise holders (contractors), 
Marshalls (EA) Ltd. and Toyota (K) Ltd., which are presented as embedded case studies. These 
two cases were selected from seven franchise holders served by A V A because, together, they 
constitute approximately 70% of A V A's total annual output. 
The case will be divided into three parts for ease of presentation of empirical data The first section 
will describe A V A as an assembler, part two will present Marshalls (EA) Ltd, while part three will 
present Toyota Kenya Ltd. 
I ASSOCIATED VEHICLE ASSEMBLERS (A VA) 
BACKGROUND 
FORMATION AND OWNERSHIP 
After a joint venture agreement between the shareholders was signed in 1975 for its establishment 
as a multi-franchise plant, A VA was established in 1977, with an installed capacity of 12000 units. 
In 1987, 80% of this capacity was being used. However, owing to industry problems at the time of 
the study, only 30% of capacity was in use. In 1987 A V A held a capital investment of KShs.120 
million (out of a total industry investment of about KShs. 990 million) with a government share 
holding of 51 %. The anticipated equity structure after completion of the ongoing programme of 
privatisation of public investment is expected to change significantly with the transfer of 
government equity to private Kenyan shareholders. The equity of the other shareholders remains 
the same while the government's shareholding reduced significantly. Table 7-6 shows the equity 
structure of A V A in 1992, the time this study was undertaken. It is important to note that because 
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the government considered it to be a strategic industry, it invested in all of the vehicle assembly 
plants in joint ven1ure agreements with various foreign and local investors . 
Table 7-6 Ownership Structure of AVA 
Industrial Development Bank 25% 
Treaswy* 26% 
Inchape Ltd (Marshalls (EA) Ltd.) 24.5% 
Kenya Motor Holdings (foyota Kenya Ltd.) 25%. 
* When the field work was carried out (1992), this holding was scheduled to go 
to private investors as the government privatised its investments. 
Note: Marshalls (EA) Ltd and Toyota (K) Ltd. are major franchise owners. 
Marshalls (EA) and Toyota (K) are AV A's main contractors. Although together they hold only 
49% of the equity, they have a significant influence on the assemblers activities because AVA is 
largely dependent on them for its operations. Hence, strategic decisions at both finns significantly 
influence A VA's decisions. For example, the importers decide what makes and models are to be 
marketed and hence determine, to some extent, A V A's production operations. According to one 
manager, "they [importers] bring their requirements, we build them!" . Essentially, importers 
provide the assembler with their requirements, complete with delivery schedules, and provide the 
CKDs and other materials required for assembly and subsequent distribution. 
PRODUCTS AND PERFORMANCE 
Currently, A VA assembles upto 62 different vehicle makes and models for seven 
importers/franchise holders. 1bis is, in fact, the highest mix of makes and models of any assembler 
in Kenya's motor vehicle industry. Consequently, A VA is affected even more than the other 
assemblers by the proliferation of vehicle types. Table 7-7 shows the various products and 
contractors. A V A has a total of six assembly lines, each capable of adjustment to produce the 
particular make or model introduced on the assembly line. Given the wide range of its contractors 
(seven in 1992), demands for flexibility are high. 
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Table 7-7 AV A Products and Contractors (1992) 
ImporterlFranchise holder Vehicle Type!Make 
1. Ryce Motors Ltd. 1. Daihatsu Charade 
2. Rocky4WD 
2. Kenya Motors Ltd. 1. Fiat Iveco 
2. DAFbus 
3. Fiat UNO passenger car 
3. ECTA (K) Ltd. 1. Subaru saloon 
4 . Bruce Trucks and Equipment Ltd. 1. Mitsubishi Fuso 
2. Mitsubishi buses 
3. Mitsubishi prime movers 
4.Lada 
5. Hino 
5. Marshalls (EA) Ltd. 1. Peugeot504, 505, 205, 405 
2. Peugeot 504 pick-ups 
3. Volvo trucks 
6. Toyota Kenya Ltd. 1. Toyota Corolla 
2. Toyota Land Cruiser 
3. Toyota Panel Van 
4. Toyota Estate 
5. Toyota Hilux pick-up 
6. Hiace mini-bus 
7. 3 ton DYMA trucks 
8. Buses 
7. Simba Colt Motors Ltd. 1. Mitsubishi Lancer saloon 
2. Mitsubishi pick-up 
Source: Freld Notes (1997/1993) 
AV A's performance within the industIy has been largely based on its assessment of the combined 
requirements of its contractors. However, based on total makes from various franchise holders, 
AVA has the highest assembly output in the sector. In 1987, for example, AVA produced 4,600 
cars compared to the 4,300 and 2,800 units produced by KVM and GMK respectively . This is not 
swprising considering that AV A has the largest number of franchise holders and assembles the 
largest mix of makes and models. In the same year, A V A also recorded the most efficient 
operation in terms of capacity utilisation among the three assemblers. For example, Table 7-8 
shows the relative performance of the assemblers in terms of capacity use and output in 1987. 
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Table 7-8 
1990*) 
AVA 's Performance - Capacity Utilisation and Average Output (1987-
Assembler Output (units) Capacity utilisation 
(%) 
AVA 4600 80% 
GMK 2800 63% 
KVM 4300 74% 
* Owing to industry-wide difficulties, production had fallen to less 
than 50% for all assemblers between 1991 and 1993. 
Source: Field Notes (1992/1993) 
PRODUCTION ORGANISATION 
ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES 
AV A is organised around the assembly activity, with other activities entering the assembly line at 
various stages. The assembly line itself is completely flexible, allowing the assembly of a variety 
of makes and models over short periods of time. The CKDs and materials are delivered to the 
plant by the importers (or their agent). These constitute the main inputs into the assembly process, 
with an input of services at all levels. For example, the security services which are vital to A VA's 
activities due to its responsibility to importers, goes into all levels of the process. Laundry, security 
and insurance services are bought in, while legal, and infonnation services are provided in-house 
with occasional consultancy services used when necessary . AV A has no further involvement 
beyond the assembly process - i.e. distribution and after-sales service activities are handled by the 
importer/franchise holder. Prospects for outsourcing , therefore, may be only possible in the 
assembly channel in the fonn of sub-assemblies, yet, this is limited by the CKD procurement 
policy which 'forces' importers to buy-in as complete a kit as possible. Fig 7-3 describes A VA's 
activity flows . 
Clearly, this mode of production organisation differs significantly from that reported for GMK. 
The main implications in this model' regards the procurement function. By separating 
procurement from assembly, it is difficult to target the assembler with regard to SME 
development. First, more actors are introduced into the 'equation'. Secondly, the assembler is 
removed from the supplier chain decision-making process. This has implications for the concepts 
of quality, delivery, and buyer-supplier relations . The assembler has limited involvement in the 
procurement, quality control and delivery of vital inputs. Consequently, the success of supplier 
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chain management depends on closer association between the franchise holder and the assembler, 
and between the franchise holder and the input supplier. 
In order to allow WOIk to be organised to suit the requirements of new makes and models, AV A's 
assembly line itself is flexible . For example, jigs and related equipment can be moved from one 
production line to another. They can also be adjusted at short notice to cater for variations in 
specifications. However, the process of assembly itself is integrated. For instance, once a kit goes 
onto the assembly line, little else goes into it in tenns of sub-assembly or specific inputs, except 
for various services. This results from the fact that the assembly kit arrives at the plant in a 
relatively complete form - including already assembled sub-a>mponents such as gear boxes, 
engines and chassis. Hence, there are few prospects for outsourcing at this level. Fig 7-4 shows the 
activity flows within the assembly process itself 
IMPORTERS ASSEMBLER 
CKDs ..---Assembly 
Local Materials -------' 
L--__ Sub-assembly 
Fig7-3 Production Activity flows - A V A 
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Fig 7-4 Asssembly Process outline - AV A 
SOURCING ACTIVITIES 
SOURCING HEHA VIOUR 
As already noted, owing to its contract assembler status, AV A does not source CKDs and local 
materials directly. In the Assembler-Importer Agreements, the assembler relies heavily on the 
importer for the provision of materials for assembly. The discussion of sourcing activities is 
presented, therefore, under the specific embedded case studies. 
However, the same agreement gives the assembler the opportunity to source whatever 
'consumables' are agreed with the importer. Hence, A V A sources whatever other materials and 
inputs as are considered non-specific to a particular importer/franchise holder. These items are 
purchased on order in a routine way. At the time of the study in 1992, the following materials were 
being sourced directly by A V A. 
Table 7-9 AVA Outsourced Items * and Suppliers 
Item Source (size of supplier) 
1. Paints 1. Sadolin Paints (Large) 
2. Twiga Paints (Large) 
3. Bergerpaints (Large) 
2. Oils and fuels Esso Ltd (Large) 
3. Welding Materials 1. East African ili'Ygen Ltcl (Large) ~% 
2. Imported (Various sources) - 40% 
3. Paintshop Chemicals Henke1 Ltd. (Large) 
4. Sealers and Adhesives 1. Henkel Ltd. (Large) - 20% 
2. Donlop Ltcl (Medium-Large)- 20% 
3. Sadolin Paints Ltd (Large) - 20% 
4. Imported - 40% 
5. Tools (e.g. spanners, hydraulic jacks, etc.) Various importing merchants (Large--
Medium) 
* 100% of all the Items IS bought-m. 
Note: (i) AV A has no ownership interests in any of the supplier finns. 
(ii) All of the listed items appear in the Legal Notices nos. 22 and 124 
Source: Field Notes (1992/1993) 
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Clearly, only those mandated items are outsourced, mainly from large or medium fums. 
MOTIV ATIONS FOR SOURClNG BEHAVIOUR 
As can be noted from the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, sourcing behaviour at AV A 
leans more towards external sourcing, not from local finns, but from manufacturers of products 
and components abroad. AV A managers cited several reasons for their sourcing behaviour. First, 
because Kenya does not manufacture vehicles, importation of the CKD is a rational behaviour by 
all assemblers and their contractors. Thus, AV A's sourcing behaviour is motivated by lack of 
internal capacity to supply parts and components. Secondly, owing to various reasons hindering 
local sourcing, mainly hinging on the weakness of the suppliers, assemblers are Iforced' to import 
most of their requirements. Finally, the only outsourcing taking place is that which is mandated by 
the government. However, in the case of services, outsourcing is influenced by lack of internal 
capacity and the expense of having such in-house facilities given the low transaction levels of such 
servIces. 
FACfORS INFLUENCING SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
As already noted, this study has used local sourcing as a proxy measure for outsourcing. 
Consequently, sourcing behaviour is defined in tenns oflocal Vs foreign sourcing. AV A managers 
reported that three main fuctors were important in detennining sourcing behaviour: 
(i) "for most items including the CKD kit, that decision is out of our hands! The importers buy 
almost all inputs"; however, for those items sourced by A V A, 
(ii) "it is important to comply with govemment requirements to source locally those items 
appearing in the Legal Notices"; 
(ii) "since AV A does not have the capacity to produce many of the items deleted from the CKD 
kit, the only option is to buy from other suppliers." 
Evidently, A VA's sourcing behaviour is circumscribed by its ability (based on its relationship with 
its contractors) to make sourcing decisions about various inputs. However, for those items it has 
purchasing jurisdiction over, AV A managers thought that compliance with government legislation 
was a veI)' important part of its strategy. The MD at AV A remarlced "when you locate operations 
in a particular country, it is incumbent upon you [the finn] to try and work within the legal 
framework of that country, or else you become counter-productive. In the long-run it is not healthy 
to contravene regulations." 
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The following specific factors were mentioned as influencing the choice to source locally or from 
foreign suppliers. These are similar to those reported by GMK, but may differ in their intensity or 
their perceived impact. 
Quality 
AV A's primary concern is with the quality of its final products. It is, therefore, upon this interest 
that selection of suppliers for those items soureed directly is made. For example, A V A imports a 
significant proportion of sealers and adhesives and welding materials (40% of total requirements in 
each case). One of the reasons given for this is that some particular types of materials cannot be 
obtained locally - their quality is perceived to be either too low, or the suppliers are judged unable 
to supply the quantities required. 
Frequency of engineering and model changes 
The first case study described in this chapter revealed that GMK is affected by frequent changes in 
engineering requirements brought about by constant makes and model changes which in tu.Jn, 
affect sourcing, particularly limiting the reliability of local suppliers. However, AV A is not 
directly affected by this phenomenon in tenns of sourcing and production scheduling. Instead, it 
has more operational implications for AV A Because AV A transacts 'with so many franchise 
holders at anyone time, it has to adopt a completely flexible assembly system to allow for such 
frequent changes. According to the production manager, "any type of vehicle can be brought here 
for assembly. We have no control over what makes and models we assemble, so we have to be 
prepared." For AV A, being prepared means being flexible enough to accommodate these changes. 
It also implies that linking the supplier's schedules to their own requires the adoption of different 
production organisation patterns. 
Access to foreign Exchange 
The shortage of foreign exchange, like at GMK, was reported to cause production bottlenecks for 
A VA Franchise holders were unable to get access to sufficient foreign exchange to utilise their 
capacity quota at A V A 
Volume levels 
The small volumes were reported to lead to higher costs of production for the supplier. In addition, 
lack of standardisation of components means that they are not interchangeable, and hence have to 
change with every make or model. Like GMK, managers at A V A felt that this mean unnecessarily 
higher prices charged by local suppliers. 
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Costs of materiaJs 
Like GMK, A VA has cost related problems with local suppliers which lead to frequent price 
increases. One of the reasons hypothesised by A VA for this increase is the high cost of obtaining 
both local and imported materials for the manufucture of parts and components. However, 
according to one manager, some suppliers do not have cause to raise prices as often and as high as 
they do. He remarlced 
some suppliers are simply opportunistic - they raise prices at the slightest excuse simply 
because they know there is nothing we can do about it. 
AV A, like GMK, has opted for multiple sourcing in order to reduce this vulnerability. However, in 
some cases, such as the case of tyres and tubes, there is no alternative supplier. 
Single Vs multiple soureing 
This refers to the measures that AV A has taken 10 reduce dependency on one supplier, and any 
subsequent loss of bargaining power. Discussing the rationale for multiple sourcing AV A's MD 
saw it as a reasonable and rational strategy in an environment where suppliers, pressured by a 
harsh economic environment, are likely to become opportunistic. He added that uncertainties in 
the economy encourage businessmen to utilise any opportunities to the maximum: "sometimes 
this means charging the highest price possible". It was also clear that A V A's management was 
aware that multiple sourcing made suppliers uncertain about future orders, but this was argued to 
have the effect of making them more Willing' to be flexible. A V A tends to distribute her 
requirements equally among suppliers as an assurance against work stoppage rather than as a price 
bargaining tool. 
Organisational policy and strategy 
AV A is a Kenyan company, and therefore unlike GMK, did not report a global corporate 
(headquarters) policy and strategy specifications to outsource or develop local suppliers. Besides, 
the number of items directly sourced by A V A is small (see Table 7-9) and may not warrant 
specific organisational policies towards sourcing. Consequently, because choice is restricted by 
legislation and mandating of local sourcing of some items, A V A's strategy is to source locally 
whatever is mandated. 
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BUYER - SUPPLIER RELATIONS 
Buyer-supplier relations at A V A are subsumed under the relations between the importers and their 
suppliers, except on those items sourced directly by AV A. Consequently, the discussion presented 
here relates only to those items directly outsourced by A V A. 
SUPPLIER DEVEWPMENT ACI'IVITIES 
AV A did not report any supplier development activities. Again, this can be attributed to the 
assembler-importer arrangements where the purchasing decision is taken away from the assembler. 
The only level of supplier development could be assumed in the manufacturer's specifications 
given to the supplier for the components and parts which A V A buys-in. In this respect, some 
technology transfer takes place. However, in the case of A V A where only paints and paint shop 
chemicals are purchased directly, there are few opportunities for supplier development, except in 
the fonn of technology transfer through specifications to the supplier. In any case, the suppliers of 
paints and chemicals (Table 7-9 above) are companies genernlly regarded as large to medium sized 
finns, with some access to resources for their own development. 
CONTRACTING 
As already noted, there are no specific contracts between A VA and her suppliers . Instead, there are 
'agreements' in the fonn of orders or intended orders by the buyer, communicated in letters or 
Purchase Orders. The MD reported that AV A enters into communication with its suppliers in 
order to ensure that the specifications and compositions of the ordered items match the importer's 
specifications. For example, in the case of paints and Paintshop chemicals, AV A is in constant 
touch with the suppliers during the fonnulation stage of a batch of paints. Samples are analysed 
and tested by A V A until the production engineers are satisfied with its quality. There is also an 
unwritten agreement that in the unlikely event that A V A is not happy with any of the products, 
arrangements would be made to rectify this. According to the production manager, all the suppliers 
try to ensure that there are as few complaints about quality as possible - "we have traded with them 
since 1977. They cannot afford to let us down!" However, in cases where items are bought 
routinely on order only, such as in the cases of oils and lubricants, AV A simply give the supplier 
their quantity specifications, and the suppliers deliver whatever items have been ordered. There 
are, therefore, minimal contacts between the purchasing department at AV A and the supplier's 
sales department except in cases where goods do not meet specifications. 
A V A also buys in 70-80% of its service requirements (i.e. laundry, advertising, and legal services) 
except for a small proportion of security services (security guards) estimated to be 30-40% of the 
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security requirements. The rest comes in the fonn of hardware such as a1ann systems, which are 
often imported. 
As at the time of the fieldwork, AVA proposed to start the manufacture of shock-absorbers to 
cover its own needs for the various ranges of makes and models, and also for export. At the time, 
all shock-absorbers were bought in from Hill Products, a medium sized Kenyan firm, who are still 
the sole producers of shock-absorbers in Kenya For this reason, AVA contractors have had 
problems with this supplier, ranging from frequent price increases to availability. This discontent 
with the perfonnance of single suppliers is a recurrent theme in the problems reported by all the 
companies interviewed, and reinforces the buyers justification for multiple sourcing .. 
ORGANISATION OF PURCHASING ACTIVITIES 
The bulk of A V A's purchasing activities is organised around the importers/franchise holders. This 
section discusses only those activities which AV A purchases directly (see Table 7-9 above). For 
these direct purchases, it is only in the case of paints and Paintshop chemicals that AV A has had 
prolonged interactions with the supplier. The final product is the outcome of a negotiation process 
where specifications are , given to the supplier and continual adjustments made until there is 
consensus on the quality of the product. For the fairly standard items such as oils, lubricants, 
welding materials, and adhesive materials, a routine order is placed for a particular quantity and no 
further interaction takes place until the next order. Hence, products requiring particular 
specifications necessitate frequent interaction between the buyer and supplier, at least for the 
duration of the order, while standardised products do not. 
Transactional dependence 
Another dimension of buyer -supplier relations is transactional dependence, and related bargaining 
power considerations. In order to reduce dependence on anyone supplier, AV A has a policy of 
multiple sourcing. In turn, its suppliers have multiple customers. This strategy reinforces the anns-
length relationship with its suppliers. 
Trading patterns 
As noted above, the trading patterns between AV A and her suppliers are of a 'short-tenn' nature, 
usually lasting the duration of the order until the next lot is required. Even in the case of paint 
procurement, the exchange of infonnation is limited to the duration of the order unless subsequent 
orders carry the same specifications as previous orders, in which case, the knowledge gained in 
these previous relationships is used in the new order. 
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Quality issues 
The question of quality was brought up in all of the three interviews with A V A managers and is a 
constant point of contention between suppliers-assemblers and franchise holders. The whole 
process of quality control is shared between A V A and her contractors. However, the production 
manager at A V A was keen to remark that since the total quality of the vehicle was ultimately the 
responsibility of those who put it together (in this case the assembler), it is critical that they get the 
quality of the inputs right. For this reason, A V A has rigorous quality control procedures when 
materials are received at the plant. Together with a quality officer from the importers finns, 
production engineers at A V A check the quality of the materials delivered by suppliers against 
manufacturers specifications. Discrepancies are reported to both the supplier and the importer. 
Apart from potential delays in the production schedule, A V A does not bear any of the costs of 
reworlcing or replacement of items. This is negotiated between the supplier and the importer. 
It was also found that the manufacturers provide continuous technical guidance and training to 
A V A staff as a strategy for achieving the quality standards they have set, the cost of which is 
borne by the franchise holder. Obviously this cost is eventually transferred to the customer. AV A 
has its own in-house technical improvement programme aimed at improving efficiency and testing 
new approaches to manufacture or adaptation of process, parts and components to Kenyan 
requirements. To this end, in 1987 AV A commissioned a technical development programme 
implemented through A V A Sport, and has since collaborated with Ford Motors on their Sierra 
Cosworth car. Lessons learned in this exercise have since been implemented throughout the plant, 
particularly in worlananship standards. 
Communication with suppliers 
The study also sought to establish the nature of communication and infonnation exchange between 
A V A and its suppliers as an indicator of buyer-supplier relations. Thus related to the issue of 
trading patterns, the extent to which buyers communicate with suppliers, and the extent to which 
information is 'shared' between them were important. As noted in chapter four, it is argued that the 
extent to which finns share infonnation is indicative of the nature of supplier relations - little 
information sharing between buyer and seller designates relations as ACR, hence reduces the 
frequency of inter-finn transactions, while greater infonnation sharing designates relations as more 
OCR It was reported that only that infonnation pertinent to the order, and necessary to meet the 
manufacturers specifications was exchanged between A V A and its suppliers. 
BUYER PERCEPTIONS OF SMES AND BUYER PREFERENCES OF SUPPLIER 
CHARACfERISTICS 
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This study also sought to establish the extent to which large firms (assemblers and importers) were 
willing and able to transact with small firms . It was evident that A VA is more concerned about 
meeting its requirements (reliability, availability, cost and quality) rather than concerned about the 
characteristics of the supplier per se. However, the production manager conceded that although 
they do not buy many of the items directly, they have had problems with the quality of items 
delivered (on behalf of the importers) to the plant. Although this was not stated explicitly, it was 
implied that larger firms are more reliable with respect to quality, prices and availability of 
components. 
AV A managers did not express any specific preference for a particular size or type of supplier so 
long as the products met their cost, quality, availability and reliability requirements. 
FORMING INTER-FIRM LINKAGES WITH SME SUPPLIERS 
In order to establish the attitude of AV A towards inter-firm linkages, particularly with small finns, 
respondents were asked to indicate their opinion about small and medium firms as partners or 
suppliers. The Managing Director noted that as far as A VA is concerned, what matters is the 
quality which a firm can deliver regardless of size. However, he conceded that given the prevailing 
low level of technology in many small firms in Kenya, they are likely to offer lower levels of 
quality than larger, more established firms. He also conceded that in some cases, buyers have little 
option - some components' sectors have predominately small to medium firms. Giving the 
example of radiator companies, he noted that almost all firms in this sector employ fewer than fifty 
people, thus falling in the category of small to medium firms. All buyers in the motor vehicle 
industry are, therefore, compelled to buy from these manufacturers. 
It was also clear from the research that AV A's concern is to maintain a continuous flow of inputs 
to avoid disruptions to the production process. It is argued by the MD, therefore, that if small firms 
are not able to meet volume requirements in addition to particular quality standards, A V A 
management are left with no option but to source from larger finns. In effect, whether A VA uses 
small or large firms largely depends on the ability of the small firms to meet its (A V A's) quality 
and volume requirements. Interestingly, there was no mention, during the interviews, of cost 
differentials between large and small firms. 
In summary, A V A is part of a vertically integrated system of production. The research also reveals 
that it has local limited procurement potential since its contractors control the input procurement 
function except for a limited number of items agreed upon. The research found that the only reason 
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these items are sourced locally is because they are mandated by legislation. The main reason given 
for this limited local sourcing is the limited supplier base. However, A V A has not specific 
programme to develop its suppliers. 
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11 MARSHALLS (EA) LTD. 
BACKGROUND 
Marshalls (EA) Ltd. is one of the thirteen franchise holders in Kenya's motor vehicle industIy, 
having held the Peugeot franchise in Kenya for over 45 years. It became involved in the assembly 
business through part ownership (24.5%) of the AVA assembly plant. This discussion will focus 
on the sourcing behaviour and buyer-supplier relations. 
FORMATION AND OWNERSHIP 
Marshalls Group comprises Marshalls (EA) Ltd. which holds the Peugeot, Volvo earth moving 
equipment and Tata trucks franchises; Doughty Ltd. which holds the Honda franchise; Lucas 
CA V; Bendix Ltd., producing bearings and allied products; Delta Ltd. which supplies Marshalls' 
requirements for vehicle batteries and shock absorbers, and also seIVes the replacement market; 
and Fulmen Batteries producing motor vehicle batteries. However, the Peugeot franchise is the 
group's flag bearer. 
PRODUcrs AND PERFORMANCE 
Marshalls' Peugeot franchise is peIhaps the most 'lucrative' in the Kenyan market with the Peugeot 
404 having the status of the "best selling vehicle ever'56. Peugeot cars have long been associated 
with reliability and cost effectiveness since the first vehicles were imported into Kenya after the 
second world war. Currently, Marshalls offers a range of Peugeot and other vehicles, and also 
motor bicycles and power products through Doughty Ltd. 
All ofMarshalls (EA) products are assembled by AVA (see section I of this case study) in which 
MarshaIls (EA) has a 25 .6% share holding. Together with Toyota Kenya Ltd. Marshalls products 
constitute almost 70% of A V A's production. 
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PRODUCTION ORGANISATION 
PRODUCTIONORGANffiATIONACTIVITY 
Marshalls, unlike GMK and A V A, is an intermediate organisation without assembly fucilities of 
its own (Fig. 7-3). Instead once the CKD kits have been purchased, Marshalls contracts AV A to 
assemble them. Marshalls then markets the vehicles. As noted in Section I above, Marshalls as an 
importer makes all the vital decisions about the importation of CKDs, and acquires other inputs 
locally. 
Table 7-10 Marshalls Product Range and Market Share (1992) 
Type Market Share (in Market Share of 
compatible market) Segment Leader (%) 
(%) 
1. 205 Saloon 23 .4% 56.3% 
2. 504 Saloon 72.1% 72.1% 
3. 405 Saloon 20.0% 72.1% 
4. 504 Estate 64.6% 64.6% 
5.504 P/up Petrol 25.6% 28.4% 
6. 504 PIup Diesel 5.6% 45 .5% 
7. Honda Civic 5.0% 32% 
8. Tata Trucks (15 tons) 9% 35% 
9. Tata Trucks (Ten tons) 11% 28% 
10. Volvo Prime Movers 36% 50% 
Source: FIeld Notes 1992/1993 
Production Activity Flows 
As can be noted from Fig. 7-5 the activity flows show a different pattern from that of GMK and 
AV A. Although Marshalls has a share holding interest in the assembler, the input procurement, 
assembly , and distribution activities are separated. 
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SOURCING ACTIVITY 
SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
Marshalls outsources its requirements from three main sources. Approximately 60% comes in as a 
CKD kit; foreign manufacturers of components supply about 15%; its local sister companies 
supply about 15%; while local independent suppliers supply about 10%. Like other assemblers 
and franchise holders, the bulk of this comes in the fonn of CKD kits . Table 7-11 indicates 
outsourced items and their suppliers. 
Input Procurement 
(Marshalls) 
( CKD) (Local) 
Fig 7-5 Activity Flows - Marshalls (EA) Ltd. 
Marketing and Distribution 
( Marshalls Branches) 
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Table 7-11 Marsha/ls - Outsourced Inputs and Suppliers (1992) 
Item Supplier (Size) Ownership lAnk with 
Marshalls 
1. CKD kits Automobiles Peugeot (AP) Principals 
2. Tyres and Tubes Firestone (Large monopoly) None 
3. Batteries Delta (Medimn) Marshalls Group 
4. Glass lmpala Glass (Large monopoly) None 
5. Fuels Esso Petrol Stations (Large) MarshallsDea1er 
6. Wiring Harnesses Antosprings Ltd. (Medium) None 
7. Radiators African Radiators (Small-Medium) Marshalls Group 
8. Shock Absorbers Delta Ltd.(Medium) Marshalls Group 
9. Advertising Scan Ad Ltd. (Medium) None 
10. Quality Control Quality Control Audit Team (AP) Principal 
11. Security services Kali Guards (Medium) None 
12. Laundry White Rose (Medium) None 
Source: Field Notes (1992/1993) 
Unlike GMK and AV A, Marshalls appears to retain one supplier for most items. As can be noted 
from Table 7-11 four of the 12 items are sourced from Marshalls' sister companies through 
internal transfers. The MD saw this as a prudent move since Marshalls needs to support sister 
companies within the group for the benefit of the company. However, such internal transfers do 
not mean that Marshalls is not concerned about competitiveness. According to the Managing 
Director, all sister companies compete with other producers, particularly in the replacement 
market, hence they are viewed by management to be competitive. 
Like GMK and A V A, Marshalls outsources only those items listed in the legal notices. 
MOTIV ATIONS FOR SOURCING BmA VIOUR 
The main motivation for outsourcing by Marshalls is the lack of capacity to produce its own inputs 
and can, therefore, be associated with necessity. Secondly, Marshalls managers reported that 
because of the Legal Notice requirements, they have had to procure inputs from local £inns rather 
than have the eKD kit supplied complete. 
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FACTORS INFLUENCING SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
It is noted above that soureing activity outside the mandated items is minimal . As with AV A, 
managers at Marshalls reported that one reason for soureing some of these items locally is 
compliance with government regulations as this meant that access to foreign exchange could be 
guaranteed in the future. In addition, since Marshalls is essentially a 'distributor', it lacks the 
capacity to produce in-house. Hence, its managers consider backward vertical integration to be a 
rational decision. The MD remarlced that as a distributor, Marshalls would be vulnerable if it did 
not have a stake in the assembly and components sectors. He further argued that vulnerability 
arose from the fact that "you would never know when you are going to be hit!", presumably by 
suppliers [or assembler] not delivering for a variety of reasons. In essence, Marshalls has 
integrated vertically as an assurance against opportunistic behaviour by suppliers, in addition to 
work stoppage caused by 'genuine' problems. 
Several specific factors emerge from the interviews with Marshalls managers. 
Quality of local products 
Like GMK and A V A, Marshalls' concern with the quality of its final products makes this its 
primaIy concern in reaching decisions about sourcing - about the supplier, and whether to source 
locally or from abroad. According to one Marshalls manager, this objective has motivated the 
company to engage in its own production of vital components such as shock absorbers. Two 
factors were mentioned as important in this decision: due to poor technology, local suppliers 
cannot meet th.e high standards demanded by Marshalls' franchisors; many of the potential 
suppliers are small or medium companies which would not singly provide all of Marshalls' 
requirements. Although in-house manufacture of batteries was motivated by profits to be gained 
from the 'replacement' matket, Fulmen batteries are quickly beginning to be considered one of the 
quality benclnruu:ks for Marshalls products. Clearly, Marshalls obtains most items as part of the 
CKD kit, and those sourced locally are sourced within the group of companies. 
Frequency of engineering and model changes 
Like GMK, Marshalls managers viewed the effect of frequent changes of makes and models as a 
limitation to the extent to which local suppliers can meet its (Marshalls') quality and delivery 
expectations. Marshalls managers considerthe deletion of parts and components from the CKD kit 
a "waste of time" in the prevailing circumstances (principal suppliers are not willing to make 
significant deductions from the cost of the kit). 
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It was also argued by one manager that because suppliers have to deal with such frequent changes, 
their ability to 'specialise' is limited, thus undermining quality levels. 
Access to foreign exchange 
Like GMK and A V A, access to foreign exchange was reported to introduce uncertainty into the 
company's supply chain. Because of limitations of foreign exchange, sister companies supplying 
Marshalls have had difficulties in filling their orders. It was estimated that the sister companies 
which supply Marshalls on average use about 60% imported materials . Hence, "given the choice", 
remaIked one manager, "we would rather buy a complete kit. At least we are allocated foreign 
exchange to buy CKDs albeit on a rather uncertain basis, but the smaller suppliers have no way of 
accessing it". 
Cost of materials 
Like GMK and AV A, Marshalls reported the frequently escalating cost of inputs sourced locally, 
particularly from those suppliers outside the Marshalls group. For example, a manager estimated 
that the cost of tyres and tubes had gone up by about 3040% between 1991 and 1992. Although 
much of these price increases could be attributed, partly, to the declining strength of the Kenya 
Shilling, Marshalls perceived some elements of increases in various suppliers as 'opportunistic'. 
It was also clear that because Marshalls does not have a specific multiple sourcing policy (unlike 
GMK and A V A), the retention of single suppliers contributed to this concern about frequent 
increases of the costs of local inputs. 
Organisational policy and strategy 
Unlike GMK, and like AV A, Marshalls does not have a specific policy to develop local suppliers. 
Besides, given that Marshalls is part of a group of companies, it is in its interests to integrate both 
vertically and horizontally within the group in order to retain markets and to access resources. 
BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONS 
SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT ACTIVTIY 
Unlike GMK, Marshalls does not have a supplier development programme. Suppliers of products 
not supplied by sister companies, are appointed and retained for the duration of the order, but the 
practice has been to retain suppliers for repeat orders even though there is no guarantee for future 
orders. 
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Like GMK and A V A, Marshalls provides suppliers with manufucturer's specifications for all its 
vehicles. In tllli; respect there is some technology transfer. The principal suppliers also provide 
training teams to assist the assembler, and Marshalls has a Quality Control officer stationed in the 
assembler's plant. However, with regard to suppliers outside the Marshalls Group, there was no 
evidence of technical assistance and training from Marshalls. A probable explanation for this is 
that Marshalls do not have the engineering capability to provide such assistance. 
Contracts 
No contracts are made between Marshalls and its suppliers outside the group. An order is made 
when components are required in the production chain (usually with a lead-time of two weeks to 
one month depending on the component type and quantities required) . Given that many of 
Marshalls' suppliers are sister companies, there is constant communication between them, and 
Marshalls orders have priority status. 
Transaction dependence 
Managers at Marshalls estimate that their suppliers have an average dependency rate of upto 40% 
on the new vehicle market while the replacement market takes 60%. On the other hand, because 
Marshalls has no production facility of its own, it completely depends on its suppliers. Asalready 
stated, Marshalls locally sources approximately 25% of its requirements (l5% from sister 
companies and about 10% from independent local suppliers). However, because it retains one 
supplier in most cases, it is dependent it has a high dependency on its suppliers. In at least two 
cases (tyres and tubes, and glass), the dependence was reported to be 100% because of the 
monopoly status of the supplier of those particular products. 
Trading patterns 
Like in the case of A V A and unlike GM!(, trading patterns between Marshalls and its independent 
(not belonging to the Marshalls Group) suppliers are of a short-tenn nature, usually lasting the 
duration of the order. According to Sako's typology tllli; denotes a more ACR than OCR 
relationship. There was little evidence of more exchange of infonnation other than that contained 
in the specifications. 
Quality issues 
Quality control is perhaps the most important concern at Marshalls. Apart from the quality 
assurance by A V A (the assembler), Marshalls have their own Quality Control officer at the 
assembly plant. It was noted in the discussion regarding A V A that the ultimate responsibility lies 
with the franchise holder and marketer of the vehicle - in this case, Marshalls. 
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Communication with suppliers 
Because of its co-ordinative role in the chain, Marshalls has frequent communication with 
suppliers, usually to check on the progress of production. However, onlyinfonnation relating to a 
particular order is exchanged between the companies. Because it is often necessary for Marshalls 
officers to know why orders have been delayed or why quality is not upto par, more infonnation 
was given by the supplier than by Marshalls. For example when an order for wiring harnesses was 
delayed, Marshalls managers telephoned the supplier seeking an explanation for the delay, and 
how the suppliers' management were dealing with the problem. In the process, considerable 
amounts of infonnation was released to Marshalls. Marshalls managers did not feel under 
obligation to offer any infonnation outside that relating to how this delay was affecting the 
production chain. 
FORMING INTER-FIRM RELATIONSIllPS WITH SMALL FIRMS 
This study intended to examine the willingness and propensity of finns to fonn inter-finn 
relationships, particularly with small finns . The concept of inter-finn relations refers to the extent 
to which the finn (or establishment) uses relationships rather than its own installations to provide 
its requirements. This includes sub-contracting relationships, joint ventures, and others. In 
response to a question about buying from small finns, the MD at Marshal1s noted that while in 
principal Marshalls has no objection to trading with small finns, they (such small finns) do not 
meet the quality and reliability standards demanded by Marshalls. He further rugued that when 
dealing with small finns, their low technological and managerial capabilities render the outcome 
of their general standards relatively lower than intemally expected. In this respect, large and 
medium finns are still very much the most rational option for Marshalls - "unless, of course, one 
can make investments in in-house production" (MD), which is the option that Marshalls has taken 
in six cases of components' supply. However, he conceded that future company decisions could 
shift sourcing activity towards smaller finns. 
BUYER PERCEPTIONS OF SME SUPPLIERS 
BUYER PREFERENCES ABOUT SUPPLIERS 
Managers at Marshalls indicated that they prefer to contract with large and medium businesses, 
and usually do so. However, in some cases, usually where there are few alternative supplier finns 
to choose from, they contract with smaller finns. The reasons given for preferring large and 
medium finns include the following. (i) Large finns are better equipped to provide the quality of 
products Marshalls needs; (ii) buying from large finns means that they can deal with large 
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volumes, and are, therefore, likely to supply the quantity demanded; (ill) large firms are more 
likely to charge lower prices if they produce high enough volumes to yield lower unit costs. 
However, it was also reported that Marshalls is beginning to seek out smaller suppliers because 
they are more likely to be more flexible than the larger companies, and can accommodate changes 
in schedules, prices and specifications more readily. According to the MD, it is also becoming 
apparent that smaller firms in Kenya are more innovative as they are not restricted by installation 
of 'specialised' machinery, and many years of ingrained production practices. They are, therefore, 
more likely to provide for Marshalls' need in the future . Another reason given for possible 
considerntion of small firms is that Marshalls managers feel that when buying from small finns in 
Kenya, the larger buyer has more bargaining power over the smaller finn and for this reason will 
prefer to deal with this size of finn. The deciding factor in this case is the dependency of the 
supplier on the buyer. However, other factors are important in this decision. For example, mangers 
believe that the small finn has to have the technological and managerial capability to meet the 
quality standards required by such a buyer. 
209 
III TOYOTA KENYA LTD. 
BACKGROUND 
FORMATION AND OWNERSHIP 
Toyma Kenya Ltd. (Toyota) is considered the flagship of the Motor Mart Group, a holding 
company incoIporated in Kenya to deal with motor vehicle distribution and engineering. Motor 
Mart is a subsidiary of Lonhro East Africa Ltd. In 1992, it accounted for about 50% of all the 
Motor Mart Group's businesses, and in 1990, the Toyota make of vehicle had the largest marlret 
share in the industry (19%). The other divisions in the group include Kenya Motors, who hold the 
FIAT franchise; Bruce Trucks and Equipment, who handle the heavy commercial vehicles and 
equipment, including the Mitsubishi Fuso Trucks franchise; Yamaha Motors, who hold the 
Yamaha franchise in Kenya; Fann Machinery Distributors, who distribute Massey FeIgUSon 
tractors; and Bums and Blane Engineering, who manufacture radiators for the local market. This 
latter subsidiary supplies its sister companies with radiators for locally assembled vehicles, and 
spare parts for the replacement market for a variety of makes and models. The Motor Mart Group 
is the local holder of the largest number of franchises in Kenya The group contracts A V A, in 
which it holds a 24.5% share, to assemble its vehicles. 
PRODUCTS AND PERFoRMANCE 
Toyota vehicles are a popular make in the small saloon car segment in Kenya, but their market 
leadership is in the Pick-up Diesel modeL Table 7-12 shows the perfonnance and maIket share of 
Toyota products in Kenya Clearly, in the selected year, Toyota led the market in only one 
category of vehicles - the light commercial vehicle. 
PRODUCfION ORGANISATION 
As indicated above, Toyota is a motor vehicle dealer within the Motor Mart Group which has a 
variety of interests in the motor vehicle industry. Its main mandate is the marketing and 
distribution of Toyota products. Other sister companies within the same Group hold other 
franchises such as FIAT and Yamaha 
PRODUCTION ACTIVITY FLows 
The production activity flows at Toyota are similar to those observed at Marshalls (see Fig. 7-2) . 
Toyota buys CKDs from suppliers abroad (see the various franchises), and also buys local inputs. 
These are delivered directly to A VA in Mombasa for assembly. They are then transported to the 
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various Motor Mart Group distribution outlets in Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Kisumu and Eldoret 
(see Appendix G for location of towns on the map of Kenya). 
Table 7-12 
(1991) 
Products and Market Share - Toyota Kenya lid 
Vehicle Make Market Share Market Share 
Toyota (%) (Segment Mkt. 
Leader - %) 
1. Toyota Sixteen 13%* 41% 
2. Toyota Corolla 90 15% 32% 
3. Toyota Corolla 90 Estate 14% 50% 
4. Toyota Land Cruiser 1% 46% 
5. Toyota Hilux DC 3% 46% 
6. Toyota Hilux PlUp Petrol 18.4% 30.4% 
7. Toyota Hilux PfUp Diesel 54.3% 54.3% 
8. Hiace Mini bus 28% 69% 
9. 3tonDYNA 5% 44% 
10. 7 ton Fuso Trucks 3% 63% 
11. Ten ton Trucks 1% 29% 
* These figures are derived from sales in comparnble IDaIket segments. For 
example, while the Fuso Trucks had a 3% and 1% market share in their segments, 
their combined share in the trucks sector was 39%. 
Source: FleldNotes 1992/1993 
SOURCING ACTMTY 
SOURCING BmA VIOUR 
Toyota's sourcing behaviour is similar to that observed at Marshalls. First, there is a high level of 
internction with sister companies, particularly Bums and Blane Ltd., a Kenyan medium sized 
subsidiary of the Motor Mart Group, which supplies all of Toyota's radiator requirements. 
Secondly, Toyota retains one supplier for most of its inputs. Finally, many of its suppliers also 
supply other ftanchise holders. However, this does not imply that there is an explicit agreement to 
use the same sources. Table 7-13 below shows the outsourced inputs. 
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Table 7-13 Outsourced Items and Suppliers - Toyota (1992) 
Item Supplier (and size) % of 
Requirements 
1. Tyres and Tubes Firestone Ltd. (Large monopoly) 100% 
2. Batteries Delta (Medium) 100% 
3. Seats Megh Cushions (also Silentnigbt since 90-100% 
1992) (Large) 
4. Soft trims Megh Cushions Ltd. (discontinued 90-95% 
Silentnight Ltd) (Large) 
5. Radiators Bums and Blane (Medium) 100% 
6. Windscreen and door glass lmpala Glass Industries Ltd. (Large 80% 
monopoly) 
7. SpaIk Plugs Car and General (sole producers in 100% 
Kenya) 
8. Wiring Harnesses Autospring Manufg. Ltd. (Medium) 80% 
9. Leaf Springs Antopsring Manufg. Ltd. (Medium) 70-80% 
10. Jacks Autospring Manufg. Ltd. (Medium) 100% 
11. Shackle pins Autospring Manufg. Ltd. (Medium) 100% 
12. Brake pads 1. Varsani Brakelinings (Small/medium) 60%} 90% 
2. RB Shaw (Medium) (used only 30%} 
occasionally) 
13. Airfilters Autoparts (EA) (smaWmedium) 100% 
14. Exhaust systems Bums and Blane (Medium) 90-100% 
15. Radio Cassettes Stenerotte and Radio (Medium) 90% 
16. Rubber Bushes and foam Rubber Products (Small) }70-80% 
Strips Foam Plastics (Medium) } 
17. Speedometer cables Express MoIpets (Small/medium) 90% 
18. Tool kit items Venus Industries (Medium) 100% 
19. Jack handle e~1ension Autospring Manufg. (Medium) 100% 
20. Radiator Brackets and Autospring Manufg. (Medium) 90% 
Inserts 
21. Battery tray Fibreglass and General Ltd. (Medium) 100% 
22. Shock Absorbers Hill Products (Medium) 100% 
23 . Spare wheel camer and AVA(Large) 100% 
brackets 
24. Assembly AVA(Large) 80% 
25. Oils, greases and fuels - 100010 
Source: Fudd Notes (199211993) 
Like the preceding cases, Toyota outsources only those products listed in the Legal Notices. It is 
also evident that Toyota retains one supplier in most cases, but has alternative suppliers whom 
they use from time to time, particularly when their main supplier has difficulties delivering. One of 
the reasons for this is that having one main supplier reassures the buyer of dedicated service from 
that supplier. Having said that, Toyota has alternative suppliers, "just in case", suggesting an 
inherent uncertainty about the reliability of anyone supplier. The same manager remarlced that 
volumes required by Toyota make it "senseless" to have more than one main supplier 
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"it simply adds to the final costs of the vehicle. You have [to] order twice. Then you 
have to co-ordinate the delivery to A V A from two or several other companies. Then 
you have to prepare payment documents to several companies. With the volumes we 
have, it is just not worth it! 11 
Currently Toyota have a total of 24 suppliers (including the assembler, A VA). In addition, almost 
all of the services (including transport, laundry, catering, distribution, and advertising) are 
provided in-house or by the holding company (which outsources about 30% of its services), and 
other sister companies. Consequently, one manager estimated that about 10-20% of service 
requirements are bought in, but this tends to be from large, established companies rather than from 
small finns. 
MOTIV ATIONS FOR SOURClNG BEHAVIOUR 
As in the cases of GMK, A V A, and Marshalls, a manager explained that the most important factor 
motivating Toyota's sourcing behaviour (outsourcing) is the legal requirement to outsource certain 
items from the local ID.aIket. However, it was evident from the interviews that like other franchise 
holders, Toyota would rather procure complete CKD kits from their principals. It was argued that 
the local suppliers do not meet the quality and reliability standards expected by Toyota 
manufacturers. According to one manager interviewed 
"it was in this light that we considered producing our own radiators. This way, we can 
assure the quality of our vehicles. In turn, we avoid those expensive warranty costs 
caused by poor quality products from local suppliers" . 
Hence, it appears that the motivations for outsourcing are related to the factors inhibiting local 
sourcing. These are mainly related to the quality of suppliers and their ability to deliver Toyota's 
requirements in the expected 'state'. More specifically, the factors outlined below were stated as 
influencing the sourcing behaviour at Toyota. Evidently, these factors are similar to those stated in 
preceding cases. 
FACTORS INFLUENCING SOURClNG BEHAVIOUR 
The following factors were cited by Toyota managers as influencing their sourcing behaviour, in 
this case, a predominately outsourcing behaviour with a preference for procuring all inputs as part 
of the CKD kit. 
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Availability of Suppliers 
It was argued that because the Kenyan industrial sector is still relatively undeveloped, it is difficult 
to find suppliers for most products. A remade from one of the managers succinctly paints the 
scenario: 
"Toyota literally has no option in some sub-sectors. There are just no suppliers. Take 
for example the case of wiring harnesses. There are perhaps only one or two producers 
in this country. Autospring Manufucturing Ltd. are a virtual monopoly in this sector. 
How do you make choices to buy locally, or even from small suppliers when they do 
not exist! 
This factor was closely linked to the issue of quality discussed in the next section. 
Quality of Suppliers 
Toyota's managers eA-pressed their concern about the quality of local suppliers, arguing that 
because of low technological and managerial competence, many suppliers are unable to supply the 
quality of products required by Toyota manufacturers. In addition, local suppliers often use 
obsolete methods of production, with poor quality control procedures. As a result, Toyota would 
prefer not to take chances with the quality of its final products. This coincides with the arguments 
cited by GMK, A V A, and Marshalls presented in preceding sections. It was further argued that it 
is these general weaknesses in the capacities of local suppliers which make it imperative for 
Toyota to consider sourcing from foreign sources. One manager remarlced, "if we could assure 
ourselves that local. suppliers can meet our quality requirements, we would source most inputs 
locally". 
Frequency of Engineering and Model Changes 
Like GMK, A V A, and Marshalls, Toyota cited the problems of frequent model changes as 
hampering the ability of local suppliers to become specialised enough to match the quality 
required by Toyota manufacturers. As argued by one manager, this is complicated by the fact that 
local suppliers tend to procure equipment from second-hand marlcets abroad with little assessment 
of the needs of the local. marlcet. As a result, when makes and models change, the new (and more 
challenging) engineering requirements become too challenging for them (small, local. suppliers). 
Access to Foreign Exchange 
Again, the lack of foreign exchange for the procurement of inputs for component manufacture was 
cited by Toyotamanagers. It was noted that the local components industry is heavily dependent on 
imported materials (estimated at 60-70%), some of which have import restrictions. Coupled with 
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the scarcity offoreign exchange at the time of the current study, this was seen as one of the reasons 
why local firms could not provide the quality and volume levels that assemblers needed. 
Like GMK, Toyota managers reported that the fluctuations in the availability of foreign exchange, 
in addition to cunency fluctuations, have introduced a high level of variability in component 
prices. It was noted that many inputs had increased in price by upto 30% between 1989 and 1990, 
and by about 40-50% between 1990-1991 . 
Volume Levels 
Another fuctor cited by Toyota is the ability of local suppliers to supply the volume required for 
the new vehicle (Original Equipment) and replacement maIkets. h was argued that many small 
suppliers are not able to meet the volume levels required by Toyota. Whereas the absolute 
numbers required for assembly activities is not very huge (considering that for example, in 1991 
6,600 passenger vehicles were assembled in Kenya), many of the components manufacturers 
supply several importers/franchise holders at the same time. In addition, these same producers 
supply the replacement maIket Cumulatively, therefore, the volumes are far higher than can be 
handled by the suppliers. 
On another level, the variety of makes and models which have different specifications, make it 
difficult for suppliers to 'build' adequate volumes for full production runs. Making an assessment 
of the situation, one manager noted that "when an order is given, the supplier tries to fill that order. 
Many times, there's no question of efficient production runs. What matters to the supplier is to fill 
the order!" Consequently, he added, production is not efficient, and accruing costs are ultimately 
transferred to the customer. 
Cost of local inputs 
As in the cases of A V A, GMK and Marshalls, the cost of local inputs was cited by Toyota as 
affecting the viability of local sources. It was argued that suppliers were suffering from double 
taxation in many cases. Because they use a considerable proportion of imported materials, they 
pay duties and taxes on materials. In addition, they often have to buy small quantities of local 
inputs and therefore often obtain them from retailers or wholesalers rather than from the 
manufacturer. In this way they are charged higher prices including VAT and other sales taxes paid 
on these materials. Given these high costs, it is more expensive for Toyota to procure inputs 
locally, hence the preference for importing as complete a CKD as they possibly can. 
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Deletion penaJties 
Toyota managers also cited the problem of deletion penalties imposed by the franchisors when 
items are excluded from the CKD kit. It is cugued by manufacturers that these penalties aim to 
reduce the extent to which the manufacturing process is disrupted through non-standard procedures 
such as removing items from a component or sub-assembly. On the other hand, many importers 
and governments in importing countries perceive this as a conspiracy to keep the importing 
countries dependent on the exporters, reducing the ability of importers to build their own 
manufacturing capacities for vehicles (Doner, 1993). Having said that, managers at Toyota noted 
that while deletion penalties have led them to source from foreign suppliers, the lead-time and 
foreign exchange problems involved in the importation of CKD kits make it economically prudent 
to source locally "if only the suppliers were available and could meet our needs" . 
Single sourcing 
As with A V A, GMK and Marshalls, Toyota managers cited the problem of single soureing, 
particularly from monopoly suppliers, as posing an additional cost problem to the company. It was 
argued that Toyota, like all franchise holders, is not in a position to bargain with monopoly 
suppliers. In addition, as was noted above, Toyota adopts the policy of retaining one main supplier 
for each input although an alternative supplier is kept 'handy' with occasional orders. Because of a 
single sourcing policy, Toyota have few assurances against price increases or other opportunistic 
behaviour by suppliers. 
Organisational Policy and Strategy 
Like A VA and Marshalls, and unlike GMK., Toyota has no specific policy to develop suppliers 
nor does it have a specified commitment to source locally. Being essentially a distributor, its aim 
is to make the most profitable business decisions. In this case, and under the prevailing 
circumstances, the decisions do not favour local sourcing, particularly from small components and 
service producers. 
BUYER-SUPPLIER RELA nONS 
Based on Sako's typology, buyer-supplier relations between Toyota and her suppliers can be 
described as ACR Toyota has no particular commitment to her suppliers, except perhaps, fur 
Bums and Blane (which is a sister company). Even then, little is done by Toyota to develop it. 
This is done at group level, with engineering and technical assistance provided for the company. 
No parallel assistance is given to other suppliers. This can be attributed to the ACR relations 
between Toyota and her suppliers. The following factors describe the nature of these relations. 
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SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY 
Unlike GMK, and like A V A and Marshalls, Toyota does not have specific supplier development 
activities. There is nei1her a programme in place nor intended in 1he near future. 
Contracting 
There were no written contracts between Toyota and her supplier, many of the inputs being 
produced on order only. Hence, 1here are no long-tenn contractual relations between Toyota and 
her suppliers. However, this lack of contracts does not imply that oral communication is used 
instead (as in OCR relations). A Local Purchase Order (LPO) is used to prompt production of a 
particular order. This coincides with the findings at GMK, AV A, and Marshalls. 
Transaction Dependence 
Toyota depend on local suppliers for about 40% of their requirements, with the balance being 
imported. On the other hancL their suppliers generally supply o1her franchise holders, and also 1he 
replacement market. 
Trading Patterns 
Except for their sister company, Bums and Blane, Toyota does not have long-tenn contracts with 
its suppliers, and no repeat orders are assured. In 1992 for example, Toyota changed its supplier 
for soft trims from Silentnight to Megh Cushions Ltd .. Reasons given for this shift included high 
prices, poor quality, poor production scheduling, lack of specia1isation, and poor after-sales 
service. Clearly, any number of issues is capable of triggering a withdrawal by a buyer. 
Quality issues 
Toyota's quality assurance procedures resemble those at A VA and Marshalls. Because the final 
quality of 1he product ultimately rests with the distributor (Toyota), quality control engineers 
'follow' products from the supplier's factory, to the assemblers plant. Hence, quality inspection 
starts with the suppliers but is e»..1ended to the assembler's plant. However, the cost of defective 
components rests wi1h the supplier. 
Communication with Suppliers 
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BUYER PERCEPTIONS OF SME SUPPLIERS 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLIERS 
Table 7-13 shows that a large proportion of Toyota's suppliers are medium sized finns. Toyota 
managers view this as the result of a lack of 'good quality' small finns, and on the other hand, the 
avoidance of the components subsectors by large firms. Hence, outsourcing from medium finns 
arises as a compromise given the quality and availability of suppliers in the Kenyan economy. 
PREFERRED CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLIERS 
As noted in the preceding paragraph, managers at Toyota would rather buy from large and 
medium enteIpnses. This finding was also reported for the A V A and Marshalls cases. In the case 
of GMK, while they accepted the ease of trading with larger firms, they perceived future 
productivity increases coming fonn relationships with smaller finns. 
FORMING INTER-FIRM RELA TIONSlllPS WITH SMALL FIRMS 
Inter-finn relationships with small firms are evident as they are at Marshalls only to the extent that 
there are no other suppliers within the sector. Toyota managers conceded that they prefer large and 
medium suppliers because of their ability to meet quality and volume requirements, and are 
generally "more reliable" than smaller suppliers. 
Having said that, it was evident that given the monopoly status of many of the large suppliers in 
Kenya, which allows them considerable bargaining power, managers at Toyota are willing to 
procure from smaller finns. They argue that smaller firms are easier to 'manage' in the sense that 
they are more flexible, and more willing to meet the fluctuations in orders brought about by 
frequent changes in makes and models. However, this 'willingness to relate with small finns is 
currently made difficult by the perceived weaknesses of the small firms . This finding is similar to 
that found in the AV A and Marshalls cases. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This case study has described the production and sourcing activities of AV A, and two of its main 
contractors (Marshalls (EA) Ltd. and Toyota (K) Ltd.). It has shown that the sourcing activities at 
A V A are limited to a few items they are 'allowed' by the Importer-Assembler agreement to source 
on behalf of importers. As a result, the bulk of the sourcing decisions are made by the 
importers/franchise holders. It also shows that the level of outsourcing is restricted to the items 
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Generally, this model differs from the GMK model with respect to soureing behaviour, and the 
nature of buyer -supplier relations. While GMK has supplier development programmes, A V A does 
not. This can be attributed to the 'commercial' orientation of the franchise holders who are the 
decision makers at A V A. 
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CASE THREE 
KENYA VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS LTD. (KVM) 
mTRODUCTIONANDBACKGROUND 
This case describes and analyses the activities of the third assembler in the Kenyan motor vehicle 
industry, Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers Ltd. (KVM). The presentation of this case is similar to the 
presentation adopted for A V A in the previous section because of similarities in production 
organisation. KVM is a contract assembler whose activities and decisions are tied to those of its 
franchise holders, hence two of these will be presented alongside it. DT Dobie Ltd. and Cooper 
Motor Corporation (CMC) are presented as embedded case studies. Together, these franchise 
holders constitute the largest proportion ofKVM's activities. 
The case will be divided into three parts, each presenting each case study (or embedded case 
study). In addition, the presentation will make comparisons with the AV A and GMK case studies 
where they coincide or differ in order to minimise detail . 
I KENYA VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS LTD. 
BACKGROUND 
FORMATION AND OWNERSHIP 
Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers was incorporated in July 1974 as Leyland Kenya Ltd., a subsidiary 
of British Leyland of Britain. Through a special resolution by shareholders, the company changed 
its n3l.1le in May 1989 to its current name. Interestingly, KVM was the first vehicle assembly plant 
to be incorporated in Kenya However, its assembly activities began at about the S3I.1le time as the 
other assemblers, with its first production in August 1976. 
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In 1992, KYM's investment in buildings stood at K£4.7 million57, on land covering about 40 
acres. At this time, installed capacity was 6,600 vehicles per anmnn with assembly being 
organised on contract basis. However, since inception KVM, like the other assemblers have not 
utilised their full capacity. This has continued to deteriorate in the fuce of competition from 
cheaper, imported completely built vehicles among other industry problems. For example, prior to 
the extreme industry problems in 1992 and 1993, KVM produced at 74% capacity on a one shift 
basis. By 1992, production had dropped to just over 30%. 
KVM's ownership structure is similar to that reported for A V A. The Government of Kenya has 
been the majority shareholder since its establishment, and upto the time the study was undertaken 
(l992/1993), but plans were underway to divest from the motor vehicle industry. Table 7-14 
shows the equity distribution. It was evident that this share holding structure was reflected in the 
boardroom. It is CMC and DT Dobie who implicitly influence decisions related to various aspects 
at the KVM plant. 
Table 7-14 Ownership Structure-
KVM (1992/1993) 
Kenya Government 35% 
CMC Holdings Ltd. 32.5% 
DT Dobie & Co. Ltd. 32.5% 
PRODUCTS AND PERFORMANCE 
The plant was originally designed to produce light and heavy cornmercial vehicles including Land 
Rovers, Range Rovers, Yolks Wagen micro-buses, Leyland trucks and buses. In 1986, KVM 
moved into passenger vehicle assembly together with other actors in the industry. In 1992, KVM 
was producing upto 47 different makes and models, reporting an average production of 3,000 
vehicles in 1992, and approximately 2,000 vehicles in 1993. This low perfonnance was attributed 
to the depressed local economy, but more to the scarcity of foreign exchange in Kenya. Table 7-15 
indicates the various franchises and :types of vehicles assembled at KVM. 
57. One K£=KShs.20. The exchange rate of the Kenya Shilling to the Pound currently averages one 
hundred shillings. 
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Table 7-15 Franchises and vehicle types - KVM (1992/1993) 
Franchise holder/distributor Vehicle Type 
Cooper Motor CoIpOI'3tion 1. Suzuki 580 
2. Mitsubishi Pajero 
3. Suzuki Jeep 4 WD 
4. L 300 Pick-up 
5. Land Rover 
6. Leyland DAF trucks & Buses 
7. NlSsan trucks (7,8,9,14,15, and 45 
tons) 
8. 67 Seater buses 
HughesLtd. 1. Mazda 323 (saloons and estates) 
2. 4 ton trucks 
3. B 1600 pick/up (l ton) 
4. 4 ton Cab T 1400 
DT Dobie (K) Lld. 1. NISSaIl Stmny 
2. E-23 minibus 
3. Datsun 112 ton pick-up 
4. Sahara d-21 pick-up (4WD) 
5. 3 ton Nissan trucks and buses 
6. Mercedes trucks 
Simba Colt Ltd. 1. Canter (434) 
2. Double Wheel Volkswagen Kombi 
Source: Fzeld Notes (199211993) 
PRODUCTION ORGANISATION 
Like A V A, KVM is otganised around the assembly activity (see fig. 7-3). Other activities enter the 
assembly process at different levels. For example, materials come in from the franchise holders 
directly to the plant, while both in-house and outsourced services are also applied to it at this level. 
KVM buys-in security, insurance, laundry and about 50% of legal services. Transportation of 
CKDs and related inputs are the responsibility of the franchise holder. 
ORGANffiATIONOFPRODUCTIONA~ 
KVM has 5 flexible production lines, with an average of six workstations on each line. Like the 
other assemblers already discussed, KVM managers argue that this flexibility is made necessary 
by the large number of makes and models being assembled at KVM. 
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PRODUCTION ACI1VITY FLows 
Production activity flows are similar to those of GMK and A V A. Similar to what occurs at A V A, 
CKDs arrive in a relatively 'complete' state, requiring few other inputs. They then enter the 
production line going through similar stages as identified in the case of A VA (Fig 7-4). 
SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
SOURClNG AcTIVITY 
Due to its assembler status, KVM does not source CKDs which, as stated, are sourced by the 
importer/distributors. However, a small range of inputs Cconsumables1 are sourced by KVM. 
Except paints, chemicals, and oils and fuels, all other inputs procured directly by KVM are not 
direct materials. This can be explained by the Importer-Assembler agreement which only allows 
KVM to purchase agreed inputs. 
It is also evident from the table that like other players in the industry, KVM retains more than one 
supplier for most items, although they generally have a 'preferred' supplier for most items. This 
characteristic extends into the buyer-supplier relations with her suppliers. While there have been 
no overt 'unpleasant episodes' with her suppliers, KVM managers noted that they were aware that 
some suppliers are uneasy about this fonn of relationship. 
An interesting and unexpected finding is that many of KVM's suppliers are small or medium 
enterprises. KVM managers provided two explanations for this phenomenon: (i) the nature of the 
inputs purchased from small or medium enterprises were required in small quantities and hence 
could not be procured from large firms. Consequently, because requirements have to be 'spread' 
over a number of suppliers, the quantities are only viable for smaller enterprises.; (ii) for about 
70% of the items, only small suppliers exist, hence there's no option. However, like all other 
assemblers the main inputs were procured from medium or large firms. For example, paints were 
procured from the large paint manufacturers. The remaining items were procured from laIge 
monopolies (i.e. electricity, water, telephone services, etc.). 
MOTIV ATIONS FOR SOURClNG BEBA VIOUR 
As noted above, for those items that KVM has jurisdiction to source, all of those sourced locally 
are those contained in the Legal Notices. No items outside this list are outsourced. Like in the case 
of A V A and her contractors, KVM is 'forced' to source locally by government regulation. It was 
also reported that KVM does not have the capacity to provide many of the inputs due to a lack of 
in-house capacity, particularly for services such as security, etc. An interesting finding regarding 
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services is that KVM originally had an internal security service but had decided to 'faun' it out, 
according to the Company Secretary, ''to those whose primary business is to protect others" . This 
argument is in addition to the perceived high cost of in-house capacity given that the low 
frequency of transactions does not warrant such investments. 
The following factors were cited as influencing sourcing behaviour. 
FACTORS INFLUENCING SOURClNG BmA VIOUR 
Like A V A, KVM's soureing behaviour is circumscribed by the Assembler-Importer agreement 
which allows the assembler to source only some items. The following factors relate to those inputs 
and services which KVM can source. As will be evident, many of these factors are similar to those 
cited by GMK, Marshalls, Toyota and AV A. 
Table 7-16 Outsourced items and suppliers - KVM (1991) 
Item Source (Size of supplier) 
Paints 1. Sadolins Paints (44%)} 
2. Twiga paints (48%) } Large 
3. Bergerpaints (8%) } 
Fuels and oils 1. Caltex (K) Ltd.(Large) 
2. Brake Fluids (K) Ltd. (Medium) 
Chemicals 1. Henk.el (K) Ltd (Large) 
2. Diversy 
3. Industrial Distributors 
Consumables (includes cleaning and 1. Dunlop (K) Ltd.(Medium to large) 
maintenance materials, rubber products, hand 2. Protech Ltd. (Medium) 
tools and equipment, industrial clothing, etc.) 3. Henk.el (Large) 
4. Car and General Ltd. (Large) 
5. Machinery Tools Ltd (small-medium) 
6. Alibbhai Sheriff (Large merchant) 
7. Koimu Ltd. (Small) 
8. Afiican Industries Ltd. (Small) 
9. Techard Steam & Power Ltd. (Small) 
10. Associated Alloys Ltd (Small-medium) 
Sanding Materials 1. Protech Ltd. (Medium) 
2. Techard Steam & Power (Small) 
Sealants and adhesives 1. Land Rover Exports 
Security 1. Falcon Security (Medium) 
2. Group 4 Security Ltd. (Medium) 
3. Securicor Guards (K) Ltd (Large) 
4. Security Guards Service Ltd. (Medium) 
5. Factory Guards Ltd. 
Telephone and Telex services Kenya Posts and Telecom. Ltd (Large state 
monopoly) 
Electricity Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd (Large 
state monopoly) 
Water Various local councils (Monopolies) 
Insurance MINET ICDC (Large) 
Source: Field Notes (1992/1993) 
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Supplier availability 
KVM's main concern is with the unavailability of 'good quality' local suppliers. Managers at KVM 
attributed their reduced competitiveness to their inability to source locally owing to this paucity of 
local finns. According to one manager, this is even more so 
"particularly [in the case of] small finns which would give us considerable savings on 
inputs. We do not import many inputs because we do not need to buy very much 
anyway! . If we were importers, I am sure we would be forced to import many items -
they are just not available locally. Those that are, come a poor second to the imported 
counterparts. " 
This finding matches what has been reported in the preceding case studies. However, it must be 
noted that KVM have several small to medium suppliers on their books. According to the 
managers at KVM, there were no particular problems peculiar to these suppliers. They viewed 
supplier problems as generally similar. 
Quality of local products 
Like the other assemblers, KVM's concern with the quality of the final product influences many of 
its sourcing activities. It was evident from the interviews that KVM managers perceived local 
suppliers to be unable to meet the quality standards set by the various manufacturers. 
Frequency of engineering and model changes 
Like GMK and AV A, managers expressed concern about the frequency of engineering and model 
changes which prevent local suppliers from meeting the quality and volume requirements of 
buyers. This was, in turn, attributed to lack of specialisation in the face of such frequent changes. 
Access to foreign exchange 
Like the cases discussed in preceding sections, access to foreign exchange was cited as influencing 
sourcing behaviour at KVM. This factor is linked to that of cost of local materials and services 
occasioned by a variety of reasons. Managers at KVM argued that foreign exchange restriction had 
not only made it difficult for importers to obtain CKD kits, but had also restricted the extent to 
which suppliers could supply their requirements reliably - explained to mean quality and cost 
expectations. 
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Cost of materials 
Like GMK, A V A, Marshalls and Toyota, KVM expressed preferences for inputs coming in as part 
of the CKD because of the escalating costs of local materials. Managers at KVM argued that the 
general weakness in the economy has made local inputs expensive relative to imported items. 
In addition, KVM managers reported that in order to prevent excessive price hikes they have 
adopted a multiple supplier strategy for those items they perceive to have a potential for frequent 
poce mcreases. 
Organisational Policy and strategy 
Unlike GMK and like A V A, Marshalls and Toyota, KVM does not have an explicit policy to 
develop local suppliers, or indeed to buy from local suppliers. According to KVM managers, their 
main concern is to produce high quality goods which meet the quality expectations stipulated by 
the customers and their (KVM's) contractors, the franchise holders. Given this overriding concern, 
KVMs managers take those options that best satisfy this commitment. As noted by one manager 
"Our first duty is to the customer. If quality means that we have to buy from abroad, 
then we shall do so. At the moment, it is more logical to buy from such 
[foreign]sources. " 
BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONS 
CONTRACTING 
Like in the preceding cases, there are no \vritten contracts for long-term supply of items. Instead, 
an order fonn is used. In some cases, telephone conversations between a purchasing officer and a 
sales person at the suppliers office is deemed sufficient to initiate an order or delivery to the KVM 
plant. 
ORGANISATION OF PURCHASING ACTMTJES 
As already noted, orders are initiated either through a fonnal order or a less fonnal telephone 
conversation. However, when this happens, they are usually followed up by a written order. It was 
also clear that no assurances oflong-tenn contracts are made. 
Transaction Dependence 
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hand, KVM managers estimated that their suppliers have an average dependency rate of about 
20% since they supply most of the assemblers (or franchise holders). 
Trading Patterns 
Like in the case of A VA, Marshalls and Toyota, trading patterns between KVM and its suppliers 
are ofa short-tenn nature, usually lasting the duration of the order. According to Sako1s typology, 
this denotes an ACR rather than an OCR relationship. In addition, there was little evidence of 
exchange of infonnation between KVM and its suppliers other than the specifications pertaining to 
the orders. For example, when a supplier did not meet agreed quality and delivery requirements, 
KVM simply used another supplier - hence the retention of more than one supplier for most items. 
Quality Issues 
As mentioned earlier, like other assemblers, quality control is perhaps the most important concern 
at KVM. It is therefore not sw:prising that KVM's managers are concerned about the fact that they 
cannot make decisions about most inputs which they consider vital to the final quality of the 
products. 
Communication with Suppliers 
For those items KVM procures directly , communication with suppliers is related to a specific 
order only. For those items procured by the importer, the communication is between the importers 
and KVM and between the importers and the suppliers. KVM only communicates with suppliers 
to clarify or explain specifications. 
Supplier Development Activities 
Like A VA, Marshalls and Toyota, KVM does not have specific supplier development activities. 
Relations can be described as essentially anns length - ACR 
BUYER PERCEPTIONS OF SME SUPPLIERS 
CHARACTERISl'ICS OF SUPPLIERS 
As shown in Table 7-16 most ofKVM's suppliers can be described as small or medium. Reasons 
provided for this status were similar to those provided by Marshalls (see case two). 
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PREFERRED CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLIERS 
While KVM has more small or medium suppliers than large ones, it was out of necessity rather 
than choice. According to one manager, for those products where they have more suppliers, few 
large finns operate in these sub-sectors. In addition, KVM managers argue that because of the 
small volumes they require for some of these items, few large finns will handle them. This 
finding was intriguing because while this argument was put forward for buying from smaller 
finns, orders were split up among several such suppliers, partly as an assurance against fuilure to 
deliver, and partly in order to realise KVM's volume requirements. One example evident in Table 
7-16 regards security services. 
FORMING INTER-FIRM LINKAGES WITH SMALL FIRMS 
In order to establish whether assemblers and franchise holders are willing and able to fonn 
linkages with other finns, particularly with small finns, they were asked to what eA.1:ent they would 
use small finns as suppliers. As has been evident it the preceding discussions, KVM has used 
some small and medium finns . However, it was clear that this was out of necessity than choice. 
First, while KVM managers have no objections to buying from small finns, it was clear that they 
were concerned about the quality and reliability of local producers. 
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11 DT DOBIE 
BACKGROUND 
DT Dobie is one ofKVM's shareholders and contractors. 
FORMATION AND OWNERSHIP 
DT Dobie is a private company incorporated in Kenya Details of its fonnation and ownership 
were withheld for reasons of confidentiality. 
PRODUCTS AND PERFORMANCE 
DT Dobie hold the Nissan (Japan) and Mercedes (Gennany) franchises in Kenya Nissan vehicles 
are assembled by KVM, while Mercedes vehicles have been imported as completely built vehicles 
since the 1960s. In 1991 and 1992, several ofDT Dobie's products held market leadership in their 
respective segments. One of the explanations given by various observers and participants in the 
industry is that partly due to prudent commercial decisions in 1991, DT Dobie had CKDs for 
assembly when the rest of the industry were experiencing extreme shortages. Consequently, DT 
Dobie reported steady sales when other franchise holders had suspended importation of CKDs due 
to a shortage of foreign exchange. 
In 1991 and 1992, Nissan-Datsun recorded the highest sales in Kenya, controlling 20% and 23% 
of the market respectively. 
Table 7-17 
lid (1991) 
Products and Market Share - DT Dobie & Co. 
Product Market Share 
I . Nissan Sunny 
2. NlSsan Sunny Estate 
3. E-23 MinIbus 
4. Datsun 112 P /up 
5. Sahara d-21 p/up 
6. Sahara4WD 
7. 3 ton NlSsan trucks 
8. Mercedestrucks (ten tons) 
9. Nissan un bus 
* Figures were not available for 1991 
Source: Field Notes (1992/1993) 
(%) 
33% 
53% 
52% 
65% 
4% 
13% 
-* 
2% 
53% 
Market Share 
of leader (%) 
33% 
53% 
52% 
65% 
43% 
26% 
-
42% 
53% 
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PRODUcnON ORGANISATION 
ORG~ATIONOFPRODUCTIONA~ 
Like Marshalls and Toyota, DT Dobie is an importer/distributor, without any internal capacity for 
production (assembly). However, as was noted, she has integrated backwards into assembly 
through part ownership ofKVM (32.5% equity). 
PRODUCTION ACTIVITY FLOWS 
In accordance with the hnporter-Assembler agreement, DT Dobie procures inputs and delivers 
them directly to KVM's plant. Sourcing decisions are made by DT Dobie. 
SOURCING ACfMTY 
SOURClNG BEHAVIOUR 
DT Dobie managers were reluctant to disclose the names of some of their suppliers or the 
proportions of inputs sourced from such sources. The only suppliers disclosed were Autofilters 
Ltd. a DT Dobie subsidiary which supplies airfilters; RE Shaw Ltd. which supplies brake pads; 
and Bums and Blane and Sagoo Radiators who supply radiators. However, a list of items was 
provided. Clearly, these are only those items mandated by the government. 
Table 7-18 Outsourced Items - DT Dobie (199211993) 
Item Supplier 
I . Tyres and tubes Firestone (EA) Ltd. (Large monopoly) 
2. Airfilters Autofi1ters Ltd (DT Dobie sobs.) (Medium) 
3. Brake pads R B Shaw Lld. (Medium) 
4. Radiators I. Bums and Blane Ltd (Small-Medimn) 
2. Sagoo Radiators (Small) 
5. Batteries Data not available (DNA) 
6. Seats DNA 
7. Soft Trims DNA 
8. Glass DNA 
9. Sparlt Plugs DNA 
10. Wiring harnesses DNA 
11. Leaf springs DNA 
12. Exhaust syst.ems DNA 
Note: Managers were reluctant to proVIde names of supphers for 
some items for reasons of confidentiality. 
Source: Field Notes (199211993) 
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It was estimated that DT Dobie outsources about 25-30% of its components and parts 
requirements, the rest come in as part of the CKD kit or imported directly from suppliers abroad. 
This finding coincides with the findings reported in preceding case studies. 
In addition, half of marketing services are bought in, mainly in the form of advertising services. 
One quarter of all transportation services, and after-sales services are bought-in. Almost all legal 
services, insurance, catering, security, laundry and trnining are bought-in. 
MOTIV ATIONS FOR SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
Like in all other cases discussed already, the main motivation driving transaction behaviour at DT 
Dobie is "necessity". Managers at DT Dobie argue that they have no choice but to source locally 
several items against "our better judgement." This was explained as the lack of good quality local 
products, a result of low level technologies used by local suppliers. This finding suggests that 
while buyers are 'willing' to buy locally, they are inhibited by the perceived poor quality of local 
suppliers. The factors outlined below in the following section were cited as influencing DT 
Dobie's sourcing behaviour. 
FACfORS INFLUENCING SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
As was noted in preceding paragraphs, only those items contained in the legal notices are 
outsourced and even then, only a small proportion of these. Clearly, like other franchise holders, 
DT Dobie appears to have responded to government pressure to outsource. 
Availability of suppliers 
Like other franchise holders, the recurrent theme in the interviews with DT Dobie managers is the 
general scarcity of good quality local suppliers. They argued that because it was difficult to find 
reliable local finns, DT Dobie is left with no option but to source from abroad. The also 
emphasised the lack of 'choice' for many inputs. For example, one manager noted that they have 
had problems with suppliers of glass but because the supplier is the sole producer of particular 
types of toughened glass, this limits their ability to source from alternative suppliers. Even in those 
cases where there were several suppliers, it was argued that the general level of technology used in 
Kenya does not match intemational standards. 
Quality of products 
This is related to .the question of availability of good quality suppliers. Giving reasons of poor 
technological and managerial capabilities, DT Dobie managers expressed concern about the 
quality oflocal products. Hence, their sourcing decisions have been influence by the availability of 
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products of international quality. One of the managers noted that because the components sector 
has been dominated by small and medium finns, and given the difficulties which 1his category of 
finns experiences in accessing finance, there's likely to be little progress in achieving the quality 
standards set by the manufacturers. He noted further 
liThe manufacture of components requires a very high level of skill and capital 
investment. Many of the small finns in this country cannot finance these requirements, 
and end up making do with obsolete machines while employing old methods of 
production. Given this scenario, one cannot expect high quality products." 
Reliability of suppliers 
The reliability of suppliers was also cited as a factor influencing sourcing activity. In 1his case, it 
was argued that local suppliers do not have the capability to deliver the quantities required by the 
frnnchise holders within the required period of time. DT Dobie managers argue that one of the 
reasons for poor supplier reliability is their size - small finns do not have sufficient capacity to 
meet their volume requirements. One of the 'explanations' provided by DT Dobie managers is the 
proliferation of makes and models. 
Like the other frnnchise holders discussed in preceding sections, DT Dobie managers argue that 
the model proliferation makes it difficult for such small local suppliers to cope with the product 
mix demanded by DT Dobie. 
Access to foreign exchange 
Like the other frnnchise holders, the lack of access to foreign exchange by suppliers has two main 
effects on DT Dobie. First, because suppliers are reliant on imported inputs, the current foreign 
exchange restrictions have created a shortage of inputs. Consequently, suppliers have had 
difficulties in meeting their delivery and quality t.aIgets . Secondly, because such inputs are 
procured from 'expensive' sources, or foreign exchange has had to be 'bought' from alternative, 
often non~fficial sources, their prices have more than doubled in the last two years. 
Cost of materials 
Another fuctor cited by DT Dobie managers is the cost of materials used by local suppliers and 
how it impacts on the prices of the finished parts and components. They argued that local finns 
have to contend with escalating costs of production brought about by high duties and taxes, and 
also the use of imported inputs. Consequently, their products are more expensive than imported 
products. Ijnking this factor to that of deletion penalties by manufacturers, they argued that 
purchasing inputs locally makes their final products less competitive. 
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Organisational policy and strategy 
Unlike GMK, and like A V A and her contractors, DT Dobie has no specific organisational policy 
nor strategy to source locally. It was also evident from the interviews that DT Dobie do not 
perceive local supplier conditions to favour local sOUIcing. 
BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONS 
SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY 
DT Dobie does not have specific supplier development activities . As one manger put it "we have 
problems coping with the effects of the recession without taking on those of our suppliers!" 
Clearly, all suppliers are expected to be selfreliant, even in the case of their subsidiary, Autofilters. 
The rationale provided by DT Dobie managers for this approach is the belief that Autofilters is a 
functionally autonomous company which should gain competitiveness without the parent 
company's assistance. 
Contracting 
No specific contracts are made between DT Dobie and its suppliers, except with KVM, their 
assembler. Orders are made on a need basis, usually with a two to four week lead-time. Thereafter, 
communications between DT Dobie and her suppliers are specific to the order. This finding is 
similar to the cases described in the preceding case studies. 
Transaction dependence 
Being an intennediate organisation, DT Dobie totally depends on its assembler, KVM, for all its 
assembly requirements. In addition, DT Dobie's purchases from local suppliers account for an 
average of about 60% of the companys requirements for any particular input, the rest being 
procured from abroad. In cases where suppliers were monopolies (e.g. tyres and tubes) DT Dobie 
procures all its requirements locally. In turn, DT Dobie managers estimated that because their 
other suppliers also supply other franchise holders (and assemblers), they are unlikely to be 
completely dependent on DT Dobie. 
Trading patterns 
Like all other cases presented in preceding sections, the trading patterns evident at DT Dobie are of 
a short-tenn nature, usually lasting the duration of the order. 
233 
Quality issues 
As already mentioned, because of the company's primary concern for quality, only defect free 
products are accepted from the supplier. DT Dobie does not bear the costs of replacement of any 
damaged goods. This reinforces the ACR type of relationship between DT Dobie and its suppliers. 
Having said that, DT Dobie's quality control officers check the quality of goods before they leave 
the supplier's plant. In addition, these are checked again at the KVM plant and any defects notified 
to DT Dobie's purchasing department, who then communicate with the relevant supplier. 
Communication with suppliers 
DT Dobie co-ordinates all the inputs and services relating to its franchise. Hence, there's frequent 
communication between its purchasing department and the sales departments of its various 
suppliers. However, only infonnation relating to the order is exchanged. For example, DT Dobie 
rarely follows up supplier's problems unless they directly relate to their order. In most cases, if a 
supplier had internal problems it (the supplier) tried to deal with them without involving DT 
Dobie. According to Sako's typology, this denotes anns (ACR) length relations. 
BUYER PERCEPTIONS OF SME SUPPLIERS 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLIERS 
The characteristics of DT Dobie suppliers are similar to those outlined for Marshalls and Toyota. 
they buy from large companies, most of whom are monopolies. They also buy from small and 
medium fiDIlS. However, the exact distribution cannot be given due to infonnation limitations (see 
Table 7-18) 
PREFERRED CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLIERS 
DT Dobie managers expressed their preference to transact with medium or large finns, arguing 
that local small finns are often "lax in their general approach to business" . This was inteIpreted as 
a general poor quality of products, a somewhat unprofessional approach to doing business, and 
generally unreliable. Consequently, reasons given for preferring large finns is their ability to assure 
quality due to their accumulated technical expertise including warranties and insurance for 
products supplied. It was also argued that larger finns are concerned about their reputation in the 
market, and are therefore likely to deliver on time. 
On the other hand, DT Dobie managers were keen not to rule out the advantages of transacting 
with smaller finns. They argued that despite their other weaknesses, small finns are more flexible . 
In addition, a finn such as DT DObie has considerable bargaining power with such finns . An 
234 
interesting factor related to the flexibility of small fions is that because small finns tend to deal in 
a narrow nmge of products, they are likely to provide more specialised service. 
FORMING INTER-FIRM RELATIONS WIm SMALL FIRMS 
In order to establish DT Dobie's attitude towards linkages with small finns, managers were asked 
what sizes of finns they preferred to transact with. h was clear that DT Dobie's main concern was 
the quality of the final product. It was therefore not important what size of firm supplied the 
inputs. However, to qualify this attitude, managers at DT Dobie argued that the concept of quality 
was closely linked with the technological and managerial capabilities of local suppliers. It was 
argued that local finns tend to have lower quality products, operate in a "haphazard way" making 
it difficult to transact. This coincided with the findings of the previous cases. 
It was also evident that similar to the situation at Toyota, Marshalls and GMK, DT Dobie's 
concern is with the continuous flow of inputs to the production line. For this reason, her managers 
prefer to receive the CKD as a complete kit. 
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III COOPER MOTOR CORPORATION (CMC) 
BACKGROUND 
This case presents findings regarding 1he Cooper Motor Corporation (CMC), which is part of1he 
CMC Motor Group of companies. All of1hese companies are, in turn, part of1he CMC Holdings 
Ltd., a wholly owned Kenyan company. The holding company comprises CMC (Kenya) Ltd. 
(various vehicle franchises) ; CMC Engineering Ltd.; CMC Aviation Ltd. (aviation school and 
charter firm); CMC Management Services Ltd.; Abacus Data Ltd. (a computer bureau); VW Rent-
A-Car Ltd (car rentals); Cooper Davies Air Ltd. (air charters); CMC Aircharters Ltd.; Tubogo 
Cooper Motors Ltd.; Dobie Cooper Motors Ltd. (joint venture dealerships with DT Dobie - CMC 
90% and DT Dobie I 0% ownership); KVM assemblers (32.5% ownership); and CMC Uganda. 
The CMC Motor Group, comprising five divisions, 'manages' 1he motor vehicle franchises . 
Table 7-19 CMC Motor Group Structure (1992/1993) 
Division Franchise(s) 
1. Land Rover Kenya 6 models of Land Rovers (Discovery, 
Defender, and Range Rover) 
2. CMC Kenya Ltd. I . VW / Aruli franchises 
2. Mitsubishi (pajero) fraIichise 
3. 4 models of Suzuki 
4. Mini Moke 
5. Mitsubisbi L 300 Minibuses and vans 
3. HCV (Heavy Commercial 1. Leyland DAF 
Vehicles) Division 2. Ashok Leyland 
3. N"ISSan Diesel (3 models of buses, and 4 
models of trucks) 
4. Suzuki and Evinrude outboard motors 
4 . Mazda (Kenya) Division Mazda franchise (1 passenger car, and 2 
models of light commercial trucks) 
5. Hughes Agric. Division 1. Earth moving equipment 
2. Ford tractors 
Source: FreldNotes (199211993) 
FORMATION AND OWNERSHIP 
The Cooper Motors Corporation Ltd. was incorporated in July 1948 to market the Land Rover, 
which has since become 1he flagship of the company . In 1951, CMC took on the VW franchise, 
marketing the VW Beetle. At the same time, CMC expanded into Tanzania and Uganda. These 
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branches were, after independence, incorporated as independent trading companies in their 
respective countries. In Kenya, CMC Holding Ltd. was incorporated to manage CMCs varied 
Kenyan interests. In 1973, CMC Holdings bought Ben, Bros. Ltd., thus transferring the Leyland, 
Morris, Jaguar franchises to CMC. In 1983, part of the Hugbes Ltd. were purchased by CMC 
Holdings, although both interests were nm as independent companies under the umbrella of the 
holding company. In 1991, CMC Holdings bought the remaining Hughes shares. CMC Motor 
Group was fonned in 1991 to bring together CMC (K) and Hughes Ltd, with the company 
restructured on divisiona11ines as outlined in Table 7-19 above. 
CMC Holdings Ltd. is a public company quoted on the Kenyan Stock Exchange with 21 % of the 
shares held by the Government of Kenya while the rest are held by the public. 
PRODUCTS AND PERFORMANCE 
CMC's marlcet perfonnance is recorded in the 4WD segment with three of its franchises leading 
the segment. The most prominent CMC product is the Land Rover, which, for over three decades 
since CMC's inception, was the only Four Wheel Drive vehicle marlceted in Kenya. Because of the 
rough Kenyan terrain, it has continued to serve as the most popular cross country vehicle. 
However, for the past three years, its best perfonner in tenns of sales has been the Suzuki Sierra 
which combines the Land Rovers qualities with "more modem styling" . Other CMC Motor Group 
franchises have been less successful. Table 7-20 shows the group's relative perfonnance in various 
vehicle marlcet segments. 
In 1991, the Mitsubishi make ranked second overaJ.L with an 18% market share, behind the 
Nissan-Datsun makes which had a 20% share of the total market. The Mazda and Suzuki makes 
ranked sixth and seventh with market shares of 6% and 4% respectively, while the Land Rover 
ranked eleventh with a one percent market share. 
PRODUCTION ORGANISATION 
ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES 
Like Marshalls, Toyota, and DT Dobie, CMC is an importer/distributor, with no internal capacity 
for production. However, CMC has vertically integrated extensively in the motor vehicle industry, 
having a 32.5% shareholding in the KVM assembly plant, as well as joint ownership with DT 
Dobie in dea1erships. CMC Holdings Ltd. subsidiaries and associated companies also provide a 
proportion ofCMC's requirements, including Computer services from Abacus Data Ltd.; domestic 
air transport services; and components and sub-processes from CMC Engineering. 
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PRODUCTION ACfIVITY FLOWS 
As at DT Dobie and the A VA franchise holders, CMC procures inputs directly from its 
franchisors, and delivers them to the KVM plant. Hence sourcing decisions are made by CMC in 
accordance with the various agreements with the franchisors and the assembler. 
Table 7-20 
(1991) 
Products and Market Share - CMC Motor Group 
Product Market Market Share of 
Sbare(%) Segment Leader 
(%) 
1. Suzuki Sierra 47% 47% 
2. Mitsubishi Pajero 25% 47% 
3. Land Rover 5% 47% 
4. Mazda Miujiza 30% 65% 
5. Mitsubishi L200 11% 23% 
6. Land Rover 2% 23% 
7. MazdaBl6 7% 23% 
8. Mitsubishi L300 3% 52% 
9. VW Transporter No data 
10. Mitsubishi Canter 14% 83% 
11. MazdaT4100 3% 83% 
12. Mitsubishi Canter (Lffruck) 39% 43% 
13. Mazda T4100 (Lffruck) 10010 43% 
14. NISSaIl Diesel (Truck) 36%* Data not 
avail 
15. Leyland (Truck) 5%* Data not 
avail. 
. .. 
* DMsional aggregate pJUVlded by CMC. Other data relates to 
comparable market segments as provided by KMI. 
Source: KM] Vehicle Sales Statistics (1992) 
SOURCING ACTMTY 
SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
The SOUlCing pattern observed at CMC is similar to that observed in the previous case studies. 
CMC locally sources only those items contained in the Legal Notices. She also uses more or less 
the same local suppliers as the franchise holders already discussed. CMC also outsources 
advertising services (80%) from Edfurce Ltd.; distribution services (dealers) (25%) and the rest 
from a sister company Dobie Cooper Motor COIporation (DCMC); Infonnation and computer 
services (90%), sourced from a sister company, Abacus Data Ltd.; Legal and Insurnnce services 
(100%) training (50%); Cleaning and maintenance (60%); Security services (80%) from Kali 
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Guards Ltd. and Riley Security Ltd.; and Laundry services (100%) from Pearl Drycleaners Ltd. 
All of these companies were described by CMC managers as small finns . 
MOTIV ATIONS FOR SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
Like in the preceding cases, the main motivation for transaction behaviour at CMC is necessity. 
Managers at CMC argue that they are 'forced' to buy from local sources because of government 
regulations. They further argue that they have experienced problems in obtaining good quality 
products locally because of the lack of reliable suppliers. This finding suggests that given 
prevailing conditions, CMC managers would prefer to purchase their requirements from abroad, at 
least, as part of the CKD kit. The Parts Manager remaxked, "h is an unwise managerial decision to 
buy locally. (But by buying locally,] we jeopardise the quality of our final product, and it is 
expensive" . 
FACTORS INFLUENCING SOURCING BEHAVIOUR 
As was noted in preceding paragraphs, like other franchise holders, CMC outsources only those 
items listed in the Legal notices, clearly responding to government pressure for localisation. 
Several reasons were cited for this behaviour. As will be noted, these are similar to those cited by 
franchise holders discussed in preceding sections. 
Availability of Suppliers 
Like other franchise holders, CMC managers believe that the most prominent factor inhibiting 
local sourcing, particularly from small local finns, is their absence. Emphasising the complexity of 
this problem, one manager argued that lithe question, in fuct:, is not simply whether they exist or 
not. We are concerned about their ability to deliver the quality that we want" . Clearly, CMC 
managers are concerned about the ability of local suppliers to meet international components 
standards. This raises the question of the quality oflocal products. 
Quality of products 
The previous cases describe the question of quality in relation to the lack of comparable 
components on the local market. While referring to the same issue of quality, one CMC manager 
explained that to their company, 
"we are talking of that quality that keeps us at th.e top of the market. It is not just good 
quality, but excellence. h is difficuh to find that kind of quality among most local 
suppliers" . 
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Singling out poor financing and equipment of local finns, the same manager further noted that the 
development of local finns has been hampered by poor support from the government and other 
development institutions. 
Table 7-21 Outsourced items and suppliers - CMC (1992) 
Item Source (and size offinn) 
1. Air and oil fihers Autofilters Ltd (Medimn) 
2. Spare Wheel carriers 1. E A Motor Industries Ltd (Medimn) 
2. CMC Engineering Ltd (Medimn) 
3. Wiring Harnesses 1. Autospring Manufacturers Ltd (Medimn) 
2. Automotive Products (K) Ltd (Small-Medium) 
4. Leaf Springs 1. Autospring Manufacturers Ltd. (Medium) 
2. Auto Ancillaries Ltd (Medium) 
5. Shackle Pins I .Autospring Manufacturers Ltd (Medium) 
2. Auto Ancillaries Ltd (Small-Medium) 
6. U4>olts and nuts 1. Autospring Manufacturers Ltd (Medium) 
2. Auto Ancillaries Ltd (Medium) 
7. Seat frames 1. Silentnigbt (K) Ltd. (Large) 
2. Megh Cushion Inds. Ltd. (Large) 
8. Speedo cables Express Moparts Ind. Ltd (Small-Medimn) 
9. Wheel spanners Auto Electric Services Ltd (Medimn) 
10. Toolkits Alibbahi Sharrif & Sons Ltd (Medium merchant) 
11. RadiolRadio-cassettes 1. Sanyo Annco (K) Ltd (Large) 
2. Stenorette & Radio Services (Medium) 
12. Brake pads and disc pads R B Shaw Ltd (Medium) 
13. Soft trims 1. Silentnigbt (K) Ltd (Large) 
2. Megb. Cushion Inds. Ltd (Large) 
14. Canvas hoods Bonar (EA) Ltd (Medium-Large) 
15. Exhaust systems 1. Auto Perfonnance Ltd (Medium) 
2. Mann Manufacturers Ltd (Medimn) 
16. Scissor jacks Auto Perronnance Ltd (Medium) 
17. Radiators 1. Sagoo Radiators Ltd (Small) 
2. CMC Engineering (Medium) 
18. Safety belts 1. Megb. Cushion Ind Ltd (Large) 
2. Bums and Blane Eng, Ltd. (Medium) 
19. Flat and cmved flattened Impala Glass Inds. Ltd. (Large monopoly) 
glass 
20. SI AbSOIbers Hill Products Ltd (Medium) 
21. Batteries Associated Battery Manufacturers Ltd. (Medium) 
22. Tyres and Tubes Firestone (EA) Ltd (Large monopoly) 
23. Tow hooks CMC Engineering Ltd (Medium) 
24. Sparkplugs Car & General (K) Ltd (Large) 
25. Hydraulicjacks 1. Car & General (Large) 
2. Industrial Hardware (Medimn) 
Source: FJeld Notes (1992/1993) 
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Reliability of suppliers 
CMC managers perceive their reputation to be founded on the reliability of their products and 
staH: within the market. They expect, therefore, a similar level of reliability from their suppliers. 
"So far, we have had a few problems with one or two local suppliers. We cannot take 
too many risks by buying locally where we can buy from more reliable sources abroad. 
Obviously, we are currently restricted by government regulations" . 
This finding denotes that CMC managers have doubts about the reliability oflocal suppliers. They 
also argue that due to quantity and quantity demands by CMC, local suppliers are un1ikely to 
deliver required products on time and to desired quality. 
Supplier's access to foreign exchange 
Like the other franchise holders, CMC consider the problems of local sourcing to be linked to the 
lack of access to foreign exchange by local producers. They argue that because local producers of 
components use an average of 60% imported materials in their products, its frequent scarcity has 
caused frequent shortages in the supply of inputs to the assemblers. Suppliers have had difficulties 
in meeting delivery and quality targets, rendering them "an unwise business option" for the 
franchise holders. In addition to this problem, 'extra' costs arise from the use by suppliers of 
alternative sources of foreign exchange, which tend to be more expensive. 
Cost of inputs and pricing of components 
Another factor cited is the high cost of local components aggravated by a combination of factors 
discussed in preceding sections. Together with the desire to avoid deletion penalties by the 
manufacturer, the relatively higher cost of local sourcing has prevented CMC from using local 
suppliers. "Even taking the higher transportation costs from overseas into consideration, it still 
cheaper to source abroad" . 
Lead time 
CMC managers perceive lead-time required for sourcing from overseas the most important factor 
affecting their company. Like GMK, CMC managers felt that if local supply conditions were 
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Organisational policy and strategy 
Unlike GMK, and like other franchise holders, CMC has no specific policy to develop suppliers, 
or to buy products locally. CMC sources from companies that already have the capability to meet 
its requirements, and hence, the company takes responsibility for its own development. 
BUYER-SUPPLIER RELA nONS 
On the whole, buyer-supplier relations between CMC and her suppliers can be described as anns-
length (ACR), with no specific commitment on the part ofCMC to develop the suppliers. 
Supplier development activity 
Like other franchise holders, CMC does not have supplier development programmes. Evidently, 
suppliers are expected to develop their own enterprises, and any problems with delivery and 
quality are the responsibility of such suppliers. 
Contracting 
Under the agreements for the procurement of CKDs, a six month finn order lead-time is provided 
for. In practice, a three to four month finn-order lead-time has continued to operate. 
Local procurement, however, does no operate on contract. Instead, like A V A, Marshalls, Toyota, 
KVM and DT Dobie, an order fonn is deemed sufficient to initiate a transaction. 
Transaction dependence 
As a coordinative, intennediate organisation, CMC is totally dependent on KVM for assembly of 
vehicles, and both foreign and local suppliers for components and parts. In cases where a supplier 
is a monopoly, or existing suppliers are not suited to CMC's needs, there is more dependence on 
one supplier. For other items, however, CMC retains more than one supplier as an assurance 
against loss of control. For example two firms supply CMC with soft trims. Both are relatively 
large finns in the furniture an upholstery industry. CMC manager believe that because of their size 
(and relative 'power in the industry) they are more likely to increase prices more frequently, and 
less likely to meet delivery commitments than would smaller firms. 
Trading patterns 
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that, CMC managers noted that it is in CMC's interests not to change suppliers "unless there is a 
good reason such as poor quality, unreliability, or unreasonably high costs." 
Quality issues 
With production focused on quality, only defect free components are accepted from suppliers. Like 
other franchise holders, CMC does not take responsibility for rectifying defects, or indeed actively 
assisting the supplier to deal with them. 
Communication with suppliers 
CMC co-ordinates all inputs associated with its franchises, hence, there's frequent communication 
with suppliers. However, this communication only related to the orders - agreeing to specifications 
and making sure that they are achieved. Infonnation about the organisational problems, or 
otherwise, of the supplier is not exchanged. In addition, the supplier does not get any information 
about CMC that does not relate to the order. This reinforces the ACR relations described above. 
BUYER PERCEPTIONS OF SME SUPPLIERS 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLIERS 
CMC's suppliers are predominately small or medium sized finns, excepting cases such as tyres 
and tubes where there is only one supplier who happen to be large. CMC managers rationalise this 
'preference' by arguing that few large finns operate in the parts and components sub-sectors due to 
the high investments required, relative to the small and fragmented vehicle market in Kenya 
BUYER PREFERENCES OF SUPPLIER CHARACTERISTICS 
Despite apparent predominant use of small to medium sized suppliers, CMC managers expressed a 
preference for medium or large" well organised" fions . They argued that small local finns have a 
tendency "not to take things seriously" . However, ''the operative word is 'organisation' of the finn 
we deal with. By this I mean we are not really concerned with a suppliers size, but with their 
ability to meet our needs." 
FORMING INTER-FIRM RELATIONSlllPS WITH SME FIRMS 
Like DT Dobie, CMC did not express any particular preferences about the size of finn they 
transact with as long as they can deliver quality products when they are required. The Parts 
Manager saw this as a "wise strategy" since, "our main concern is with quality. In Kenya, you 
cannot afford to be choosy. There are not enough suppliers around. Who provides what we want 
does not matter, so long as the quality is right" . 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This case has described KVM and two of her contractors, DT Dobie & Co. Ltd and CMC Motor 
Group. Like A V A, and unlike GMK, KVM is a contract assembler making only a few direct 
purchases of inputs and services, the bulk of which are made by the franchise holders (the 
contractors). 
In summary, sourcing activities at KVM and its associated contractors follows the pattern 
observed at A V A. Only those items listed in the Legal Notices are outsourced, the rest coming in 
the fonn of a CKD kit. Although these are outsourced from small and medium local finns, 
managers stated that they preferred to source from larger firms for their perceived ability to meet 
the buyer's quality and delivery requirements. 
Other factors influencing sourcing behaviour were found to be related to the perceived weaknesses 
of the local supplier infrastructure: unavailability of good quality suppliers; poor quality of local 
products; frequent changes in engineering and vehicle model changes; high cost of local inputs; 
lack of access to foreign exchange by loca:l supplier, and lack of organisational policy or strategy 
to use local suppliers or to develop a local supplier base. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CASE SYNTHESIS AND DISCUSSION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The broad aim of this study was to explore how large fums can be encouraged to use small finns 
as suppliers or partners as a strategy for SME development. It was argued in chapter one to four, 
that this requires first, an assessment of whether large finns have the propensity and motivation to 
form inter-finn linkages with small finns; and second, an understanding of those factors which 
condition the formation of inter-firm relations. 
The literature has suggested, in general, various motivational factors which stimulate inter-finn 
relationships, such as flexibility, the search for core competence, and supplier chain management. 
However, in the main, particularly with regard to vehicle industries in other countries, it has 
focused on the underlying motive of efficiency and related cost effectiveness. Consequently, all 
secondary motivations such as access to resources have been viewed from the efficiency 
perspective. This study proceeded on the proposal that large finns in Kenya's motor industry are 
more likely to internalise activities than externalise them and use inter-finn linkages. It further 
suggested that if they do use any inter-finn linkages, other factors, besides the cost minimisation 
motives suggested in the literature, stimulate their formation . In the findings of the study 
conducted in Kenya and reported in a descriptive form in chapter seven, it is suggested that inter-
finn linkages are largely fonned as a response to legislative compulsion rather than voluntarily'. In 
this case, the managerial strategy adopted, it would seem, is compliance with the compulsion in 
order to access resources and maIkets at some point in the future. This chapter synthesises and 
discusses the findings from the cases within the broad frame of the inter-finn relationship 
fonnation and strategic behaviour literature. 
Because of the nature of the research design, this analysis adopts a "cross~e analysis" approach. 
Miles and Hubennan (1984) argue that this approach allows the investigator to progress from 
description and partial analysis (chapter seven) to an interpretative level of analysis. They note 
"Doing a cross-site analysis with a core list of variables determined to have significance 
across several sites is the most powerful way to move from partial to an interpretative 
explanatory account" (p 197) 
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Although a core list of variables was not used in this study, specific issues were studied across all 
the cases investigated. 
This chapter also brings together the observations made in the case studies in an effort to 
consolidate methodology and observation with theory, as a strntegy for moving beyond 
particularistic observations and to link observations to theory (Denzin, 1970). This means that 
conclusions and inference are part of the analysis (Moser and Kalton, 1971). During this process, 
the analysis drnws from existing knowledge, but also makes use of intuition (Miles and 
Hubennan, 1984). 
The wolk presented here does not claim the statistical representativeness of the cases to the wider 
population, and agrees with Miles and Hubennan (1984) who argue that research findings need not 
be assumed to be typical, or representative of a more general phenomenon. The study, as noted 
previously, aimed to 'describe and explore' rather than make generalised inferences about the 
behaviour of the population. Nevertheless, some important propositions emerge and are important 
in setting the agenda for further research. The inteIpretation of the data presented in this thesis, 
therefore, aims to make some proposals rather than make claims to being representative of a 
population. In this respect, numerical "evidence" is not as important as the "theoretical" 
suggestions made by such evidence (yin, 1984). It is the patterns replicated in succeeding case 
studies that contribute toward the generation of theory, rather than the quantification of incidences. 
In total, seven cases were studied in a multiple case study approach. Three 'main' cases which 
fonned the core of the study, were examined. Additionally, four sub-cases from the importer 
category were examined. The latter category is a result of the nature of production organisation in 
two of the three main cases studied, where the assembler and 'importer' fimctions are carried out by 
separate finns . All of these cases are what are referred to in Kenya as 'large' enteIprises (employing 
more than 100 people). The rationale for focusing on large firms has been discussed in chapters 
one and six where it was posited that as ~or players, large firms are likely to initiate industry-
wide activity. In addition, in chapter five, it was further argued that in an environment where large 
finns dominate an industry, their decisions and actions condition industry behaviour. They can, 
therefore, be considered an important initial focus for an industry wide study. Besides, in a buyers' 
maIket such as pertains in Kenya's component industry, it is critical to study, initially, the buyer 
category, since their decisions are likely to influence the nature and extent of inter-firm 
relationships within the industry. 
The evidence from these case studies is used to test the guiding hypothesis (see chapters 3 and 6) 
that SME development through linkages with large finns is predicated on the large finns' 
propensity and motivation to dis-aggregate or externalise their activities, and outsource from small 
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finns. In turn, this is predicated on the large finn's perceptions about the 'suitability' of SMEs as 
suppliers, and what impediments, if any, are likely 10 hinder this outcome. Hence,the two 
questions introduced in chapter one guide this analysis: 
(1) Do large finns in Kenya's motor vehicle industry have the propensity and motivation to dis-
aggregate, and outsource? In other words, is their production organisation conducive to 
outsourcing? 
(2) Do large finns in Kenya's motor vehicle industry have the motivation to outsource from 
SMEs? What are the perceived factors influencing their sourcing activity? What is the nature 
of relationships between buyers and suppliers? 
A third question is important in putting the findings of this study within a theoretical context. 
(3) What wider lessons can be drawn from the findings of this research with regard to existing 
theory on inter-finn relationship formation in general, in the motor vehicle industry, and in a 
developing country context. ? 
These questions are addressed in terms of the production organisation by finns in the motor 
industry, their sourcing activity, the prevailing buyer-supplier relationships, and the prospects for 
forming inter-finn linkages with small finns . 
8.2 PRODUCflON ORGANISATION IN KENYA'S MOTOR ASSEMBLY INDUSTRY 
It was argued in chapter three that for inter-firm linkages, particularly with small finns to take 
place, large firms must have a production organisation approach which allows de~upling of 
activities. They must exhibit discrete processes and activities which, on a technological level, 
allow them to dis-aggregate should it become a corporate strategy, to provide a frameworlc for 
inter-fiIDl relations. This is predicated on the finns' perception of the need to dis-aggregate 
production. The literature, using examples such as steel production, argues that in industries where 
production organisation does not allow de~upling, lower levels of vertical de-integration are 
expected. 
The research reported here reveals that like the vehicle industries elsewhere, production 
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distribution, and after-sales service are conceptually separate activities which potentially can be 
perfonned by different finns. AIguably, therefore, there should not be production OIganisation 
related reasons why large finns cannot dis-aggregate and externalise activities. 
This finding is important for the broad framework suggested in chapter two. It was argued that the 
principles of flexible specialisation and lean production suggest a framework within which to 
interpret production de-integration. It argues that for various reasons, fragmentation takes place in 
large enterprises and inter-firm relationships used to bridge the supply gap arising. This study 
found that as expected, at the level of the finn, there is potential for fragmentation since services as 
well as various parts and components can be de-linked from the assembly process. However, it 
was also found that the use of inter-firm linkages is limited to compulsory items. The next step is 
to establish whether the actual organisation of production activities fucilitates de-integration and if 
not, what factors prevent it. 
8.2.1 PRODUCfION ORGANISATION 
At the level of the firm, however, activities can be broken down further into various processes and 
sub-processes as shown in Fig. 7-2 and 7-4 in chapter seven. The differences in the various cases 
is presented under each case study. All the assemblers have 'flexible' assembly lines in order to 
facilitate the assembly of the large number of makes and models. By this is meant the ability to re-
tool and change jigs and other equipment after each production run. However, the organisation of 
the actual assembly activity is fully integrated - all the sub-processes lead directly into each other, 
making it difficult to de~uple the main assembly process. Except for the material and services 
inputs, all other activities are linked. Consequently, once the CKD is delivered to the assembly 
line, there seems to be little opportunity for outsourcing. However, there are opportunities at the 
levels of materials and services sourcing. For example, services such as transportation of CKDs 
from the port to the assembly plants, security and laundry services are soun:ed from different 
suppliers and 'fed' into the process at different levels. As discussed in chapter seven, all the cases 
studied 'bought-in' an avernge of 80% of their service requirements. Arguably, this is to be 
expected in a manufacturing enterprise, particularly if the services are of a specialist nature. 
Arguing from an efficiency perspective, and in view of Pralahad and Hamel's (1990) concept of 
core competence, firms are unlikely to have a high level of specialist competence needed for in-
house production of most services. 
This finding establishes that at the broad production activity level, vertical de-integration can be 
expected because of the production organisation which offers opportunities for de-linking of 
materials procurement, assemb1y, distribution, and after-sales services. At the assembly process 
level (the level of the firm), however, this is difficult because the current production techniques 
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integrate all these processes in what appears to be a continuous flow of activities. The following 
description of processes derived from the case studies illustrates the integration at assembly level. 
It is important to note that at this level, the assemblers exhibit an identical pattern of production 
organisation (see figs. 8-1 below) 
Materials 
.---------1 Handling 
Frame 
VVorlts 
Fig. 8-1 Assembly Activity Outline 
Source: Field Notes (199211993) 
Adjusments 
1. Materials handling: When CKDs and local materials are received, quality control checkers 
go through the despatch documents, verifying the quality and quantities of deliveries. The 
various parts and components are then unpacked and despatched to their respective work 
stations within the plant. 
2. Frameworks: Using pre-assembled jigs, the frame of the vehicle is assembled from the 
CKD kit. The panels are welded onto the frame-work. This is loaded onto a wheeler which 
is the main method of conveyance of the vehicle until it is ready for a test drive. The 
conveyor belt system is not used in any of the assembly plants. 
3. Trimming: involves modifying the vehicle frame according to specifications. Often this 
involves panel beating and shaping. 
4. Painting. The vehicle shell is then pre-treated against rust and then painted. 
5. Fitting: This involves fitting the essential components of the vehicle i.e. the engine, 
gearbox, front/rear axles, dashboard, etc. Vehicles which have a chassis are assembled on 
the chassis. 
6. Soft Trimming: This involves adding interior trimmings to the vehicle's shell. This includes 
upholstery fitting, lining, and carpeting. 
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7. Test Drive: lbis subjects the vehicle to a road test. Adjustments are made to correct any 
defects before the distributor takes physical procession of the vehicle. 
Given this assembly activity organisation, all the cases studied reported outsourcing of various 
inputs, CKDs being the major input outsource<i, but always from manufacturers abroad. GMK is 
the only assembler importing CKDs from a sister company. In addition, it is not vertically 
integrated with other companies within Kenya Hence, any local outsourcing activities are with 
independent finns rather than sister companies like is the case for AV A and KVM. Its vertical 
integration pattern is, therefore, at the intentional level (MNC or lNC) while the other assemblers 
are integrated at the national level. 1bis has implications for local industrialisation. Vaitsos (1991) 
has argued that the Kenyan government fears that lNCs do not always have national 
industrialisation interests in mind when they fonnulate policy at the corporate level. Hence, 
GMK's activities, while currently favowable for local inter-finn sourcing may not be entirely 
predictable, and may be reversed at a later date by changes in sourcing strategies at the corporate 
level. For example, in the event that legislation restricting importation of components is lifted, 
such an internationally integrated finn is more likely to source many of its requirements from 
sister companies abroad. The broader implication of this finding is that there seems to be limited 
'control' over the activities of such a firm, since corporate policy is an important factor in its 
behaviour. Hence, there are limitations to long-tenn planning by the government for localisation 
and local SME development. 
However, this does not imply that the nationally integrated finns will use local suppliers 
automatically in the case of removal of legislation. It is probable that they too are likely, in the 
short-term, to use other sources, particularly overseas suppliers, as this may be argued to be more 
cost effective, or to offer better quality products. 1bis implies that currently in those finns 
integrated at the local level, vertical integration is used as a strategy to minimise the cost of 
importation, and the risks of using local suppliers who are under the direct control of the finns . 
The finding that GMK sources from independent local finns is, however, promising. This implies 
that currently, GMK provides some potential for SME development activities since it uses fewer 
intra-finn transfers. On the other hand, as noted in chapter seven, the other assemblers are 
themselves part of a vertically integrated system with few opportunities for independent finns to 
supply them, or to fonn strategic alliances with them. The stndy also reveals that in turn, the main 
contractors of A VA (Marsha11s and Toyota) and KVM (DT Dobie and CMC) are also integrated 
into the components and parts industries as, according to one manager, "an assurance against 
resource scarcity orthe possibility of our competitors controlling the input market". The study also 
revealed that the franchise holders are integrated into the distribution of vehicles and spare parts, 
and horizontally into other motor vehicle related activities such as motor cycle marketing and 
servicing, aviation, and fuel distribution outlets. This finding confinns the market failure thesis 
argued by authors such as Stuckey and White (1993) and Doner (1993). 
The finns studied reported that because of the absence of alternative suppliers, they found it 
prudent to invest in those activities for which they have current or expected demand. It is 
interesting to note, however, that these finns do not depend only on internal demand for the 
survival of their subsidiaries. Bums and Blane, for example, is a subsidiary of Toyota Kenya, 
which produces radiators for all the assemblers and importers. They also serve the replacement 
market, particularly for those makes and models already assembled in the country. Evidently, the 
logic for integration can be argued to be rational since thesubsidiaI)' is not dependent on the small, 
highly differentiated demand of the parent company. This analysis suggests that there are 
incentives for vertical integration since subsidiaries can operate semi-autonomously, and serve 
other buyers in addition to intra-fum tnmsfers with the parent company. Integration has also been 
argued to result from 'poor quality suppliers'. In this regard, as noted in the Marshalls case, there 
are plans to invest in the local production of shock-absorbers since local suppliers cannot meet 
Marshalls' "quality and delivery" requirements. 
The findings discussed here have important implications for emeIging theories about flexible 
specialisation, lean production and downsizing of firms. They lead to the conclusion that there are 
limited prospects for SME development given the current production organisation in the Kenyan 
vehicle assembly industry. The main limitation is the way the assemblers have organised their 
activities to deal with perceived resource scarcity, and the availability of opportunities for 
investing in different stages of the production chain (Stuckey and White, 1993). In both cases, 
market failures arise, with finns perceiving the incentive to use intra-firm transfers as an assurance 
of access to scarce resources, and related competitiveness. 
They also lead to the conclusion that despite the small, highly fragmented markets in the motor 
vehicle industry in Kenya, where finns in other environments are reported to use inter-firm 
relationships to achieve flexibility, Kenyan finns are still reluctant to outsource. The explanations 
confinn Doner's (1993) and Masai's (1991) view that this reluctance is laJ:gely related to the 
perception of a poor supplier infrastructure. This finding also indicates that the fragmentation 
expected by the lean production thesis is not taking place. In fact, the finns studied did not indicate 
downsizing as a restructuring process aimed at efficiency, but as a reaction to the recessionaI)' 
trends affecting industry in Kenya at the time of the study. Unavailability of foreign exchange for 
the procurement of CKD kits, for example, account for a laJ:ge proportion of the reduction in 
employment (see chapter seven). 
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8.2.2 ORGANISATION OF INPUT PuRCHASING 
As reported in the introduction of chapter seven, this decision-making fuunework identified in the 
three assembly plants has interesting operational implications. GMK can import all its 
requirements (CKDs) and also make decisions about local inputs, while KVM and AV A only 
make decisions about a limited number of inputs. The majority of the inputs are bought by the 
importers/distributors. In the GMK model, the importer and assembler functions are fused into the 
same organisation, and differ significantly, therefore, from those at KVM and AVA. This can be 
attributed to the contractual agreements entered into by the assembler and the importer at the time 
of the contract to assemble (see for example, Appendix E). The contract emphasises three aspects 
of the relationship between the parties which motivated the emphasis on the importer rather than 
the assembler: 
1. The duty of the assembler is to assemble. (Importer -Assembler Agreement p2) 
2. The importer is under obligation to supply the CKDs, any local materials, training, 
technical assistance and equipment. (Importer-Assembler Agreement pp 2-6) 
3. The hnporter remains the sole hnporter and distributor of the products, and shall also be 
responsible for clearing all imported materials ordered by it through customs and 
delivering the same 10 the plant. (Importer-assembler Agreement p3) 
This scenario tempers the purchasing arrangements within the industry. Arguably, this production 
organisation pattern allows GMK as an assembler to make critical decisions about sourcing as part 
ofan integrated production and/or structural policy. On the other hand, the production organisation 
adopted in the other two cases limits the scope for integrated sourcing policies. 
A distinct variation in the purchasing activities under the various models is evident. At GMI<, the 
purchasing department has closer ties with the suppliers whole operation, particularly in the cases 
of small and medium suppliers. This is consistent with the supplier development strategy adopted 
by GMK as an assurance against poor quality inputs from suppliers. The same does not apply at 
the other two assemblers plants since the purchasing function lies with the importer, except for the 
few items agreed upon as per the importer-assembler agreement. However, a liaison exists with the 
importers. In turn, a liaison exists between the importers and the suppliers. At this level, the 
importers' purchasing departments were found to liaise continually with the suppliers sales 
department. 
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8.3 SOURCING ACTIVITY IN KENYA'S MOTOR INDUSTRY 
8.3.1 SOURClNG BmA VIOUR 
The sourcing behaviour of the three assemblers and their constituent importers does not differ 
significantly. All of the cases presented source locally only mandated items, and some selVices. 
Table 8-1 Aggregate Local Soureingfor All Assemblers (1992/93) 
Assembler Estimated Local Estimated Local Estimated 
Sourcing of parts Soureing of Soureing from 
and components Services Local SMEs 
GMK 37% 40% 70% 
AVA* 40% 75% 65% 
KVM* 30% 80% 70% 
* These figures are an average which mcludes the franchise holders/contractors 
Source: Field Notes (1992/1993) 
Table 8-1 summarises at an aggregate level, the sourcing activities of large firms in the motor 
assembly industry in Kenya Local sourcing of parts and components is low compared to the local 
sourcing of services. One of the explanations could be the fact that many manufacturing finns find 
the need to focus on manufacture, and to buy-in all required services. In addition, contrary to 
expectations given the perception by managers that local SMEst end to be of a generally poor 
quality, the share of SME contribution is relatively high. About 70% of GMK's local suppliers 
can be categorised as SMEs while 60-70% and 70% of A V A's and KVM's local suppliers, 
respectively, full within this category. This finding can be explained by the absence of large 
suppliers in the components industry. It is also probable that due to the small volumes required as 
a result of a highly fragmented vehicle market, large finns would have been unlikely to supply the 
industry. This is partly due to the current production organisation in Kenya's large finns, which 
still operate amass production system. On the other hand, in all probability, this development can 
be explained by the structure of the industry itself where few large firms operate in the parts and 
components sub-sectors. As noted in chapter seven, large suppliers tended to be in sectors which 
had larger and wider new and replacement markets, while the smaller suppliers operated in input 
markets served by small or medium firms . 
All the products outsoun:ed were standard parts and components produced according to the 
manufucturers' specifications. Hence, there are few technologically specialised needs requiring 
specialised suppliers (Polanyi, 1967) as is the case with technology-based SMEs highlighted by 
Forrest (1990). Consequently, technology based strategic alliances and partnerships are less likely 
to occur in this particular context. This has a bearing on the nature and operational impact of an 
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assembly based industry. There are fewer opportunities for technological development as all parts 
and components come already manufactured, or as blueprints provided for their local manufucture 
and/or adaptation. Again, this has deleterious implications for industrialisation in developing 
countries where the technology levels are argued to be lower than 1hose of their counter-parts in 
business. WIthout a generic manufacturing industry, little, if any, indigenous technology can 
develop as assemblers concentrate on meeting the immediate needs of the suppliers of kits, leaving 
little time or funds for R&D. In no case studied was there investment or direct involvement in 
generic R&D. 
Table 8-2 summarises the items outsourced by the assemblers and their contractors. Clearly, all the 
assemblers and franchise holders outsource only those items listed in the legal notices since none 
of these items are 'voluntarily' locally soureed. The table also highlights the fuct that KVM and 
A V A outsource fewer items than GMK. This has implications for the ownership pattern in the 
industry. h would appear that the franchisefunporter model has less potential for outsourcing and 
therefore would have fewer opportunities for SME development through large finn outsourcing 
activities. 
8.3.2 FACTORS INFLUENClNG SOURClNG BEHAVIOUR 
Local sourcing was used in this study to measure outsourcing - levels of local content. This 
argument also made the assumption that local sourcing draws into the net SMEs in the 
components sub-sector since it traditionally has more SMEs than large finns. Hence, the finding 
that an average of approximately 43% of the motor vehicle industry's requirements are local.ly 
sourced is a crude measure of sourcing from SMEs. 
The research was interested in the factors which influence soureing activity, based on the initial 
finding that large finns (buyers) outsource only mandated items. It was also found that while not 
having a specific preference for large or small sized finns as suppliers, a large majority of large 
firm suppliers are small or medium-sized businesses. As already noted in chapter seven and in 
section 8.3.1 above, one of the reasons given is that the components sector in Kenya is 
predominately populated by small and medium finns owing to the small and fragmented markets 
in the sector. Tables 8-3 to 8-5 summarise the perceived factors, related to the buyer, supplier, and 
the business environment, influencing sourcing activity on the dimensions of cost, quality, and 
availability. As was explained in an chapter four, in this study, local sourcing has been linked to 
outsourcing from small and medium-sized suppliers because of the structure of the components 
sub-sector in Kenya currently predominately populated by small and medium-sized finns (Masai, 
1991). Hence, by examining factors which influence local sourcing, 'inferences' can be made about 
the potential for local sourcing from local SMEs. 
254 
Table 8-2 
(199211993) 
Locally Sourced Itemsl - Assemblers and Selected Franchise holders 
ITEM GMK AVA KVM MARS TOYOTA CMC DOBIE 
HALLS 
1. Oils x x x x x x x 
2. Greases x x x x x x x 
3. Fuels x x x x x x x 
4. Brake and Clutch Fluid x a a x x x x 
5. Sealers x x x a a a a 
6. Adhesives x x x a a a a 
7 . Batteries x a a x x x x 
8. Tyres x a a x x x x 
9. Tubes x a a x x x x 
10. Paints x x x a a a a 
11. Toughened flat glass x a a x x x x 
12. Canvas hoods, covers & a a a a a x a 
Screens 
13. Soft trim and upholstery x a a a x x x 
14. Sound deadening na a a na na na na 
materials 
15. Radiators x a a x x x x 
16. Exhaust pipes and x a a na x x x 
silencers 
17. Leaf springs x a a na x x x 
18. Spare wheel carriers x a a na x na 
19. Seat Frames x a a na x x x 
20. Wiring Harnesses x a a x x x x 
21. Brake liIrings na a a na na na na 
22. U-Bolts and U-Boh Nuts x a a na na x na 
23. Disk Brake Pads x a a na x x na 
24. Hydraulic Dampers & x a a x x x na 
Shocks 
25. Pre-mixed metal pre- x x x a a a a 
treatment chemicals 
26. Windscreens, side and x a a x x x x 
rear 
27. Radio and cassette x a a na x x x 
players 
28. Hydraulic Jacks & x a a na x x na 
Handles 
Cont'd 
ITEM GMK AVA KVM MARS TOYOTA 
HALLS 
29. Spark Plugs x a a x x 
30. Speedometer cables x a a na x 
3l. Disk brake pad backing x a a na na 
plates 
32. Seat belts x a a na na 
33. Toolkits x a a x x 
34. Airfilters x a a na x 
35. Shackle ]lins for x a a na x 
Leafsprings 
36. Consumables (cleaning na na x na na 
materials etc) 
37. Sanding materials x na na na na 
38. Water na na x na na 
39. Welding materials na x x na a 
40. Rubber bushes and foam na na na na x 
strips 
4l. Security saices na na x na na 
42. Telephone and telex na na x na na 
43. Electricity na na x na na 
44. Insurance na na x na na 
45. Advertising x x x x x 
46. LaundIy na x x x x 
47. Catering n na na na na 
48. Assembly n a a x x 
IIn this study, local sourcing was used as a proxy measure for outsourcing 
Note: (i) Local Content figures were available for only one company - GMK 
(ii) na - information not available 
(iii) a - input or service not procured directly by the company 
(iv) x - bought-in item or service 
(v) n - provided in-house 
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CMC DOBIE 
x x 
x 
x x 
x na 
x x 
x x 
x na 
na na 
na na 
na na 
a a 
na na 
x x 
na na 
na na 
na na 
x x 
x x 
na na 
x x 
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Tahle8-3 Perceived Fadors Influencing Sourcing Activity - Supplier Related 
Cost Quality Availability & Reliability 
(i) High cost of materials used in (i) Technological and managerial 0)Nurnb~of~li~ 
manufacture of inputs makes them capacity of suppli~: Low available: Small numb~ of 
expensive, hence discourages local managerial and technological 'good quality' ~li~ 
soorcing. capacity of suppliers discourages discourages outsourcing 
(ii) High use of imported materials local soorcing, particularly from (n) Capacity of ~liers: low 
which are p~ceived to cost more, small firms. capacity of suppliers, or low 
discourages local soorcing. (n) Compa1lbility of ~lier's capacity use due to lack of 
(ill) Lack of access to foreign production equipment and working capital discourages 
exchange by ~liers necessitates processes with manufacturer's outsourcing 
specifications: Low compatibility 
the use of 'alternative' markets for discourages outsourcing from (ill) Lead-time associated 
funds, making local products more SMEs with sourcing: Long lead-time 
expensive. Hence local somcing is offered by foreign ~liers 
discouraged. (ill) Access to skilled manpower: discourages foreign soorcing, 
(IV) High duties and taxes make Due to low profitability levels, and encourages local 
small and medium firms employ soorcing. 
local products more expensive, less skilled workers. The 
hence discourage local soorcing. 
resulting ''poor'' quality products (iv) Access to foreign 
(v) High prices due to low volumes discourage outsourcing from exchange: Limited access to foreign exchange for sourcing 
discourage local sourcing. local SMEs. inputs discourages 
(IV) Quality control and testing outsourcing. Foreign funds 
procedores: Poor quality can be used if internal 
standards discourage local markets are used 
soorcing. (v) Lack of professionalism 
(v) Production methods used: by small firms discourages 
Obsolete production approaches large buy~ from using them 
lead to poor quality relative to 
currents standards expected by 
manufactor~. Hence because of 
p~ceive "poor" quality of 
products, local soorcing is 
discouraged 
Source: Field Notes (1992/1993) 
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Table 8-4 Perceive Factors Influencing Sourcing Activity - Buyer Related 
Quality Cost Availability and 
Reliability 
(i) Demands for high quality (i) Problems of economies of 
standards: Perceived low quality scale: proliferation of makes and 
of local suppliers and their models do not allow sufficient 
(i) Proliferation of makes and 
models leads to a perception 
of excessive demands on the 
capacity of small supplier. 
Because this affects the 
quality of local products, it 
discourages local soureing. 
products discourages local volumes. 1bis also prevents 
soureing specialisation, leading to poor 
Source: Field Notes (1992/1993) 
quality products. These 
discourage local soureing. 
(ii) High deletion penalties by (ii) In order to assure 
manufacturers discourages local themselves of availability and 
soureing. reliability of resource flows, 
one supplier has a supplier 
development programme. 
Cill) A lack of in-house 
capacity encourages local 
soureing. 
Table 8-5 Perceived Fadors influencing Sourcing Activity - Business 
Environment Related 
I Cost 
(i) Duties and taxes: High duties 
and taxes discourage local sourcing 
by making local inputs more 
expensive. 
(ii) Cost of raw materials: because 
of the high cost of local materials 
required by local suppliers, local 
sourcing is discouraged. 
Source: Field Notes (1992/1993) 
1 Quality 
(i) Legislation affecting acquisition 
of inputs by suppliers: Mandating 
for local soureing encourages local 
soureing. 
(ii) Perceived adverse macro-
economic conditions affecting 
availability of raw materials, 
finance, technology and skilled 
manpower to local suppliers 
discourage local sourcing. 
(ill) National business culture: 
Negative attitudes towards local 
products and services discourage 
local sourcing. 
(Iv) National business culture: 
Negative attitudes towards the 
products of small and medium-
sized firms discomage local 
sourcing. 
(i) Lack of foreign exchange for the 
procurement of CKDs and inputs 
for locally sourced parts and 
components 
Cri) Non-tariff restrictions to 
importation of some components. 
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Tables 8-3 to 8-5 above outline some of the main findings of the research. Four pre~nditi.ons for 
inter-finn relations are apparent. First, the buying finn must have the ability to dis-aggregate, 
predicated on various reasons for dis-aggregation or use of external sources (for example, the lack 
of internal capacity, the need to access resources and markets, etc.). Secondly, also important are 
the buyer's perceptions about the availability of suitable suppliers, particularly their ability to meet 
their quality, price and delivery requirements. These are influenced, in turn, by suppliers' 
technological and managerial capabilities to access and process resources and manpower to meet 
the needs of the buyer. Thirdly, according to Hanigan and Newmann (1990), inter-firm linkages 
are predicated on factors in the environment which condition the extent to which the buyers and 
sellers perceive the need to form linkages. These include those legislative and regulatory 
conditions which make it necessary to form such linkages, in this case, specific mandatory local 
sourcing required by the government; macro- issues which limit the growth of local suppliers; 
availability of skilled manpower, and regulations restricting the free flow of resources such as 
foreign exchange. 
Tables 8-3 to 8-5 present the factors as those discouraging local sourcmg ID prevailing 
circumstances, with a particular emphasis on the link between local sourcing and SMEs. The same 
factors encourage local sourcing within different contex.'ts. For example, model proliferation and 
rruuket fragmentation have been argued to be the main stimulants for large firm fragmentation in 
the context of the vehicle industries of developed economies (Hoffinan and Kaplinsky, 1988). In 
addition, it is clear that many of these factors are attitudinal. This implies that in order to promote 
inter-firm linkages their removal, or reversal of the processes by which these negative attitudes are 
created, should encourage local sourcing. 
Such findings have several practical and theoretical implications. Overall, the findings indicate that 
'necessity' is the dominant motive for any inter-firm linkage formation. Consequently, only 
mandated items are outsourced, although an unexpectedly high proportion of these is sourced from 
SMEs. However, other findings which further throw light on this finding follow. First, they refute 
the suggestion of the primacy of cost efficiency as suggested by Williamson (1975), in the 
formation of inter-firm relationships. In this case, inter-firm relations are used for reasons of 
necessity (Whetten, 1981). The findings also indicate that firms seek to stabilise their business 
environment to some extent by integrating, essentially to reduce the number of competitors in this 
environment. This is not swprising since business environments in developing countries have a 
high element of uncertainty, in addition to extreme scarcity of resources. It can be inferred from 
this discussion that where resources are scarce, stabilisation is achieved through integration rather 
than through inter-firm linkages. This contradicts Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) view that inter-firm 
relations are used to stabilise the business environment. 
259 
Secondly, other motivations for inter-finn linkages were evident in this study. As noted in chapter 
seven, for example, GMK has a supplier development programme developed at headquarters. 
Consequently, it was responding to coIpornte policy rather than to immediate commercial 
considerations to use local suppliers. It can be argued, therefore, that coxpornte policy plays an 
important role in GMK's sourcing behaviour, but as noted above, this could be short-lived since 
coIpornte policy at headquarters is detennined by factors largely beyond the control of their 
branches. 
Thirdly, although it does not come out explicitly in the interviews, there are possibilities that the 
assemblers are using local suppliers as a secondary motive to achieve legitimacy (DiMaggio, 
1988). Since the Kenyan Govemment launched its JUG kali development programme, large finDs 
have made efforts to contribute to the process, ostensibly, in order to contribute to 
industrialisation. However, sceptics may argue that this is but one way of ensuring that the 
government allocates resources to those who are seen to be contributing to its goals. However, as 
mentioned, this was not specifically captured in the study. It would be interesting to establish how 
much of current inter-finn relations is attributable to this motive, and the nature of the power 
distribution in the relationship. 
Finally, it is evident that a large number of the factors influencing the limited sourcing behaviour 
of the assemblers are attitudinal. This implies that it is the perceptions of the buyer which are 
important in initiating or continuing an inter-finn relationship. Consequently, theories which 
examine the external factors which explain inter-finn relationships are inappropriately focused on 
such factors, when in fact, it is the internal sourcing strntegies of buyers which influence the 
foonation ofinter-finn linkages. 
Figure 8-2 presents some tentative suggestions about the perceived factors affecting inter-finn 
linkages in the Kenyan context. Clearly, many of the factors presented in fig. 8-2 represent the 
perceptions of management about the conditions affecting their sourcing choices, and the process 
by which they search for solutions to their procurement challenges. As was stated in the 
introduction to this thesis, the perceptions of management about the feasibility of inter-finn 
relationships as an alternative procurement arrangement are critical in detennining whether such 
relationships can be developed in a particular environment. 
8.4 BUYER-SUPPLIER RELA nONS IN KENYA'S MOTOR INDUSTRY 
The nature of buyer-supplier relations is an indicator of whether buyers can 'support' small 
suppliers. As reported earlier (in chapter 4) Sako (1992) identified two contractual patterns - Ann's 
Length Contractual Relations (ACR) which she associates with buyer-supplier relations in Britain, 
and Obligational Contractual Relations (OCR) which she associates with Japanese buyer supplier 
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relations. ACR relations, because of their anus length treatment of the supplier, do not encourage 
SME development through buyer support. The study reported here found that buyer-supplier 
relations in the Kenyan motor vehicle industry are generally ACR, although GMK exhibited a less 
extreme variant of these relations. For example, all the assemblers and importers/distributors 
studied reported that they preferred to retain more than one supplier for each item as an asSUI3l1ce 
against excessive bargaining power by suppliers. In practice, however, two of the 
importer/distributors retained only one supplier in over 60% of the items outsourced, arguing that 
the scarcity of good quality suppliers made it difficult to find more than one supplier who could 
meet their needs. 
1. Need for Inter-firm linkage 
Attitudes towards SMEs 
Perceptions of Environment 
Attitudes towards 
local products 
5. Organisational Strategy 
. Macro~conomic factors 
Availability of Resources 
1. Supplier Characteristics 
2. Ability to meet buyer's needs 
3. Attitudes towards large buyers : 
4. Attitudes towards linkages .' 
:: 3. Availability of Skilled Manpower 
. 4. Regulatory environment 
5. Market conditions 
Fig. 8-2 Fadors Influencing Inter-firm Linkages in Kenya's Motor Industry. 
A second demonstration of ACR relations within the sector is the low level of information 
exchange during the life of an order (Sako, 1992). This means that suppliers only have information 
pertinent to the order (specifications and standards), and little, if any, information about the general 
OIganisation of each other's production and administrative processes. According to Sako (I 992) 
this reduces the level of trust, and has potential for opportunistic behaviour by either party. 
Arguably, therefore, this buyer-supplier relations environment does not provide opportunities for 
'voluntary' outsourcing by buyers. Additionally, because buyers and sellers are seeking 
profitability individually, they act in self interest, hence changing suppliers at will to maintain 
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bargaining power, or indeed sourcing from foreign suppliers, becomes appealing if there are no 
obligations between the parties. A lack of supplier development activities in all the cases, with the 
exception of GMK, implies that there is no motivation to 'nurture' local suppliers. 
Consequently, supplier development activities were found to be limited. GMK was the only 
assembler with a specific supplier development policy. It would appear that this is related to the 
way GMK is OIganised for production. It is the only assembler which makes sourcing decisions 
both as an assembler and importer None of the importer/distributor companies associated with 
KVM and A V A have supplier development activities either. The only supplier development 
activity that may be inferred from the case studies is the transfer of technology through blueprints 
and training provided by the manufucturer. One possible explanation is the anus-length nature of 
their association with suppliers. 
The contractual patterns exhibited by all of the cases studied further demonstrate their ACR 
orientation, demonstrated by multiple sourcing, absence of long-tenn contractual agreements, and 
a limited exchange of communication beyond the specifications of a particular order. Expectedly, 
this kind of frameworlc introduces high levels of uncertainty for suppliers, particularly when they 
are dependent on the buyer. SMEs would be vulnerable in the sense that they would have 
difficulties in coping with such extreme variability, particularly if assets are dedicated to the needs 
of one or a few buyers. This implies that policy intended to stimulate local sourcing has to address 
these issues. On a practical level, for example, specific requirements for contracts between buyers 
and suppliers would help ameliorate the uncertainty for both buyers and suppliers. 
This discussion confinns that finns act in self interest and only take those decisions which assure 
them survival and competitiveness in the short-run. In two of the case studies discussed in chapter 
seven, supplier development was seen as an added cost, and thus considered to be managerially 
unsound in the short-run. Interestingly, it is the uncertainty of the political and economic 
environments which were cited as the causes of this short-tennist behaviour. This short-tennism is 
reflected, not surprisingly, in the buyer-supplier relations. In two of the cases, an element of 
opportunism is also reported. 
Again this has important implications for policy. Stability and the relative certainty of the business 
and political environments are key factors in the use and development of SMEs by huge buyers. 
Uncertain environments elicit defensive behaviour. 
8.5 FORMING INTER-FIRM RELATIONSHIPS WITH SMES 
As stated previously (chapters 1-5), the prospects of huge finns fonning inter-finn linkages with 
small finns is predicated on the large finn's propensity to fonn linkages with other finns, 
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particularly with small finns. This, it was argued, is predicated on their motivation to use small 
firms as suppliers or partners. From the research, it is evident that one of the critical factors 
influencing inter-finn linkages in the sector is the buyers' attitude towards the suppliers in tenus of 
their ability to meet (buyers') requirements. This refers to buyer perceptions of supplier 
characteristics and the ability of these to satisfy the buyers' needs. Several issues become apparent 
from the case studies presented in chapter seven about buyer preferences of supplier 
characteristics. First, buyers are interested in quality suppliers reganlless of size. This is defined as 
those suppliers who can deliver acceptable quality, competitively and reliably. This confinns the 
contention of the vertical integration literature that finns integrate vertically because of perceived 
mmket failure brought about by, among other things, 'unacceptable' suppliers. 
However, the finding that on average, approximately 65% of the suppliers to the sector can be 
categorised as small or medium finus suggests that there are other factors influencing large finn 
local sourcing behaviour. This relatively large proportion of SME suppliers contradicts 
expectations that large buyers will be reluctant to transact with small firms because of their 
perceived and reported "poor quality, unreliability, and lack of professionalism" as discussed in 
chapter four. The study reveals that buyers do perceive suppliers to be of low quality, with 
incompatible and incongruent technologies and production modes. However, this does not 
correspond with the subsequent finding that despite these weaknesses, there seems to a more use 
of small and medium suppliers than large ones. Arguably, therefore, the quality of suppliers does 
not present the whole picture here. Two other factors were found to impact on this high level of 
use of small and medium suppliers. First, as already discussed in chapter seven, the finns in the 
study use small and medium finns because of compulsory local sourcing. Secondly, against this 
background, small and medium small finns are used because buyers are faced with a mmket where 
there are only a few suppliers in many components and parts sub-sectors, and because of the 
fragmented small mmkets, these tend to be the small and medium sized finns. 
Hence, this finding suggests that the structure of an industry is important in the fonnation and use 
of inter-finn linkages. A small number of suppliers limits the extent to which large finns can 
exploit the opportunities to dis-aggregate and use external suppliers because of the lack of 
alternatives. Secondly, it suggests that the lack of flexibility in large finns themselves limits the 
extent to which they select strategies such as inter-finn linkages. Flexible specialisation theories 
argue that the basis of using inter-finn linkages is their search for flexibility, hence the use of small 
and medium finns which themselves are flexible enough to cope with variety, or allow the large 
finn to introduce flexibility into its own schedule by 'buying-in' capacity, technology and skills. 
Finally, this finding suggests that a fiagmented consumer maIket does not necessarily lead to 
extemalisation, or indeed, to the use of small and medium finns. In the case studies presented in 
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chapter seven, large finns have been shown to be reluctant to deal with local small suppliers due to 
perceived weaknesses arising from market fragmentation. 
8.6 BUYER PERCEPTIONS OF SMEs AND BUYER PREFERENCES OF SUPPLIER 
CHARACTERISTICS 
From the cases, it is evident that buyer perceptions of SMEs significantly impact on sourcing from 
such SMEs. In all the cases, it was reported that in principle, large buyers have no prejudice 
against SMEs. However, in practice, SMEs in Kenya do not appear to possess the managerial and 
technological capacity to provide the quality required by the industry. This means that according to 
large filID decision makers, it is the weaknesses of the SMEs themselves that are problematic to 
the promotion of linkages with large finns. AIguably, this is a one sided view from the large finns' 
perspective, but it is, nevertheless, the buyer's perceptions of potential suppliers that are critical in 
developing linkages between large and small finns . As was argued in chapter three, sourcing 
decisions are hugely based on the buyer's interpretation of the ability of the potential and existing 
suppliers to meet their requirements. Hence, if the buyer perceives that existing suppliers cannot 
meet their requirements, the tendency will be to vertically integrate or to use alternative sources. It 
is important to note that this has little to do with the Teality' of supplier suitability, but rather a 
question of perception and attitude. Theories which aim to develop frameworks for SME 
development through this vehicle have, therefore, to take buyer perceptions and attitudes seriously, 
while practical progrnmmes aimed at developing SMEs through strategic alliances, joint ventures, 
or sub-contracting folIDS of linkages with large filIDS need to address the specific perceived 
problems. For example, it is unlikely that any progrnmmes which aim to develop such linkages 
will succeed if large buyers do not perceive that the quality, cost and delivery taIgets they set in 
their organisations can be met by local suppliers. 
8.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to bring together the findings reported in chapter seven, discussing 
their implications. It has been argued that currently, under existing politico-economic 
arrangements, despite the amenability of production organisation to outsourcing, there are limited 
prospects for SME development through linkages with large finns in Kenya's motor vehicle 
industry. First, outsourcing by large finns is limited to mandated items, and existing arrangements 
discourage further outsourcing. In the absence of mandates, large finns would prefer to source 
from suppliers overseas as these are perceived to offer better quality products. Consequently, it 
would appear that the received models explaining inter-fiIID relationship folIDation take for 
granted that the market is efficient, allowing the assumption that decision-makers are confronted 
only with the choice between alternatives of production organisation. It has emerged, for example, 
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that local sourcing, and hence sourcing from local small finns is predicated on coercive legislation. 
An interesting 'political' dimension is thus introduced. Secondly, opportunities for various types of 
linkages with SMEs exist, but these are currently attributed to the somewhat negative factor of 
lack of alternative suppliers for many items. In the long run, this will not sustain small-large finn 
linkages as there is potential for SOUTCing from alternative sources when opportunities present 
themselves. For example, removing legislated sourcing requirements could mean that overseas 
sources could be used. Indeed, anecdotal evidence was given by an industry observer, that 
importers have frequently used 'loopholes' in the regulatory system to obtain No Objection 
Certificates to source from overseas. 
Various factors discouraging or encouraging local sourcing were identified. These fall into three 
broad categories: factors related to the macro~nvironment within which the finns are operating, 
the most critical being government influences; factors (as perceived by the large buyers) relating to 
the nature and behaviour of the local suppliers, many of whom are small and medium-sized :fi.nn; 
factors relating to the buyers themselves. It is clear that most of these factors relate to the limited 
number of suppliers in the sector, and the perceived 'weakness' of the supplier base. However, 
opportunities do exist. Buyers are, in principal, willing to buy from SMEs, although their reasons 
for using local small finns have limited prospects for increased trnnsactions between large and 
small finns. Policy must focus, therefore, on the removal of these impediments, and on changing 
the perceptions of SMEs held by large buyers. 
The chapter also discusses the buyer-supplier relations within the sector, arguing that their 
distinctively ACR nature discourages inter-firm relations in general and does not provide the 
opportunity for supplier development. If inter-finn relationships are to be used as a vehicle for 
SME development, large finns 'must' have the motivation to develop, at least, their small and 
medium suppliers. In the prevailing business climate, however, where buyers are concerned with 
short-term profits, supplier development is considered to be an unwanted cost. 
Under such circumstances it seems unlikely that large finns will source from these finns, or 
transfer technology and skills to them. Thus, few inter-finn linkages with SMEs can be expected, 
and the development of the indigenous small finn sector of the economy through formation of 
large-small finn linkages seem to have limited practical applicability in a country such as Kenya 
However, there is evidence from the case studies that the Kenya vehicle assembly firms will 
source locally, and from small and medium-sized enteIprises, ifmandated to do so. While further 
legal mandating may be deemed, currently, to be the only practical strategy for promoting 
linkages, it may be necessary for the government to work with the Kenyan motor vehicle industry 
to develop a programme of incentives which will encourage both the use of local small business 
suppliers and their technological and commercial development Clearly, it is in the long-term 
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interests of both the motor vehicle industry in Kenya and the government to ensure the growth of 
local small firm suppliers in order to benefit from the current global motor vehicle industry 
restructuring encapsulated in the processes of flexible specialisation or lean production (see 
chapters 2, 3 and 4) and the development of a strengthened local economy. At the same time, 
however, care must be taken to ensure that the country's small firms do not become over-
dependent on anyone client or market sector. However, although currently, the structure of the 
supplier base described in the case studies does not appear to be a problem since most suppliers 
serve more than one client, and all of the firms studied are reluctant to be dependent on one 
supplier, there is potential for collusion by the clients since they are few in number. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarises the study and presents some rruYor conclusions of the research. It also 
presents some theoretical and policy recommendations for promoting large-small finn linkages in 
Kenya, and indeed, other developing countries, and considers the theoretical implications of the 
findings . 
9.1 SUMMARY 
The research aimed to explore the prospects for SME development through linkages with large 
finns in Kenya by exploring the production organisation and sourcing strategies of large firms in 
the county's motor vehicle industry. It has been argued in the thesis that despite the positive 
e).-periences of countries which have used the complementarity of large and small finns in their 
industrialisation, few developing countries have used this as a deliberate strategy for SME 
development. Kenya falls within this latter category. It has also been argued that in the particular 
case of Kenya, because of the historical emphasis by policy makers on large finns, SMEs have 
continued to remain weak and unable to support the needs oflarge finns in industry. It was argued, 
therefore, that in order to take advantage of the potential of the complementarity between large and 
small finns, a linkage strategy is e).-pedient. Yet, there is limited knowledge about how to motivate 
large finns to fonn linkages with SMEs as suppliers. It was argued in chapter five, as does Masai 
(1991), that like other developing countries ridden by infrastructural problems, large finns in 
Kenya are likely to have limited linkages with small finns, mainly due to the perceived 
weaknesses of the small finns themselves as suppliers of components and services. It was 
important, therefore, to understand how large finns organise themselves for production, and 
whether this organisation offers any prospects for small enterprise development through inter-finn 
linkages such as sub~ntracting, joint ventures or strategic alliances. It entails, therefore, 
examining their sourcing strategies and the motivations behind them as an indicator of the 
possibility of future use of similar strategies . 
From a review of the literature addressing the issue of inter-finn linkage formation, it was 
detennined that theories which abstract from efficiency paradigms, such as those suggested by 
Williamson (1975) and Porter (1985) provide important, but not sufficient explanations for the 
choice by large finns to buy from small finns in Kenya This research suggests that while keeping 
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cost considerations in mind, the motivation behind the large finD.'s sourcmg strategies 15 a 
combination of the pursuit of market power through distinctive access to quality products, and the 
need to comply with legal requirements, essentially as an assurance against exclusion from 
participating in the economy. Hence, inter-finD. relations have been hypothesised to be determined 
by the extent to which buyers perceive that they can access markets and resources. In other words, 
the extent to which they perceive the existence of suitable suppliers for their needs. 
In order to address the research problem, a case study approach was adopted. The sourcing 
behaviour and inter-finD. relations of the three large Kenyan vehicle assemblers and four of their 
constituent 'importers' were studied. In~epth interviews were conducted using interview guides 
containing open-ended questions. The data was analysed using qualitative approaches. The 
research is based on the thesis that in order to promote large finn-small finn linkages, it is critical 
to understand the factors which influence the soureing behaviour of large firms . Hence, the case 
studies were structured around the sourcing activities of the assemblers, and their constituent 
'importers', who hold the franchises for the importation of CKD kits in Kenya. Local soureing was 
used as a surrogate measure of outsourcing on the grounds that Kenya does not have local vehicle 
manufacturing capacity. An important extension related to the thesis of this research is that local 
finD.s in the components sector tend to be small or medium sized £inns (Masai, 1991), hence, 
suggesting a relationship between local soureing in the motor vehicle industry and the use of small 
and medium sized £inns as suppliers. A concomitant dimension involved the analysis of the 
general buyer-supplier relations within the sector, which helps to contextualise the reluctance of 
large buyers to outsource. It is also within this context that the study was extended to examine 
large finn attitudes towards small suppliers, and the prospects for linkage fonnation at this level. 
The resulting findings are presented as case studies in chapter seven and eight of this thesis. 
9.2 MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In conceiving this study, assumptions were made that a size distribution of production between 
large and small finns in Kenya would contribute to the alleviation of the current economic crisis, 
and to the development of SMEs. Based on the positive experiences of Japan, South East Asia, 
Gennany and others, it was further assumed that this distribution could be achieved through the 
promotion of inter-finD. linkages within all industries. It is further suggested that Kenya could 
benefit from the local sourcing activities of existing finns, as one strategy towards the 
development of a local (indigeneous?) manufacturing sector. However, as argued by authors such 
as Masai (1991) and Coughlin (1991), and also from anecdotal and experiential evidence, it was 
assumed that there is a problem in developing inter-finD. linkages of all types between large and 
small £inns in Kenya. 
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Two questions were pertinent in investigating this problem: Do large firms in Kenya's motor 
vehicle industIy, through external sourcing activities, offer any prospects for SME development? 
As already mentioned, it was argued that this question could be addressed by examining the 
sourcing behaviour of large firms, particularly sub-contract:ing. It was particularly important to 
understand the motivations behind sourcing behaviour, and how these affect decisions about inter-
finn linkages. This led to the second question: What factors influence their sourcing behaviour, 
and do these offer opportunities for SME development? This involved the analysis of the factors 
influencing managerial choices to source from local SME firms, and large buyers attitudes 
towards SMEs as suppliers. 
The emergent picture from the research confirms expectations. Overall, the study lends support to 
the argument that for various reasons, largely related to market failure, and the limited potential for 
exploiting scale economies due to limited markets, large firms in Kenya's motor vehicle industry 
are reluctant to outsource 'voluntarily' from local small firms. Consequently, given the prevailing 
conditions in the business environment, and despite the amenability of the vehicle assembly 
industIy to production organisation dis-aggregation, prospects for SME development through 
linkages with large firms are minimal. Whatever outsourcing exists (mainly sub-contract:ing of 
components) is stimulated by legislation, and even then, efforts are made to use alternative 
sources, for example, foreign suppliers. This seems to support Doners (1993) analysis of the effect 
of mandating on local sourcing in some South East Asian countries. However, this research also 
found that the extent to which such mandating precipitates voluntary local sourcing is limited. h is 
doubtful, therefore, whether mandating alone will stimulate local sourcing, or ind~ linkages 
between large and small finns . h has to be accompanied by schemes which facilitate expansion of 
the domestic car market, and at the same time initiating export schemes. In addition, the process 
by which CKDs are compiled has an effect on the adoption of local sourcing strategies. It was 
highlighted in the findings in chapter seven that one of the most important factors limiting local 
sourcing is the deletion penalty imposed by the manufacturers of CKDs. This implies that Kenya 
as a country has little control, if any, on the industry's activities, and local assemblers are largely 
responding to decisions made by the principal manufacturers. This brings to question how realistic 
a recommendation for local sourcing is in the prevailing environment. Countries such as Korea 
and Taiwan have used the logic of economic nationalism to justify localisation even if initially, 
they found few economic advantages for doing so (Donner, 1991). 
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items. Hence, access implies competitive advantage. Compliance is viewed, therefore, within the 
framework of accessing future resources over which the government has a significant control. 
Consequently, the outsourcing activities in the sector are limited to those items mandated. 
In addition, despite reporting an indifference to the size of their supplier, huge firms in the motor 
vehicle industry perceive Kenya's small and medium-sized enterprises in the components industry 
to be of poor quality and unreliable. By reference to the analysis of the manufucturing industry 
presented in chapter five, in prevailing business circumstances, it is unlikely that this desired level 
of quality will be found in small and medium firms in Kenya. This scenario suggests that 
outsourcing from small firms is limited by perceived market failure brought about by a perceived 
absence of 'quality' suppliers. Quality suppliers were defined by the respondents as those suppliers 
who could supply quality, competitively priced components or services in good time, all the time. 
In other words, quality and reliability were of primary concern. Cost considerations were reported 
to be secondary. This generally agrees with the vertical integration literature which posits that 
firms adjust to market failure by integrating. On the other hand, it negates Williamson's (1975) 
proposal of the primacy of cost in sourcing decisions, and suggests that instead, firms are 
motivated by a combination of factors including the need to comply with government regulations 
as an assurance of access to licenses and foreign exchange allocations. 
A second emergent picture is that buyer-supplier relations are distinctively anus-length, with little 
or no supplier development activity in the sector. This short-tennist orientation affects the buyer's 
attitude towanis suppliers. It is difficult, therefore, to envisage large firm support of small 
enterprises as a strategy for increasing the supply of good 'quality' suppliers, thus limiting the 
eAtent to which the perceived market failure can be alleviated by the private sector itself Secondly, 
it offers little opportunity for SME development through technology transfer and training. 
9.3 IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The implications of the research fall into two broad categories: those relating to theory; and those 
relating to the practical problem of promoting linkages between large and small firms in Kenya, 
and developing countries in general. 
9.3.1. IMPUCATIONS FOR THEORY 
This research was conceived in view of the current global trends in industrial development where 
fragmentation and inter-firm relationships are used as a strategy for organisational and national 
competitiveness. This approach argues that as firms respond to environmental pressures, they are 
adopting downsizing strategies (lean production) in order to achieve efficiency. This study reveals 
that this process is not as obvious in Kenya's motor vehicle industry. Finns are reluctant to use 
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external SOUIreS of supply. They continue to obtain a large proportion of their requirements from 
their sister companies. Additionally, they procure their CKD kits from principle suppliers, based 
on the argument oflack of supply in the local environment. Consequently, it can be argued that the 
existence of SOUIreS of supply play an important role in encouraging inter-fum relations. This 
implies that prospects for inter-fum relationship fonnation are currently limited. By extension, the 
related benefits of dis-aggregation such as flexibility of labour and production are limited. This 
supports Kaplinsky and Posthuma's (1993) finding regarding the limited adoption of JIT 
techniques in developing countries. 
The study also reveals that large finns outsource in response to government mandating rather than 
to purely rational economic decisions. This contradicts two elements of the literature. First, it 
contradicts the literature which suggests that finns form inter-fum linkages as an outcome of 
economic considerations of efficiency and effectiveness. The study supports, therefore, the 
alternative contention that other motivations influence the use of inter-fum relationships. 
Consequently, in designing inter-firm relationship promotion programmes, it is critical to include 
other possible influencing factors such as the effect of legislation which mandates extemal 
sourcing or control of vertical integration, or requires finns to use inter-fum linkages. Secondly, it 
contradicts the primacy of cost minimisati.on advocated by students of transaction cost theory. h 
was found that other factors motivate inter-fum linkage fonnation, in this case, the desire to 
comply with government regulation as an assurance against being denied access to resoUIreS and 
markets. Consequently, strategies for the promotion of SMEs must consider the extent to which 
finns perceive inter-fum relationships as 'necessary' rather than as a rational, economic 
consideration about cost minimisati.on. This finding also suggests that finns form inter-fum 
linkages because of a combination of reasons. This contradicts the generic inter-fum relationship 
theory which analyses the various motivations separately, and supports Oliver's (1990) contention 
that there is need to rethink approaches to inter-fum relationship theorisation. Further research is a 
needed, therefore, to establish the inter-relationship between the various motivations, and also the 
relative importance of each one to company decisions. 
Another implication for theory suggests that the limited inter-firm relationships obselVed in the 
Kenyan motor vehicle industry can be attributed to attitudinal issues which impact on managerial 
sourcing decisions. For example, the perception that local suppliers are of relatively poor quality 
and unable to supply required quantities has implications for the supplier search process, generally 
tending to overlook local possibilities. It is also possible that due to this attitudinal orientation, 
large finns are even less likely to use small local firms. This finding supports the a priori 
assumption made by the study that in order to understand inter-fum linkage fonnation, it is critical 
to analyse the large finn's propensity and motivation to fonn linkages with small local suppliers. 
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However, it seems that in order to promote linkages between large and small finns, four pre-
conditions are critical: the ability of the large finn to dis-aggregate, based on its motivations to do 
so; its motivation to use external suppliers; its attitudes towards using SMEs as suppliers; and its 
perception about the business environment, particularly that regarding the regulatory and economic 
environments. Consequently, strntegies which aim to promote inter-finn linkages must focus on 
the large finns' motivations towards suppliers, rather than focus on external factors. This approach 
is useful in arguing, for example, that verti~ integration and internal transfers are stimulated by a 
finn's perception of the efficiency of input markets. Hence, market efficiency encourages inter-firm 
linkages, while market failure contributes to vertical integration. Strategies which remove those 
factors which lead to marlret failure are considered, therefore, to be appropriate for promoting 
linkages. 
Finally, this study suggests that while there appear to be prospects for SME development through 
linkages with large finns, the pre-conditions for the realisation of this goal are far from clear. 
Consequently, there is need to test the tentative propositions developed in chapter eight. 
9.3.2 IMPUCATIONS FOR SME PROMOTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
This study contributes towards a framework for analysing and promoting SMEs through linkages 
between small and large finns by highlighting the role of legislation in the promotion of inter-finn 
linkages in a developing country context. 
The study also supports the asswnption that there are prospects for inter-finn linkages in 
developing countIy contexts, although these have to be deliberately promoted by developing a 
specific policy which addresses current impediments to their promotion. h suggests that. in a 
developing country context, inter-finn relationships are less likely to be used 'voluntarily. by large 
finns as their attitude towards local inputs is negative. It also implies that this negative attitude is a 
function of the large finns' perception of market inefficiency - the ability of existing suppliers, if 
any, to supply required inputs in required quantities, at appropriate prices. 
Secondly, it highlights the role of the state in promoting linkages between large and small finns. 
The study's revelation that large finns outso~ only mandated items implies that other incentives 
(alternatives) are not 4nmediately available to managers in the sector. For example, all the finns in 
the study argued that they were prevented from using local suppliers by the weaknesses they 
perceive in the SlijJplier base. 
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9.3.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR SME PROMOTION IN KENYA 
The study reported here confinns the widely held view, in Kenya, that the negative attitude of 
large finns towards small local suppliers limits the prospects for linkages. These predominately 
atti:tudinal explanations to the limited use of inter-finn linkages include doubts about the quality of 
local products. While the objectivity of these contentions was not tested in this study, it is 
important to consider their impact on the use of local suppliers. It was argued earlier that it is the 
perceptions and managerial decisions made by large finns that influence industry behaviour. 
Consequently, strategies which aim to promote large finn-small finn linkages must take the 
motivations of these fiIDls seriously. Such strategies will have to address the 'weaknesses' 
attributed to the local inputs markets, while simultaneously encouraging large buyers to use those 
inputs available, and to develop those not available in conjunction with small local suppliers. 
Evidence presented in chapters seven and eight suggests that these weaknesses are related, largely, 
to the nature and impact of the macro~vironment. Hence, this approach requires government 
support in teIDlS of resources, and a conducive environment. 
Secondly, the study found that mandating generates some inter-finn relationship fOIDlation. This 
implies that finns are concerned about their relationship with the state, and the effect of the state 
on their access to resources and markets. This COnfiIDlS the literature on managing in developing 
countries which suggests that the role of the state in deteIDlining the business environment is 
critical. This finding can be used to advantage by the government by using selective regulatory 
measures which address the particular deficiencies in large finn behaviour. For example, selective 
import restrictions could help encourage the development of some input sectors with a view to 
encouraging local supplier development. In addition, such import restriction could prevent the 
'collapse' of strategic industries, such as the vehicle assembly industry. However, this strategy 
would need to be accompanied by specific incentives to ameliorate the effects of reduced 
competition in domestic markets. 
Finally, it was found that AV A and KVM, whose model of production organisation includes 
constituent importers/distributors, do not have a specific supplier development programme, use 
multiple sources of suppliers for their requirements, and do not encourage long-teIDl relations with 
suppliers. This short-temtist approach to industrial organisation is, arguably, the result of the lack 
of economic incentives within the industry for finns to seek. long-teIDl benefits from their 
production organisation strategies. Strategies which aim to develop SMEs through linkages, 
therefore, have to address this problem, mainly by developing cohesive long-range 
industrialisation policies which encourage long-range perspectives by managers. Currently, the 
fiequent market fuilure and uncertainties in the business environment encourage opportunistic 
behaviour by both buyers and suppliers. 
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9.3.4IMPUCATIONS FOR KENYA'S MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 
Finally, there are implications for the motor vehicle industIy in particular. This study has re-stated 
empirically the suggestion made by Masai (1991) and others that vehicle assemblers make limited 
use of local small suppliers for their input needs . It also helps to clarify some issues about Kenya's 
motor vehicle industry. 
The study reveals that based on the number of makes and models assembled by each assembler, 
the Kenyan vehicle market is heavily fragmented. In industrialised coun1ries, this fragmentation is 
argued to be the basis for large firm dis-aggregation and the use of smaller units of production in 
search offlexibility. In Kenya, however, this was found to con1ribute significantly to the perceived 
'undesirability' of local suppliers. On the one hand, the components sub-sector was viewed as 
'weak' and unable to meet the demands of the assembly sub-sector. On the other hand, the 
components sub-sector was set up earlier than the assembly sub-sector and might be expected to 
have developed adequately to serve the needs of the sector. Hence, this finding has two 
implications: that the supplier market has not developed at the rate expected to meet the needs of a 
growing vehicle assembly sector, or that managers are not objective about their assessment of the 
supplier alternatives. 
If the first case is indeed 'true" then strategies which aim to develop the motor vehicle industry, or 
indeed manufacturing industry in general, must first examine the reasons for the failure of local 
finns to 'grow' and acquire their capabilities to provide high quality products to buyers. For 
example, issues of access to technology, finance, foreign exchange, and skilled manpower, which 
have been argued by large firms in this study to limit their use of local suppliers, have to be 
addressed in order to facilitate the growth of a 'sophisticated' local supplier base. In addition, 
standardisation of parts and components through rationalisation of makes and models could 
increase specialisation, and perhaps allow some firms to achieve economies of scale at plant level. 
It: on the other hand, the second case is 'true', then strategies which seek to change large firms 
attitudes towards small firms are required. This may be accomplished by adopting the strategies 
outlined in the preceding paragraphs to 'improve' the attractiveness of small local suppliers. It may 
also be accomplished by presenting large buyers with the incentives to use local supplier rather 
than overseas suppliers, or indeed internal transfers. One approach is to increase the relative cost 
competitiveness oflocal firms through tariffs on imports. 
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9.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
9.4.1 PRoBLEMS OF CONCEPIUALISING THE RESEARCH ISSUES 
The research problem concerns the understanding of how inter-firm relationships are formed 
between large and small finns . The vast body of literature available 'explains' linkage formation as 
an outcome of structural dis-aggregation by organisations. Yet, the actual social process of linkage 
formation is equally important. A more powerful approach than that used in this study would have 
been to establish, first, the relationship between organisational dis-aggregation, and the politico-
social process of inter-firm linkage formation. Given the time limitations, this study did not pursue 
this strategy. In addition to the general lack of knowledge about linkage formation between large 
and small finns, it was difficult to conceptualise the research issues 
This led to the general problem of identifying and defining the concepts to be studied. In an 
attempt to avoid the 'slavish' use of concepts, the cross~ approach was used to analyse the data 
collected. Obviously, this does not satisfy the critics of the case study approach. Having said that, 
it is believed that the empirical exploration exercise has resulted in a number of valuable findings. 
Chapter eight outlines the results of this exercise. 
9.4.2 MEmODOWGY AND REsEARCH DESIGN 
This study has not reviewed the SME perspective. By this omission, the research is conspicuously 
lacking in balance of opinion. In chapter one, it was stated that for various reasons, the emphasis of 
this study would be on the large firm (buyer). Consequently, the analysis of the suppliers was 
considered to be an integral part of the study despite the particular focus on the buyer. A third 
phase of the study was, therefore, to pursue this line of enquiry. However, an early focusing of the 
study was required. This was achieved by pursuing the sourcing strategies of large finns, and then 
pursuing their specific suppliers. This starting point is considered by the author to offer the first 
building blocks to what appears to be a complex research agenda 
Two outcomes of the effort to include the SME supplier finns discouraged further activity along 
these lines: out of the thirty suppliers identified and targeted, only seven agreed to be interviewed 
and/or to complete a questionnaire (see copy of questionnaire in Appendix D). Secondly, of the ten 
questions asked, only four were answered comprehensively, while the most critical questions 
attempting to find out the eAtent of linkage with buyers were not answered. Further investigation 
revealed that as in the case of the large buyers, suppliers in the motor vehicle industry were 
experiencing the debilitating effects of the recession coupled with extreme industry uncertainty. 
They were reluctant, therefore, to give indications of the extent of their interaction with their 
buyers. 
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h was also clear that because most of these suppliers are small or medium sized, often family 
owned Asian businesses, full participation in the study would be difficult. Such businesses usually 
exhibit high levels of secrecy and reticence, particularly when they are not 'fumiliat with the 
person asking questions. 
Due to its exploratory nature, the study reported here does not test the hypotheses it suggests. 
Consequently, it will be necessary to test the various hypotheses and issues raised in the findings, 
since, due to temporal and resource limitations, these could not be tested within the scope of this 
PhD. This is suggested as a future line of investigation in section 9.5.2 below. 
These methodological limitations suggest that future research in a developing country context 
must consider them and provide for them if a methodological balance is to be achieved. In 
addition, future investigations must not underestimate the 10gistica1 and operational difficulties of 
conducting research in a developing country such as Kenya. Political, social, economic and 
cultural factors invalidate many of the 'tried and tested' approaches taken for granted in developed 
economies (Austin, 1990). For example, it was difficult to obtain responses about future industry 
behaviour as respondents were uncertain about the outcome of ongoing political changes in the 
country at the time of the study. 
Finally, it is clear that survey data would have been useful in augmenting the case study 
methodology, not as a way of 'supporting' the qualitative data, but as a way of establishing genernl 
trends at industry and sub-sector levels (Miles and Hubennan., 1984). For example, at the 
commencement of the research, it was not clear what the nature of inter-firm linkages was, or what 
fonus of linkages were more prevalent. It was not appropriate, therefore, to structure the study 
around particular trends and patterns, or particular forms of inter-firm linkages. While this was 
eventually found beneficial in that it reduced the bias towards certain fonus of such relations, the 
study had to cast its nets wide by investigating inter-firm linkages in general, rather than say, sub-
contracting, strategic alliances or joint ventures as particular fonus of inter-firm relationships. 
Clearly, this research is not without its limitations. However, it has provided a useful starting point 
in understanding the nature and motivations for inter-finn linkages in a developing country context 
such as Kenya, and has provided the foundations for further empirical research. The proposals 
presented in this thesis need to be tested on a wider scale, both in Kenya and elsewhere. 
9.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations for future actions evolve from the outcomes and limitations of this 
particular research. Although it is a context specific study, both policy and theoretical 
recommendations can be made. 
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9.5.1 POliCY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The policy recornmendations are made relative to the three levels of action envisaged: the 
government; the large finns (buyers); and the SMEs (suppliers). This strategy is two phased: (i) 
encourage vertical de-integration by removing those factors which encourage vertical integration; 
and (ii) encourage linkages by developing an incentive package which addresses the weaknesses of 
the small enterprise sector, and reduces the negative attitudes oflmge finns towards small firms. 
Recommendations for Government 
This study suggests that what little outsourcing by large finns exists is attributable to compulsory 
local sourcing requirements. This supports the findings of other studies such as those of the 
UNIDO Expert Group on the Role and Promotion of Subcontract:ing in Industrial Development 
(1969) and Masai (1991). However, it is clear that legislation alone does not lead to 'voluntary' 
outsourcing or to inter-firm linkages. The issues raised in this study suggest that inter-firm linkage 
formation is limited by market failure, brought about by the limited number of suppliers who are 
able to meet the requirements oflarge buyers. While arguing for limited 'interference' by the state, 
it is critical that the business environment has adequate economic incentives for firms to outsource 
flum local finns rather than use compulsory sourcing strategies. The government can make the 
business environment conducive for both small and large firms to seek economic returns through 
macro-level reforms. For example, foreign exchange and inflationary issues were reported to have 
adversely affected the competitiveness of local finns relative to foreign suppliers. Consequently, 
they were reported to be inappropriate by local Imge buyers. In addition, through specific 
initiatives such as duty and tax exemptions and other direct assistance for companies sourcing 
flum SMEs, the government can facilitate intrinsically motivated behaviour to outsource flum 
local small finns . As mentioned by Doner (1993), Korea has successfully used strategies such as 
tax incentives for buyers to encourage voluntary modernisation of small local suppliers through the 
transfer of technology and managerial know-how. The Kenyan government could also use 
selective controls on imports, as well as selective subsidies for large finns, as a strategy for 
stimulating the motivation to use local inputs. 
Secondly, the government must put into place a specific and coherent policy framework within 
which firms can operate as buyers and suppliers. This includes legal reforms which penalise 
excessive vertical integration while increasing incentives for de-integration and local sourcing. For 
example, the Monopolies Control and Price Control Commission should be strengthened and 
equipped to implement the various pieces of legislation which attempt to control concentration of 
industry. This calls for a transformation of the economy through a competitive policy which 
recognises the positive stimuli coming flum the entry of new producers, and the exit of 
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established, but less competitive firms. This does not mean that the government should aim to 
control the growth of the large firms. As KiIby (1984:55) stresses, the relationship between large 
and small finns should be symbiotic but in order to maximise productivity, both large and small 
finns must perceive a need for each other. This is not likely to be developed by perpetuating an 
adversarial relationship between the small and large firms sectors. Rather, efforts must be made 
through training schemes and other incentives, to encourage large firms to develop small firms 
voluntarily, a situation which has prevailed in Japan for some time (Sato, 1989). 
It is also critical to address the supply side of the equation. Current small enterprise development 
programmes do not deliberately address the potential of large-small finn linkages. First, such 
assistance programmes should be aimed specifically at increasing the 'quality' of small firms 
through resource assistance, in particular, aiming to modernise the sector. Again, the Korean 
example offers important lessons. Tax incentives have been used as a strategy for the 
modernisation of small and medium enterprises, in addition to other strategies such as the 
allocation of financial and foreign exchange resources; promotion of supplier cartels; mandating 
the frequency of payment of suppliers by buyers; reseIVation of markets for small and medium 
finns; and the banning of prime contractors from buying SMEs through stock ownership (Doner, 
1993). In this context, specific technology acquisition programmes can be supported through the 
various assistance organisations, in addition to assisting large firms to transfer technology to small, 
local suppliers. In addition, management training and capacity building in the various training 
institutions is critical. 
Having said that, it is critical for policy makers to be aware of the finding that owner-assemblers 
(the GMK 'model') are more likely to link backwards than franchise assemblers (A V A and KVM 
contractors). By implication, there is need to consider limiting the size, or the decision-making 
powers of the franchisefImporter category. 
Secondly, the government must institute legal refonns which remove the impediments which 
restrict the competitiveness of local small finns. This specifically refers to import restrictions 
reported to increase the unit pIice of products. However, this strategy must be implemented with 
caution as complete liberalisation of some markets could introduce deleterious competition. The 
components manufacturing sector, although reasonably developed, is not yet sufficiently 
competitive to accommodate the potential pressures of total liberalisation. 
Thirdly, it is necessary to increase the capacity of the Kenya Subcontracting Exchange as a 
strategy for increasing large finn 'awareness' of the capacity of small local firms. However, the 
exchange must be seen as a private sector initiative rnther than as a government sponsored 
organisation. One way of organising this would be to use the existing business associations as the 
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basis for referencing and data collection, especially if such associations have both large and small 
sized finns as their members. 
Finally, the study revealed that SMEs are perceived as weak on a number or criteria, particularly 
the lack of 'sophisticated' managerial and technological capabilities. It is incumbent upon the 
government, therefore, to increase the general level of technology and skilled manpower within 
the business environment. 1bis can be done through the specific promotion of technology-based 
education and training. Current policies aimed to promote technology development and diffusion 
should be articulated in specific terms to address the deficiencies of small and medium enteIprises, 
with specific goals which address the deficiency of technology within the country. However, this 
must be done with careful consideration of the most appropriate technology for the country's needs 
rather than as an effort to acquire state of the art technology which may not be 
relevant/appropriate . 
A concomittant fuctor revealed by the study is the deleterious effect of model proliferation. For 
small finns to develop a 'reasonable' level of skills, it is critical for government planners to control 
model proliferation through rationalisation policies. One of such policies already used successfully 
in several of the East Asian countries is a negotiated maximum number of new models introduced 
within a 'negotiated' period. What this implies is that the government has to agree with importers 
and assemblers what models are likely to satisfY their commercial and engineering requirements, 
while delivering an agreed level of welbeing to the consumer. 
The problem of economies of scale might be met through export expansion of both the finished 
vehicles and the parts and components produced by the small suppliers. Although export 
promotion schemes exist in the prevailing environment, these are not focussed on particular 
sectors as a strategy of addressing the sector or sub-sector specific challenges. One possible 
approach is to encourage small finns in this sub-sector to take advantage of the Export Processing 
Zones as a way of eliminating the difficulties encountered in accessing importing raw materials. In 
addition, as is the case with most small finns in Kenya, this inability to access inputs is caused by 
limited financing. Government assistance should therefure aim at financing the purchase of 
equipment and other inputs. 
Recommendations for Large firms 
It was found that although they have the capability and motivation to OutsOUICe, large finns 
generally perceive local finns to be, for various reasons, of a lower than expected 'quality'. 
However, there is no specific initiative to develop small finns to the quality levels required. Hence, 
the prospects for linkages with local finnsis limited. Large finns should begin to think of their 
particular industries as a network of inter~ependent sub-networks. Hence, the role of small and 
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medium enterprises in the laIge finn's profitability should be conceptualised within the context of 
the value of the supplier chain. Large finns should, therefore, be encowaged to see small and 
medium sized finns as part of this wider chain and seek to develop small and medium sized 
enterprises as if they were an extension of their own chain. Lessons learned from the Japanese 
exemplar indicate that competitiveness can be achieved collectively through the use of OCR 
buyer-supplier relationships which encowage supplier development, which is expected to improve 
the technological and managerial capability of SMEs. As was noted in chapter seven, the three 
assemblers give limited assistance to their suppliers through order specific blueprints and 
standards. This way, some technology transfer place takes between large and small finns (buyers 
to suppliers). It was also reported that some training, guidance and engineering expertise are 
provided by the laIge finns . In some cases, buyers were reported to arrange for subcontractors to 
produce, under license or franchise, from the principal vehicle manufacturers, and a limited 
amount of quality control was reported. Hence, as a strategy to improve supplier development, 
large finns must be given the incentive to strengthen these fonns of assistance. Clearly, there is 
need for the govemment to 'assist' large :finns through various incentive schemes as was outlined 
above under government recommendations. 
It is unlikely that given the prevailing conditions, a reasonable number of 'good quality' suppliers 
will be found in the Kenyan industry. To break the vicious cycle, therefore, large :firms have to 
look to future gains from collaborative inter-finn relations rather than short term profitability 
(Contractor and Lorange, 1988). This requires both an attitudinal change by managers regarding 
the potential of small and medium sized finns in Kenya, and a specific organisational policy to 
develop local small and medium suppliers. 
ReconunendariOnsforSmalljU7ns 
Small enterprises have the task of making themselves 'attractive' to laIge buyers. According to the 
findings, laIge :finns perceive local suppliers, particularly small and medium sized suppliers, to be 
of relatively 'poor quality' . Because this is a perceived position, it is important for small finns, 
together with other participants, to change this perceptions. First, through technology, skills, 
production processes, and efficiency improvements, they must seek to increase their 
competitiveness in general. 
Secondly, SMEs must actively seek to lobby for legal reforms which remove those impediments 
to their development. Through Business Associations and other sub-sector specific groupings, 
small enterprises can consolidate their 'power to argue for reforms in their business environment. 
Thirdly, and peIhaps more critically, small:finns must reduce their atomisation through clustering, 
various fonns of industrial networks, and other co-operative arrangements (Brusco, 1986), either 
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as suppliers to large buyers, or as independent competitors in comparable markets. One approach 
is the business association fonnat. By grouping into industry specific groupings SMEs can address 
the specific problems related to their industry. A second approach is use of existing trade 
associations and chambers of commerce as a basis for 'improving' the SME image, particularly 
with respect to large finns. In addition, such associations can facilitate the development of inter-
finn relations between members, particularly if such associations have both large and small finns 
within their membership. Finally, SMEs can reduce their atomisation through sub-contractors co-
operatives, known in Japan as Zaibatsu. Evidence from Japan and the Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NICs) of South East Asia suggests that firms use such co-operatives in order to increase 
their bargaining power with buyers, and also as forums for assisting members in other ways. 
(Friedmann, 1988; Doner, 1993). This assistance includes helping members to enter markets, 
acquire finance, training, infonnation, joint labour control, joint purchasing and joint 
manufacturing in cases where a member does not have adequate capacity. 
9.5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
At the theoretical level, some hypotheses were advanced in chapter eight. It is critical that further 
research establishes the extent to whioh these hold in specific industrial sub-sectors, across the 
manufacturing industry, and in the industrial structures of other countries of the developing world. 
Additionally, although compulsory local sourcing accounted for a large proportion of inter-finn 
relationships found in the organisations under study, the relative importance of this motivation has 
not been established. It is not clear, for example, whether mandating only led to inter-finn 
relationships for a period of time, and then changing to other motivational foci . 
It was also hypothesised that inter-firm relationship formation between large and small firms are 
dependent on three categories offuctors: those related to the buyer (the large finn); those related to 
the suppliers (large and small finns); and those related to the nature of the business environment. 
These hypotheses need to be tested in various settings to establish, for example, the relationship 
between the various motivations for inter-firm linkages and the levels of their interaction, if any 
with each other. In addition, detailed studies of specific fonns of inteT-finn linkages, such as joint 
ventures, subcontracting, and strategic partnerships, within developing country contexts are 
required. 
Future research might also involve forecasting the direction which inter-finn linkages are likely to 
take in the Kenya, and developing countries at large, possibly using Delphi forecasting techniques. 
As noted above, the main limitation of the study is the lack of a 'balancing' analysis of the 
suppliers. Taking into consideration possible reluctance of small and medium finns to provide 
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information, future research should aim to explore the 'objectivitY of the factors raised by the large 
buyers. 
Finally, analysis of the developmental processes of inter-firm fonnation is the next logical step 
emanating from this preliminary work. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) argue that inter-finn 
relationship development is dependent on interpersonal relationships which often supplement 
fonnal relationships, and that inter-personal psychological contracts substitute for fonnal legal 
contracts. Consequently, the process by which individuals carry these roles forward in order to 
bind their organisations to fonn relationships, are important in inter-finn linkage fonnation. It is 
critical to explore the extent to which this influences the fonnation of inter-finn relationships in 
Kenya In addition, it is necessary to study the effects of such social factors as prejudice and 
nepotism on sourcing activities within £inns given that the award and management of contracts 
can be fimdamenta1ly governed by social relationships among key participants. 
******** 
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APPENDIXE 
Hft.!WFACTUR I NG A::D ASSEH3l '( ".G ~~EME tH 
THIS AGP.EEMENT i s ~ade the day of 
One thousand nine hundred and BEnlEEN 
British Leyland UK Limited a company incorpo rated in the United Kingdom 
{hereinafter called "the Licensor" whose registered office is at 174 ' 
t'.aryJebone Road London N.W.I. England AND Leyland Ke~ya Limi ted a corr.pany 
incorporated in Kenya (hereinafter called "the Licensee") whOSE' principal 
place of business is situate at 
WHEREAS 
A. The Licensee has requested the Licensor to pennit it to manufacture 
or have manufactured in ~he territory hereinafter defined for i~ ce~air. part~ 
for Vehicles excluding proprietary .parts a~d to asse=ble complete vehicles 
. . . . 
purchased from the U censor in ~lete knodc.down (CKD) form incorporating 
suc~ m~~ufactured Parts and has represented ~ the Licensor that it has all 
the necessary fad 1 it'ies the!"efor 
6. Tbe Licensor agreed ~opermlt~ud: 1!3u,rfacture.and asSiSbly on ~te 
~nns hereinafter appearing 
-.wow IT 1 SAGREED as fo 11 ows:-
.nefi n; t ions: 
1. 
~ . 
sudI new and unuS°.d ·vehicles .u are shawl in Sched.u~e 1 omd ·as 
shal1 be IllUtually agreed hom time to l:ime PROViDED I\U"i).YS rtlcrt 
any lIDde 1 or deri vat i 'le i"c1 ud~ in the sa id Sc:hedu I e 1 sha i 1 
(unless otherwise determined by the Licensor) cease tt> be a 
Vehicle as defined herein whenever the same shall cease t:D be 
~nufacture~ and sold by the Licensor in the ~rdinary course of 
business. 
b. . "Parts" means parts 'of Vehicles amufactured by or for the Licensor 
. - . 
or to its design or .speclflcat·i"" Wlether for Incorporation In 
-. -.. : - - .. . . 
complete Vehicles or .for .use as replacement parts- · 
'. 
2. 
•• .t"'~.-"," ... . _ 
c.:·,-· "Proprietary Parts" means parts of Vehicles wh ic'"! a ,e ;: :- C'::::.:.: : ~ 
of ~anufacturers other . than the Licensor or the Licensee ~c ;- g 
also products not to the design er specification of the Li:e~ 50r 
and which are new and :Jnu~ed anci which fvrm or are intended to 
form part of Vehicles. 
d. · :"Products ll means Vehicles Parts Proprietary Ports cnd any other 
. parts which form or are intended to form part of Vehicles. 
e. 'IlLocal" where appl ied to Products means that the S2me have been 
manufactured by the Licensee or obtained by the Licensee fro~ 
:sources within the Territory (or other sources approved by the 
,Licensor) other than the ·Licensor. 
f. "The Distributor Agreement" shall mean an Agreement between the. 
Licensee and British leyland Exports Limited a company incorporated 
in the United Kingdom dated 
thousand r.ine hundred and 
day of One 
whereby the- Licensee has 
been appointed distributor for Vehicles and parts on the terms 
therein contained and any further agreement between the parties 
in that regard. 
g. "The Territoryll means the territory of The Republic of Kenya_ 
a. During the continuance of this Agreement the Licensee shall have 
the exclusive right to asse~ble Vehicles and to manufacture 
such Parts in The Territory as may be mutually agreed from time 
to time for inclusion in Vehicles as original equipment and 
as replacement parts also. The Licensor shall not ( except as 
otherwise expressly provided for in this /Agreement) assemble 
or manufacture Vehicles or Parts in Tpe Territory nor grant 
assembly or manufacturing rights for Vehicles or Parts to any 
other person firm or company in the Territory. 
b. Unless otherwise 'l(Jreed In writing by the Licensor the Licensee 
shdll not during the oontinuance of this Agreement assemble 
manufacture or di -stri bute or enter into. any other arrangement 
or agree~nt with any other ·person firm or company in respect 
of the design manufacture assembly or distrib~tion oi any 
other automotive products other than Vehicles or be connected 
with the design manufacture assembly or distribution of 
such autolOOt i '.'~ products. 
. - ..; '. 
3. 
licence: 
a. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement the Licensor will 
grant to -the licensee any exclusive licences during the term 
~f this Agreement necessary for the assembiy and manufacture 
in The Territory of Parts that are no\o/ or may' during the term 
of this Agreement be the subject of inventions protected by patents 
under which the Licensor can grant such exclusive licences in The 
Territory for the purposes of this Agreemeot. 
b. It shall be the responsibility of the Licensee to obtain all 
.necessary licences for the manufacture of Parts which are protected 
by patents not owned by the Licensor and for the 'payments~f any 
~alty in respect thereof but the licensor will subject to the 
"terms of th i s Ag reemen t use i ts reasonab 1 e endeavou rs to fae i 1 i tate . 
such arTangements. 
c. The Licensee shall -net without the written consent of the licensor 
- ; 
·grant any sOO-l i cence for the manufacture of Products or for the . 
, , 
.use of trade marks or !!!Odel naTfe5 of the Products nor Shall It 
'gJ3Dt or assign any rights gran.t.ed to it under or by virt.ae .of 
~ I 5 Ag re.enten t. 
It .' 
4. Asse ~Gly and ~anufa ct ur c 
a. 'The Licensee sh'ull maJ~e availab1c buildin;s servic es 
.. . 
. materials and equip ~ent~uitable in the opinion of the 
. - . 
licensor for the reception preparation rnanuf~c ~urc and 
assembly of Products ~ in accordance with the st andards of 
quality required by the Lice nsor a"nd as shall D2 neccs s.:! r J' 
fro m t i met 0 t i m 2 t 0 f u 1 f i 1 the ass e;;l b 1 Y and I!i a 11 u f act u r i n 9 
programmes agre~d between the'Licensor and the Licensee 
(rom time to time . . • 
b. The Licensf!c ' shall dil"igent1y and skilfull:,' asse '.lb lc · 
and manufacture .Products in accordance ' wjth the ~tandards 
laid down from time to time by the \icensor and the 
' process of assembly and manufacture and the quality and 
_ ~he fini~h of Products and the state of stoc~s from tibe 
to time shall be ' open to inspection by the licensor. The: 
licensor shall have the r~ght to reject any Product which 
falls beloi'/ such standards and the licensee shilll make any,-_,: 
I modification to such Product or 'order -fron:· the Licensor" ar.Y~ 
Parts units or parts thereof necessary to b~ing such 
Froduct up to such standards making paycent therefor in 
accordance \'d th the terms of this Agreement te the extent 
,that such Parts arc not crivered by Conditions of ~J c.rranty 
set out in Clause 19 hereof. 
c~ The Licensee shall assemble and/or manufacture (where 
:S.Uch manufacture is authorised in accordanc~ \d th 'this 
! . 
~greement) at a rate sufficient 4 at all times to achieve 
- ;;:-the greatest market penetrati on PDSS ib le fOT Products 
il. The Terri tory. 
. . 
$. Use of ~a~es: 
~. The licensee shall apply to Products such carques' ~ 
" 
and names as are specified in Schedule ~ hereto or as 
"s.hall be agreed .in \'Jriting between t~e parties hereto 
.and shall not without the pdor: written pernission of the 
" licensor advertise or sU'pply any Product except under 
suc~ @arques and ' ~ames and sh~ll n~t use such Rarque~ and -
names (or any name likely to b:e confused there\'lith) except ': 
. . . .' - "'" . . 
as a~plied tu 'or, in connection with Prod~cts. 
b.' The licensee shall not ",ithout · the . wrj-tten consent , 
of: the lic'ensor ~s·e the" name · :d~- :-~r~i:.tiaT'~~~-f- the :S'rltis'h-
.-. . 
confused therewith. 
c. 
-~- -- ':" --.. ' :--: ' - ~:-
The Licenso~ grants to the LiCensee t h~ righ t to. use in The 
!erritory the marques and names inc l uded in Schedule I in 
connection with the sal e· of the . Froducts and the Licensee hereby 
UDdertakes and agrees that it wiil not attack the use or validity 
or extent of such marques and nau~s nor shall it assist any third 
party to do so but shall at all ti~s do all in its pOwer to 
pr~tect such marques and names a~d shall ensure that the same 
-, -. 
" 
6. 
remain connected only with the Products as defined in this Agieement 
and as the Licensor may inoicate from time to time. 
d. The right to use such marques and names mentioned in this clause 
shall in no , .. ay give the Licensee any form of proprietory right 
a. 
in respect of such marques or nar.es. 
Supply of Products: 
The Licensor will from time to ti me use its best endeavours to 
supply to or procure the supply tt-:ereof to the Licensee su=h 
Products in knocked do~-m (KO) cnits or otherwise as in the opinion 
of the Licensor are applicabie to the market of The Territory 
both in relation to the allocatie~ of import licences and exchange 
granted by the competent uovernlrer.t authority and to the production 
capacity for Products of the Licensor which is ava i lable for The 
Territory. The supply of Products by the Licensor relating to any 
model 'of Vehicle may be discontinued where in the opinion of th~ 
licensor such supply by virt~~ of the volumes thereof required by 
the Licensee can no longer be supplied by th~ Licensor or. a 
'sat,isfactory economic basis. 
. ~ . 
0.. The licensee shall at all .time!'; be responsible at its own expense 
-for the safekeeping and geod condition of Products after it or its 
agent have accepted delivery of the~ and also while the Products 
are held in stock by the Licensee or its ~gent. 
-. 
~ In the event of any claim by the Licensee regarding purported 
errors in delivery of Products the Licens~~ 'shall supply to . th~ 
licensor such information relating ·to such errors and on suc.h 
forms as the Li censor may reasonably . require from time -to time. 
d. The Licensor wi 11 endeC!lvour to comply _ with Customs 
import currency and vehicle ·regulations but shall not 
. ····6. 
'be r~spon$ible for any loss .. c:n~lty or othcl' co ns::: ':; : ;:": ~ : L 
res u 1 tin 9 fro m non - c 0 m p 1 i a nee u n 1 e s sag re e din \.: r: i t i : ~ 0 
oy the Licensor ofter cOI:su 1 t .J~iu n \·:i t h the Licens(' e, .he 
. .' ~ . . -
. delivery of Products by the licenser shall he made in sl.!ch 
1_ •• ' " - . • 
• .. . .' = - . J . . 
. . ' manner and at such t 1 :n ~ s and p 1 aces as the l i censor and 
Tfc.ftnsee agree but the Licensor and :its agents . shall not 
be liable for any failure. delay or error in delivery or any 
consequential loss arising therefro~ howsoever caused. 
e. NohJi t hstc:.ndi rlg anything herein contained the !.ic e n:;or 
sha)l not be under any liability to supp}y any Product or 
make any other deliveries to be supplied or made by it und 2r 
this Agreement if at the date that such Product is to be 
supplied or delivered the Licensor has given the Licensee 
. previous notice in \'/riting that:- . 
.,. i. any sums \'Ihi ch have become due under this 
Agreement 'or any of thEm have not been 
paid in accordance with the terms of this 
J\greemen t; or 
ii. the licensor has reasonable grounds for 
believing tha~ any sums which will become 
due by reason of the delivery of such Product 
or in respect of any other liability will not 
be paid in acccrdance with this Agreement 
" 
. : 
' on the due · date ana the Licensee has r.ot ~omplied · . 
with the prcvisions set out in that notice by the 
licensor. ' .1, _ , 
! .. ~he Licensee will in respect f f Products ensure that 
· -th~ .ti cens or befo re the ·fi rs t day of every month is in 
'. :~.ceipt of six month.s firm orde~s ,and an es~imate of its 
Te:qui rements for tw~ 1 ve months therea ft'e:- but such es ti ma te 
will not constitute a firm commitment on the part ef the ' 
, . 
1. i msee or of the Li cens or. The peri od for recei pt of" 
.firm . orders .or for an es·ticate of rc'qui-recents ::ay .be 
'~anged by the licnesor from time to time • 
. ,. Any orders for Products placed by the licen!:ee shalll>e 
1J1)0n ' order forms furnished by the licensor and nctwithst.!ndir. i'; 
-anything to the contrary in such forms each ~ch -orde'r shall 
be govern~d by .the terms . of this Agreement ari~ ~y the ter~s 
\ 
of ~~y Distributor Agre~m~ijt relevant to 
•. : -current. at the date of order.' 
7 •. 
7. Payment for Products: 
. . 
-
8. 
Jhe licensee shall pay fOt, all Products purchased ' from 
. . Agreement in the United Kingdom .and .in United Kil~gdor.1 
currenc), (or such ot..:1~r currency as Day be a9reE ~ in 
writing between the parties hereto) and in such manner a~d 
at iuch times as may fro~ time to time be mutually ~gr~ed 
between the Licensor and the Licensee. • 
Direct Contracts: 
. 
The Licensor reserves the right to enter into direct 
contracts for the supply assembly or tr.anufa~ture of Products 
. . 
to Government Munitipal authorities and other similar 
'bodi es . 
9. Local Products: 
.·In addition to those parts ~hich the Licensor h~s 
...... 
before the date of this Agree'rnentagreed either to supply 
in unfinished condition for manufacturing completion by 
the Licensee or to delete from KO units for replace~ent 
. ~~.-
~y local Products the Licenso~ will fro~ time to time 
by ·a~reement in writing ~·lith the Licensee delete further 
~arts fro~ KO units supplied by the Licensor to be re-
placed by local Products or supply f~rther ' unfinished parts 
~or manufacturing completion by the .Licensee provided 
. 1,. • . 
~hat the Licensor shall not be requested to :give suc.h 
"'gre-ement unti 1:-
i. samples of each such local Product 
intended to replace such further parts 
. bav~ been s ubmi tted to tne li censor for 
its approval at t~e Licensee's expense 
-and have been acc'E'pted in tlriting by the 
Licensor .for both lluality and design; and 
1i the Licensee shall a't its own ' expense have . 
.:s-atisfied the licensor that it is able 
satisfa~torily to ~o~plete th~ m~nufacture 
C ~ sn' ,, ' .urthn ........ in'rh,..~ "'r+C' "ft """p, .. ",f • __ J' ........ ...... ~ .... t'w ... ., ~tJ ~w.., .• _-. 
, 
, 
The Li~ensee shall ensure that all c lo~al Products approved 
.' ~' ... .- by :the li.censor . contin~e .: ~~~ -al ·~ .. ·:"t.~~~~ ... Si'"j~;;~~ !!~~~PPliE:d)ll ... ~ - " J 
-- ... ... ·:accordance wi tll app.roved S~IIlP.1 es~ ana .~1:a·~-:S11fricie~t· -qua-nti !;i:!s 
• - .... _ ~r_ .: - ! ~ .. ,:;.\~~ .. ,., w:'; ~"5oo-r~ ... -! - ... :.. -- -: ....... _ . .... • • , 
. '" . for' 'th'~ Du-roo~~~ of · th; ~ .' Anr@pm@.n·~::.~ 
8. ' 
b. , The licensor shall have th :: right to reject 'c;r.y 
local product, or any p.U"ts finished by the licensee \"hich 
sha'11 fan 'bel~~'f the 'sti!nda~d cpproved by the Licensor 
givi.rig the licensee \'n"itten" reilson therefor and advice 
nece.ssary to remedy any such sho;'tcomings and the Licensee 
shal'l , make any modification necessary to bring such local 
Product or finished PC!l'ts ~p to such standard 'or replece 
the $ame by a Pro~uct ordered from the Licensor, • 
c. The licensee shall ensure that every local supplie:-
(that is every person firm or company man!lfactul~ing 10c2.1 
Products ,for the Licensee) does so upon terms which 
, 
pre~erve the licensor's rights under this ,Clause 9. The 
Licensee shall further use, its best endeavours to ensure that 
every slIch local supplier s'upplics local ~arts only to the 
licensee and to no ~ther person firm or company. 
d. With the prior written approval of the licensor the ' 
, , 
Licensee may inCOrpOl"ute into its manufacture any modificatio; :' I ' " 
it rnay :consider desirable to meet ~ny locally peculia~ ~-
~perating conditions with the object of producing products ' 
specially suitable for the market in The Territcry and with 
~uch prior written approval may alter ,the standard designs ' 
af the licensor accordingly but the licensor shall not be 
Tesponsible fo~ any components or pa~ts aanufactured ~, the 
' - I Licensee nor for any modifications ot performance of any 
~Ilits so modified \-/hieh shall be the entire responsibility 
, . . . ;; 
' ~T the licensee both as regards initial, design guarantee 
'liab:i 1 i ty st'rvi ce and the effect , -"/hi ch any 100di fi ed eqlJi pr.l(~nt 
,say have on any other components or 'parts of the l i cens or 
'fftted ;n the Products and in all other respects ho,;:soever ' 
, " 
ilrising. 
'e. Any modifica'tion to the licensor's standat'd designs 
vhich may be introduced by the licensee shail be made 
~vailable without cost to the licensor ~ith the right 
to incorporate such modification in its own design at 
:.-
any time. 
, , 
<'. ~ .. .. •• " 
10. Tpchnical A~sist~~c~: 
I~ order to facilitate assembly ~ and jr~gressive 
man~facture of the, Produ~ts in :' Tbe Territory , the l i ce'nsor, 
. - .~ ., \ ... ~ ' ••••• , ' -:' ' . ' ; "": : ' , :.:.- .;; •• ~. ~ ' . _ 4 -_ .. _ • • ,:- ":. 
.. n .in,.,,: lI'" ~C: ' a~ " f ,o 11D\,/S :"_.:'.~ '~ , ' , _.... '''_ J .. ,. -- , ' . ":,L..~'- .~, , , ~ .... ,-1; ," .' :-, ~: . ~. 
a. The Licensor \~ i 11 supply to the Licensee upon reql!est at t he cost 
of the Licensee in accordance with Clause 11: 
i. manufactu t ing and assembJy dr~w ings 
:.:.--: . , .. 
_. __ ~_.~ ~. I i . specifi~~tions Qf material 
. - ~ ~ . 
iil. description and specifi.cations of materia l 
treatment 
Iv. laboratory tests and s2mpte'5~ and 
v. continuous advice and technical information 
and other inforQation adequate for the 
efficient assembly manufacture and servicing 
of the Products by the Licensee within The 
Territory. 
Such drawings and infor~ation shall be supplied prior to assembly 
and manufacture being undertaken in accordance with the plant 
i nstea. 1 ed by the Li censee and wi th the programmes to be agreed 
between the Licensor and the Licensee from time to time. The 
! Licensor cannot r;ro"/ide any information in respect of proprietory 
parts. 
b. The Licensor wi 11 supply to the Li.censee upon request at the cost 
. ' :, 
of the Licensee in accordance with Cla~se 11 atl relevant operation 
sheets and jig and tool drawings relating to the Products which are 
/ 
normally used by the Licensor in corresponding operations for which 
. ( 
the data is reqcired but it is understood that all o!lerat!on sheets 
~re 'given only as 'a guide and are bas~d 'solely on the quantity of 
~ PToducts being manufactured by the Licensor. likewise any 
Jig Gnd tool draWings are also intended 'as a guide and any modifi-
·cation or redesign to suit the plant of the Lice"see must be the 
~ponsibility of the Licensee. The Licensor ,nall not be under 
~ obligation to divulge its ~ manufacturing/assembly operational 
times. It is understood by ~he Licensee that a11 ~ufacturing 
drawings suppl ied by the Licensor under the terms hereof will be ' 
the standard ·drawings ·used ·by the Licensor in ' its ~ factory .~n~ 
,;,' , . , 
its ~ dimensions and the L,icensor cannot accep~ .~r:·respons.i_~~.1"tY_: 
, " • • , , " :,":: ~', w ' - ~ \~ !, ". .. ' ,~. _~·5~.~·~:: ,'~ _ .. ' , 
fOT alter! ng these dlmens ions to ' confo .... ·wl th ' the ·U .censee '3 
. . . ".. . ' - - - -~--. ~~ ;::''1'~~~ - ' ~_k:,1~~7~'': -:-~ ; -:~ ~--..#. 
- ;requl rements.· :: ' In~"" ad4itlon .. tertal ··~tf'_lonswI11 ~ 
. ' . ' .. ' .. ' , . ,- ' ,. - -..~ -"~ _ ... -~ :: ~ ::~~:.~~ I, "., ~ ~ ':" ", : ; •. ~ 
'. 
to By j ti~h sti:nc(u~ds \IT; ~ t li C Licensor ,·fill havc no 
responsibility fOi-, uSCE i- t ;;i n ila 9 2G:;ival ~ r. t s in Th'e 
'I" e r ri t(; ry. '_ 
c. The - Lice~sor will ' advi~e the Licensee concerning 
the pm'-chas.e of seall tools, ' production equiprr.ent " !:1C!chin ~ 
tools 0 r h P. a v y Ii1 () chi n e r y I' e qui red by' t h ,e L ice n see i n 
relation to the assembly and manu f acture of the Produc t s. 
d. The Licensor \'li11 supply to the licensee upon req ues t 
at the cos t 0 f the L ice n s (' e ass C i:i b 1 Y jig S \'! h i c h are • 
manuf.c:ctured by or for t he Lice.lsor. .. 
e. The Licensor id 11 ol'der, :)rocure, or ~upply against G 
firm order ,from the Licensee small tools, production 
equipment, ~achinc ~ools o~ heavy machi~ery rciquired by th 
.licensee in relation to the assembly and manufacture of th 
,' Products. , Suc,h tools, equipi:lent and machinery will be 
purchased by the Li~ensor as agent for the Licensee withou 
a-ny responsibility to the Lic~nsol" but the Li~ensol' Hill 
pass on to the 'L i censee the benefi t of any Cond~ ti ons , ' 
of Business and Guarantee under which the Licensor purchas 
the tools, equipr:lent or machi!lery. The licensee 'shall be 
responsible for making payment in full for any tools:. 
equip::lent or machinery so order-ed s procured or supplied. 
f. The licensee will: 
-
i. Be responsible for any expenses incurred 
by the License}' in respect of" the testing 
.1 
. , 
handling and storing ' of the assembly jigs, 
, 
tools, machinery and equip~ent. 
ii. Make pay~ent of all packing. carriage~ 
-freight insurance and all , other charges 
-relating to the supply of the asse:!bly jigs. 
:tools~ machinery and equipaent to the 
lic.ensee or agt:llt. 
1ii. Pay to the licensor a handling charge on 
the following scale: 
• 
. 
, 'ji 'lIS mach,iner.'1 or equipnent for 
11. 
... - " _ : -: ~D ' :~ _~ 
. g. , . ... The licensor is respons.ible for providing information solely 
o"i • • : ,:;',' ~~ _ ".=-; ! - . _ - .:', .... . . 
11. 
tn connec~ion with its standard product~ and has no obliga-
tion to ~dertake special design and development work on behalf 
of the Licensee but may ifrequested without cost to the Licensee 
give an opinion on any reasonable development undertaken by the 
Ucensee provided that no extensive testing examination or 
engineering is required to give that opfnion. Any opin i on . 
given is without liability of any kind to the Licensor. 
"\, 
Supply of Documents: 
The cost to the Licensee of all documents drawings and infonma-
tion referred to in Clause 10 shall be paid by the Licensee in 
.accordance with Schedule II of this Agreement. Such costs 
-.ay be varied by the licer.sor · f~ time to time in the event of 
·a reduction or increase in the cost of providing thes~. 
i 
; 
T~nical Assistance 
.. In -order to faci 1 i tate the c.ssembly and/or manuf2cture of the 
rrooiucts to the standard requi red under the terms hereof the 
Licensor shall provide in con~ultation with th~ Licensee ·the 
.;ervices of such a number of technicians and other personnel 
-for such perit)~s of "time as 1I1aY be ag~ and ~e li~ensee shall 
be responsible for ,all costs ,in respect of such visits to The 
Territory of such technicians and personnel f~ the date on 
which any personnet' arrive in The TerrItory .• 
, 
., 
'. 
J3. 
12. ' 
The charges (subje:ct to varii!-::ion fl-o m time to t i f.1C 
b,r ~he,Liccllsor) to be p2ic! 1-,./ the lic~jjs~e . " J a re as 
' " follo'rls:-
.: -" . " 
D; re c tors ' and Se'll; ot' Executives £Stg. 50 per day 
r" c, n a 9 e r i a 1 Ex e c l' t i ves fStg. 40 p'er any 
Junior Executives and Senior 
• 
Technicians IStg. 30 per day 
" 
Technicians and I\rtisans ' £S tg. 20 per day 
" plus ,all reasonable living expenses in The Territory 
and First Class air fare for Directors and Senior 
Executives and Tourjst Class for all other personnel. 
b. The licensor fur t her shall allow and facilitate ,visits 
by , par tie s 0 f 'u pto six t e ch n ie i an sat a n'y 0 net i me 
,being approved, represeptatives of the licensee to the 
l;cens,or's factories in th~ United Kingdom at ~uch time 
and for such period of time 'as may be mutually agreed to 
inspect and familiarise themselves with and be instructed on 
~anufacturc inspection 3nd ~esting techniques and methods ' of 
the licensor. All ' cosis and ' ~xpe~ses i~ connection with , 
s~ch visits shall be borne by the ,licensee. At lea~t one 
-JlJember of each party shall have a working kno.\Jledge of the 
" English language. 
-
- ~ ... ~ 
Confidential Information: 
The licensee shall not part l-lith any documents supplied 'to it 
'~n~ at all times both during the currency of this Agree~ent 
and also aftfr the determination thereof shall k~~p secr~t 
and confidential and shall ensure that its ernpjoy~es ke~r 
secret a'nd confidential an plans documents and illforwation 
cnncern; ng the manufacture of the. Products and any 
comporyents or parts therefor which are supplied , to the 
licensee under the teres hereof and shall not. and sh'all 
., 
~ns'·rl\... ."',~ l'+r- "' ...... , .......... ~ 'po&,"l ..... + .. + " .. " +; '.ne .. " ....... ,f+ .... 
'- u ~- "'it':''''' ... ~ \.. • .,t' . • '"'J .... ~ ..... ...... 'IV ...... W"J .... .... .. •• ~. ~-. - \_. -
disclose any such inforl!l,~tion to any ~erson . firm or cornpa.~y: -
' or in ~ny way utilize ~uch information except for the purpo~! 
• - _ -::r. ". _~ . ...... ~ • 
. Qf 'instructing any !uthorized '.sub-contr,,.+n,..c ~!I: are 
,';-p~rinitted under ~tds ' ;Agr~e,!"e~ ~~ ' 
13. ., -
14. Exclusive Supply: 
During , the currency o f this !;g rec iJ cnt the Licensc'~ \'/i 11 
o~tain ' Products exclusively fl'om the Licensor and fror.l ' such 
.- + - - &:-. • 
sources as the :'Licensor Shilll specify or appro ve ,1n 
writin~ fro~ t{me to ~ime and not from any other source 
unless the same are produced in The Terri tory by vi rtue 
' of the authority contained in this A9reerncnt. 
• Orders for products placed by the licensee shall specify 
whether such Products are required for u~e as original 
, equipment ~r for sale as spare parts. The'manufacture or 
assembly of Products shall not 'be sub-contra~ted tn the 
. " 
licensor's competitors without its prior written consent . 
• ,y 
15. Part Numbers: 
All parts manufactured by o~ for the Licensee in The 
Territory mus~ be identified \·lith a part number \'/hich 
~ s the s~me as the corresponding part number of the 
'original part normally suppli~d ~y the Li~en~or but 
incorporating a special prefix letter or letters and 
tile License:e shall notify the Licensor in \'!riting and 
make full details of the proposed prefix letter or 
letters available to the licensor three months before 
prcduction commences in The Territo~y~ 
i 
, i ... _-
, 
• Lt ' .; , , " , " 
->6. Servi ce: . . ' 
,Tbe Licensee shall ensure .that ~deqlJate and suitable 
arra.ngerr.ents are availab·le in The Territory in relation 
~ the service facilities (inclu~ing staff equipment 
. ' 
a:Jd -premises) for Products which it pr,!H!!.!c~S under this 
' Agreement and no responsibility shall rest with the 
licensor in this respect~ The licensor will supply the 
licensee \'lith such ififorlilati~n as the Licensor considers 
..appropriate in relation to the service facilities for 
Products. 
. ' ." .... .. 
, " 
: 17. Changes in Oesign and SpeCifica't;on: ': ', 
a. The licensor 'reserves the ,right to 'make -any" changes : 
i 'n , sp~ci fi cati'on . or d~s ign, i~'" !roducts;~;:~ ~ni_ ,ti~e: ,:.,: ,, ' .,- :~.-:.' 
. ' . " ~-~ - •. -. \ " ~-:t'!!t. .: ~ ..,w'" • _ _ . -~ •.• '-~ ' ;. ~ ,";""t 
without incur ring ' anyobli'gation ':', to" :in ,cQrporate-~them _' ,. :.-' 
~ , "_. ":~' _' in :any "ro~u~,t~ dc,~~ , ~~, r:~;~ ~~,~O~~~~~~5:~~~ii~~~I~~.~i:~~f~.~·z<;' 
H. 
\·iill notify the licens-e:c of al~y such c1:anScs un d give ud\-i ( : 
• 0 n (l n y s u c h ch a 11 9 e sir, a c cor d il n. cc \.: i t h c 1 .3 use 1 0 ( i) ) ( '/ J Cl f 
thi s Agreement. 
· . ·. ·.: b~~. ·. The. 'Licensee sha'll not \-lithout the pl"ior \-!ritte~ 
. _ : ., -
~ conse~t of the licensor (w~ich will ~ot be unreasonably 
' .. . . --
withheld) 'change the design or specification of any 
Product nor knowingly do nor after notice continue doing 
anything that m~y in any \-lilY lessen the validity of ilny 
patent or trade mark under which Products are rnanufactuped ' 
or sold. 
I .. 
, 
B. Identification Marks: 
19. 
Except as may be necessary for the assembly of the Products 
'\. . 
. the Licensee shall not altel' remove -or :othenrise hide from 
. ':'. . . . . 
s'19ht the serial numbers identifi.·ca t fpr'l .· pl ·ates , o·nd patent 
numbers as affixed ~y ' the Licensor' ~~d f'u '~tiler more the 
Licensee shall affix and retain in a visible and suitable 
manner on all Products all necessary patent numbers. 
I -: 
~la rran ty: 
a. Products supplied to the licensee under this Agreement 
are sold subject to and with the benefit of the warranties 
appropriate to the Products (or such variation as the 
Licensor may from time to ti1l!e notify to the licensee) to 
~he exclusion of all other warranties conditions and 
. . 1i~bi1ities l'lhatsoever. 
b..r The .benefit of the ·\,/arrantie~ . is exercisable on'ly by 
.the Licensee \'lho shall include in its Conditions of Sale 
. - . 
such provisions as will insure t~at no legal l1ability 
cl~im or relationsnip shall arise between the licensor 'and ' 
. any person fi rm 'or company purchas,i n9 a Prod;:~t from the 
licensee. 
~. The iicensee will issue its own Conditions of Sale 
Alld l1arran ty to its cus tomers and the teros and 
' . interpretation thereof shall be fn conformity with the 
Licensor's policy as notified to the-licensees in writing 
from time to time •. The liccns.ec shall 9i.v~ to its 
cu~toccr~ a warr!nty the ter~s of ~hich shal~ be no less 
favourable than the warrj5nty. 9i v'en to the li censC!e 'under 
sub-clause (a) hereof •. 
~ .. : 
15. 
-
- 20. Inrlc:nnit)': .. 
.. - . . . 
a~ : The licensee· shal ·1 indecmify the Licensor as·c ';nst ' all 
clilirus· costs"7 1iabilitics and expenses incurred by the 
Lic~nsor in r~spect of or arising out of any defe~~ivc 
workmanship in the ass~li1bly or m<!nufacturing by the. 
Licensee 0[- Pnd ucts or fl1 the cssei:lbly or manufucture 
of l~cal Products and in respect of or arising out of 
~efcctive materials used in local Products ~ 
b. As and \,,'h(:11 required by tl10 Licenser the Licensee 
shall furn·ish the Licensor \1ith particulars of· claims 
"' . ~nd reports made and pending in ~espect of-defective 
\'/orkmanship in Products (including locally made parts) 
?nd shall at all r.~asonable tir.1cS permit the licensor 
,?r its representatives ·to inspect the licensee'.s reco·rd 
~ooks and accounts relative thereto. 
?l~ Inv~ritions by the Licensee: · 
If at any time during the continuance of this A9ree~ent 
_~he ~icensee shall become entitled to a~y develop~ent 
• 
. improvement or invention relating to any of the Products 
or their assembly manufacture or ser~icing then (whether 
Qr n:>t the same shal1 he p-atentable) the Licensee shall 
forthwitfi give notiCE in writing thereof to the licensor· 
~n6 $hall at the request of ·the Licensor explain the 
. ~ . 
same and the Licensor shall for a -period of twelve ~onths 
.......... 
frQm ~he date of re:eipt of such notice have the · sDle r.ight 
~o apply for and obt~in in the licensor's name in all parts 
of "the \'/orld (including The_lerri~Dry) letters p.atent or 
~imilar monopoly rights in respect thereof and the same 
~hall belong to the Licensor absolutely. The licens·ee 
$h~ll at the request and cost o~ the licensor Execute or 
procure to be execut~d such documents as may be n~ccssary 
.~ ~ive effect to the provisions of this clause. 
Royal t ;~S : . -
The ~i~ensee shall . pay to th:e 
the basis set out in Sche~ule 
~3 •. Duration: - . : : ' ,.e; .· 
' ~ . :." Thi"~ 'Agre<emen·t sh~ 1 J 
~, 
, .. . '1,.. • 
Licensor a royalty on .. 
Ill ·· of · this Agreement.'~~~ · 
, . .. -' ~: ~~ :,,:";.::' .. ~ 
24. 
25. 
and""~1 1VCOnt1 nl.ie· :·1-n fOrced thereafter unless and unti 1 dete rm ine-::l 
:~~_t.=:: ~ .:~~~:(-5~~ -- ~ ~ : " -11 
by 12 months ' prior notice in writing given by ei t her party to t he 
.other. 
International Conflict an d Force H3j eure: 
a • . .. : ... In the' event of a di spute between the Governments of the Uni ted 
-:f :>- .. ~ ! '._' ' .: : .. .;:~,?; ::: 
--. 
.. . 
Kingdom and The Territo!"yor between either of them and any other 
. ~untry or state or any civi 1 war or insurrection wi thi n such 
country or state which shall result in the cessation or interruption 
,. 
~f commerce between .. We United . Kingdom and The Territory either of 
the parties hereto shall reat liberty to give to the other party 
notice iii .- writing to suspenc this ' Agreement forthwith unti I such 
cessation or interruptionrns ceased but su~h suspension shall be 
without prejudice to the rights of either party which shall have 
accrued at the time of such cessation or interruption. 
b. J f at any time duri ng the continuance of thi s Agreement it shall 
become impossible by reason of any strike lo'ckC'Out combination of 
, ' ;" 
l. 
workmen trade dispute -difficulty.in obtaining workmen or lltaterials 
or by reason of Governm~nt direct ion accident ' fire lmstilities 
(whether war ' has been declareri or nct) civi 1 riot requi sitioni.r.g 
by Government or any other circumstances of force . majeure beycnd 
the control of either P3rty for it to fu1ffl its Obligations .under 
. 
:t:his -Agreement neither party shall by reason- of such impossibiJity 
alone be entitled to determine this Agreement or hav:e any cla'im 
..asainst the othe,r i"nd .on determination of such event as above 
-deliveries and assembling and manufactu~ing (as the. case may be) , 
. shall be resumed within a rea90nable time. 
le""i nation: 
The Licensor shall have the right to terminate this Agreement on 
giving notice ir. writing to the Licensee 'if:-
the Licensee's assembly and manufacturing plants are In the 
. . op i n I on . of the Li censor ut il i zed for purpo~e5 other than. those 
_ .:. __ .. -~ : ' : . ". '.' . . . . : . " • ~ - . :' '. :..~ .• , ,~::.~r; .. . -.. ""';'~"" ~-o-i_ ;- . , ~. - " 
. >;~';·.'.·.ntlclpated bY, 'thls Agreenent to ·s·ueh .an ·extent .that It · Js 10 t~ ~-
..... ~ :~- ' ., " . #. . ..-. __ .' ".. .:~ .. ·., .. : ~ . ~!~ . . . "~.r .... . -~.;.~:.: ': .. -', ', . . -. 
:: ';:-.; ' .detriment of ' the 1.leensor and the Utensee'"nas ·not ·recttfled:.thls·1" 
;:,".' .. ".'" ~ " . .. .·_'"> <~""" :;;f'i~~ ~~-:'=~.f-:i:~·\.4~~:~::"'-·=.~·-:~ ·": --. -: - . . -; . 
17 • 
. b • . ·. Any amOllnts pl\y~blc by the Lice ns ~e to ~h e CO;:i j>2 r y 
~. '. ' - - .. . . . 
.~ . . !/nder .. the ·pro.vis;cr.s. of this f;grce::lcr:t shull be iD 
-~':'"".-': .... . "':".,-... :.--: --.' ~ - - . . 
ar.rear .. and r~rJai .n unpaid for more thi;n ninety day.s ()f ~e r 
the du~ d~t~ ~f ' payment. 
c. The licensee shell have cOI;:;;;ittcd any brench of it s 
ob 1 i gat i 0 r. sun cl c r t his /1 9 re e iil e n t u\1 d fa i 1 s tor e c t i .f .Y 
~uch breach ~~thin thirty days of bci~g rcqucst2d to d~ 
SO.' 
d. The Licensee shall go into liquidation other than for 
the purpose of reconstruction or amalgamation or beco ~ e 
insolvent or a receiver of . any o( it~ assets shall be 
appointed or cease ' or threaten to cease to carry ~n 
business. 
e. If there is any change in the shareholding control or 
management of the Licensee which in the opinion of the 
Company \%uld make it detrimental to the interests of 
the Conpany to ccntinue to be bound by this Agreement. 
I , 
f. If the Licensee attempts in any way to assign · t~i~ 
Agrecoent. 
26. ~b 'lig3ti(Jns upon Ter:OIinatio!l: 
The licensor and the Licensee hereby agree that upon 
termination . of this Agrc~Eeilt for any reason the follo'o:in~ 
- . 
provisiops shall apply: 
~ . - . 
i. the licensee ~ill continue to observe the 
conditions of Clause 13 hereof. 
ii. the License~ lhall fort~with cease the 
manufactur'e cnd assembly of Products ~nd 
thereafter shal' not manufacture or 
assemble any Pr~ducts nor in any way 
procure or assist in the ma~ufacture or 
'Bsso~mbly (If the same by" any thi rd pa.rty 
except as may be necessary. to complete 
~rders ~ivento and ' ac~e~ted by the ·licenser 
prior to the date of · notice of termination. 
• ' ,'. 0 • • " .: :'-:-t~ ~:,~, . . ~:~~~ t.i~:~·.:ii~L, ,"" ;~" ' ... ' . ~: 
,.i.i L .. th~ . ' ~ i censor:~.~a~ . ~.!.~ ,k:~1~"~ ~!!Y ,. ~~.~!rs ;' .... \:~ 
. .•. pl Iced wi ~h :,1 t .by .::tll~··: t·:fS~ll~ee. ,~n.d . u~exec~t~.~~,~~ 
, ' . ,4 ,' .... .., .... ' ... ., .. _. : .;:. ..  ~ .• • ~1. .1; .. : -; ... ... . zo .• : ~:· .. :ll · _.. -l . • ~': ~ ;..'" ~~ •• 
at ~oth-e ' dat~_:·o~ .·;term1..,n-~lt0!.~ :o .. ~'t".J.s;,~gr.~.e~~nt:~~~~ 
• ...n. --" , ... - f' .. t;..<oL.- 0".: ._1. _  ,,- · .. _.dt~ ... ,..::;.,.. · •• '-.. .. . :;' -,:, • • _ • .. ........ i,. 
v 
Hi. 
the contir.t! linC~ by the liCC !iSCC to orUCI' 
. 
~ I' 0 d n t s 0 r by the Lie ens 0 r to sup ply r. r 0 cl u c t 5 
shall not be cpn~trued as renewal of . t~~ terms 
or .this Agr~ernent f~r any specific peri~d nor 
as a waiver of ' its termination but all orders 
placed by the licensee and accepted by the 
licensor and all manur~cture assembly and sale 
of Pro~ucts after the date of termination shall 
• 
unless otherwise agreed be governed by the terms 
of this Agreement so far as the~ may be 
applicable. 
v. The licensee shall forthwith return .to the 
licensor all equipment suppli~d to the Licensee 
or any of its agents on loan and all drawings 
and speci.fications, lists, models, records, 
instructions and other information supplied by 
the licens~r free of charge or on loan and any 
. . copies thereof so far· as the same are · at the 
· d~te when notice of termination is given in the 
posse~sion or control of the Licensee or shall 
~ome into its possession or under its control 
thereafter. 
vi. Such termination shall be without prejudice to 
the rights and oblig~tions of either party 
~rising prior to such termi~ation and ' shall' also 
; be without prejudice to those provisions herein 
( . 
contained ,·thich govern th'e rights and obligations 
of t.he parties on' and after termination. 
F~rther ObliQations on Termination: 
. 
~ithin a re!s'onable ti~2 aft~r the ~errninaticn ef this 
Agreement for whatsoever cause .the licensor shall have the 
option by flotice in wri~ing to the Licensee to repurchase 
.t the price paid by ihe licensee to the licensor any or 
.all unused !~.D. material and/or Parts in current demand 
",hlCh shall be in ~he possec;sion of thE: licensee at the. ' 
time of -the receipt b'y th{' t. icense~ .cf such nl)tice and upon 
tender by the Li cens or of tha t purchas e:-pr; ce the Li cens ce 
. . 
~t its own expense $hall ;~eliver K~D. material ·and/or Part~ 
to th~ Licensor and th~ L;~ensee · shall . without charge tti the 
.. - 01'., ... ~ a-·;' - • .... · c • .... .... ! .. a 
tice~sor de'liver sU:c~ ·~ .K.D. ·.ii~e~rJ .al andjor·''Parts· in ' ·.··· . 
:.: accordance wi th th~ ' Li' cenSD~'~ ", d~li v~'r~,~:t~~~;~cti'~ns' .: . 
. _·.: · .. ~~·:1...... ."'- . .... . _-_ . . -_ • .N,«" ,:,!"'roe.~ "'~ "- _ _'0 .. --. 
. . ' 19.- ' RCl'r-ctc~ ta t fonc:- ~'f(e' r Te r ';ll n l: t'(on : 
a. The Licc:nscc ' silall no t be released frOfJ any.o~) li~,:t i(;:\ 
.arisin~ from any transaction entered into with the licenser 
prior to ter~in~tion of t his Agr e ement. 
b. · -~,The . Licensee shall-a.s SOO:1 as pI'acticable and in any 
event within two months of termination of this Agre~Qent ':~~'~- ~ 'thereaftcr di-~conti~ue the use of the names ' or initiuls . 
. ~.:." - - .' . . . 
of the licensor, the Products ' 01- The British leylund :·lator 
Corporation limited or any name, initials or expressio~ 
resembl i ng them and the Licensee shall also within th~t 
period discontinue all advert i s( rnents signs and notifications 
that it is a licensee of or dealing in th~ licensor's Product~ 
c. The Licensee shall upon termination ,re move and thereaft ( r' 
dis~ontinue al l advertisements, signs, and notifications that 
"'-, t is' a L ice n see c for d e a 1 i n gin the L h: ens 0 r 's Pro d u c t s . 
29. Variation of Agreement: 
This Agreement and the annexures to it constitute the \o:hole 
of the Agree~ent between the Licensor and the Licensee in 
respect of the assembly and manufacture of Vehicles and 
Parts thcrefor in , The Territory nott-:ith$tanding any prior 
negotiation or correspondence existing. No variation 
alteration or abandonment of any of its ter~s sh~ll have 
e f fee tun 1 e s s m a dei n \'I r i tin 9 by the Li c e Tt see 0 r i ts d u 1 y 
authorized representative and by a duly authorized 
representative of the Licensor. 
--
, . 
, 
J 
"30. 'Prohibitior. on Assignmcr.t: 
31. 
This Agreement and the rights of the~icensee and a11 -
information supplied uncer this Agreement sh.all"·except as 
~xpressly provided for in this Agreement be personal tt? .. the 
1icensee and cannot be £ssighed char9~d or disposed of 
-by t .he Licensee ~n whole or in part i~ any \,:31 whatever 
~xcept with ~he prior written" consent of the licensor which 
sball not be unreasonably \'Ii~hheld in the case of a \"111011y 
c,.tned subsidiary of the licensee. ~ 
Enol i sh l";n/: 
.. -~.- - -- ._-
a. This Agreement shall be construed iri accordance with 
-".' 
Engl -j sh La\~. , . \" 
20. 
b. The illegaliiy 01' invill 'jdity of ar.:: Ilart of t.his 
.:-· _Agreeroie-nt · shall not.~ffcct the legal-ity or vali .di.ty of 
~. the - remainder thereof . 
. '. 
: . ": ... .: -: --
~~ ----- -- . ~ "' . ".i" ~ 
32~The headings notes are for reference only and shall not 
affect the interpretation of this AgreeMent. 
IN l:ITHF.SS \·ll1EREOF these presents have . been executed the 
-day and yezr first hereinbefore wri~ten. 
• 
APPENDIXF 
1992 KENYA VEHICLE SALES STATISTICS (Locally assembled vehicles only) 
1992 MARKET 1991 MARKET %SALES %SHARE 
SALES SHARE % SALES SHARE CHANGE CHANGE 
TYPES 
PASSENGER CARS 2749 32.8 2792 29.5 -1 .5 3 .3 
PICK-UPS 2113 25 .2 2806 29 .7 -24.7 -4.4 
4WD 918 11.0 992 10 .5 -7.5 0 .5 
UGHTTRUCKS 871 10.4 1013 10.7 -14.0 -0.3 
HEA VYTRUCKS 650 7.8 895 9.5 -27.4 -1.7 
MINIBUSES 587 7.0 580 6.1 1.2 0.9 
BUSES 484 5 .8 377 4.0 28.4 1.8 
TOTAL 8372 9455 -11.5 
MAKES 
NISSAN 1767 21 .1 1848 19.5 -4.4 1.6 
ISUZIJ 1559 18.6 1587 16 .8 -1.8 1.8 
TOYOTA 1108 13.2 1273 13.5 -13.0 -0.2 
PEUGEOT 956 11 .4 1085 11 .5 -11.9 -0.1 
MITSUBISHI 893 10.7 1392 14.7 -35.8 -4.1 
MAZDA 455 5.4 597 6 .3 -23 .8 -0.9 
SUZUKl 267 · 3 .2 390 4.1 -31 .5 -0.9 
DAIHATSU 222 2 .7 210 2 .2 5.7 0.4 
NISSAN-UD 210 2.5 185 2.0 13.5 0 .6 
OPEL 199 2.4 24 0.3 729.2 2.1 
MITSUBISHI-FUSO 159 1.9 317 3.4 -49 .8 -1.5 
LANDROVER 152 1.8 100 1 . 1 52.0 0 .8 
HONDA 95 1 .1 97 1.0 -2.1 0.1 
SUBARU 89 1 .1 90 1.0 -1 .1 0.1 
FIAT-AUTO 60 0 .7 67 0.7 -10.4 0.0 
VOlKSWAGEN 44 0.5 33 0.3 33.3 0 .2 
LEYLAND-OAF 39 0 .5 41 0.4 ' -4.9 0.0 
TATA 36 0.4 3 0.0 1100 .0 0.4 
HINO 20 0 .2 15 0.2 33 .3 0.1 
MINI-MOKE 1 6 0.2 5 0.1 220.0 0 . 1 
FIAT-IVECO 1 1 0.1 26 0.3 -57.7 -0.1 
VOlVO 6 0.1 17 0.2 -64.7 -0.1 
NIVA 5 0.1 1 6 0.2 -68.8 -0.1 
BEDFORD 2 0.0 5 0.1 -60.0 0.0 
MERCEDES-BENZ 2 0.0 32 0.3 -93.8 -0.3 
TOTAL 8372 9455 . -11.5 
END YEAR REVIEW 
1992 KENYA VEHICLE SALES STATISTICS (Locally assembled vehicles only) 
1992 MARKET 1991 MARKET %SALES %SHARE 
SALES SHARE % SALES SHARE CHANGE CHANGE 
TYPES 
PASSENGER CARS 2749 32.8 2792 29 .5 -1 .5 3 .3 
PICK-UPS 2113 25 .2 2806 29.7 -24 .7 -4.4 
4WD 918 11.0 992 10 .5 -7 .5 0 .5 . 
UGHTTRUCKS 871 10 .4 1013 10.7 -14.0 -0.3 
HEAVY TRUCKS 650 7 .8 895 9.5 -27.4 -1.7 
MINIBUSES 587 7.0 580 6 .1 1.2 0.9 
BUSES 484 5.8 377 4 .0 28.4 1.8 
TOTAL 8372 9455 -11.5 
MAKES 
NISSAN 1767 21 .1 1848 19.5 -4.4 1.6 
ISUZU 1559 18 .6 1587 16 .8 -1.8 1.8 
TOYOTA 1108 13.2 1273 13.5 -13 .0 -0.2 
PEUGEOT 956 11 .4 1085 11.5 - 11 .9 -0.1 
MITSUBISHI 893 10.7 1392 14.7 -35.8 -4.1 
MAZDA 455 5.4 597 6.3 -23 .8 -0 .9 
SUZUKl 267 3.2 390 4 .1 -31.5 -0 .9 
DAIHATSU 222 2.7 210 2 .2 5.7 0 .4 
NISSAN-UD 210 2.5 185 2.0 13 .5 0 .6 
OPEl 199 2.4 24 0 .3 729.2 2.1 
MITSUBISHI-FUSO 159 1.9 317 3.4 -49 .8 -1.5 
LANDROVER 152 1.8 100 1 .1 52 .0 0 .8 
HONDA 95 . 1 .1 97 1.0 -2 .1 0 .1 
SUBARU 89 1 .1 90 1.0 -1 .1 0 .1 
FIAT-AUTO 60 0.7 67 0.7 -10.4 0 .0 
VOlKSWAGEN 44 0.5 33 0.3 33 .3 0.2 
LEYLAND-DAF 39 0.5 41 0.4 -4.9 0.0 
TATA 36 0.4 3 0.0 1100.0 0.4 
HINO 20 0.2 15 0.2 33 .3 0.1 
MINI-MOKE 1 6 0 .2 5 0.1 220 .0 0.1 
FIAT-IVECO 1 1 0.1 26 0.3 -57 .7 -0 .1 
VOlVO 6 0.1 17 0.2 -64 .7 -0.1 
NIVA 5 0.1 16 0 .2 -68.8 -0 .1 
BEDFORD 2 0.0 5 0.1 -60.0 0 .0 
MERCEDES-BENZ 2 0 .0 32 0 .3 -93 .8 -0.3 
TOTAL 8372 9455 -11 .5 
"' . 
1992 KENYA VEHICLE SALES STATISTICS (Locally assembled vehicles only) 
.. 
1992 MARKET 1991 MARKET %SALES %SHARE 
SALES SHARE % SALES SHARE CHANGE CHANGE 
SOURCES 
JAPAN 6844 81 .7 8001 84.6 -14.5 -2.9 
FRANCE 956 11 .4 1085 11 .5 -11 .9 -0.1 
GERf'vW.JY 245 2.9 89 0.9 175 .3 2 .0 
GT. BRITIAN 209 2.5 151 1.6 38.4 0 .9 
ITALY 71 0 .8 93 1.0 -23 .7 -0.1 
INDIA 36 0 .4 3 0.0 1100.0 0 .4 
SWEDEN 6 0.1 1 7 0 .2 -64.7 -0.1 
RUSSIA 5 0.1 16 0.2 -68.8 -0 .1 
TOTAL 8372 9455 -11.5 
·SMALL-MEDIUM SALOONS 
NISSAN SUNNY 518 28.9 606 31.8 -14 .5 -3.0 
TOYOTA COROLLA 27 7 15.4 28 1 14 .8 -1.4 0 .7 
MITSUBISHI LANCER 270 15 .0 394 20.7 -31 .5 -5.7 
OPELASTRA 199 11.1 24 1.3 729.2 9.8 
DAIHATSU CHARADE 166 9.2 189 9 .9 -12.2 -0.7 
MAZDA 323 125 7. 0 130 6 .8 -3 .8 0.1 
HONDACIVIC 95 5 .3 97 5 .1 -2.1 0 .2 
PEUGEOT205 69 3.8 103 5.4 -33 .0 -1.6 
FIAT UNO 60 3 .3 67 3 .5 -1 0.4 -0.2 
MINI-MOKE 1 6 0 .9 5 0.3 220.0 0 .6 
VWGOLF 7 0.4 -1 00.0 -0.4 
SUZUKI SKYLARK 
TOTAL 1795 1903 -5 .7 
SMALL-MEDIUM STATION WAGONS 
NISSAN SUNNY 119 58 .0 141 52 .4 -15 .6 5.6 
MAZDA 323 45 22.0 44 16.4 2.3 5.6 
TOYOTA COROLLA 21 10 .2 40 14 .9 -47 .5 -4.6 
MITSUBISHI LANCER 20 9.8 44 16.4 -54.5 -6 .6 
TOTAL 205 269 -23.8 
LARGE SALOONS 
PEUGEOT 521 87.4 402 81.7 29 .6 5 .7 
VWGOLF 44 7.4 25 5.1 76.0 2.3 
TOYOTA COROLLA 31 5 .2 65 13 .2 -52.3 -8.0 
TOTAL 596 492 21.1 
~ YEAR REVIEW 
1992 KENYA VEHICLE SALES STATISTICS (Locally assembled vehicles only) 
1992 MARKET 1991 MARKET %SALES %SHARE 
SALES SHARE % SALES SHARE CHANGE CHANGE 
LARGE STATION WAGONS 
- PEUGEOT 97 63.4 90 70.3 7 .8 -6.9 
SUBARU 56 36 .6 38 29.7 47.4 6.9 
TOTAL 153 128 19.5 
4X4 VEHICLES 
TOYOTA 135 14 .7 119 12.0 13.4 2.7 
SUZUKl 267 29 .1 390 39.3 -31 .5 -10.2 
MrTSU81SHI PAJERO 192 20 .9 211 21.3 -9 .0 -0.4 
lANDROVER 152 16 .6 100 10.1 52.0 6.5 
ISUZU TROOPER 111 12.1 135 13.6 -17 .8 -1 .5 
DAIHATSU ROCKY 56 6.1 21 2.1 166 .7 4 .0 
NIVA 5 0.5 1 6 1.6 -68 .8 -1 .1 
TOTAL 918 992 -7 .5 
HALF-TON PICK-UPS 
NISSAN 1200 384 75.0 429 64 .2 -10.5 10.8 
MAZDA MUIJIZA 95 18 .6 187 28.0 -49 .2 -9.4 
SUBARU 33 6.4 52 7.8 -36 .5 -1.3 
TOTAL 512 668 -23 .4 
ONE TON PICK-UPS (INCLUDING 4WD) 
TOYOTA HILUX 507 31 .7 548 25.6 -7 .5 6.0 
ISUZUTFR 327 20.4 418 19 .6 -21 .8 0.9 
NISSAN SAHARA 308 19.2 266 ' 12.4 15.8 6.8 
PEUGEOT 269 16 .8 490 22.9 -45.1 -6.1 
MAZOA 81600 110 6 .9 167 7 .8 -34.1 -0.9 
MITSU81SHI L200 80 5 .0 249 11.6 -67 .9 -6.6 
TOTAL 1601 2138 -25.1 
MINIBUSES 
NISSAN URVAN 438 74.6 387 66.7 13.2 7.9 
TOYOTA HIACE 135 23.0 178 30.7 -24.2 -7.7 
MITSUBISHI L300 14 2.4 14 2 .4 0 .0 0.0 
VWTRANSPORTER 0 0.0 1 0.2 -100 .0 -0.2 
TOTAL 587 580 1.2 
/END YEAR REVIEW 
1992 KENYA VEHICLE SALES STATISTICS (Locally assembled vehicles only) 
.. 
1992 MARKET 1991 MARKET %SALES %SHARE 
SALES SHARE % SALES SHARE CHANGE CHANGE 
MEDIUM BUSES 
ISUZU 308 84.4 198 81.8 55.6 2.6 
-
MrrSUBISHI ROSA 30 8.2 0 0 .0 100 .0 8 .2 
MrrSUBISHI CANTER 25 6 .8 35 14 .5 -28 .6 -7 .6 
LEYLAND-DAF 2 0.5 6 2 .5 -66. 7 -1.9 
MAZDA 3 1.2 -100 .0 -1.2 
TOTAL 365 242 50.8 
LARGE BUSES 
NISSAN-UD 46 38 .7 63 46 .7 -27 .0 -8.0 
ISUZU 40 33 .6 61 45.2 -34.4 -11 .6 
LEYLAND-DAF 26 21 .8 9 6 .7 188 .9 15.2 
MrrSUBISHI-FUSO 6 5 .0 2 1.5 200.0 3.6 
TATA 0.8 100.0 0.8 
TOTAL 119 135 -11.9 
LIGHT TRUCKS (2 - 6 TONS) 
ISUZUNKR 527 60 .5 451 44.5 16 .9 16 .0 
MrrSUBISHI CANTER 262 30 .1 445 43 .9 -41 .1 -13.8 
MAZDA T4100 80 9.2 66 6 .5 21 .2 2.7 
TOYOTA DYNA 2 0 .2 32 3 .2 -93 .8 -2.9 
NISSAN CABSTAR 1 9 1.9 -100.0 -1 .9 
TOTAL 871 1013 -14.0 
6 - 9 TON TRUCKS 
ISUZU 126 62.1 215 63 .0 -41.4 -1.0 
MrrSUBISHI-FUSO 62 30 .5 1 1 1 32.6 -44 .1 -2.0 
NISSAN DIESEL 12 5 .9 0 .0 100 .0 5 .9 
BEDFORD 2 1.0 5 1.5 -60 .0 -0 .5 
HINO 0.5 0 .0 100.0 0.5 
TOYOTA 1 0 2.9 -100 .0 -2.9 
TOTAL 203 341 -40.5 
1992 KENYA VEHICLE SALES STATISTICS (Locally assembled vehicles only) 
1992· MARKET 1991 MARKET %SALES %SHARE 
SALES SHARE % SALES SHARE CHANGE CHANGE 
9 - 15 TON TRUCKS 
NISSAN-DIESEl 138 32 .8 1 12 21.7 23 .2 11 .1 
ISUZU 120 28.5 109 21 .1 10 .1 7.4 
MfTSUBISHI-FUSO 87 20 .7 196 37 .9 -55.6 -17.2 
TATA 35 8 .3 3 0.6 1066.7 7.7 
HINO 1 9 4.5 15 2.9 26.7 1.6 
lEYLAND-DAF 1 1 2 .6 26 5.0 -57 .7 -2.4 
FIAT 9 2.1 26 5.0 -65.4 -2.9 
MERCEDES-BENZ 2 0 .5 30 5.8 -93 .3 -5.3 
TOTAL 421 517 -18.6 
END YEAR REVIEW 
1992 KENYA VEHICLE SALES STATISTICS (Locally assembled vehicles only) 
OVER 15 TON + PRIME MOVERS 
NISSAN-DIESEl 14 53.8 1 0 27 .0 40.0 26 .8 
VOlVO 6 23.1 1 7 45.9 -64 .7 -22.9 
MfTSUBISHI-FUSO 4 15.4 8 21 .6 -50 .0 -6 .2 
FIAT 2 7. 7 0.0 100 .0 7.7 
MERCEDEs-BENZ 2 5.4 -100.0 -5.4 
TOTAL 26 37 -29.7 
APPENDIX G 
cKita le 
cEldoret 
Kisunu Nakuru 
o 
c 
laa II'Ii 
Nanyuki 
c 
cNyeri 
c Thika 
• NAIROBI 
KENYA 
fopulation 
21.3 Million 
Area (sq 11'11) 
221,96a 
City Population 
[] Ouer l,aaa,aaa 
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